Emotional stimuli similarly disrupt attention in both visual fields.

People often need to filter relevant from irrelevant information. Irrelevant emotional distractors interrupt this process. But does the degree to which emotional distractors disrupt attention depend on which visual field they appear in? We thought it might for two reasons: (1) people pay slightly more attention to the left than the right visual field, and (2) some research suggests the right-hemisphere (which, in early visual processing, receives left visual field input) has areas specialised for processing emotion. Participants viewed a rapid image-stream in each visual field and reported the rotation of an embedded neutral target preceded by a negative or neutral distractor. We predicted that the degree to which negative (vs. neutral) distractors impaired target detection would be larger when targets appeared in the left than the right stream. This hypothesis was supported, but only when the distractor and target could appear in the same or opposite stream as each other (Experiments 2a-b), not when they always appeared in the same stream as each other (Experiments 1a-1b). However, this effect was driven by superior left-stream accuracy following neutral distractors, and similar left- and right-stream accuracy following negative distractors. Emotional distractors therefore override visuospatial asymmetries and disrupt attention, regardless of visual field.

Real world familiarity does not reduce susceptibility to emotional disruption of perception: evidence from two temporal attention tasks.

The visual system has been found to prioritise emotional stimuli so robustly that their presence can temporarily "blind" people to non-emotional targets in their direct line of vision. This has ostensible implications for the real world: medics must not be blinded to important information despite the trauma they confront, and drivers must not be blinded when passing emotionally engaging billboards. One possibility is that the familiarity of goal-relevant information can protect people's perception of it despite emotional distraction (e.g. drivers' perception might be less impaired by graphic ads when on a familiar road). In two experiments, we tested whether familiarity renders targets more perceptible following the presentation of an emotional distractor in two temporal attention tasks, emotion-induced blindness (Experiment 1) and the attentional blink (Experiment 2). Targets were pictures of familiar or unfamiliar locations. Although, overall, familiar targets were seen better than unfamiliar targets in both studies, stimulus familiarity did not reduce the relative perceptual impairments caused by emotional distractors.

Capture and Control: Working Memory Modulates Attentional Capture by Reward-Related Stimuli.

Physically salient but task-irrelevant distractors can capture attention in visual search, but resource-dependent, executive-control processes can help reduce this distraction. However, it is not only physically salient stimuli that grab our attention: Recent research has shown that reward history also influences the likelihood that stimuli will capture attention. Here, we investigated whether resource-dependent control processes modulate the effect of reward on attentional capture, much as for the effect of physical salience. To this end, we used eye tracking with a rewarded visual search task and compared performance under conditions of high and low working memory load. In two experiments, we demonstrated that oculomotor capture by high-reward distractor stimuli is enhanced under high memory load. These results highlight the role of executive-control processes in modulating distraction by reward-related stimuli. Our findings have implications for understanding the neurocognitive processes involved in real-life conditions in which reward-related stimuli may influence behavior, such as addiction.

Manipulations of distractor frequency do not mitigate emotion-induced blindness.

Emotional distractors can impair perception of subsequently presented targets, a phenomenon called emotion-induced blindness. Do emotional distractors lose their power to disrupt perception when appearing with increased frequency, perhaps due to desensitisation or enhanced recruitment of proactive control? Non-emotional tasks, such as the Stroop, have revealed that high frequency distractors or conflict lead to reduced interference, and distractor frequency appears to modulate attentional capture by emotional distractors in spatial attention tasks. But emotion-induced blindness is thought to reflect perceptual competition between targets and emotional distractors, and it is unclear whether high frequency emotional stimuli cause less disruption at this relatively early stage of processing. In four experiments, participants searched streams of images for a rotated target image. A negative or neutral distractor appeared before the target, and their relative frequency was manipulated. Across all experiments, the frequency of emotional distractors did not modulate emotion-induced blindness even when participants were explicitly informed that they would appear often or seldom. Thus, increased distractor frequency does not appear to mitigate the priority allotted to emotional distractors during perceptual competition.

