Leveraging a Preexisting Global Infectious Disease Network for Local Decision Making During a Pandemic.

Emerging infectious disease epidemics require a rapid response from health systems; however, evidence-based consensus guidelines are generally absent early in the course of events. Formed in 2017 by 5 high-level isolation units spanning 3 continents, the experience of the Global Infectious Disease Preparedness Network (GIDPN) early in the course of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) provides a model for accelerating best practice development and improving decision-making in health emergencies. The network served as a platform for real-time, open and transparent information-sharing during unknowns of an active outbreak by clinicians caring for patients, by researchers conducting clinical trials and transmission and infection prevention studies, and by teams advising local and national policy makers. Shared knowledge led to earlier adoption of some treatment modalities as compared to most peer institutions and to implementation of protocols prior to incorporation into national guidelines. GIDPN and similar networks are integral in enhancing preparedness for and response to future epidemics/pandemics.

A pilot study of core body temperatures in healthcare workers wearing personal protective equipment in a high-level isolation unit.

Personal protective equipment used by healthcare workers to mitigate disease transmission risks while caring for patients with high-consequence infectious diseases can impair normal body cooling mechanisms and exacerbate physiological strain. Symptoms of heat strain (e.g., cognitive impairment, confusion, muscle cramping) are especially harmful in the high-risk environment of high-consequence infectious disease care. In this pilot study, the core body temperatures of healthcare workers were assessed using an ingestible, wireless-transmission thermometer while performing patient care tasks common to a high-level isolation unit setting in powered air purifying respirator (PAPR)-level. The objective was to determine the potential for occupational health hazard due to heat stress in an environmentally controlled unit. Maximum core temperatures of the six participants ranged from 37.4 °C (99.3 °F) to 39.9 °C (103.8°F) during the 4-hr shift; core temperatures of half (n = 3) of the participants exceeded 38.5 °C (101.3 °F), the upper core temperature limit. Future investigations are needed to identify other heat stress risks both in and outside of controlled units. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic offers unique opportunities for field-based research on risks of heat stress related to personal protective equipment in healthcare workers that can lead to both short- and long-term innovations in this field.

Update on Ebola Treatment Center Costs and Sustainability, United States, 2019.

We surveyed 56 Ebola treatment centers (ETCs) in the United States and identified costs incurred since 2014 ($1.76 million/ETC) and sustainability strategies. ETCs reported heavy reliance on federal funding. It is uncertain if, or for how long, ETCs can maintain capabilities should federal funding expire in 2020.

Can You Catch It? Lessons Learned and Modification of ED Triage Symptom- and Travel-Screening Strategy.

INTRODUCTION: Efficient identification and isolation of patients with communicable diseases limits exposure to health care workers, other patients, and visitors. In August 2014, our team developed and implemented an algorithm to triage suspected cases of Ebola virus disease in a midwestern United States emergency department and outpatient clinics based on patient travel history and symptoms. Here, we present the lessons learned and modifications to update the tool. METHODS: Two strategies were developed and utilized to properly identify, isolate, and inform on patients with suspected highly hazardous communicable diseases: 1) a robust electronic symptom and travel screen with decision support tools in the electronic medical record, and 2) the availability of workflow protocols for Ebola virus disease, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) once a person under investigation is identified. After action reports provided opportunities to modify the algorithm and improve the identification and isolation processes. RESULTS: Since our screening and travel electronic medical record inception 5 years ago, modifications changed iteratively to further enhance the screening process. Since 2018, staff have identified 5 patients at risk for MERS; in all cases, identification occurred during the check-in process. Exposure investigations in the emergency department decreased significantly after algorithm implementation in January 2019, from 30 in 2018 to 0 in 2019. DISCUSSION: Although highly hazardous communicable diseases like Ebola virus disease and MERS are of concern due to their mortality rates and limited treatment options, these same concepts may be applied to the early identification and isolation of patients suspected of having more common communicable diseases like measles and influenza, emphasizing the importance of protocol-based screening in the healthcare environment.

