Leadership in the eye of the beholder: Follower self-esteem is associated with divergent perceptions of leadership ability for dominant and prestigious leaders.

OBJECTIVE: Drawing from dual-strategies theory, leader-member exchange theory, and several theories of self-esteem, we develop and test hypotheses about how followers' self-esteem predicts their perceptions of dominant and prestigious leaders' leadership ability. METHOD: Across four studies (N = 1568), we tested the association between self-esteem and perceptions of leadership ability for dominant and prestigious leaders. RESULTS: Individuals with high self-esteem perceived greater leadership ability in prestigious leaders than did those with low self-esteem and individuals with low self-esteem perceived greater leadership ability in dominant leaders than did those with high self-esteem. These results emerged across ratings of leaders from hypothetical vignettes (Studies 1 and 4), abstract beliefs about what constitutes good leadership (Study 1), past personal experiences with leaders (Study 2) and clips of leaders from reality television (Study 3). In Study 4, we also tested potential mechanisms. Compared with followers with low self-esteem, followers with high self-esteem found prestigious leaders more trustworthy, and they anticipated feeling inauthentic around a dominant leader. CONCLUSIONS: Self-esteem is reliably and robustly related to perceived leadership ability of dominant and prestigious leaders, and these differences might stem from differences in trust in prestigious leaders and anticipated authenticity around dominant leaders.

From Freud to Android: Constructing a Scale of Uncanny Feelings.

The uncanny valley is a topic for engineers, animators, and psychologists, yet uncanny emotions are without a clear definition. Across three studies, we developed an 8-item measure of unnerved feelings, finding that it was discriminable from other affective experiences. In Study 1, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis that yielded two factors; an unnerved factor, which connects to emotional reactions to the uncanny, and a disoriented factor, which connects to mental state changes more distally following uncanny experiences. Focusing on the unnerved measure, Study 2 tests the scale's convergent and discriminant validity, concluding that participants who watched an uncanny video were more unnerved than those who watched a disgusting, fearful, or a neutral video. In Study 3, we determined that our scale detects unnerved feelings created during early 2020 by the coronavirus pandemic; a distinct source of uncanniness. These studies contribute to the psychological and interdisciplinary understanding of this strange, eerie phenomenon of being confronted with what looms just beyond our understanding.

The dubious precision and utility of heritability estimates.

Uchiyama et al. question heritability estimates in a convincing manner. We offer additional arguments to further bolster their claims, highlighting methodological issues in heritability coefficients' derivation, their misuse in various contexts, and their potential contributions to exacerbating common erroneous intuitions that have been shown to lead to deleterious social phenomena. We conclude that science should move away from using them.

What is implicit self-esteem, and does it vary across cultures?

Implicit self-esteem (ISE), which is often defined as automatic self-evaluations, fuses research on unconscious processes with that on self-esteem. As ISE is viewed as immune to explicit control, it affords the testing of theoretical questions such as whether cultures vary in self-enhancement motivations. We provide a critical review and integration of the work on (a) the operationalization of ISE and (b) possible cultural variation in self-enhancement motivations. Although ISE measures do not often vary across cultures, recent meta-analyses and empirical studies question the validity of the most common way of defining ISE. We revive an alternative conceptualization that defines ISE in terms of how positively people evaluate objects that reflect upon themselves. This conceptualization suggests that ISE research should target alternative phenomena (e.g., minimal group effect, similarity-attraction effect, endowment effect) and it allows for a host of previous cross-cultural findings to bear on the question of cultural variability in ISE.

Are implicit self-esteem measures valid for assessing individual and cultural differences?

