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H9N2 avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are a major concern for the poultry sector and human health in countries where this subtype is endemic. By fitting a model simulating H9N2 AIV transmission to data from a field experiment, we characterise the epidemiology of the virus in a live bird market in Bangladesh. Many supplied birds arrive already exposed to H9N2 AIVs, resulting in many broiler chickens entering the market as infected, and many indigenous backyard chickens entering with pre-existing immunity. Most susceptible chickens become infected within one day spent at the market, owing to high levels of viral transmission within market and short latent periods, as brief as 5.3 hours. Although H9N2 AIV transmission can be substantially reduced under moderate levels of cleaning and disinfection, effective risk mitigation also requires a range of additional interventions targeting markets and other nodes along the poultry production and distribution network.
Assuntos
Galinhas , Vírus da Influenza A Subtipo H9N2 , Influenza Aviária , Animais , Vírus da Influenza A Subtipo H9N2/isolamento & purificação , Vírus da Influenza A Subtipo H9N2/imunologia , Influenza Aviária/transmissão , Influenza Aviária/epidemiologia , Influenza Aviária/virologia , Galinhas/virologia , Bangladesh/epidemiologia , Doenças das Aves Domésticas/transmissão , Doenças das Aves Domésticas/virologia , Doenças das Aves Domésticas/epidemiologia , Modelos BiológicosRESUMO
The prevalence of avian influenza viruses is commonly found to increase dramatically as birds are transported from farms to live bird markets. Viral transmission dynamics along marketing chains are, however, poorly understood. To address this gap, we implemented a controlled field experiment altering chicken supply to a live bird market in Chattogram, Bangladesh. Broilers and backyard chickens traded along altered (intervention) and conventional (control) marketing chains were tested for avian influenza viruses at different time points. Upon arrival at the live bird market, the odds of detecting avian influenza viruses did not differ between control and intervention groups. However, 12â¯h later, intervention group odds were lower, particularly for broilers, indicating that viral shedding in live bird markets resulted partly from infections occurring during transport and trade. Curtailing avian influenza virus prevalence in live bird markets requires mitigating risk in marketing chain nodes preceding chickens' delivery at live bird markets.
Assuntos
Galinhas , Influenza Aviária , Doenças das Aves Domésticas , Animais , Influenza Aviária/epidemiologia , Influenza Aviária/virologia , Bangladesh/epidemiologia , Doenças das Aves Domésticas/virologia , Doenças das Aves Domésticas/epidemiologia , Doenças das Aves Domésticas/transmissão , Doenças das Aves Domésticas/prevenção & controle , Prevalência , Vírus da Influenza A/isolamento & purificação , Meios de Transporte , Criação de Animais Domésticos/métodos , Eliminação de Partículas Virais , Marketing , ComércioRESUMO
Between 16 March and 14 June 2024, 42 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus detections were reported in domestic (15) and wild (27) birds across 13 countries in Europe. Although the overall number of detections in Europe has not been this low since the 2019-2020 epidemiological year, HPAI viruses continue to circulate at a very low level. Most detections in poultry were due to indirect contact with wild birds, but there was also secondary spread. Outside Europe, the HPAI situation intensified particularly in the USA, where a new A(H5N1) virus genotype (B3.13) has been identified in >130 dairy herds in 12 states. Infection in cattle appears to be centred on the udder, with milk from infected animals showing high viral loads and representing a new vehicle of transmission. Apart from cattle, HPAI viruses were identified in two other mammal species (alpaca and walrus) for the first time. Between 13 March and 20 June 2024, 14 new human cases with avian influenza virus infection were reported from Vietnam (one A(H5N1), one A(H9N2)), Australia (with travel history to India, one A(H5N1)), USA (three A(H5N1)), China (two A(H5N6), three A(H9N2), one A(H10N3)), India (one A(H9N2)), and Mexico (one fatal A(H5N2) case). The latter case was the first laboratory-confirmed human infection with avian influenza virus subtype A(H5N2). Most of the human cases had reported exposure to poultry, live poultry markets, or dairy cattle prior to avian influenza virus detection or onset of illness. Human infections with avian influenza viruses remain rare and no human-to-human transmission has been observed. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian A(H5) influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general public in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low-to-moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals or contaminated environments.
