Variability across subjects in free recall versus cued recall.

Memory scientists usually compare mean performance on some measure(s) (accuracy, confidence, latency) as a function of experimental condition. Some researchers have made within-subject variability in task performance a focal outcome measure (e.g., Yao et al., Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 38, 227-237, 2016). Here, we explored between-subject variability in accuracy as a function of experimental conditions. This work was inspired by an incidental finding in a previous study, in which we observed greater variability in accuracy of memory performance on cued recall (CR) versus free recall (FR) of English animal/object nouns (Mah et al., Frontiers in Psychology, 14, 1146200, 2023). Here we report experiments designed to assess the reliability of that pattern and to explore its causes (e.g., differential interpretation of instructions, [un]relatedness of CR word pairs, encoding time). In Experiment 1 (N = 120 undergraduates), we replicated the CR:FR variability difference with a more representative set of English nouns. In Experiments 2A (N = 117 Prolific participants) and 2B (N = 127 undergraduates), we found that the CR:FR variability difference persisted in a forced-recall procedure. In Experiment 3 (N = 260 Prolific participants), we used meaningfully related word pairs and still found greater variability in CR than in FR performance. In Experiment 4 (N = 360 Prolific participants), we equated CR and FR study phases by having all participants study pairs and, again, observed greater variability in CR than FR. The same was true in Experiment 5 (N = 120 undergraduates), in which study time was self-paced. Comparisons of variability across subjects can yield insights into the mechanisms underlying task performance.

Recognition, remember-know, and confidence judgments: no evidence of cross-contamination here!

ABSTRACTWe report three experiments designed to reveal the mechanisms that underlie subjective experiences of recognition by examining effects of how those experiences are measured. Prior research has explored the potential influences of collecting metacognitive measures on memory performance. Building on this work, here we systematically evaluated whether cross-measure contamination occurs when remember-know (RK) and/or confidence (C) judgments are made after old/new recognition decisions. In Experiment 1, making either RK or C judgments did not significantly influence recognition relative to a standard no-judgment condition. In Experiment 2, making RK judgments in addition to C judgments did not significantly affect recognition or confidence. In Experiment 3, making C judgments in addition to RK judgments did not significantly affect recognition or patterns of RK responses. Cross-contamination was not apparent regardless of whether items were studied using a shallow or deep levels-of-processing task - a manipulation that yielded robust effects on recognition, RK judgments, and C. Our results indicate that under some conditions, participants can independently evaluate their recognition, subjective recognition experience, and confidence. Though contamination across measures of metamemory and memory is always possible, it may not be inevitable. This has implications for the mechanisms that underlie subjective experiences that accompany recognition judgments.

Test position effects on hit and false alarm rates in recognition memory for paintings and words.

When old/new recognition memory is tested with equal numbers of studied and nonstudied items and no rewards or instructions that favour one response over the other, there is no obvious reason for response bias. In line with this, Canadian undergraduates have shown, on average, a neutral response bias when we tested them on recognition of common English words. By contrast, most subjects we have tested on recognition of richly detailed images have shown a conservative bias: they more often erred by missing a studied image than by judging a nonstudied image as studied. Here, in an effort to better understand these materials-based bias effects (MBBEs), we examined changes in hit and false alarm (FA) rates (and in sensitivity and bias) from the first to fourth quartile of a recognition memory test in eight experiments in which undergraduates studied words and/or images of paintings. Response bias for images tended to increase across quartiles, whereas bias for words showed no consistent pattern across quartiles. This pattern could be described as an increase in the MBBE over the course of the test, but the underlying patterns for hits and FAs are not easily reconciled with this interpretation. Hit rates decreased over the course of the test for both materials types, with that decline tending to be steeper for images than words. For words, FA rates tended to increase across quartiles, whereas for paintings FA rates did not increase across quartiles. We discuss implications of these findings for theoretical accounts of the MBBE.

Different definitions of the nonrecollection-based response option(s) change how people use the "remember" response in the remember/know paradigm.

