Limits on Parental Discretion in Medical Decision-Making: pediatric intervention principles converge.

Pediatric intervention principles help clinicians and health-care institutions determine appropriate responses when parents' medical decisions place children at risk. Several intervention principles have been proposed and defended in the pediatric ethics literature. These principles may appear to provide conflicting guidance, but much of that conflict is superficial. First, seemingly different pediatric intervention principles sometimes converge on the same guidance. Second, these principles often aim to solve different problems in pediatrics or to operate in different background conditions. The potential for convergence between intervention principles-or at least an absence of conflict between them-matters for both the theory and practice of pediatric ethics. This article builds on the recent work of a diverse group of pediatric ethicists tasked with identifying consensus guidelines for pediatric decision-making.

Policy Feedback and the Politics of Childhood Vaccine Mandates: Conflict and Change in California, 2012-2019.

CONTEXT: In 2012, California instituted a new requirement for parents to consult with a clinician before receiving a personal belief exemption to its school entry vaccine mandate. In 2015, the state removed this exemption altogether. In 2019, legislators cracked down on medical exemptions to address their misuse by vaccine refusers and supportive clinicians. This paper explores these political conflicts using 'policy feedback theory,' arguing that personal belief exemptions informed the emergence and approaches of two coalitions whose conflict reshaped California's vaccination policies. METHODS: We analysed legal, policy, academic and media documents; interviewed ten key informants; and deductively analysed transcripts using NVivo 20 transcription software. FINDINGS: California's long-standing vaccination policy inadvertently disseminated two fundamentally incompatible social norms: vaccination is a choice; vaccination is not a choice. Over time, the culture and number of vaccine refusers grew, at least in part because the policy state-sanctioned the norm of vaccine refusal. CONCLUSIONS: The long-term consequences of California's 'mandate + PBE' policy - visible, public, and socially sanctioned vaccine refusal - undermined support for it over time, generating well-defined losses for a large group of people (the vaccinating public) and specifically for the parent activists whose experiences of personal grievance drove their mobilisation for change.

Conscientious Objection to Aggressive Interventions for Patients in a Vegetative State.

Some physicians refuse to perform life-sustaining interventions, such as tracheostomy, on patients who are very likely to remain permanently unconscious. To explain their refusal, these clinicians often invoke the language of "futility", but this can be inaccurate and can mask problematic forms of clinical power. This paper explores whether such refusals should instead be framed as conscientious objections. We contend that the refusal to provide interventions for patients very likely to remain permanently unconscious meets widely recognized ethical standards for the exercise of conscience. We conclude that conscientious objection to tracheostomy and other life-sustaining interventions on such patients can be ethical because it does not necessarily constitute a form of invidious discrimination. Furthermore, when a physician frames their refusal as conscientious objection, it makes transparent the value-laden nature of their objection and can better facilitate patient access to the requested treatment.

It's Worth What You Can Sell It for: A Survey of Employment and Compensation Models for Clinical Ethicists.

This article reports results of a survey about employment and compensation models for clinical ethics consultants working in the United States and discusses the relevance of these results for the professionalization of clinical ethics. This project uses self-reported data from healthcare ethics consultants to estimate compensation across different employment models. The average full-time annualized salary of respondents with a clinical doctorate is $188,310.08 (SD=$88,556.67), $146,134.85 (SD=$55,485.63) for those with a non-clinical doctorate, and $113,625.00 (SD=$35,872.96) for those with a masters as their highest degree. Pay differences across degree level and type were statistically significant (F = 3.43; p < .05). In a multivariate model, there is an average increase of $2,707.84 for every additional year of experience, controlling for having a clinical doctorate (ß=0.454; p < .01). Our results also show high variability in the backgrounds and experiences of healthcare ethics consultants and a wide variety of employment models. The significant variation in employment and compensation models is likely to pose a challenge for the professionalization of healthcare ethics consultation.

Practising what we preach: clinical ethicists' professional perspectives and personal use of advance directives.

The field of clinical bioethics strongly advocates for the use of advance directives to promote patient autonomy, particularly at the end of life. This paper reports a study of clinical bioethicists' perceptions of the professional consensus about advance directives, as well as their personal advance care planning practices. We find that clinical bioethicists are often sceptical about the value of advance directives, and their personal choices about advance directives often deviate from what clinical ethicists acknowledge to be their profession's recommendations. Moreover, our respondents identified a pluralistic set of justifications for completing treatment directives and designating surrogates, even while the consensus view focuses on patient autonomy. Our results suggest important revisions to academic discussion and public-facing advocacy about advance care planning.

Three Kinds of Decision-Making Capacity for Refusing Medical Interventions.