Beyond perceptual judgment: Categorization and emotion shape what we see.

By limiting their review largely to studies measuring perceptual judgment, Firestone & Scholl (F&S) overstate their case. Evidence from inattentional blindness and emotion-induced blindness suggests that categorization and emotion shape what we perceive in the first place, not just the qualities that we judge them to have. The role of attention in such cases is not easily dismissed as "peripheral."

Emotion-induced blindness reflects competition at early and late processing stages: an ERP study.

Emotion-induced blindness (EIB) refers to impaired awareness of items appearing soon after an irrelevant, emotionally arousing stimulus. Superficially, EIB appears to be similar to the attentional blink (AB), a failure to report a target that closely follows another relevant target. Previous studies of AB using event-related potentials suggest that the AB results from interference with selection (N2 component) and consolidation (P3b component) of the second target into working memory. The present study applied a similar analysis to EIB and, similarly, found that an irrelevant emotional distractor suppressed the N2 and P3b components associated with the following target at short lags. Emotional distractors also elicited a positive deflection that appeared to be similar to the PD component, which has been associated with attempts to suppress salient, irrelevant distractors (Kiss, Grubert, Petersen, & Eimer, 2012; Sawaki, Geng, & Luck, 2012; Sawaki & Luck, 2010). These results suggest that irrelevant emotional pictures gain access to working memory, even when observers are attempting to ignore them and, like the AB, prevent access of a closely following target.

Mimicking Facial Expressions Facilitates Working Memory for Stimuli in Emotion-Congruent Colours.

It is one thing for everyday phrases like "seeing red" to link some emotions with certain colours (e.g., anger with red), but can such links measurably bias information processing? We investigated whether emotional face information (angry/happy/neutral) held in visual working memory (VWM) enhances memory for shapes presented in a conceptually consistent colour (red or green) (Experiment 1). Although emotional information held in VWM appeared not to bias memory for coloured shapes in Experiment 1, exploratory analyses suggested that participants who physically mimicked the face stimuli were better at remembering congruently coloured shapes. Experiment 2 confirmed this finding by asking participants to hold the faces in mind while either mimicking or labelling the emotional expressions of face stimuli. Once again, those who mimicked the expressions were better at remembering shapes with emotion-congruent colours, whereas those who simply labelled them were not. Thus, emotion-colour associations appear powerful enough to guide attention, but-consistent with proposed impacts of "embodied emotion" on cognition-such effects emerged when emotion processing was facilitated through facial mimicry.

Memory benefits when actively, rather than passively, viewing images.

Serial visual presentations of images exist both in the laboratory and increasingly on virtual platforms such as social media feeds. However, the way we interact with information differs between these. In many laboratory experiments participants view stimuli passively, whereas on social media people tend to interact with information actively. This difference could influence the way information is remembered, which carries practical and theoretical implications. In the current study, 821 participants viewed streams containing seven landscape images that were presented at either a self-paced (active) or an automatic (passive) rate. Critically, the presentation speed in each automatic trial was matched to the speed of a self-paced trial for each participant. Both memory accuracy and memory confidence were greater on self-paced compared to automatic trials. These results indicate that active, self-paced progression through images increases the likelihood of them being remembered, relative to when participants have no control over presentation speed and duration.

Setting sights higher: category-level attentional set modulates sustained inattentional blindness.

Previous research has shown that inattentional blindness is modulated by how people tune their "attentional set": the more featurally similar the unexpected object is to what people are trying to attend, the more likely it is that they will notice it. The experiments in this paper show that people can also establish attentional sets based on semantic categories, and that these high-level attentional sets modulate sustained inattentional blindness. In "Experiment 1", participants tracked four moving numbers and ignored four moving letters or vice versa, and the unexpected object was either a capital letter 'E' or its reverse, a block-like number '3'. Despite their featural similarity, participants were more likely to notice the unexpected object belonging to the same category as the tracked objects. "Experiment 2" replicated this effect in conditions where the unexpected object possessed a unique luminance and was less likely simply to be confused with other display items.