Clinical Management of Ebola Virus Disease in the United States and Europe.

BACKGROUND: Available data on the characteristics of patients with Ebola virus disease (EVD) and clinical management of EVD in settings outside West Africa, as well as the complications observed in those patients, are limited. METHODS: We reviewed available clinical, laboratory, and virologic data from all patients with laboratory-confirmed Ebola virus infection who received care in U.S. and European hospitals from August 2014 through December 2015. RESULTS: A total of 27 patients (median age, 36 years [range, 25 to 75]) with EVD received care; 19 patients (70%) were male, 9 of 26 patients (35%) had coexisting conditions, and 22 (81%) were health care personnel. Of the 27 patients, 24 (89%) were medically evacuated from West Africa or were exposed to and infected with Ebola virus in West Africa and had onset of illness and laboratory confirmation of Ebola virus infection in Europe or the United States, and 3 (11%) acquired EVD in the United States or Europe. At the onset of illness, the most common signs and symptoms were fatigue (20 patients [80%]) and fever or feverishness (17 patients [68%]). During the clinical course, the predominant findings included diarrhea, hypoalbuminemia, hyponatremia, hypokalemia, hypocalcemia, and hypomagnesemia; 14 patients (52%) had hypoxemia, and 9 (33%) had oliguria, of whom 5 had anuria. Aminotransferase levels peaked at a median of 9 days after the onset of illness. Nearly all the patients received intravenous fluids and electrolyte supplementation; 9 (33%) received noninvasive or invasive mechanical ventilation; 5 (19%) received continuous renal-replacement therapy; 22 (81%) received empirical antibiotics; and 23 (85%) received investigational therapies (19 [70%] received at least two experimental interventions). Ebola viral RNA levels in blood peaked at a median of 7 days after the onset of illness, and the median time from the onset of symptoms to clearance of viremia was 17.5 days. A total of 5 patients died, including 3 who had respiratory and renal failure, for a mortality of 18.5%. CONCLUSIONS: Among the patients with EVD who were cared for in the United States or Europe, close monitoring and aggressive supportive care that included intravenous fluid hydration, correction of electrolyte abnormalities, nutritional support, and critical care management for respiratory and renal failure were needed; 81.5% of these patients who received this care survived.

U.S. High-Level Isolation Unit Clinical Laboratory Capabilities Update.

In late 2014, 56 hospitals in the United States were designated by state and federal public health authorities as specially designed high-level isolation units (HLIUs) equipped with advanced infrastructure, laboratory capabilities, and trained staff to care for patients with highly hazardous communicable diseases (HHCDs), such as Ebola virus disease. This survey describes the clinical laboratory support capabilities of U.S. HLIUs, including the specific test menus that HLIUs have identified to safely manage HHCD patients and the locations where such testing would be performed. In spring 2016, a survey was electronically distributed, as a fillable pdf file, to the 56 U.S. HLIUs. Site representatives completed the surveys, and data were coded and analyzed in an electronic spreadsheet, using descriptive statistics. Thirty-six HLIUs (64%) responded, and 33 completed the laboratory capabilities section. Thirty-one HLIUs (94%) had performed risk analyses for all laboratory procedures and equipment. Twenty-nine (88%) had decontamination procedures specified for all laboratory equipment used for patients with suspected or confirmed HHCDs. On-site laboratories in 27 HLIUs (81%) had the capacity to inventory and to securely store HHCD patient specimens. Ten HLIUs (31%) had at least one test they would conduct within the patient isolation room. The high-risk nature of HHCDs and the occupational exposures that may occur in clinical laboratories demand advanced preparation and risk assessment of work practices, laboratory equipment, and instrumentation by HLIU laboratories. Although risk analyses of clinical laboratory testing and equipment that HLIUs have conducted have likely focused on those for Ebola virus, HLIUs must be prepared to revise their current procedures for other HHCDs.