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Between 2 December 2023 and 15 March 2024, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (227) and wild (414) birds across 26 countries in Europe. Compared to previous years, although still widespread, the overall number of HPAI virus detections in birds was significantly lower, among other reasons, possibly due to some level of flock immunity in previously affected wild bird species, resulting in reduced contamination of the environment, and a different composition of circulating A(H5N1) genotypes. Most HPAI outbreaks reported in poultry were primary outbreaks following the introduction of the virus by wild birds. Outside Europe, the majority of outbreaks in poultry were still clustered in North America, while the spread of A(H5) to more naïve wild bird populations on mainland Antarctica is of particular concern. For mammals, A(H5N5) was reported for the first time in Europe, while goat kids in the United States of America represented the first natural A(H5N1) infection in ruminants. Since the last report and as of 12 March 2024, five human avian influenza A(H5N1) infections, including one death, three of which were clade 2.3.2.1c viruses, have been reported by Cambodia. China has reported two human infections, including one fatal case, with avian influenza A(H5N6), four human infections with avian influenza A(H9N2) and one fatal case with co-infection of seasonal influenza A(H3N2) and avian influenza A(H10N5). The latter case was the first documented human infection with avian influenza A(H10N5). Human infections with avian influenza remain rare and no sustained human-to-human infection has been observed. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for those occupationally or otherwise exposed to infected animals.
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All European Union (EU) Member States (MSs) are required to implement surveillance for avian influenza (AI) in poultry and wild birds and (i) to notify the outbreaks, when relevant and (ii) to report the results to the responsible authority. In addition, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) also implement ongoing surveillance programmes to monitor occurrences of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in poultry and wild birds. EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to collate, validate, analyse and summarise the data resulting from these AI surveillance programmes in an annual report. The present report summarises the results of the surveillance activities carried out in MSs, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) in 2022. Overall, the 31 reporting countries (RCs) sampled 22,171 poultry establishments (PEs) during the 2022 surveillance activity: 18,490 PEs were sampled for serological testing and 3775 were sampled for virological testing. Some PEs were therefore sampled for both type of analytical methods. Out of the 18,490 PEs sampled for serological testing, 15 (0.08%) were seropositive for influenza A(H5) viruses. Out of the 3775 PEs sampled for virological testing, 74 PEs (1.96%) were positive to the virological assay for influenza A(H5) viruses. Seropositive PEs were found in four RCs (Belgium, Poland, Spain and Sweden) and as in previous years, the highest percentages of seropositive PEs were found in PEs raising breeding geese and waterfowl game birds. Out of these 15 seropositive PEs, 3 also tested positive by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for influenza A (H5) viruses - 2 for highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) and 1 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) (H5N3). In relation to the virological surveys, 10 RCs (32%) out of the 31 reported the detection of A (H5) viruses in 74 PEs, covering 12 different poultry categories. More specifically, 54 reported HPAIV A(H5N1), 17 HPAIV (H5N8), 2 AIV (H5N1) with unknown virus pathogenicity and 1 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) (H5N3). Additionally, six PEs tested positive for undefined AIVs in three RCs. A total of 32,143 wild birds were sampled, with 4163 (12.95%) wild birds testing positive for HPAIVs by PCR, from 25 RCs. In contrast to previous years, out of the 4163 wild birds testing positive for HPAIv, subtype A(H5N1) virus was the main influenza A virus subtype identified among the wild bird testing positive for HPAIVs (3942; 95%). In addition, RCs also reported 984 wild birds testing positive for low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). Out of those, for 660 (67%) it was ascertained that the subtype was non-A(H5/H7); 260 (26%) wild birds tested positive for LPAIv of A(H5 or H7) subtypes and the remaining 64 (7%) LPAI viruses were belonging to other H-subtypes.