Taking the path of least resistance now, but not later: Pushing cognitive effort into the future reduces effort discounting.

Effort discounting describes the devaluation of rewards that require effort to obtain. The present study investigated whether discounting of cognitive effort depends on how near the effort is in time. The present study also investigated whether effort discounting, and its modulation by temporal distance to the effort, might depend on need for cognition, a personality trait that describes how much one enjoys cognitively demanding tasks. Participants performed a validated effort discounting task that measured the extent to which they subjectively devalued a $20 reward when effort was required to receive it. Immediacy of the effort was manipulated by having participants imagine exerting varying levels of effort either immediately, in a day, or in a month. Results revealed linear increases in discounting of rewards as a function of both how much effort was involved and how imminent the effort was. The extent to which both these variables influenced discounting correlated with need for cognition. Individuals low in need for cognition exhibited more effort discounting overall and a linear increase in effort discounting as the effort grew imminent. Individuals high in need for cognition engaged in less effort discounting, which was not modulated by how imminent the effort was. These results indicate that people exhibit dynamic inconsistency in effort-related decisions, such that the degree to which they discount effort depends on how soon the effort is. Additionally, this tendency is linked with systematic individual differences in need for cognition. Lastly, this study demonstrates that these tendencies can be quantitatively operationalized.

Gone for good: Lack of priming suggests early perceptual interference in emotion-induced blindness with negative stimuli.

Emotionally negative stimuli are perceptually prioritized to such a degree that they can cause people to miss seeing subsequent targets that appear in front of their eyes. It is unclear whether this effect (known as emotion-induced blindness) reflects postperceptual interference, in which case unseen targets might still impact later responses, as in the seemingly similar "attentional blink". An alternative is that emotional distractors prevent target encoding, and so leave no residual trace of target information. In this study, we used a priming task to assess these alternative possibilities. Each emotion-induced blindness trial was immediately followed by a speeded arrow judgment task, in which the arrow's orientation could be congruent or incongruent with the orientation of an emotion-induced blindness target. Analyses revealed strong evidence that seen targets primed the arrow judgment, but there was moderate to strong evidence that unseen targets elicited no priming whatsoever. These results lend support to claims that emotion-induced blindness reflects failure to perceptually encode target information, and may reflect a different mechanism from the phenomenally similar attentional blink. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

On the relative sensitivity of spatial and nonspatial measures of attentional bias: Emotion-induced blindness, the dot probe, and gradations in ratings of negative pictures.

Attentional biases toward negative information are implicated in various emotional disorders. The literature probing this relationship relies on assumptions that the tasks used to measure attentional biases are sensitive to the negative emotional qualities of stimuli; but are such assumptions justified? We assessed the degree to which two widely used tasks-the dot probe and emotion-induced blindness-displayed sensitivity to gradations in valence and arousal ratings for negative emotional pictures. For emotion-induced blindness (the failure to see a target that follows an emotional distractor in a rapidly presented sequence of items), there was strong evidence of sensitivity to gradations in both valence and arousal. In contrast, there was moderate to strong evidence that the dot probe (a spatial attention task where latency to respond to a target depends on whether it appears at or away from the location of an emotional stimulus) was insensitive to gradations in valence and arousal, although there was some evidence of its sensitivity to emotional versus neutral stimuli overall. That said, in the dot probe, response latency regardless of spatial relationship between the target and the emotional image appeared sensitive to gradations in stimulus emotionality. Together, these findings suggest that such sensitivity may be characteristic of nonspatial, rather than spatial, aspects of attention. Implications for attentional bias studies are discussed. Notably, the finding that emotion-induced blindness was sensitive to gradations in ratings of emotional pictures supports claims that the effect arises due to stimulus emotionality rather than simply differences in visual features of pictures (e.g., color, brightness, complexity). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Enhanced recognition of emotional images is not affected by post-exposure exercise-induced arousal.

