To what extent does post-identification feedback translate into witness behaviour?

When eyewitness receive feedback implying they have accurately identified the perpetrator from a lineup, it boosts their confidence and possibly distorts their memory. Most research investigating this "post-identification feedback effect" (PIF effect) suggests the feedback changes eyewitness' retrospective memory of their actual experiences. But it remains unclear to what extent this feedback might change the eyewitness's subsequent behaviour. Across four experiments, we addressed this issue. We investigated whether people who received confirming feedback were more likely to provide recorded or written statements as evidence for an ongoing trial. Across the four experiments, we replicated the basic PIF effect. But we found no consistent evidence that these same people were more willing to offer their experimental data nor to submit a statement about what they saw. We did find preliminary evidence that people who received confirming feedback submitted longer statements. Taken together, these findings have theoretical implications establishing boundary conditions on the influence of feedback. On the practical side, these findings suggest caution in extrapolating the influence of PIF beyond a relatively small set of retrospective reports, beliefs, and inclinations.

Collective remembering and future forecasting during the COVID-19 pandemic: How the impact of COVID-19 affected the themes and phenomenology of global and national memories across 15 countries.

The COVID-19 pandemic created a unique set of circumstances in which to investigate collective memory and future simulations of events reported during the onset of a potentially historic event. Between early April and late June 2020, we asked over 4,000 individuals from 15 countries across four continents to report on remarkable (a) national and (b) global events that (i) had happened since the first cases of COVID-19 were reported, and (ii) they expected to happen in the future. Whereas themes of infections, lockdown, and politics dominated global and national past events in most countries, themes of economy, a second wave, and lockdown dominated future events. The themes and phenomenological characteristics of the events differed based on contextual group factors. First, across all conditions, the event themes differed to a small yet significant degree depending on the severity of the pandemic and stringency of governmental response at the national level. Second, participants reported national events as less negative and more vivid than global events, and group differences in emotional valence were largest for future events. This research demonstrates that even during the early stages of the pandemic, themes relating to its onset and course were shared across many countries, thus providing preliminary evidence for the emergence of collective memories of this event as it was occurring. Current findings provide a profile of past and future collective events from the early stages of the ongoing pandemic, and factors accounting for the consistencies and differences in event representations across 15 countries are discussed.

Collective memories serve similar functions to autobiographical memories.

People from the same country often hold shared, culturally-shaped memories about important events from that country's history, known as collective memories. Although empirical research has started to shed light on the properties of these memories, none has systematically examined the functions these memories. To what extent do collective memories serve functions? We hypothesised that collective memories serve functions for a collective similar to those that autobiographical memories serve for individuals-directive, identity, and social functions. We conducted two experiments using adapted versions of the Thinking About Life Experiences questionnaire (TALE) in which we asked people to rate the functions of their collective memories. Across both experiments, we found evidence that collective memories serve directive, identity, and social functions for the collective. These results suggest collective memories perform important roles in their collectives.

Oversimplifications and Misrepresentations in the Repressed Memory Debate: A Reply to Ross.

Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory.

Memories people no longer believe in can still affect them in helpful and harmful ways.

People can come to "remember" experiences they never had, and these false memories-much like memories for real experiences-can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These "retracted memories" continue to have many of the same phenomenological characteristics as their believed memories. But can they also continue to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions and compared these functions with those served by "genuine" autobiographical memories. People rated their retracted memories as serving both helpful and harmful functions, much like their genuine memories. In addition, we found only weak relationships between people's belief in their memories and the extent to which those memories served perceived functions. These results suggest memories can serve functions even in the absence of belief and highlight the potential for false memories to affect people's thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them.

The memories that people would save or erase differ from their most positive and negative memories on function, emotion and correspondence with the life script.

Autobiographical remembering is a dynamic process in which narrators construct their life story from single memories. What is included in or deleted from the life story depends on many factors. Here, we examined the functions, emotions and correspondence with the life script for the memories that people desire to save or erase from their past. We asked people to generate either the two memories they were most likely to save and erase or the two memories they regarded as their most positive and negative memories. Then everyone rated those memories on function, emotion and correspondence with the life script. Overall, we found save and erase memories corresponded less with the life script relative to most positive and most negative memories though they were similarly emotionally intense. Additionally, erase memories were more associated with shame and less with social functions than most negative memories, whereas most negative memories to a higher degree involved the death of significant others, albeit being similarly traumatic. These findings have important implications for theory about autobiographical memory, and possible clinical relevance.

