A systematic investigation of tobacco industry sourced data relating to illicit tobacco trade featured in Pakistan's media coverage (2015-2020).

INTRODUCTION: Previous evidence suggests the tobacco industry uses media to disseminate misleading narratives relating to illicit tobacco trade (ITT) as part of efforts to influence policy outcomes. Such evidence is largely High-Income Countries (HIC) focussed, resulting in a literature gap for Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs). Pakistan and its annual budget cycle is used as a case study for addressing this gap. METHODS: Electronic English-language articles from newspapers in Pakistan (328) were sourced from LexisNexis and a sub-sample of Urdu-language electronic articles (12) were identified through internet searches.The articles were published between 2015- 2020and included claims/estimates relating to ITT, which were coded to identify cited data sources. Changes in media coverage before and after Pakistan's annual budget announcements were explored via Wilcoxon signed rank and Poisson regression tests. RESULTS: Of the 357 claims/estimates analysed, 66 (20%) were industry funded. The most prevalent sources were national government bodies (36.6%) and tobacco companies or their representatives (15.1%). Wilcoxon signed-rank and Poisson regression tests on the frequency of English-language articles both created a p-value of < 0.05 for the frequency of relevant articles between the months of April and May, compared to the other months, indicating statistical significance. CONCLUSIONS: There was a statistically significant increase in the number of English-language articles featuring claims/estimates relating to Pakistan's ITT in the months leading up to the annual budget each year. The government should consider measures to improve transparency standards within media coverage and promote factcheck journalism to safeguard against industry tactics to manipulate public discourses. IMPLICATIONS: This paper is, to our knowledge, the largest exploration of the use of data sourced from the tobacco industry within a country's media that has been undertaken to date, utilising a team of seven coders across the UK and Pakistan. Our findings reveal weaknesses within media coverage of ITT in Pakistan, both in English and Urdu language publications. We encourage the government to consider new standards to enhance transparency and promote factcheck journalism within media coverage in the country.

Turning a threat into an opportunity: British American Tobacco's weakening of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.

BACKGROUND: Previous research has outlined transnational tobacco company (TTC) efforts to undermine implementation of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol) and evidence of ongoing TTC complicity in the illicit tobacco trade (ITT). However, the industry's views on the Protocol and role in its development are not well understood. METHODS: Systematic searching and analysis of leaked documents-approximately 15 000 from British American Tobacco (BAT) and 35 from Philip Morris International, triangulated via searches of online resources and interviews with five stakeholders across academia, international organisations, governments, civil society and the private sector. FINDINGS: Evidence indicates that after privately viewing the Protocol as a significant threat (2003), BAT worked to influence its content, while publicly signalling support for it (2007-2012), and was largely satisfied with the final text. BAT successfully pushed for a non-prescriptive text which enabled further country-level TTC influence during the Protocol's implementation phase. The final text also reflected other BAT policy preferences, including preventing outright bans on duty-free sales and intermingling, and making it difficult to sanction and hold tobacco companies accountable for ongoing involvement in the ITT. TTC representatives were present during early Protocol negotiations, despite rules against this, and BAT obtained draft texts before they were public and paid at least one delegate to support its position. CONCLUSIONS: BAT's primary interest in shaping the Protocol was to minimise its financial and legal costs for BAT while maximising potential costs to small competitors. These findings raise concern about the Protocol's ability to control the ITT, particularly given TTCs' intention to influence ongoing national implementation. An effective Protocol is vital to controlling both the ITT and ongoing tobacco industry involvement in it and, in turn, governments' ability to increase tobacco taxes and thereby save lives.

Understanding the long-term policy influence strategies of the tobacco industry: two contemporary case studies.