Research suggests that aerobic exercise (i.e., exercise aiming to improve cardiovascular fitness) promotes cognition, but the impact on memory specifically, is unclear. There is some evidence to suggest that as little as one session of post-learning exercise benefits memory consolidation. Furthermore, memory may be particularly facilitated by exercise when the individual is emotionally aroused while encoding stimuli. The current study tested whether exercise after exposure to neutral and emotional images improved memory consolidation of the items among university students. Ninety-nine students were randomly instructed to either exercise or not exercise after viewing a set of images that were positive, neutral, and negative in valence, and they were later tested on their memory. Although emotional images were remembered better than non-emotional images, the results suggested that exercise did not influence this effect or enhance consolidation of the items overall. Explanations and implications for these findings are discussed.

Blinded by and Stuck in Negative Emotions: Is Psychological Inflexibility Across Different Domains Related?

Psychological inflexibility is theorized to underlie difficulties adjusting mental processes in response to changing circumstances. People show inflexibility across a range of domains, including attention, cognition, and affect. But it remains unclear whether common mechanisms underlie inflexibility in different domains. We investigated this possibility in a pre-registered replication and extension examining associations among attentional, cognitive, and affective inflexibility measures. Participants (N = 196) completed lab tasks assessing (a) emotion-induced blindness, the tendency for task-irrelevant emotional stimuli to impair attention allocation to non-emotional stimuli; (b) emotional inertia, the tendency for feelings to persist across time and contexts; and global self-report measures of (c) repetitive negative thinking, the tendency to repeatedly engage in negative self-focused thoughts (i.e., rumination, worry). Based on prior research linking repetitive negative thinking with negative affect inertia, on one hand, and emotion-induced blindness, on the other, we predicted positive correlations among all three measures of inflexibility. However, none of the three measures were related and Bayes factors indicated strong evidence for independence. Supplementary analyses ruled out alternative explanations for our findings, e.g., analytic decisions. Although our findings question the overlap between attentional, cognitive, and affective inflexibility measures, this study has methodological limitations. For instance, our measures varied across more than their inflexibility domain and our sample, relative to previous studies, included a high proportion of Asian participants who may show different patterns of ruminative thinking to non-Asian participants. Future research should address these limitations to confirm that common mechanisms do not underlie attentional, cognitive, and affective inflexibility. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-022-00145-2.

Reward learning and statistical learning independently influence attentional priority of salient distractors in visual search.

Existing research demonstrates different ways in which attentional prioritization of salient nontarget stimuli is shaped by prior experience: Reward learning renders signals of high-value outcomes more likely to capture attention than signals of low-value outcomes, whereas statistical learning can produce attentional suppression of the location in which salient distractor items are likely to appear. The current study combined manipulations of the value and location associated with salient distractors in visual search to investigate whether these different effects of selection history operate independently or interact to determine overall attentional prioritization of salient distractors. In Experiment 1, high-value and low-value distractors most frequently appeared in the same location; in Experiment 2, high-value and low-value distractors typically appeared in distinct locations. In both experiments, effects of distractor value and location were additive, suggesting that attention-promoting effects of value and attention-suppressing effects of statistical location-learning independently modulate overall attentional priority. Our findings are consistent with a view that sees attention as mediated by a common priority map that receives and integrates separate signals relating to physical salience and value, with signal suppression based on statistical learning determined by physical salience, but not incentive salience.

Dissociating spatial attention and awareness in emotion-induced blindness.

Emotional stimuli attract spatial attention, sometimes improving perception at their location. But they also can disrupt awareness of targets at their location, a phenomenon known as emotion-induced blindness. Such discrepant findings might reflect the impact of emotional stimuli on different perception mechanisms. We dissociated spatial attention and awareness by investigating the spatial distribution of emotion-induced blindness. Participants searched for a target within two simultaneous rapid streams of pictures, one of which could also contain a preceding emotional distractor. When targets were followed by additional stream items, emotion-induced blindness occurred only at the location of the distractor. However, when no items appeared after the target, so that it could persist in iconic memory and its temporal position was easily discernible, emotional disruption of target perception was more robust away from the distractor's location than at the distractor's location. The results suggest that although emotional distractors attract spatial attention, they inhibit identification of competing items potentially linked to the same spatiotemporal position.

