How cognitive selection affects language change.

Like biological species, words in language must compete to survive. Previously, it has been shown that language changes in response to cognitive constraints and over time becomes more learnable. Here, we use two complementary research paradigms to demonstrate how the survival of existing word forms can be predicted by psycholinguistic properties that impact language production. In the first study, we analyzed the survival of words in the context of interpersonal communication. We analyzed data from a large-scale serial-reproduction experiment in which stories were passed down along a transmission chain over multiple participants. The results show that words that are acquired earlier in life, more concrete, more arousing, and more emotional are more likely to survive retellings. We reason that the same trend might scale up to language evolution over multiple generations of natural language users. If that is the case, the same set of psycholinguistic properties should also account for the change of word frequency in natural language corpora over historical time. That is what we found in two large historical-language corpora (Study 2): Early acquisition, concreteness, and high arousal all predict increasing word frequency over the past 200 y. However, the two studies diverge with respect to the impact of word valence and word length, which we take up in the discussion. By bridging micro-level behavioral preferences and macro-level language patterns, our investigation sheds light on the cognitive mechanisms underlying word competition.

Time, valence, and imagination: a comparative study of thoughts in restricted and unrestricted mind wandering.

William James' "stream of thought" is a key component of human cognition. Such thoughts arise in both restricted and unrestricted contexts, either with or without the presence of a secondary task. This study examines the similarities and differences in thoughts produced in these two contexts, which we call restricted and unrestricted mind wandering. Participants performed a mindfulness task representing restricted mind wandering and an unrestricted thought task where they spontaneously explored thoughts, reporting them as they arose. Participants then self-rated their thoughts based on valence, temporal orientation (past/present/future), and reality orientation (imaginary vs. real). Participants' emotional states were also evaluated using the Emotion Recall Task (ERT) and the PANAS questionnaire. Unrestricted mind wandering generated more thoughts, which were more positive and future-oriented than those in restricted mind wandering. Additionally, participants' thought valence correlated with their PANAS and ERT scores. Approximately 1 out of 4 thoughts in both restricted and unrestricted mind wandering were imaginary, with increased future orientation linked to more imaginative thought. Despite the statistical differences separating restricted and unrestricted thought, effect sizes were predominantly small, indicating that the thoughts arise during these two types of mind wandering are largely of the same kind.

Confirmation bias emerges from an approximation to Bayesian reasoning.

Confirmation bias is defined as searching for and assimilating information in a way that favours existing beliefs. We show that confirmation bias emerges as a natural consequence of boundedly rational belief updating by presenting the BIASR model (Bayesian updating with an Independence Approximation and Source Reliability). In this model, an individual's beliefs about a hypothesis and the source reliability form a Bayesian network. Upon receiving information, an individual simultaneously updates beliefs about the hypothesis in question and the reliability of the information source. If the individual updates rationally then this introduces numerous dependencies between beliefs, the tracking of which represents an unrealistic demand on memory. We propose that human cognition overcomes this memory limitation by assuming independence between beliefs, evidence for which is provided in prior research. We show how a Bayesian belief updating model incorporating this independence approximation generates many types of confirmation bias, including biased evaluation, biased assimilation, attitude polarisation, belief perseverance and confirmation bias in the selection of sources.

Correction to "When fairness is not enough: The disproportionate contributions of the poor in a collective action problem" by Malthouse et al. (2023).

Reports an error in "When fairness is not enough: The disproportionate contributions of the poor in a collective action problem" by Eugene Malthouse, Charlie Pilgrim, Daniel Sgroi and Thomas T. Hills (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2023[Nov], Vol 152[11], 3229-3242). The third and final research question in The Collective-Risk Social Dilemma section now appears as follows: 3. If what people perceive as fair is insufficient to solve the problem, under what conditions do groups still manage to succeed? All versions of this article have been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2023-92402-001.) Many of our most pressing challenges, from combating climate change to dealing with pandemics, are collective action problems: situations in which individual and collective interests conflict with each other. In such situations, people face a dilemma about making individually costly but collectively beneficial contributions to the common good. Understanding which factors influence people's willingness to make these contributions is vital for the design of policies and institutions that support the attainment of collective goals. In this study, we investigate how inequalities, and different causes of inequalities, impact individual-level behavior and group-level outcomes. First, we find that what people judged to be fair was not enough to solve the collective action problem: if they acted according to what they thought was fair, they would collectively fail. Second, the level of wealth (rich vs. poor) altered what was judged to be a fair contribution to the public good more than the cause of wealth (merit vs. luck vs. uncertain). Contributions during the game reflected these fairness judgments, with poorer individuals consistently contributing a higher proportion of their wealth than richer participants, which further increased inequality-particularly in successful groups. Finally, the cause of one's wealth was largely irrelevant, mattering most only when it was uncertain, as opposed to resulting from merit or luck. We discuss implications for policymakers and international climate change negotiations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Patterns of asthma medication use and hospital discharges in New Zealand.