In the remember/know paradigm, a "know" response can be defined to participants as a high-confidence state of certainty or as a low-confidence state based on a feeling of familiarity. To examine the effects of definition on use of responses, in two experiments, definitions of "remember" and "guess" were kept constant, but definitions of "know" and/or "familiar" were systematically varied to emphasize (a) a subjective experience of high confidence without recollection, (b) a feeling of familiarity, (c) both of these subjective experiences combined within one response option, or (d) both of these experiences as separate response options. The confidence expressed in "know" and/or "familiar" definitions affected how participants used response options. Importantly, this included use of the "remember" response, which tended to be used more frequently when the nonrecollection-based middle response option emphasized a feeling of familiarity rather than an experience of "just knowing." The influence of the definitions on response patterns was greater for items that had undergone deep rather than shallow processing, and was greater when deep-encoded and shallow-encoded items were mixed, rather than blocked, at test. Our findings fit with previous research suggesting that the mnemonic traces underlying subjective judgments are continuous and that the remember/know paradigm is not a pure measure of underlying processes. Findings also emphasize the importance of researchers publishing the exact definitions they have used to enable accurate comparisons across studies.

Evidence that photos promote rosiness for claims about the future.

When people rapidly judge the truth of claims about the present or the past, a related but nonprobative photo can produce "truthiness," an increase in the perceived truth of those claims (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012). What we do not know is the extent to which nonprobative photos cause truthiness for the future. We addressed this issue in four experiments. In each experiment, people judged the truth of claims that the price of certain commodities (such as manganese) would increase (or decrease). Half of the time, subjects saw a photo of the commodity paired with the claim. Experiments 1A and 1B produced a "rosiness" bias: Photos led people to believe positive claims about the future but had very little effect on people's belief in negative claims. In Experiment 2, rosiness occurred for both close and distant future claims. In Experiments 3A and 3B, we tested whether rosiness was tied to the perceived positivity of a claim. Finally, in Experiments 4A and 4B, we tested the rosiness hypothesis and found that rosiness was unique to claims about the future: When people made the same judgments about the past, photos produced the usual truthiness pattern for both positive and negative claims. Considered all together, our data fit with the idea that photos may operate as hypothesis-confirming evidence for people's tendency to anticipate rosy future outcomes.

Constraints on generality statements are needed to define direct replication.

Whether or not a replication attempt counts as "direct" often cannot be determined definitively after the fact as a result of flexibility in how procedural differences are interpreted. Specifying constraints on generality in original articles can eliminate ambiguity in advance, thereby leading to a more cumulative science.

A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies.

Understanding that suggestive practices can promote false beliefs and false memories for childhood events is important in many settings (e.g., psychotherapeutic, medical, and legal). The generalisability of findings from memory implantation studies has been questioned due to variability in estimates across studies. Such variability is partly due to false memories having been operationalised differently across studies and to differences in memory induction techniques. We explored ways of defining false memory based on memory science and developed a reliable coding system that we applied to reports from eight published implantation studies (N = 423). Independent raters coded transcripts using seven criteria: accepting the suggestion, elaboration beyond the suggestion, imagery, coherence, emotion, memory statements, and not rejecting the suggestion. Using this scheme, 30.4% of cases were classified as false memories and another 23% were classified as having accepted the event to some degree. When the suggestion included self-relevant information, an imagination procedure, and was not accompanied by a photo depicting the event, the memory formation rate was 46.1%. Our research demonstrates a useful procedure for systematically combining data that are not amenable to meta-analysis, and provides the most valid estimate of false memory formation and associated moderating factors within the implantation literature to date.

Trauma-related versus positive involuntary thoughts with and without meta-awareness.

In earlier work, we asked subjects to report involuntary thoughts relating to a trauma film and also probed subjects periodically. Subjects often reported involuntary thoughts in response to probes, suggesting they lacked meta-awareness of those thoughts. But it is possible that some or all probe-detected thoughts were continuations of thoughts subjects had spontaneously reported, leading us to overestimate involuntary thoughts lacking meta-awareness. It is also unclear whether failures in meta-awareness occur for other emotional events. We exposed subjects to a negative or positive film. Subsequently, they reported involuntary film-related thoughts and responded to probes that distinguished new from continuing thoughts. Many (54%) but not all probe-caught thoughts were thought continuations. This result supports our earlier finding that people can lack meta-awareness for trauma-related thoughts, but suggests caution in how meta-awareness is assessed. We also found that self-caught negative and positive involuntary thoughts occurred at a similar frequency, with different characteristics.

Long-Term Motor Recovery After Severe Traumatic Brain Injury: Beyond Established Limits.