Negative memories serve functions in both adaptive and maladaptive ways.

Autobiographical memories are said to serve at least three functions: they direct people's behaviour, inform their identity, and facilitate social bonding and communication. But much of the research on these three functions has not distinguished between memories that serve functions in adaptive ways from those that serve functions in maladaptive ways. Across two experiments, we asked subjects to provide either positive or negative memories. Then, to operationalise adaptive and maladaptive functions, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which those memories serve directive, self, and social functions in ways that "help" and in ways that "hurt". To investigate whether people believe the adaptive benefits of their memories outweigh any maladaptive effects, we also asked subjects how willing they would be to erase the memories if given the opportunity. We found that negative memories served functions in both helpful and hurtful ways, whereas positive memories were primarily helpful. Furthermore, the more helpful a memory was, the more reluctant subjects were to erase it. Conversely, the more hurtful a memory was, the more willing subjects were to erase it. These results suggest it is important to distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive functions when investigating the functions of autobiographical memory.

Disfluent difficulties are not desirable difficulties: the (lack of) effect of Sans Forgetica on memory.

Scientists working at the intersection of cognitive psychology and education have developed theoretically-grounded methods to help people learn. One important yet counterintuitive finding is that making information harder to learn - that is, creating desirable difficulties - benefits learners. Some studies suggest that simply presenting information in a difficult-to-read font could serve as a desirable difficulty and therefore promote learning. To address this possibility, we examined the extent to which Sans Forgetica, a newly developed font, improves memory performance - as the creators of the font claim. Across four experiments, we set out to replicate unpublished findings by the font's creators. Subjects read information in Sans Forgetica or Arial, and rated how difficult the information was to read (Experiment 1) or attempted to recall the information (Experiments 2-4). Although subjects rated Sans Forgetica as being more difficult to read than Arial, Sans Forgetica led to equivalent memory performance, and sometimes even impaired it. These findings suggest that although Sans Forgetica promotes a feeling of disfluency, it does not create a desirable difficulty or benefit memory.

How do ordered questions bias eyewitnesses?

Background: Suggestive techniques can distort eyewitness memory (Wells & Loftus, 2003, Eyewitness memory for people and events. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.), Handbook of psychology: Forensic Psychology, Vol. 11 (pp. 149-160). Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc). Recently, we found that suggestion is unnecessary: Simply reversing the arrangement of questions put to eyewitnesses changed what they believed (Michael & Garry, 2016, Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 601-608. doi: 10.3758/s13423-015-0933-1 ). But why? One explanation might be that early questions set an anchor that eyewitnesses then adjust away from insufficiently. Methods: We tracked how eyewitness beliefs changed over the course of questioning. We then investigated the influence of people's need to engage in and enjoy effortful cognition. This factor, "Need for Cognition," (NFC) affects the degree to which people adjust (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984, The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306-307. doi: 10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13 ; Epley & Gilovich, 2006, The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311-318. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x ). Results: In our first two experiments we found results consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment account. But in Experiments 3 and 4 we found that NFC provided only partial support for that account. Conclusions: Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding how people form beliefs about the accuracy of their memory.

People infuse their passwords with autobiographical information.

Passwords might unlock more than our computer accounts. A New York Times Magazine described anecdotes of people who infused their passwords with autobiographical information [Urbina, I. (2014, November 20). The Secret Life of Passwords. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/magazine/the-secret-life-of-passwords.html ]. We suspected people infused their passwords with autobiographical information so they could privately remember that information. Across two studies we took a systematic approach to address the extent to which people infused passwords with autobiographical information and the functions that information served. We also examined the self-reported consequences of people infusing their passwords with autobiographical information. Across both studies, 41.6-71.1% of people infused their passwords with autobiographical memories; in Study 2, 9.3% of people infused their passwords with episodic future thoughts. People who infused their password with autobiographical information reported that information served identity, social, and directive functions, and they created their password to remember that information. These studies show that people do not simply use passwords to unlock their computer accounts. Some people might use passwords as mementos to cue autobiographical information.

Evidence that photos promote rosiness for claims about the future.

