Exploring Attitudes Toward "Sugar Relationships" Across 87 Countries: A Global Perspective on Exchanges of Resources for Sex and Companionship.

The current study investigates attitudes toward one form of sex for resources: the so-called sugar relationships, which often involve exchanges of resources for sex and/or companionship. The present study examined associations among attitudes toward sugar relationships and relevant variables (e.g., sex, sociosexuality, gender inequality, parasitic exposure) in 69,924 participants across 87 countries. Two self-report measures of Acceptance of Sugar Relationships (ASR) developed for younger companion providers (ASR-YWMS) and older resource providers (ASR-OMWS) were translated into 37 languages. We tested cross-sex and cross-linguistic construct equivalence, cross-cultural invariance in sex differences, and the importance of the hypothetical predictors of ASR. Both measures showed adequate psychometric properties in all languages (except the Persian version of ASR-YWMS). Results partially supported our hypotheses and were consistent with previous theoretical considerations and empirical evidence on human mating. For example, at the individual level, sociosexual orientation, traditional gender roles, and pathogen prevalence were significant predictors of both ASR-YWMS and ASR-OMWS. At the country level, gender inequality and parasite stress positively predicted the ASR-YWMS. However, being a woman negatively predicted the ASR-OMWS, but positively predicted the ASR-YWMS. At country-level, ingroup favoritism and parasite stress positively predicted the ASR-OMWS. Furthermore, significant cross-subregional differences were found in the openness to sugar relationships (both ASR-YWMS and ASR-OMWS scores) across subregions. Finally, significant differences were found between ASR-YWMS and ASR-OMWS when compared in each subregion. The ASR-YWMS was significantly higher than the ASR-OMWS in all subregions, except for Northern Africa and Western Asia.

Tell it to a child! A brain stimulation study of the role of left inferior frontal gyrus in emotion regulation during storytelling.

In everyday life we need to continuously regulate our emotional responses according to their social context. Strategies of emotion regulation allow individuals to control time, intensity, nature and expression of emotional responses to environmental stimuli. The left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) is involved in the cognitive control of the selection of semantic content. We hypothesized that it might also be involved in the regulation of emotional feelings and expressions. We applied continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) over LIFG or a control site before a newly-developed ecological regulation task that required participants to produce storytelling of pictures with negative or neutral valence to either a peer (unregulated condition) or a child (regulated condition). Linguistic, expressive, and physiological responses were analyzed in order to assess the effects of LIFG-cTBS on emotion regulation. Results showed that the emotion regulation context modulated the emotional content of narrative productions, but not the physiologic orienting response or the early expressive behavior to negative stimuli. Furthermore, LIFG-cTBS disrupted the text-level structuring of negative picture storytelling and the early cardiac and muscular response to negative pictures; however, it did not affect the contextual emotional regulation of storytelling. These results may suggest that LIFG is involved in the initial detection of the affective arousal of emotional stimuli.

Conscious and unconscious representations of observed actions in the human motor system.

Action observation activates the observer's motor system. These motor resonance responses are automatic and triggered even when the action is only implied in static snapshots. However, it is largely unknown whether an action needs to be consciously perceived to trigger motor resonance. In this study, we used single-pulse TMS to study the facilitation of corticospinal excitability (a measure of motor resonance) during supraliminal and subliminal presentations of implied action images. We used a forward and backward dynamic masking procedure that successfully prevented the conscious perception of prime stimuli depicting a still hand or an implied abduction movement of the index or little finger. The prime was followed by the supraliminal presentation of a still or implied action probe hand. Our results revealed a muscle-specific increase of motor facilitation following observation of the probe hand actions that were consciously perceived as compared with observation of a still hand. Crucially, unconscious perception of prime hand actions presented before probe still hands did not increase motor facilitation as compared with observation of a still hand, suggesting that motor resonance requires perceptual awareness. However, the presentation of a masked prime depicting an action that was incongruent with the probe hand action suppressed motor resonance to the probe action such that comparable motor facilitation was recorded during observation of implied action and still hand probes. This suppression of motor resonance may reflect the processing of action conflicts in areas upstream of the motor cortex and may subserve a basic mechanism for dealing with the multiple and possibly incongruent actions of other individuals.

Unconscious processing of body actions primes subsequent action perception but not motor execution.

Previous studies have shown that viewing body actions primes not only the visual perception of congruent versus incongruent actions, but also their motor execution. Here, we used a masked-priming paradigm to explore whether visuoperceptual and visuomotor action priming may also occur when the prime is not consciously perceived. In 5 experiments, healthy individuals were presented with masked implied-action primes and were then prompted to perceive congruent or incongruent implied-action stimuli or to execute congruent or incongruent finger movements. Results showed that implied-action primes affected subsequent action perception also when they were not consciously perceived. Unconscious visuoperceptual action priming effects were independent from spatial compatibility and reflected genuine action representation. Conversely, masked implied-action primes affected motor preparation and execution processes only when they were consciously perceived. The results provide evidence of unconscious visuoperceptual but not visuomotor action priming effects, suggesting that unconscious processing of actions affects perceptual, but not motor representations.