Personnel Management and Biosecurity of U.S. High-Level Isolation Units.

OBJECTIVE: To describe strategies used by US high-level isolation units (HLIUs) to recruit, train, and sustain a full team of multidisciplinary staff and identify how units are secured. BACKGROUND: Fifty-six US hospitals have been designated HLIUs, capable of providing safe care to patients with highly infectious disease. METHODS: An electronic survey was administered to the 56 HLIUs in spring of 2016. Responses were collected via a fillable PDF and analyzed using descriptive statistics. RESULTS: Thirty-six HLIUs (64%) responded; 33 completed surveys, and 3 reported no longer being a designated HLIU. HLIUs reported large numbers of multidisciplinary staff, primarily consisting of RNs and critical care clinicians. Nearly all HLIUs (94%) required orientation training, although hours varied. CONCLUSIONS: Over a short period, HLIUs recruited and trained significant numbers of staff with little guidance. Costs of ongoing trainings are considerable, and it remains unclear how HLIUs will continue funding these activities.

US State Public Health Departments Special Pathogen Planning.

CONTEXT: US state public health departments played key roles in planning for and responding to confirmed and suspected cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) during the 2014-2016 outbreak, including designating select hospitals as high-level isolation units (HLIUs) for EVD treatment in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. OBJECTIVE: To identify existing guidelines and perspectives of state health departments pertaining to the management and transport of patients with EVD and other highly hazardous communicable diseases (HHCDs). DESIGN: An electronic 8-question survey with subquestions was administered as a fillable PDF. SETTING: The survey was distributed to publicly accessible e-mails of state health department employees. PARTICIPANTS: State epidemiologists, emergency preparedness directors, or chief medical officers from each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia were contacted; a representative from 36 states and the District of Columbia responded (73%). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Descriptive statistics were used to identify the proportion of state health departments with various existing protocols. RESULTS: A majority of states reported that they would prefer patients confirmed with viral hemorrhagic fevers (eg, EVD, Marburg fever) and smallpox be transported to an HLIU for treatment rather than remain at the initial hospital of diagnosis. While most (89%) states had written guidelines for the safe transportation of patients with HHCDs, only 6 (16%) had written protocols for the management of accidents or other travel disruptions that may occur during HHCD transport within the state. Twenty-two state health departments (59%) had operationally exercised transport of a patient to an HLIU. CONCLUSIONS: Nearly half of states in the United States lack an HLIU, yet most prefer to have patients with HHCDs treated in high-level isolation. Recent budget cuts and uncertainty of future funding threaten the abilities of health departments to devote the necessary resources and staff to prepare for and deliver the desired care to HHCD cases. The lack of HLIUs in some states may complicate transport to a geographically proximate HLIU. Moreover, limited guidance on diseases that warrant high-level isolation may cause disagreement in HHCD patient placement between health departments, diagnosing facilities, and HLIUs.

Sustainability of High-Level Isolation Capabilities among US Ebola Treatment Centers.

To identify barriers to maintaining and applying capabilities of US high-level isolation units (HLIUs) used during the Ebola virus disease outbreak, during 2016 we surveyed HLIUs. HLIUs identified sustainability challenges and reported the highly infectious diseases they would treat. HLIUs expended substantial resources in development but must strategize models of sustainability to maintain readiness.

Ultraviolet (UV)-reflective paint with ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) improves decontamination of nosocomial bacteria on hospital room surfaces.

An ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) generator (the TORCH, ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.) was used to compare the disinfection of surface coupons (plastic from a bedrail, stainless steel, and chrome-plated light switch cover) in a hospital room with walls coated with ultraviolet (UV)-reflective paint (Lumacept) or standard paint. Each surface coupon was inoculated with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) or vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecalis (VRE), placed at 6 different sites within a hospital room coated with UV-reflective paint or standard paint, and treated by 10 min UVC exposure (UVC dose of 0-688 mJ/cm2 between sites with standard paint and 0-553 mJ/cm2 with UV-reflective paint) in 8 total trials. Aggregated MRSA concentrations on plastic bedrail surface coupons were reduced on average by 3.0 log10 (1.8 log10 Geometric Standard Deviation [GSD]) with standard paint and 4.3 log10 (1.3 log10 GSD) with UV-reflective paint (p = 0.0005) with no significant reduction differences between paints on stainless steel and chrome. Average VRE concentrations were reduced by ≥4.9 log10 (<1.2 log10 GSD) on all surface types with UV-reflective paint and ≤4.1 log10 (<1.7 log10 GSD) with standard paint (p < 0.05). At 5 aggregated sites directly exposed to UVC light, MRSA concentrations on average were reduced by 5.2 log10 (1.4 log10 GSD) with standard paint and 5.1 log10 (1.2 log10 GSD) with UV-reflective paint (p = 0.017) and VRE by 4.4 log10 (1.4 log10 GSD) with standard paint and 5.3 log10 (1.1 log10 GSD) with UV-reflective paint (p < 0.0001). At one indirectly exposed site on the opposite side of the hospital bed from the UVGI generator, MRSA concentrations on average were reduced by 1.3 log10 (1.7 log10 GSD) with standard paint and 4.7 log10 (1.3 log10 GSD) with UV-reflective paint (p < 0.0001) and VRE by 1.2 log10 (1.5 log10 GSD) with standard paint and 4.6 log10 (1.1 log10 GSD) with UV-reflective paint (p < 0.0001). Coating hospital room walls with UV-reflective paint enhanced UVGI disinfection of nosocomial bacteria on various surfaces compared to standard paint, particularly at a surface placement site indirectly exposed to UVC light.

Containment Care Units for Managing Patients With Highly Hazardous Infectious Diseases: A Concept Whose Time Has Come.

The concept of containment care for patients with highly hazardous infectious diseases originated in conjunction with the development of sophisticated biosafety level 4 laboratories at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in the late 1960s. Over time, the original containment facility served as a model for the development of other facilities in the United States at government and academic centers. The Ebola outbreak of 2014-2015 brought the issue of containment care into the mainstream and led to the development of such capabilities at strategic points around the country. We describe the original concepts behind development of such facilities, how the concept and acceptance has evolved over time, and how the guidelines for managing patients infected with viral hemorrhagic fevers have evolved as new information has been learned about protecting medical care providers from highly hazardous infectious pathogens.

Use of Postexposure Prophylaxis After Occupational Exposure to Zaire ebolavirus.

From September 2014 to April 2015, 6 persons who had occupational exposures to Zaire ebolavirus in West Africa received investigational agent rVSV-ZEBOV or TKM-100802 for postexposure prophylaxis and were monitored in the United States. All patients experienced self-limited symptoms after postexposure prophylaxis; none developed Ebola virus disease.

U.S. Ebola Treatment Center Clinical Laboratory Support.

Fifty-five hospitals in the United States have been designated Ebola treatment centers (ETCs) by their state and local health authorities. Designated ETCs must have appropriate plans to manage a patient with confirmed Ebola virus disease (EVD) for the full duration of illness and must have these plans assessed through a CDC site visit conducted by an interdisciplinary team of subject matter experts. This study determined the clinical laboratory capabilities of these ETCs. ETCs were electronically surveyed on clinical laboratory characteristics. Survey responses were returned from 47 ETCs (85%). Forty-one (87%) of the ETCs planned to provide some laboratory support (e.g., point-of-care [POC] testing) within the room of the isolated patient. Forty-four (94%) ETCs indicated that their hospital would also provide clinical laboratory support for patient care. Twenty-two (50%) of these ETC clinical laboratories had biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) containment. Of all respondents, 34 (72%) were supported by their jurisdictional public health laboratory (PHL), all of which had available BSL-3 laboratories. Overall, 40 of 44 (91%) ETCs reported BSL-3 laboratory support via their clinical laboratory and/or PHL. This survey provided a snapshot of the laboratory support for designated U.S. ETCs. ETCs have approached high-level isolation critical care with laboratory support in close proximity to the patient room and by distributing laboratory support among laboratory resources. Experts might review safety considerations for these laboratory testing/diagnostic activities that are novel in the context of biocontainment care.