When people rapidly judge the truth of claims about the present or the past, a related but nonprobative photo can produce "truthiness," an increase in the perceived truth of those claims (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012). What we do not know is the extent to which nonprobative photos cause truthiness for the future. We addressed this issue in four experiments. In each experiment, people judged the truth of claims that the price of certain commodities (such as manganese) would increase (or decrease). Half of the time, subjects saw a photo of the commodity paired with the claim. Experiments 1A and 1B produced a "rosiness" bias: Photos led people to believe positive claims about the future but had very little effect on people's belief in negative claims. In Experiment 2, rosiness occurred for both close and distant future claims. In Experiments 3A and 3B, we tested whether rosiness was tied to the perceived positivity of a claim. Finally, in Experiments 4A and 4B, we tested the rosiness hypothesis and found that rosiness was unique to claims about the future: When people made the same judgments about the past, photos produced the usual truthiness pattern for both positive and negative claims. Considered all together, our data fit with the idea that photos may operate as hypothesis-confirming evidence for people's tendency to anticipate rosy future outcomes.

A robust preference for cheap-and-easy strategies over reliable strategies when verifying personal memories.

People depend on various sources of information when trying to verify their autobiographical memories. Yet recent research shows that people prefer to use cheap-and-easy verification strategies, even when these strategies are not reliable. We examined the robustness of this cheap strategy bias, with scenarios designed to encourage greater emphasis on source reliability. In three experiments, subjects described real (Experiments 1 and 2) or hypothetical (Experiment 3) autobiographical events, and proposed strategies they might use to verify their memories of those events. Subjects also rated the reliability, cost, and the likelihood that they would use each strategy. In line with previous work, we found that the preference for cheap information held when people described how they would verify childhood or recent memories (Experiment 1), personally important or trivial memories (Experiment 2), and even when the consequences of relying on incorrect information could be significant (Experiment 3). Taken together, our findings fit with an account of source monitoring in which the tendency to trust one's own autobiographical memories can discourage people from systematically testing or accepting strong disconfirmatory evidence.

Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people's) pasts.

Photos lead people to believe that both true and false events have happened to them, even when those photos provide no evidence that the events occurred. Research has shown that these nonprobative photos increase false beliefs when combined with misleading suggestions and repeated exposure to the photo or target event. We propose that photos exert similar effects without those factors, and test that proposition in five experiments. In Experiment 1, people saw the names of several animals and pretended to give food to or take food from each. Then people saw the animal names again, half with a photo of the animal and half alone, and decided whether they had an experience with each. The photos led people to believe they had experiences with the animals. Moreover, Experiments 2-5 provided evidence that photos exerted these effects by making it easier to bring related thoughts and images to mind-a feeling that people mistook as evidence of genuine experience. In each experiment, photos led people to believe positive claims about the past (but not negative claims), consistent with evidence that feelings of ease selectively increase positive judgments. Experiment 4 also showed that photos (like other manipulations of ease) bias people's judgments broadly, producing false beliefs about other people's pasts. Finally, in Experiment 5, photos exerted more powerful effects when they depicted unfamiliar animals, and thus could most help bring information to mind. These findings suggest that nonprobative photos can distort the past without other factors that encourage false beliefs, and that they operate by helping related thoughts and images come to mind.

Misconceptions about childhood sexual abuse and child witnesses: Implications for psychological experts in the courtroom.

Recent changes to the law in New Zealand have led to a marked increase in experts being called to give evidence in cases of alleged child sexual abuse. Here we outline some of the common misconceptions that are held by expert witnesses in these cases and we review research on patterns of abuse disclosure and retraction, symptoms of abuse, external influences on children's reports, and experts' ability to distinguish true from false reports. We also consider what experts can say about memory that has relevance for these cases. We conclude that many long-held notions of child sexual abuse and children's testimony that make their way into our courtrooms are not supported by empirical research, raising questions about who is-and who is not-qualified to act as an expert witness.

Experimental and meta-analytic evidence that source variability of misinformation does not increase eyewitness suggestibility independently of repetition of misinformation.