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In the context of the initiative 'CP-g-22-04.01 Direct grants to Member States' authorities', EFSA was requested to develop and conduct a prioritisation of zoonotic diseases, in collaboration with Member States, to identify priorities for the establishment of a coordinated surveillance system under the One Health approach. The methodology developed by EFSA's Working Group on One Health surveillance was based on a combination of multi-criteria decision analysis and the Delphi method. It comprised the establishment of a list of zoonotic diseases, definition of pathogen- and surveillance-related criteria, weighing of those criteria, scoring of zoonotic diseases by Member States, calculation of summary scores, and ranking of the list of zoonotic diseases according to those scores. Results were presented at EU and country level. A prioritisation workshop was organised with the One Health subgroup of EFSA's Scientific Network for Risk Assessment in Animal Health and Welfare in November 2022 to discuss and agree on a final list of priorities for which specific surveillance strategies would be developed. Those 10 priorities were Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, echinococcosis (both E. granulosus and E. multilocularis), hepatitis E, influenza (avian), influenza (swine), Lyme borreliosis, Q-fever, Rift Valley fever, tick-borne encephalitis and West Nile fever. 'Disease X' was not assessed in the same way as other zoonotic diseases on the list, but it was added to the final list of priorities due to its relevance and importance in the One Health context.
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Between 24 June and 1 September 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (25) and wild (482) birds across 21 countries in Europe. Most of these outbreaks appeared to be clustered along coastlines with only few HPAI virus detections inland. In poultry, all HPAI outbreaks were primary and sporadic with most of them occurring in the United Kingdom. In wild birds, colony-breeding seabirds continued to be most heavily affected, but an increasing number of HPAI virus detections in waterfowl is expected in the coming weeks. The current epidemic in wild birds has already surpassed the one of the previous epidemiological year in terms of total number of HPAI virus detections. As regards mammals, A(H5N1) virus was identified in 26 fur animal farms in Finland. Affected species included American mink, red and Arctic fox, and common raccoon dog. The most likely source of introduction was contact with gulls. Wild mammals continued to be affected worldwide, mostly red foxes and different seal species. Since the last report and as of 28 September 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans have been reported by the United Kingdom, and three human infections with A(H5N6) and two with A(H9N2) were reported from China, respectively. No human infection related to the avian influenza detections in animals on fur farms in Finland or in cats in Poland have been reported, and human infections with avian influenza remain a rare event. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated); this assessment covers different situations that depend on the level of exposure.
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Between 29 April and 23 June 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus (clade 2.3.4.4b) outbreaks were reported in domestic (98) and wild (634) birds across 25 countries in Europe. A cluster of outbreaks in mulard ducks for foie gras production was concentrated in Southwest France, whereas the overall A(H5N1) situation in poultry in Europe and worldwide has eased. In wild birds, black-headed gulls and several new seabird species, mostly gulls and terns (e.g. sandwich terns), were heavily affected, with increased mortality being observed in both adults and juveniles after hatching. Compared to the same period last year, dead seabirds have been increasingly found inland and not only along European coastlines. As regards mammals, A(H5N1) virus was identified in 24 domestic cats and one caracal in Poland between 10 and 30 June 2023. Affected animals showed neurological and respiratory signs, sometimes mortality, and were widely scattered across nine voivodeships in the country. All cases are genetically closely related and identified viruses cluster with viruses detected in poultry (since October 2022, but now only sporadic) and wild birds (December 2022-January 2023) in the past. Uncertainties still exist around their possible source of infection, with no feline-to-feline or feline-to-human transmission reported so far. Since 10 May 2023 and as of 4 July 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans were reported from the United Kingdom, and two A(H9N2) and one A(H5N6) human infections in China. In addition, one person infected with A(H3N8) in China has died. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA, low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated).
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Between 2 March and 28 April 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5Nx) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, outbreaks were reported in domestic (106) and wild (610) birds across 24 countries in Europe. Poultry outbreaks occurred less frequently compared to the previous reporting period and compared to spring 2022. Most of these outbreaks were classified as primary outbreaks without secondary spread and some of them associated with atypical disease presentation, in particular low mortality. In wild birds, black-headed gulls continued to be heavily affected, while also other threatened wild bird species, such as the peregrine falcon, showed increased mortality. The ongoing epidemic in black-headed gulls, many of which breed inland, may increase the risk for poultry, especially in July-August, when first-year birds disperse from the breeding colonies. HPAI A(H5N1) virus also continued to expand in the Americas, including in mammalian species, and is expected to reach the Antarctic in the near future. HPAI virus infections were detected in six mammal species, particularly in marine mammals and mustelids, for the first time, while the viruses currently circulating in Europe retain a preferential binding for avian-like receptors. Since 13 March 2022 and as of 10 May 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans were reported from China (1), and Chile (1), as well as three A(H9N2) and one A(H3N8) human infections in China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.