Links between neuroticism, emotional distress, and disengaging attention: evidence from a single-target RSVP task.

Anxiety and depression are often associated with attention control deficits, but few studies have explored whether neuroticism can account for these links. In the present study, undergraduate students (n=146) completed self-report measures of neuroticism, worry, anxious arousal, and anhedonic depression and also completed a visual attention task in which they were asked to identify a red target letter embedded within a rapid sequence of items. Neuroticism was associated with detection of the target when it was preceded by a distracter with which it shared a feature in common (a green letter). Specifically, these distracters produced longer attentional blinks in individuals with elevated levels of neuroticism. In contrast, target detection was not significantly associated with worry, anxious arousal, or anhedonic depression. We discuss the implications of this link between neuroticism and attention for cognitive models of emotional distress and disorders.

Learned value and predictiveness affect gaze but not figure assignment.

Many factors affect figure-ground segregation, but the contributions of attention and reward history to this process is uncertain. We conducted two experiments to investigate whether reward learning influences figure assignment and whether this relationship was mediated by attention. Participants learned to associate certain shapes with a reward contingency: During a learning phase, they chose between two shapes on each trial, with subsets of shapes associated with high-probability win, low-probability win, high-probability loss, and low-probability loss. In a test phase, participants were given a figure-ground task, in which they indicated which of two regions that shared a contour they perceived as the figure (high-probability win and low-probability win shapes were pitted against each other, as were high-probability loss and low-probability loss shapes). The results revealed that participants had learned the reward contingencies and that, following learning, attention was reliably drawn to the optimal stimulus. Despite this, neither reward history nor the resulting attentional allocation influenced figure-ground organization.

Out of fright, out of mind: impaired memory for information negated during looming threat.

People often need to update representations of information upon discovering them to be incorrect, a process that can be interrupted by competing cognitive demands. Because anxiety and stress can impair cognitive performance, we tested whether looming threat can similarly interfere with the process of updating representations of a statement's truthfulness. On each trial, participants saw a face paired with a personality descriptor. Each pairing was followed by a signal indicating whether the pairing was "true", or "false" (a negation of the truth of the statement), and this signal could be followed by a warning of imminent electric shock (i.e., the looming threat). As predicted, threat of shock left memory for "true" pairings intact, while impairing people's ability to label negated pairings as untrue. Contrary to our predictions, the pattern of errors for pairings that were negated under threat suggested that these mistakes were at least partly attributable to participants forgetting that they saw the negated information at all (rather than being driven by miscategorization of the pairings as true). Consistent with this, linear ballistic accumulator modelling suggested that this impaired recognition stemmed from weaker memory traces rather than decisional processes. We suggest that arousal due to looming threat may interfere with executive processes important for resolving competition between mutually suppressive tags of whether representations in memory are "true" or "false".

Increasing negative emotions by reappraisal enhances subsequent cognitive control: a combined behavioral and electrophysiological study.

To what degree do cognitively based strategies of emotion regulation impact subsequent cognitive control? Here, we investigated this question by interleaving a cognitive task with emotion regulation trials, where regulation occurred through cognitive reappraisal. In addition to obtaining self-reports of emotion regulation, we used the late positive potential (LPP) of the event-related brain potential as an objective index of emotion regulation. On each trial, participants maintained, decreased, or increased their emotional response to an unpleasant picture and then responded to a Stroop stimulus. Results revealed that (1) the magnitude of the LPP was decreased with reappraisal instructions to decrease negative emotion and were enhanced with reappraisal instructions to increase negative emotion; (2) after cognitive reappraisal was used to increase the intensity of negative emotion, RT interference in the subsequent Stroop trial was significantly reduced; and (3) increasing negative emotions by reappraisal also modulated the cognitive control-related sustained potential. These results suggest that increasing negative emotions by cognitive reappraisal heightens cognitive control, which may be sustained for a short time after the regulation event.