Considerable evidence has shown that repeating the same misinformation increases its influence (i.e., repetition effects). However, very little research has examined whether having multiple witnesses present misinformation relative to one witness (i.e., source variability) increases the influence of misinformation. In two experiments, we orthogonally manipulated repetition and source variability. Experiment 1 used written interview transcripts to deliver misinformation and showed that repetition increased eyewitness suggestibility, but source variability did not. In Experiment 2, we increased source saliency by delivering the misinformation to participants via videos instead of written interviews, such that each witness was visibly and audibly distinct. Despite this stronger manipulation, there was no effect of source variability in Experiment 2. In addition, we reported a meta-analysis (k = 19) for the repeated misinformation effect and a small-scale meta-analysis (k = 8) for the source variability effect. Results from these meta-analyses were consistent with the results of our individual experiments. Altogether, our results suggest that participants respond based on retrieval fluency rather than source-specifying information.

Hits and Misses: Digital Contact Tracing in a Pandemic.

Traditional contact tracing is one of the most powerful weapons people have in the battle against a pandemic, especially when vaccines do not yet exist or do not afford complete protection from infection. But the effectiveness of contact tracing hinges on its ability to find infected people quickly and obtain accurate information from them. Therefore, contact tracing inherits the challenges associated with the fallibilities of memory. Against this backdrop, digital contact tracing is the "dream scenario"-an unobtrusive, vigilant, and accurate recorder of danger that should outperform manual contact tracing on every dimension. There is reason to celebrate the success of digital contact tracing. Indeed, epidemiologists report that digital contact tracing probably reduced the incidence of COVID-19 cases by at least 25% in many countries, a feat that would have been hard to match with its manual counterpart. Yet there is also reason to speculate that digital contact tracing delivered on only a fraction of its potential because it almost completely ignored the relevant psychological science. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of digital contact tracing, its hits and misses in the COVID-19 pandemic, and its need to be integrated with the science of human behavior.

Building false memories without suggestions.

People can come to remember doing things they have never done. The question we asked in this study is whether people can systematically come to remember performing actions they never really did, in the absence of any suggestion from the experimenter. People built LEGO vehicles, performing some steps but not others. For half the people, all the pieces needed to assemble each vehicle were laid out in order in front of them while they did the building; for the other half, the pieces were hidden from view. The next day, everyone returned for a surprise recognition test. People falsely and confidently remembered having carried out steps they did not; those who saw all the pieces while they built each vehicle were more likely to correctly remember performing steps they did perform but equally likely to falsely remember performing steps they did not. We explain our results using the source monitoring framework: People used the relationships between actions to internally generate the missing, related actions, later mistaking that information for genuine experience.

Trivially informative semantic context inflates people's confidence they can perform a highly complex skill.

Some research suggests people are overconfident because of personality characteristics, lack of insight, or because overconfidence is beneficial in its own right. But other research fits with the possibility that fluent experience in the moment can rapidly drive overconfidence. For example, fluency can push people to become overconfident in their ability to throw a dart, know how rainbows form or predict the future value of a commodity. But surely there are limits to overconfidence. That is, even in the face of fluency manipulations known to increase feelings of confidence, reasonable people would reject the thought that they, for example, might be able to land a plane in an emergency. To address this question, we conducted two experiments comprising a total of 780 people. We asked some people (but not others) to watch a trivially informative video of a pilot landing a plane before they rated their confidence in their own ability to land a plane. We found watching the video inflated people's confidence that they could land a plane. Our findings extend prior work by suggesting that increased semantic context creates illusions not just of prior experience or understanding-but also of the ability to actually do something implausible.

The importance of the smallest effect size of interest in expert witness testimony on alcohol and memory.

Memory experts are sometimes asked to evaluate the validity of accounts of witnesses, victims, or suspects. In some of these cases, they are asked what effect alcohol has on the validity of such accounts. In this article, we offer a guide on what expert witnesses can reliably say about how alcohol affects memory. We do so by resorting to effect sizes from previous studies and meta-analytic work, and address this novel question: Are these effect sizes meaningful in legal cases? More specifically, we argue that any determination of whether individual studies about alcohol and memory are practically relevant for legal cases, scientists must focus on the smallest effect size of interest. We make the case that a decrease or increase of only 1 detail, especially an incorrect detail, should be regarded as the smallest effect size of interest in this line of research. In line with this idea, we show that effect sizes in the alcohol and memory literature are often larger than this smallest effect size of interest. This finding is important because it implies that alcohol often exerts a practically relevant and meaningful detrimental effect on the reporting of both correct and incorrect details, which in turn negatively affects the validity of witness testimony.