Case Studies and Literature Review of Pneumococcal Septic Arthritis in Adults.

We conducted a retrospective study on all cases of pneumococcal septic arthritis (SA) in patients >18 years of age reported to the Picardie Regional Pneumococcal Network in France during 2005-2016. Among 1,062 cases of invasive pneumococcal disease, we observed 16 (1.5%) SA cases. Although SA is uncommon in adult patients, the prevalence of pneumococcal SA in the Picardie region increased from 0.69% during 2005-2010 to 2.47% during 2011-2016 after introduction of the pneumococcal 13-valent conjugate vaccine. We highlight the emergence of SA cases caused by the 23B serotype, which is not covered in the vaccine.

Implementation of Active Learning Approach to Teach Biorisk Management and Dual-Use Research of Concern in Egypt.

Introduction: Frequent reports of laboratory- and hospital-acquired infection in Egypt suggested a deficiency in handling hazardous samples and microorganisms among different researchers and professionals. The most common cause of laboratory incidents and potential exposure is often identified as a lack of biosafety training. Methods: In this study, we designed and implemented an effective laboratory biorisk management (BRM) training. Two workshops were delivered to 42 faculty members working in laboratories handling biological material in Egypt. The workshop modules were based on the global biorisk management curriculum developed by Sandia National Laboratories, with some modifications. The content was delivered to actively engaging participants in the learning process that included group work, case studies and scenarios, short presentations, demonstrations, hands-on activities, and questions and answers that created analytical thinking situations. These workshops introduced the concept of biorisk management, which combines risk assessment, risk mitigation, and performance systems and dual-use research of concern. Results: Results of pre-tests/post-tests revealed significant (P < .001) improvement in knowledge acquisition among participants. Course evaluation surveys indicate that most participants felt that these teaching methods met their needs and that their personal laboratory practices would change as a result of the training course. Conclusion: We conclude that using varied hands-on strategies in teaching biorisk management provided the participants with the skills, tools, and confidence to guide their laboratory staff and colleagues on sustainable biorisk management to reduce the risks associated with infectious disease research in a laboratory setting.

Guidelines for Biosafety Training Programs for Workers Assigned to BSL-3 Research Laboratories.

The Guidelines for Biosafety Training Programs for Workers Assigned to BSL-3 Research Laboratories were developed by biosafety professionals who oversee training programs for the 2 national biocontainment laboratories (NBLs) and the 13 regional biocontainment laboratories (RBLs) that participate in the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) NBL/RBL Network. These guidelines provide a general training framework for biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) high-containment laboratories, identify key training concepts, and outline training methodologies designed to standardize base knowledge, understanding, and technical competence of laboratory personnel working in high-containment laboratories. Emphasis is placed on building a culture of risk assessment-based safety through competency training designed to enhance understanding and recognition of potential biological hazards as well as methods for controlling these hazards. These guidelines may be of value to other institutions and academic research laboratories that are developing biosafety training programs for BSL-3 research.

A Unique BSL-3 Cryo-Electron Microscopy Laboratory at UTMB.

This article describes a unique cryo-electron microscopy (CryoEM) facility to study the three-dimensional organization of viruses at biological safety level 3 (BSL-3). This facility, the W. M. Keck Center for Virus Imaging, has successfully operated for more than a year without incident and was cleared for select agent studies by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Standard operating procedures for the laboratory were developed and implemented to ensure its safe and efficient operation. This facility at the University of Texas Medical Branch (Galveston, TX) is the only such BSL-3 CryoEM facility approved for select agent research.