RESUMO
The original "Dutch Protocol"-the treatment model comprised of puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgery-was intended to improve the mental and physical health of pediatric patients experiencing distress over their sexed bodies. Consequently, both researchers and clinicians have couched eligibility for treatment and measures of treatment efficacy in terms of the interventions' effects on outcomes such as gender dysphoria, depression, anxiety, and suicide. However, recent systematic reviews have concluded that the scientific evidence supporting these interventions is uncertain, leading to significant international differences in what treatments are offered to youth. Against this backdrop, a different argumentative approach has emerged in support of gender-affirming care. This approach appeals not to reductions in patient morbidity or mortality but to patient autonomy, where medical intervention is pursued as a means to the satisfaction of a patient's "embodiment goals." In this article, I raise objections to autonomy-based justifications for pediatric gender-affirming care, concluding that these arguments misunderstand the place of autonomy in clinical decision-making and, consequently, put patients at risk of medical harm.
Assuntos
Disforia de Gênero , Humanos , Disforia de Gênero/psicologia , Disforia de Gênero/terapia , Autonomia Pessoal , Feminino , Pessoas Transgênero/psicologia , Criança , Masculino , AdolescenteAssuntos
Custos de Medicamentos , Prescrições de Medicamentos , Medicamentos Genéricos , Adesão à Medicação , Patentes como Assunto , Controle de Custos , Prescrições de Medicamentos/economia , Prescrições de Medicamentos/normas , Custos de Cuidados de Saúde , Humanos , Adesão à Medicação/estatística & dados numéricos , Equivalência Terapêutica , Estados UnidosRESUMO
Given the profound influence of social media and emerging evidence of its effects on human behavior and health, bioethicists have an important role to play in the development of professional standards of conduct for health professionals using social media and in the design of online systems themselves. In short, social media is a bioethics issue that has serious implications for medical practice, research, and public health. Here, we inventory several ethical issues across four areas at the intersection of social media and health: the impact of social networking sites on the doctor-patient relationship, the development of e-health platforms to deliver care, the use of online data and algorithms to inform health research, and the broader public health consequences of widespread social media use. In doing so, we review discussions of these topics and emphasize the need for bioethics to focus more deeply on the ways online technology platforms are designed and implemented. We argue that bioethicists should turn their attention to the ways in which consumer engagement, bias, and profit maximization shape online content and, consequently, human behavior and health. We also offer a set of recommendations and suggest future directions for addressing ethical challenges in these domains.
Assuntos
Ética Médica , Mídias Sociais/ética , Telemedicina/ética , HumanosRESUMO
The shift away from paternalistic decision-making and toward patient-centered, shared decision-making has stemmed from the recognition that in order to practice medicine ethically, health care professionals must take seriously the values and preferences of their patients. At the same time, there is growing recognition that minor and seemingly irrelevant features of how choices are presented can substantially influence the decisions people make. Behavioral economists have identified striking ways in which trivial differences in the presentation of options can powerfully and predictably affect people's choices. Choice-affecting features of the decision environment that do not restrict the range of choices or significantly alter the incentives have come to be known as "nudges." Although some have criticized conscious efforts to influence choice, we believe that clinical nudges may often be morally justified. The most straightforward justification for nudge interventions is that they help people bypass their cognitive limitations-for example, the tendency to choose the first option presented even when that option is not the best for them-thereby allowing people to make choices that best align with their rational preferences or deeply held values. However, we argue that this justification is problematic. We argue that, if physicians wish to use nudges to shape their patients' choices, the justification for doing so must appeal to an ethical and professional standard, not to patients' preferences. We demonstrate how a standard with which clinicians and bioethicists already are quite familiar-the best-interest standard-offers a robust justification for the use of nudges.