OBJECTIVE: Our research utilized two popular theoretical conceptualizations of implicit self-esteem: 1) implicit self-esteem as a global automatic reaction to the self; and 2) implicit self-esteem as a context/domain specific construct. Under this framework, we present an extensive search for implicit self-esteem measure validity among different cultural groups (Study 1) and under several experimental manipulations (Study 2). METHOD: In Study 1, Euro-Canadians (N = 107), Asian-Canadians (N = 187), and Japanese (N = 112) completed a battery of implicit self-esteem, explicit self-esteem, and criterion measures. Included implicit self-esteem measures were either popular or provided methodological improvements upon older methods. Criterion measures were sampled from previous research on implicit self-esteem and included self-report and independent ratings. In Study 2, Americans (N = 582) completed a shorter battery of these same types of measures under either a control condition, an explicit prime meant to activate the self-concept in a particular context, or prime meant to activate self-competence related implicit attitudes. RESULTS: Across both studies, explicit self-esteem measures far outperformed implicit self-esteem measures in all cultural groups and under all experimental manipulations. CONCLUSION: Implicit self-esteem measures are not valid for individual or cross-cultural comparisons. We speculate that individuals may not form implicit associations with the self as an attitudinal object.

Can merely learning about obesity genes affect eating behavior?

Public discourse on genetic predispositions for obesity has flourished in recent decades. In three studies, we investigated behaviorally-relevant correlates and consequences of a perceived genetic etiology for obesity. In Study 1, beliefs about etiological explanations for obesity were assessed. Stronger endorsement of genetic etiology was predictive of a belief that obese people have no control over their weight. In Study 2, beliefs about weight and its causes were assessed following a manipulation of the perceived underlying cause. Compared with a genetic attribution, a non-genetic physiological attribution led to increased perception of control over one's weight. In Study 3, participants read a fictional media report presenting either a genetic explanation, a psychosocial explanation, or no explanation (control) for obesity. Results indicated that participants who read the genetic explanation ate significantly more on a follow-up task. Taken together, these studies demonstrate potential effects of genetic attributions for obesity.

When are people more open to cheating? Economic inequality makes people expect more everyday unethical behavior.

Economic inequality has been found to be associated with increased unethical behavior and an increased acceptance of unethical behavior. In this paper we explored whether higher amounts of perceived inequality lead to an increase in the expectation of unethical behavior. We tested whether people would say that they themselves would engage in more unethical behavior in a context of high compared to low inequality. We find evidence for this hypothesis in 3 of 4 studies (n = 3,038). An internal meta-analysis shows a small but significant effect. Such increased expectations that oneself will behave unethically likely has consequences for societal trust and functioning.

The common pain of surrealism and death: acetaminophen reduces compensatory affirmation following meaning threats.

The meaning-maintenance model posits that any violation of expectations leads to an affective experience that motivates compensatory affirmation. We explore whether the neural mechanism that responds to meaning threats can be inhibited by acetaminophen, in the same way that acetaminophen inhibits physical pain or the distress caused by social rejection. In two studies, participants received either acetaminophen or a placebo and were provided with either an unsettling experience or a control experience. In Study 1, participants wrote about either their death or a control topic. In Study 2, participants watched either a surrealist film clip or a control film clip. In both studies, participants in the meaning-threat condition who had taken a placebo showed typical compensatory affirmations by becoming more punitive toward lawbreakers, whereas those who had taken acetaminophen, and those in the control conditions, did not.

Compassion and contamination. Cultural differences in vegetarianism.

A growing body of research has shown that Western vegetarians report more concern for animal welfare and environmental sustainability, and endorse more liberal values than do Western omnivores. However, despite the prevalence of Indian vegetarianism, its psychological associations and underpinnings remain largely unexamined. In Study 1, we find that Euro-American vegetarians are more concerned than omnivores with the impact of their daily food choices on the environment and animal welfare, show more concern for general animal welfare, and endorse universalistic values more, yet among Indian participants, these differences are not significant. In Study 2, we show that Indian vegetarians more strongly endorse the belief that eating meat is polluting, and show a heightened concern for the conservative ethics of Purity, Authority, and Ingroup relative to their omnivorous peers, whereas these differences are largely absent among Euro-Canadians and Euro-Americans.

Shame and anger differentially predict disidentification between collectivistic and individualistic societies.