Evaluating Isolation Behaviors by Nurses Using Mobile Computer Workstations at the Bedside.

This secondary analysis from a larger mixed methods study with a sequential explanatory design investigates the clinical challenges for nurses providing patient care, in an airborne and contact isolation room, while using a computer on wheels for medication administration in a simulated setting. Registered nurses, who regularly work in clinical care at the patient bedside, were recruited as study participants in the simulation and debriefing experience. A live volunteer acted as the standardized patient who needed assessment and intravenous pain medication. The simulation was video recorded in a typical hospital room to observe participating nurses conducting patient care in an airborne and contact isolation situation. Participants then reviewed their performance with study personnel in a formal, audio-recorded debriefing. Isolation behaviors were scored by an expert panel, and the debriefing sessions were analyzed. Considerable variation was found in behaviors related to using a computer on wheels while caring for a patient in isolation. Currently, no nursing care guidelines exist on the use of computers on wheels in an airborne and contact isolation room. Specific education is needed on nursing care processes for the proper disinfection of computers on wheels and the reduction of the potential for disease transmission from environmental contamination.

Comparison of hospital room surface disinfection using a novel ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) generator.

The estimated 721,800 hospital acquired infections per year in the United States have necessitated development of novel environmental decontamination technologies such as ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI). This study evaluated the efficacy of a novel, portable UVGI generator (the TORCH, ChlorDiSys Solutions, Inc., Lebanon, NJ) to disinfect surface coupons composed of plastic from a bedrail, stainless steel, chrome-plated light switch cover, and a porcelain tile that were inoculated with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) or vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecalis (VRE). Each surface type was placed at 6 different sites within a hospital room and treated by 10-min ultraviolet-C (UVC) exposures using the TORCH with doses ranging from 0-688 mJ/cm(2) between sites. Organism reductions were compared with untreated surface coupons as controls. Overall, UVGI significantly reduced MRSA by an average of 4.6 log10 (GSD: 1.7 log10, 77% inactivation, p < 0.0001) and VRE by an average of 3.9 log10 (GSD: 1.7 log10, 65% inactivation, p < 0.0001). MRSA on bedrail was reduced significantly (p < 0.0001) less than on other surfaces, while VRE was reduced significantly less on chrome (p = 0.0004) and stainless steel (p = 0.0012) than porcelain tile. Organisms out of direct line of sight of the UVC generator were reduced significantly less (p < 0.0001) than those directly in line of sight. UVGI was found an effective method to inactivate nosocomial pathogens on surfaces evaluated within the hospital environment in direct line of sight of UVGI treatment with variation between organism and surface types.

Administration of Brincidofovir and Convalescent Plasma in a Patient With Ebola Virus Disease.

From 2014 to May 2015, >26 000 Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases were reported from West Africa. We present a patient with EVD who received brincidofovir and convalescent plasma. The relative contributions of supportive care, investigational therapies, and patient's immune-response on survival could not be determined. Randomized trials are needed.

The Use of TKM-100802 and Convalescent Plasma in 2 Patients With Ebola Virus Disease in the United States.

BACKGROUND: The current West Africa Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak has resulted in multiple individuals being medically evacuated to other countries for clinical management. METHODS: We report two patients who were transported from West Africa to the United States for treatment of EVD. Both patients received aggressive supportive care measures, as well as an investigational therapeutic (TKM-100802) and convalescent plasma. RESULTS: While one patient experienced critical illness with multi-organ failure requiring mechanical ventilation and renal replacement therapy, both patients recovered without serious long-term sequelae to date. CONCLUSIONS: It is unclear what role the experimental drug and convalescent plasma had in the recovery of these patients. Prospective clinical trials are needed to delineate the role of investigational therapies in the care of patients with EVD.