OBJECTIVE: To report neural plasticity changes after severe traumatic brain injury. SETTING: Case-control study. PARTICIPANTS: Canadian soldier, Captain Trevor Greene survived a severe open-traumatic brain injury during a 2006 combat tour in Afghanistan. DESIGN: Longitudinal follow-up for more than 6 years. MAIN MEASURES: Twelve longitudinal functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) examinations were conducted to investigate lower limb activation changes in association with clinical examination. Trevor Greene's lower limb fMRI activation was compared with control fMRI activation of (1) mental imagery of similar movement and (2) matched control subject data. RESULTS: Trevor Greene's motor recovery and corresponding fMRI activation increased significantly over time (F = 32.54, P < .001). Clinical measures of functional recovery correlated strongly with fMRI motor activation changes (r = 0.81, P = .001). By comparison, while Trevor Greene's mental imagery activated similar motor regions, there was no evidence of fMRI activation change over time. While comparable, control motor activation did not change over time and there was no significant mental imagery activation. CONCLUSION: Motor function recovery can occur beyond 6 years after severe traumatic brain injury, both in neural plasticity and clinical outcome. This demonstrates that continued benefits in physical function due to rehabilitative efforts can be achieved for many years following injury. The finding challenges current practices and assumptions in rehabilitation following traumatic brain injury.

Meta-awareness and the involuntary memory spectrum: Reply to Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015).

In their commentary, Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015) raise several important issues about the definitions, characteristics and applications of various involuntary cognitive phenomena. Here we respond to the comments of Meyer et al. in ways that we hope will advance understanding of these issues, and inform future research. In particular, we have focused on the characteristics of involuntary phenomena-particularly in relation to meta-awareness-and the clinical relevance of mind-wandering.

Self-report may underestimate trauma intrusions.

Research examining maladaptive responses to trauma routinely relies on spontaneous self-report to index intrusive thoughts, which assumes people accurately recognize and report their intrusive thoughts. However, "mind-wandering" research reveals people are not always meta-aware of their thought content: they often fail to notice shifts in their attention. In two experiments, we exposed subjects to trauma films, then instructed them to report intrusive thoughts during an unrelated reading task. Intermittently, we asked whether they were thinking about the trauma. As expected, subjects often spontaneously reported intrusive thoughts. However, they were also "caught" engaging in unreported trauma-oriented thoughts. The presence and frequency of intermittent probes did not influence self-caught intrusions. Both self-caught and probe-caught intrusions were related to an existing tendency toward intrusive cognition, film-related distress, and thought suppression attempts. Our data suggest people may lack meta-awareness of trauma-related thoughts, which has implications for theory, research and treatment relating to trauma-related psychopathology.

Top-down constraint on recognition memory.

Can recognition memory be constrained "at the front end," such that people are more likely to retrieve information about studying a recognition-test probe from a specified target source than they are to retrieve such information about a probe from a nontarget source? We adapted a procedure developed by Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (Psychonomic bulletin & review 12:852-857, 2005) to address this question. Experiment 1 yielded evidence of source-constrained retrieval, but that pattern was not significant in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 (nor in several unpublished pilot experiments). In experiment 5, in which items from the two studied sources were perceptibly different, a pattern consistent with front-end constraint of recognition emerged, but this constraint was likely exercised via visual attention rather than memory. Experiment 6 replicated both the absence of a significant constrained-retrieval pattern when the sources did not differ perceptibly (as in exps. 2, 3 and 4) and the presence of that pattern when they did differ perceptibly (as in exp. 5). Our results suggest that people can easily constrain recognition when items from the to-be-recognized source differ perceptibly from items from other sources (presumably via visual attention), but that it is difficult to constrain retrieval solely on the basis of source memory.

Investigating industrial investigation: examining the impact of a priori knowledge and tunnel vision education.

The current study addressed tunnel vision in industrial incident investigation by experimentally testing how a priori information and a human bias (generated via the fundamental attribution error or correspondence bias) affected participants' investigative behavior as well as the effectiveness of a debiasing intervention. Undergraduates and professional investigators engaged in a simulated industrial investigation exercise. We found that participants' judgments were biased by knowledge about the safety history of either a worker or piece of equipment and that a human bias was evident in participants' decision making. However, bias was successfully reduced with "tunnel vision education." Professional investigators demonstrated a greater sophistication in their investigative decision making compared to undergraduates. The similarities and differences between these two populations are discussed.

A direct replication and extension of Popp and Serra (2016, experiment 1): better free recall and worse cued recall of animal names than object names, accounting for semantic similarity.