In the present research we tested the differential effects of anger versus shame as emotional predictors of ingroup disidentification in one rather collectivistic (Japan) and two rather individualistic societies (Germany, Canada). We tested the idea that individuals cope with socially undesired emotions by disidentifying from their group. Specifically, we predicted that after a group conflict, anger, an undesired emotion in Japan, would elicit disidentification in Japan, whereas shame, an undesired emotion in Canada and Germany, would elicit disidentification in Germany and Canada. Study 1 (N = 378) found that anger, but not shame, was related to disidentification in Japan, whereas shame, but not anger, was related to disidentification in Canada and Germany. Study 2 (N = 171) shows that, after group conflict, Japanese disidentified more when imagining to feel angry, whereas Germans disidentified more when imagining to feel ashamed. Implications for these findings are discussed.

Too close to home. Factors predicting meat avoidance.

In most societies, meat is valued more highly, yet tabooed more frequently, than any other type of food. Past research suggests that people avoid eating animals they consider similar to themselves, but what specific factors influence which they eat, and which they avoid? Across an array of samples from the USA, Canada, Hong Kong, and India, perceived animal intelligence and appearance emerged as the chief predictors of disgust at the thought of eating them. Furthermore, reflecting on animals' psychological attributes increased reported disgust, especially among Euro-Canadians and Euro-Americans, suggesting that these factors are more influential in shaping disgust in individualistic cultural contexts. Concordant with past research, disgust was a major predictor of willingness to eat animals, but social influence (frequency of consumption by friends and family) also emerged as a strong predictor, especially among Hong Kong Chinese and Indians, providing evidence that one's friends and family have a stronger influence on one's food choices in collectivistic cultural contexts.

Subjective Economic Inequality Decreases Emotional Intelligence, Especially for People of High Social Class.

Across five studies (three preregistered; N = 2,481), we investigated two effects as follows: (1) Is higher subjective economic inequality associated with a decreased ability to accurately identify emotions (emotional intelligence)? When inequality is high, people are less focused on others and may thus be less motivated to correctly identify their emotions. (2) Is this main effect of subjective inequality qualified by an interaction with socioeconomic status (SES)? Past research suggests that high SES leads to lower emotional intelligence because people of higher SES are less dependent on others and thus less motivated to identify their emotions. When perceiving higher inequality, high SES individuals should feel even more self-reliant, thereby exacerbating the difference in emotional intelligence between people of low and high SES. We provide empirical support in three out of five studies for the first and in four out of five studies for the second hypothesis. An internal meta-analysis supported both hypotheses.

The Construct of Subjective Economic Inequality.

Economic inequality has been associated with a host of social ills, but most research has focused on objective measures of inequality. We argue that economic inequality also has a subjective component, and understanding the effects of economic inequality will be deepened by considering the ways that people perceive inequality. In an American sample (N = 1,014), we find that some of the key variables that past research has found to correlate with objective inequality also correlate with a subjective measure of inequality. Across six countries (N = 683), we find that the relationship between subjective inequality and different psychological variables varies by country. Subjective inequality shows only modest correlations with objective inequality and varies by sociodemographic background.

The (im-)moral scientist? Measurement and framing effects shape the association between scientists and immorality.

Recent years have not only seen growing public distrust in science, but also in the people conducting science. Yet, attitudes toward scientists remain largely unexplored, and the limited body of literature that exists points to an interesting ambivalence. While survey data suggest scientists to be positively evaluated (e.g., respected and trusted), research has found scientists to be perceived as capable of immoral behavior. We report two experiments aimed at identifying what contributes to this ambivalence through systematic investigations of stereotypical perceptions of scientists. In these studies, we particularly focus on two potential sources of inconsistencies in previous work: divergent operationalizations of morality (measurement effects), and different specifications of the broad group of scientists (framing effects). Results show that scientists are generally perceived as more likely to violate binding as opposed to individualizing moral foundations, and that they deviate from control groups more strongly on the latter. The extent to which different morality measures reflect the differentiation between binding and individualizing moral foundations at least partially accounts for previous contradictory findings. Moreover, the results indicate large variation in perceptions of different types of scientists: people hold more positive attitudes toward university-affiliated scientists as compared to industry-affiliated scientists, with perceptions of the 'typical scientist' more closely resembling the latter. Taken together, the findings have important academic ramifications for science skepticism, morality, and stereotyping research as well as valuable practical implications for successful science communication.