OBJECTIVE: This paper explores transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) long-term policy influence strategies using two case studies, harm reduction and illicit tobacco, to identify lessons for the tobacco control movement and wider efforts to address the commercial determinants of health. METHODS: Evidence from a broad combination of sources including leaked documents and findings from over two decades of TTC monitoring were reviewed for each case study and categorised using the Policy Dystopia Model, focusing on the primary discursive strategy and key instrumental (action-based) strategies used. RESULTS: In both case studies, TTCs seek to advance their interests by engaging primarily in reputation management, coalition management and information management strategies over the long-term to propagate their over-riding discursive strategy-'we've changed, we are part of the solution'-despite clear evidence from both case studies that this is not the case. These strategies are globally coordinated and attempt primarily to reshape norms towards TTC involvement in tobacco control policy and delivery. Findings also suggest that industry denormalisation and the advent of Article 5.3 have led to the TTCs growing use of increasingly complex and opaque 'webs of influence'. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco control community must develop its own proactive long-term strategies which should include industry denormalisation, new ways to fund research that reduce industry control, and improved transparency measures for research and policy. These findings, including TTC adaptations to Article 5.3, also indicate the need for more structural solutions, addressing corporate power and the underlying political and economic system. These lessons can be applied to other unhealthy commodity industries.

Analysis of submissions to the EU's public consultation on tobacco traceability and security features.

BACKGROUND: The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products requires all parties to establish a tobacco track and trace (T&T) system. In 2016, the European Commission held a public consultation on T&T implementation where parties were asked to respond online to 22 multiple-choice questions and were given additional opportunities to leave comments. In May 2019, the European Union's (EU) T&T system became operational. This paper explores tobacco industry influence over and policy positions within the consultation process. METHODS: We identified consultation respondents and investigated any financial links with the tobacco industry and if these were transparent. Respondent's answers to the consultation's multiple-choice questions were collated to explore whether industry-linked respondents held the same policy positions as transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). Associations between policy positions and respondent's financial link status were tested using χ2 and Cranmer's V tests. FINDINGS: Of the 197 consultation respondents identified, 131 (66.4%) had financial links to the industry; 29 (22.1%) were not transparent about these links. A large number of trade associations responded (87), the majority of which (74/87) had financial links to the industry. There was a clear divide in the policy preferences of respondents with and without a financial link. Collectively, respondents with a financial link supported an industry-operated T&T solution. CONCLUSIONS: There was an extensive lobbying effort by the tobacco industry over the EU's T&T system, with TTCs' interests being represented repeatedly through multiple trade associations. The transparency requirements regarding consultation respondents' affiliations with relevant stakeholders (eg, tobacco manufacturers) should be improved for future consultations.

Tracking and tracing the tobacco industry: potential tobacco industry influence over the EU's system for tobacco traceability and security features.

BACKGROUND: Subsequent to the transnational tobacco companies' (TTC) history of involvement in tobacco smuggling, the Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires that tobacco tracking and tracing (T&T) systems be established independent of the industry. In response, TTCs developed a T&T system, originally called Codentify, promoting it via an elaborate set of front groups to create a false impression of independence. The European Union (EU) is one of the first and largest jurisdictions to operationalise T&T. We explore how industry efforts to influence T&T have evolved. METHODS: Analysis of tobacco industry documents, policy documents, submissions to a relevant consultation and relationships between the tobacco industry and organisations proposed by it and approved by the European Commission to provide a data repository function within the EU's T&T system. FINDINGS: 17 months after TTCs sold Codentify to Inexto and Philip Morris International claimed Inexto was independent, leaked documents suggest TTCs and Inexto continued to have a financial and operational relationship. Inexto's meetings with TTCs, engagement with EU Member States and promotion of industry-favoured technical standards suggest TTCs influenced Inexto's activities, using the company to undermine EU T&T. The EU's T&T system appears to be inconsistent with the ITP due to its 'mixed' governance and seven of eight organisations approved as data repository providers having pre-existing industry business links. CONCLUSIONS: TTC's efforts to maximise their control and minimise external scrutiny of T&T systems seriously limit attempts to address tobacco smuggling. Countries implementing T&T should be alert to such efforts and should not replicate the EU system.