RESUMO
Between 2 September and 1 December 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) outbreaks were reported in domestic (88) and wild (175) birds across 23 countries in Europe. Compared to previous years, the increase in the number of HPAI virus detections in waterfowl has been delayed, possibly due to a later start of the autumn migration of several wild bird species. Common cranes were the most frequently affected species during this reporting period with mortality events being described in several European countries. Most HPAI outbreaks reported in poultry were primary outbreaks following the introduction of the virus by wild birds, with the exception of Hungary, where two clusters involving secondary spread occurred. HPAI viruses identified in Europe belonged to eleven different genotypes, seven of which were new. With regard to mammals, the serological survey conducted in all fur farms in Finland revealed 29 additional serologically positive farms during this reporting period. Wild mammals continued to be affected mostly in the Americas, from where further spread into wild birds and mammals in the Antarctic region was described for the first time. Since the last report and as of 1 December 2023, three fatal and one severe human A(H5N1) infection with clade 2.3.2.1c viruses have been reported by Cambodia, and one A(H9N2) infection was reported from China. No human infections related to the avian influenza detections in animals in fur farms in Finland have been reported, and human infections with avian influenza remain a rare event. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA. The risk of infection remains low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people to infected birds or mammals (wild or domesticated); this assessment covers different situations that depend on the level of exposure.
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Infectious pancreatic necrosis (IPN) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular, the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to IPN. The assessment was performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether IPN can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (50-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that IPN does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 0-1% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 33-66%, 33-66%, 50-90% and 50-99% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for IPN according to Article 8 criteria are provided.
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Infection with Gyrodactylus salaris was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular, the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid down in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to infection with G. salaris. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method for data collection and assessment previously developed by AHAW panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether infection with G. salaris can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-70% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that Infection with G. salaris does not meet the criteria in Section 1 and 3 (Category A and C; 1-5% and 10-33% probability of fulfilling the criteria, respectively) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 4 and 5 (Categories B, D and E; 33-80%, 33-66% and 33-80% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for infection with G. salaris according to Article 8 criteria are provided.
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European Union (EU) Member States (MSs) are required to carry out surveillance for avian influenza (AI) in poultry and wild birds and notify the results to the responsible authority. In addition, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) also implement ongoing surveillance programmes to monitor incursions of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in poultry and wild birds. EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to collate, validate, analyse and summarise the data resulting from these AI surveillance programmes in an annual report. The present report summarises the results of the surveillance activities carried out in MSs and the aforementioned countries in 2021. Overall, 24,290 poultry establishments (PEs) were sampled, of which 27 were seropositive for influenza A(H5) and 4 for A(H7) viruses. Seropositive PEs were found in 10 MSs and, as per previous years, the highest percentages of seropositive PEs were found in establishments raising waterfowl game birds and breeding geese. Out of these 31 seropositive PEs, 3 tested positive by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for influenza A(H5) viruses: 1 for highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV), 1 for low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) and 1 with unknown virus pathogenicity. In addition, 16 countries reported PCR test results from 1,858 PEs which did not correspond to the follow-up testing of a positive serology event (e.g. in some PEs, PCR tests were used for screening). Sixty-five of these PEs in 10 MSs were found positive for AIVs. Apart from poultry, 31,382 wild birds were sampled, with 2,314 wild birds testing positive for HPAIVs by PCR. Twenty-two countries reported HPAIV-positive wild birds and most positive samples were identified as highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N8) virus. In addition, 328 wild birds tested positive for LPAIVs of the A(H5/H7) subtypes and 362 wild birds tested positive for non-A(H5/H7) subtype AIVs.