Background: In New Zealand a progressive increase in budesonide/formoterol dispensing, accompanied by a reduction in dispensing of short-acting ß2-agonists (SABAs), inhaled corticosteroids (ICSs), and other ICS/long-acting ß2-agonists (ICSs/LABAs), occurred in the 18-month period following publication of the 2020 New Zealand asthma guidelines, which recommended budesonide/formoterol anti-inflammatory reliever therapy. Objective: Our aim was to investigate more recent trends in asthma medication use and asthma hospital discharges in New Zealand. Methods: New Zealand national dispensing data for inhalers for the period from January 2010 to December 2022 were reviewed for patients aged 12 years and older. Monthly rates of dispensing of budesonide/formoterol, ICSs, other ICS/LABAs, and SABAs were displayed graphically by locally weighted scatterplot smoother plots. The rates of dispensing and hospital discharge for asthma were compared between the past 6 months for which dispensing data were available (July-December 2022) and the corresponding period from July to December 2019. Results: There has been a progressive increase in dispensing of budesonide/formoterol since 2019, with a 108% increase between the period from July to December 2019 and the period from July to December 2022 in adolescents and adults. In contrast, there was a reduction in rates of dispensing of other ICS/LABAs, ICSs, and SABAs by 3%, 18%, and 5%, respectively. During this period, there was a 17% reduction in hospital discharges for asthma. Conclusion: There has been a further widespread uptake of ICS/formoterol reliever and/or maintenance therapy in adolescents and adults with asthma in New Zealand. The changes in prescribing practice have been temporally associated with a reduction in hospital admissions for asthma.

TMPRSS2 inhibitors for the treatment of COVID-19 in adults: a systematic review and meta-analysis of randomized clinical trials of nafamostat and camostat mesylate.

BACKGROUND: Synthetic serine protease inhibitors block the cellular enzyme transmembrane protease serine 2, thus preventing SARS-CoV-2 cell entry. There are two relevant drugs in this class, namely, nafamostat (intravenous formulation) and camostat (oral formulation). OBJECTIVE: To determine whether transmembrane protease serine 2 inhibition with nafamostat or camostat is associated with a reduced risk of 30-day all-cause mortality in adults with COVID-19. DATA SOURCES: Scientific databases and clinical trial registry platforms. STUDY ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA, INTERVENTIONS, AND PARTICIPANTS: Preprints or published randomized clinical trials (RCTs) of nafamostat or camostat vs. usual care or placebo in adults requiring treatment for COVID-19. METHODS OF DATA SYNTHESIS AND RISK-OF-BIAS ASSESSMENT: The primary outcome of the meta-analysis was 30-day all-cause mortality. Secondary outcomes included time to recovery, adverse events, and serious adverse events. Risk of bias (RoB) was assessed using the revised Cochrane RoB 2 tool for individually randomized trials. Meta-analysis was conducted in the R package meta (v7.0-0) using inverse variance and random effects. Protocol registration number was INPLASY202320120. RESULTS: Twelve RCTs were included. Overall, the number of available patients was small (nafamostat = 387; camostat = 1061), the number of enrolled patients meeting the primary outcome was low (nafamostat = 12; camostat = 13), and heterogeneity was high. In hospitalized adults, we did not identify differences in 30-day all-cause mortality (risk ratio [95% CI]: 0.58 [0.19, 1.80], p 0.34; I2 = 0%; n = 6) and time to recovery (mean difference [95% CI]: 0.08 days [-0.74, 0.89], p 0.86; n = 2) between nafamostat vs. usual care; and for 30-day all-cause mortality (risk ratio [95% CI]: 0.99 [0.31, 3.18], p 0.99; n = 2) between camostat vs. placebo. CONCLUSION: The RCT evidence is inconclusive to determine whether there is a mortality reduction and safety with either nafamostat or camostat for the treatment of adults with COVID-19. There were high RoB, small sample size, and high heterogeneity between RCTs.