Introduction: Free recall tends to be better for names of animate concepts such as animals than for names of inanimate objects. In Popp and Serra's 2016 article, the authors replicated this "animacy effect" in free recall but when participants studied words in pairs (animate-animate pairs intermixed with inanimate-inanimate pairs) and were tested with cued recall, performance was better for inanimate-inanimate pairs than for animate-animate pairs ("reverse animacy"). We tested the replicability of this surprising effect and one possible explanation for the effect (semantic similarity). Methods: Our Experiment 1 was a preregistered direct replication (N = 101) of Popp and Serra's Experiment 1 (mixed-lists condition). In a second preregistered experiment conducted in four different samples (undergraduate N = 153, undergraduate N = 143, online Prolific N = 101, online Prolific/English-as-a-first-language N = 150), we manipulated the within-category semantic similarity of animal and object wordlists. Results: AIn Experiment 1, just as in Popp and Serra, we observed an animacy effect for free recall and a reverse animacy effect for cued recall. Unlike Popp and Serra, we found that controlling for interference effects rendered the reverse animacy effect non-significant. We took this as evidence that characteristics of the stimulus sets (e.g., category structure, within-category similarity) may play a role in animacy and reverse animacy effects. In Experiment 2, in three out of our four samples, we observed reverse animacy effects when within-category similarity was higher for animals and when within-category similarity was equated for animals and objects. Discussion: Our results suggest that the reverse animacy effect observed in Popp and Serra's 2016 article is a robust and replicable effect, but that semantic similarity alone cannot explain the effect.

Mixed News about the Bad News Game.

Basol et al. (2020) tested the "the Bad News Game" (BNG), an app designed to improve ability to spot false claims on social media. Participants rated simulated Tweets, then played either the BNG or an unrelated game, then re-rated the Tweets. Playing the BNG lowered rated belief in false Tweets. Here, four teams of undergraduate psychology students each attempted an extended replication of Basol et al., using updated versions of the original Bad News game. The most important extension was that the replications included a larger number of true Tweets than the original study and planned analyses of responses to true Tweets. The four replications were loosely coordinated, with each team independently working out how to implement the agreed plan. Despite many departures from the Basol et al. method, all four teams replicated their key finding: Playing the BNG reduced belief in false Tweets. But playing the BNG also reduced belief in true Tweets to the same or almost the same extent. Exploratory signal detection theory analyses indicated that the BNG increased response bias but did not improve discrimination. This converges with findings reported by Modirrousta-Galian and Higham (2023).

The effect of pre-event instructions on eyewitness identification.

Research on eyewitness identification often involves exposing participants to a simulated crime and later testing memory using a lineup. We conducted a systematic review showing that pre-event instructions, instructions given before event exposure, are rarely reported and those that are reported vary in the extent to which they warn participants about the nature of the event or tasks. At odds with the experience of actual witnesses, some studies use pre-event instructions explicitly warning participants of the upcoming crime and lineup task. Both the basic and applied literature provide reason to believe that pre-event instructions may affect eyewitness identification performance. In the current experiment, we tested the impact of pre-event instructions on lineup identification decisions and confidence. Participants received non-specific pre-event instructions (i.e., "watch this video") or eyewitness pre-event instructions (i.e., "watch this crime video, you'll complete a lineup later") and completed a culprit-absent or -present lineup. We found no support for the hypothesis that participants who receive eyewitness pre-event instructions have higher discriminability than participants who receive non-specific pre-event instructions. Additionally, confidence-accuracy calibration was not significantly different between conditions. However, participants in the eyewitness condition were more likely to see the event as a crime and to make an identification than participants in the non-specific condition. Implications for conducting and interpreting eyewitness identification research and the basic research on instructions and attention are discussed.

Identifying the bad guy in a lineup using confidence judgments under deadline pressure.

Eyewitness-identification tests often culminate in witnesses not picking the culprit or identifying innocent suspects. We tested a radical alternative to the traditional lineup procedure used in such tests. Rather than making a positive identification, witnesses made confidence judgments under a short deadline about whether each lineup member was the culprit. We compared this deadline procedure with the traditional sequential-lineup procedure in three experiments with retention intervals ranging from 5 min to 1 week. A classification algorithm that identified confidence criteria that optimally discriminated accurate from inaccurate decisions revealed that decision accuracy was 24% to 66% higher under the deadline procedure than under the traditional procedure. Confidence profiles across lineup stimuli were more informative than were identification decisions about the likelihood that an individual witness recognized the culprit or correctly recognized that the culprit was not present. Large differences between the maximum and the next-highest confidence value signaled very high accuracy. Future support for this procedure across varied conditions would highlight a viable alternative to the problematic lineup procedures that have traditionally been used by law enforcement.