L. pneumophila resists its self-harming metabolite HGA via secreted factors and collective peroxide scavenging.

IMPORTANCE: Before environmental opportunistic pathogens can infect humans, they must first successfully grow and compete with other microbes in nature, often via secreted antimicrobials. We previously discovered that the bacterium Legionella pneumophila, the causative agent of Legionnaires' disease, can compete with other microbes via a secreted molecule called HGA. Curiously, L. pneumophila strains that produce HGA is not wholly immune to its toxicity, making it a mystery how these bacteria can withstand the "friendly fire" of potentially self-targeting antimicrobials during inter-bacterial battles. Here, we identify several strategies that allow the high-density bacterial populations that secrete HGA to tolerate its effects. Our study clarifies how HGA works. It also points to some explanations of why it is difficult to disinfect L. pneumophila from the built environment and prevent disease outbreaks.

Tracking cryptic SARS-CoV-2 lineages detected in NYC wastewater.

Tracking SARS-CoV-2 genetic diversity is strongly indicated because diversifying selection may lead to the emergence of novel variants resistant to naturally acquired or vaccine-induced immunity. To monitor New York City (NYC) for the presence of novel variants, we deep sequence most of the receptor binding domain coding sequence of the S protein of SARS-CoV-2 isolated from the New York City wastewater. Here we report detecting increasing frequencies of novel cryptic SARS-CoV-2 lineages not recognized in GISAID's EpiCoV database. These lineages contain mutations that had been rarely observed in clinical samples, including Q493K, Q498Y, E484A, and T572N and share many mutations with the Omicron variant of concern. Some of these mutations expand the tropism of SARS-CoV-2 pseudoviruses by allowing infection of cells expressing the human, mouse, or rat ACE2 receptor. Finally, pseudoviruses containing the spike amino acid sequence of these lineages were resistant to different classes of receptor binding domain neutralizing monoclonal antibodies. We offer several hypotheses for the anomalous presence of these lineages, including the possibility that these lineages are derived from unsampled human COVID-19 infections or that they indicate the presence of a non-human animal reservoir.

Protocol for safe, affordable, and reproducible isolation and quantitation of SARS-CoV-2 RNA from wastewater.

The following protocol describes our workflow for processing wastewater with the goal of detecting the genetic signal of SARS-CoV-2. The steps include pasteurization, virus concentration, RNA extraction, and quantification by RT-qPCR. We include auxiliary steps that provide new users with tools and strategies that will help troubleshoot key steps in the process. This protocol is one of the safest, cheapest, and most reproducible approaches for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in wastewater. Owing to a pasteurization step, it is safe for use in a BSL2 facility. In addition to making the protocol safe for the personnel involved, pasteurization had the added benefit of increasing the SARS-CoV-2 genetic signal. Furthermore, the RNA obtained using this protocol can be sequenced using both Sanger and Illumina sequencing technologies. The protocol was adopted by the New York City Department of Environmental Protection in August 2020 to monitor SARS-CoV-2 prevalence in wastewater in all five boroughs of the city. In the future, this protocol could be used to detect a variety of other clinically relevant viruses in wastewater and serve as a foundation of a wastewater surveillance strategy for monitoring community spread of known and emerging viral pathogens.