Evidence for a sensitive period for acculturation: younger immigrants report acculturating at a faster rate.

Though recent adult immigrants often seem less acculturated to their new society than people who immigrated as children, it is not clear whether this difference is driven by duration of exposure or exposure during a sensitive developmental period. In a study aimed at disambiguating these influences, community and student samples of Hong Kong immigrants to Vancouver, Canada, completed the Vancouver Index of Acculturation, a measure that assesses respondents' identification with their mainstream and heritage cultures. A longer duration of exposure was found to be associated with greater identification with Canadian culture only at younger ages of immigration, but not at later ages of immigration. Conversely, identification with Chinese culture was unaffected by either age of immigration or length of exposure to Canadian culture. These findings provide evidence for a sensitive period for acculturation: People are better able to identify with a host culture the longer their exposure to it, but only if this exposure occurs when they are relatively young.

Meat, morals, and masculinity.

Much research has demonstrated that people perceive consumers of "good," low-fat foods as more moral, intelligent, and attractive, and perceive consumers of "bad," high-fat foods as less intelligent, less moral, and less attractive. Little research has contrasted perceptions of omnivores and vegetarians, particularly with respect to morality and gender characteristics. In two between-subject studies, we investigated people's perceptions of others who follow omnivorous and vegetarian diets, controlling for the perceived healthiness of the diets in question. In both studies, omnivorous and vegetarian participants rated vegetarian targets as more virtuous and less masculine than omnivorous targets.

Do scientific theories affect men's evaluations of sex crimes?

Evolutionary psychology accounts of gender differences in sexual behaviors in general and men's sexual aggression, in particular, has been criticized for legitimizing males' sexual misconduct. To empirically assess such critiques, two studies examined how men's judgments of male sex crimes (solicitation of sex from a prostitute; rape) are influenced by exposure to (a) evolutionary psychological theories and (b) social-constructivist theories. Across two studies, a consistent pattern emerged compared with a control condition (a) exposure to evolutionary psychology theories had no observable impact on male judgments of men's criminal sexual behavior, whereas (b) exposure to social-constructivist theories did affect judgments, leading men to evaluate sex crimes more harshly. Additional results (from Study 2) indicate that this effect is mediated by perceptions of male control over sexual urges. These results have implications for journalists, educators, and scientists. Aggr. Behav. 37:440-449, 2011. © 2011 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

The role of genetic essentialism and genetics knowledge in support for eugenics and genetically modified foods.

People are regularly exposed to discussions about the role of genes in their lives, despite often having limited understanding about how they operate. The tendency to oversimplify genetic causes, and ascribe them with undue influence is termed genetic essentialism. Two studies revealed that genetic essentialism is associated with support for eugenic policies and social attitudes based in social inequality, and less acceptance of genetically modified foods. These views about eugenics and genetically-modified foods were especially evident among people who had less knowledge about genes, potentially highlighting the value of education in genetics.

Exploring people's thoughts about the causes of ethnic stereotypes.

Much research has shown that people tend to view genes in rather deterministic ways-often termed genetic essentialism. We explored how people would view the causes of ethnic stereotypes in contexts where human genetic variability was either emphasized or downplayed. In two studies with over 1600 participants we found that people viewed ethnic stereotypes to be more of a function of underlying genetics after they read an article describing how ancestry can be estimated by geographic distributions of gene frequencies than after reading an article describing how relatively homogeneous the human genome was or after reading a control essay. Moreover, people were more likely to attribute ethnic stereotypes to genes when they scored higher on a measure of genetic essentialism or when they had less knowledge about genes. Our understanding of stereotypes is a function of our understanding of genetics.