Ebola virus disease: preparedness and infection control lessons learned from two biocontainment units.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: This review details infection control issues encountered in the management of patients with Ebola virus disease (EVD), with emphasis on how these issues were confronted in two biocontainment patient care units in the United States. RECENT FINDINGS: There is a notable paucity of medical literature to guide infection control policies and procedures when caring for patients with EVD. Thus, the experience of the Serious Communicable Diseases Unit at Emory University Hospital and the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit at the University of Nebraska Medical Center serves as the basis for this review. Facility issues, staffing, transportation logistics, and appropriate use of personal protective equipment are detailed. Other topics addressed include the evaluation of patients under investigation and ethical issues concerning the safe utilization of advanced life support. SUMMARY: This review intends to serve as a reference for facilities that are in the process of creating protocols for managing patients with EVD. Given the lack of literature to support many of the recommendations discussed, it is important to utilize the available referenced guidelines, along with the practical experiences of biocontainment units, to optimize the care provided to patients with EVD while strictly adhering to infection control principles.

Lessons learned: critical care management of patients with Ebola in the United States.

OBJECTIVE: This report will describe the preparations for and the provision of care of two patients with Ebola virus disease in the biocontainment unit at the University of Nebraska Medical Center. DATA SOURCES: Patient medical records. STUDY SELECTION: Not applicable. DATA EXTRACTION: Not applicable. DATA SYNTHESIS: Not applicable. CONCLUSIONS: Safe and effective care of patients with Ebola virus disease requires significant communication and planning. Adherence to a predetermined isolation protocol is essential, including proper donning and doffing of personal protective equipment. Location of the patient care area and the logistics of laboratory testing, diagnostic imaging, and the removal of waste must be considered. Patients with Ebola virus disease are often dehydrated and need adequate vascular access for fluid resuscitation, nutrition, and phlebotomy for laboratory sampling. Advanced planning for acute life-threatening events and code status must be considered. Intensivist scheduling should account for the significant amount of time required for the care of patients with Ebola virus disease. With appropriate precautions and resources, designated hospitals in the United States can safely provide care for patients with Ebola virus disease.

Surrogate testing suggests that chlorine dioxide gas exposure would not inactivate Ebola virus contained in environmental blood contamination.

The ability to decontaminate a room potentially containing the Ebola virus is important to healthcare facilities in the United States. Ebola virus remains viable in body fluids, a room that has housed a patient with Ebola virus disease must have all surfaces manually wiped with an approved disinfectant, which increases occupational exposure risk. This study evaluated the efficacy of gaseous chlorine dioxide inactivation of bacterial organisms in blood as Ebola virus surrogates and as the organisms used by the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit to provide the margin of safety for decontamination. Bacillus anthracis, Escherichia coli, Enterococcus faecalis, and Mycobacterium smegmatis blood suspensions that were exposed to ClO2 gas concentrations and exposure limits. The log reduction in Colony Forming Units (CFU) was determined for each bacterial blood suspension. Exposure parameters approximating industry practices for ClO2 environmental decontamination (360ppm concentration to 780 ppm-hrs exposure, 65% relative humidity) as well as parameters exceeding current practice (1116 ppm concentration to 1400 ppm-hrs exposure; 1342ppm concentration to 1487 ppm-hrs exposure) were evaluated. Complete inactivation was not achieved for any of the bacterial blood suspensions tested. Reductions were observed in concentrations of B. anthracis spores (1.3 -3.76 log) and E. faecalis vegetative cells (1.3 log) whereas significant reductions in vegetative cell concentrations for E. coli and M. smegmatis blood suspensions were not achieved. Our results showed that bacteria in the presence of blood were not inactivated using gaseous ClO2 decontamination. ClO2 decontamination alone should not be used for Ebola virus, but decontamination processes should first include manual wiping of potentially contaminated blood; especially for microorganisms as infectious as the Ebola virus.