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Equine herpesvirus-1 (EHV-1) can affect the entire equine sector in EU, and the large outbreak reported in 2021 in Spain drew attention to the needs of the European Commission for scientific advice for the assessment of EHV-1 infection within the framework of Animal Health Law. EHV-1 is considered endemic in the EU; its main risk is linked to the characteristic of producing latent life-long infections. These can reactivate producing clinical disease, which can include respiratory, abortive and possibly fatal neurological forms. From the epidemiological and genomic viewpoint, there are no specific neuropathogenic EHV-1 strains; the respiratory, reproductive and neurological signs are not found to be strain-specific. This was also the case of the virus that caused the outbreak in Valencia (Spain) in 2021, which was genetically closely related to other viruses circulating before in Europe, and did not present the so-called neuropathogenic genotype. The outbreak reported in Valencia was followed by wide geographic spread of the virus possibly due to a delay in diagnosis and late application of biosecurity measures. The recommended and most sensitive diagnostic test for detecting EHV-1 is PCR performed on swabs collected according to the type of clinical signs. Serological assays on paired blood samples can help to detect a recent infection, while no diagnostic methods are available to detect EHV-1 latent infections. Safe movements of horses can be ensured at premovement phase by testing and issuing health certificates, and by isolating animals upon arrival at new premises with regular health monitoring. In case of suspicion, movements should be forbidden and EHV-1 infection early detected/confirmed by validated diagnostic tools. During outbreaks, no movements should be allowed until 21 days after the detection of the last case. In general, vaccination against EHV-1 should be promoted, although this offers limited protection against the neurological form of the disease.
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Enterococcus cecorum (E. cecorum) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for poultry in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR E. cecorum can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-75% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 4 (Categories A, B and D; 0-5%, 5-10% and 10-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 3 and 5 (Categories C and E, 33-66% and 33-75% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for AMR E. cecorum according to Article 8 criteria are mostly birds belonging to the families of Anatidae, Columbidae and Phasianidae.
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Enterococcus faecalis (E. faecalis) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for poultry in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR E. faecalis can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-66% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 4 (Categories A, B and D; 0-5%, 5-10% and 1-10% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 3 and 5 (Categories C and E, 33-66% and 33-66% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for AMR E. faecalis according to Article 8 criteria are mostly birds of the orders Galliformes and Anseriformes, but also mammals and reptiles can serve as reservoirs.
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Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for cattle and horses in previous scientific opinions. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR S. aureus can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (60-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 4 (Categories A, B and D; 1-5%, 5-10% and 10-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel was uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 3 and 5 (Categories C and E, 33-90% and 60-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for AMR S. aureus according to Article 8 criteria include mainly mammals, birds, reptiles and fish.
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Escherichia coli (E. coli) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for dogs and cats, horses, swine, poultry, cattle, sheep and goats in previous scientific opinions. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR E. coli can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-66% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Categories A, B, C and D; 0-5%, 5-10%, 10-33% and 10-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel was uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Section 5 (Category E, 33-66% probability of meeting the criteria). The animal species to be listed for AMR E. coli according to Article 8 criteria include mammals, birds, reptiles and fish.
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Pseudomonas aeruginosa (P. aeruginosa) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for dogs and cats in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR P. aeruginosa can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Categories A, B, C and D; 0-5%, 1-5%, 5-33% and 5-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel was uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Section 5 (Category E, 33-90% probability of meeting the criteria). The animal species to be listed for AMR P. aeruginosa according to Article 8 criteria are mainly dogs and cats.
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Brachyspira hyodysenteriae (B. hyodysenteriae) was identified among the most relevant antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) bacteria in the EU for swine in a previous scientific opinion. Thus, it has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to the bacterium. The assessment has been performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether AMR B. hyodysenteriae can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-66% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that the bacterium does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 3 (Categories A, B and C; 1-10%, 10-33% and 10-33% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) and the AHAW Panel was uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 4 and 5 (Categories D and E, 50-90% and 33-66% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The main animal species to be listed for AMR B. hyodysenteriae according to Article 8 criteria are pigs and some species of birds, such as chickens and ducks.