According to a standard account of patient decision-making capacity (DMC), patients can provide ethically valid consent or refusal only if they are able to understand and appreciate their medical condition and can comparatively evaluate all offered treatment options. We argue instead that some patient refusals can be capacitated, and therefore ethically authoritative, without meeting the strict criteria of this standard account-what we call comparative DMC. We describe how patients may possess burdens-based DMC for refusal if they have an overriding objection to at least one burden associated with each treatment option or goals-based DMC for refusal if they have an overriding goal that is inconsistent with treatment. The overridingness of a patient's objections to burdens, or of their commitment to a goal, can justify the moral authority of their refusal, even when a patient lacks some of the cognitive capacities that standard accounts of DMC involve.

COVID-19 Vaccine Hesitancy Among Healthcare Personnel Who Generally Accept Vaccines.

To identify psychological antecedents of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy among healthcare personnel (HCP). We surveyed 4603 HCP to assess psychological antecedents of their vaccination decisions (the '5 Cs') for vaccines in general and for COVID-19 vaccines. Most HCP accept vaccines, but many expressed hesitancy about COVID-19 vaccines for the psychological antecedents of vaccination: confidence (vaccines are effective), complacency (vaccines are unnecessary), constraints (difficult to access), calculation (risks/benefits), collective responsibility (need for vaccination when others vaccinate). HCP who were hesitant only about COVID-19 vaccines differed from HCP who were consistently hesitant: those with lower confidence were more likely to be younger and women, higher constraints were more likely to have clinical positions, higher complacency were more likely to have recently cared for COVID-19 patients, and lesser collective responsibility were more likely to be non-white. These results can inform interventions to encourage uptake of COVID-19 vaccines in HCP.

Pox Parties for Grannies? Chickenpox, Exogenous Boosting, and Harmful Injustices.

Some societies tolerate or encourage high levels of chickenpox infection among children to reduce rates of shingles among older adults. This tradeoff is unethical. The varicella zoster virus (VZV) causes both chickenpox and shingles. After people recover from chickenpox, VZV remains in their nerve cells. If their immune systems become unable to suppress the virus, they develop shingles. According to the Exogenous Boosting Hypothesis (EBH), a person's ability to keep VZV suppressed can be 'boosted' through exposure to active chickenpox infections. We argue that even if this hypothesis were true, immunization policies that discourage routine childhood varicella vaccination in order to prevent shingles for other people are unethical. Such policies harm children and treat them as mere means for the benefit of others, and are inconsistent with how parents should treat their children and physicians should treat their patients. These policies also seem incompatible with institutional transparency.

Guidance and Intervention Principles in Pediatrics: The Need for Pluralism.

Two core questions in pediatric ethics concern when and how physicians are ethically permitted to intervene in parental treatment decisions (intervention principles), and the goals or values that should direct physicians' and parents' decisions about the care of children (guidance principles). Lainie Friedman Ross argues in this issue of The Journal of Clinical Ethics that constrained parental autonomy (CPA) simultaneously answers both questions: physicians should intervene when parental treatment preferences fail to protect a child's basic needs or primary goods, and both physicians and parents should be guided by a commitment to protect a child's basic needs and primary goods. In contrast, we argue that no principle-neither Ross's CPA, nor the best interest standard or the harm threshold-can serve as both an intervention principle and a guidance principle. First, there are as many correct intervention principles as there are different kinds of interventions, since different kinds of interventions can be justified under different conditions. Second, physicians and parents have different guidance principles, because the decisions physicians and parents make for a child should be informed by different values and balanced by different (potentially) conflicting commitments.

Reasons to Amplify the Role of Parental Permission in Pediatric Treatment.

Two new documents from the Committee on Bioethics of the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) expand the terrain for parental decision making, suggesting that pediatricians may override only those parental requests that cross a harm threshold. These new documents introduce a broader set of considerations in favor of parental authority in pediatric care than previous AAP documents have embraced. While we find this to be a positive move, we argue that the 2016 AAP positions actually understate the importance of informed and voluntary parental involvement in pediatric decision making. This article provides a more expansive account of the value of parental permission. In particular, we suggest that an expansive role for parental permission may (1) reveal facts and values relevant to their child's treatment, (2) encourage resistance to suboptimal default practices, (3) improve adherence to treatment, (4) nurture children's autonomy, and (5) promote the interests of other family members.

Capacity for Preferences and Pediatric Assent Implications for Pediatric Practice.

In the past thirty to forty years, clinicians and bioethicists have expanded the scope for children's participation in decision-making about their medical care, often under the banner of "pediatric assent." The success of this movement was signaled perhaps most strongly by the creation of American Academy of Pediatrics guidance on pediatric assent in 1995. We agree with the AAP that both the best interests of the child patient and the need to respect the child patient are reasons to take seriously children's treatment preferences. However, we argue that the AAP could provide a stronger and more stable ethical foundation for pediatric assent. Current policy documents invoke a conception of respect that is grounded in autonomy and cannot apply in most cases of pediatric assent. We argue that the mere fact that children have treatment preferences is a reason to support pediatric assent. We defend this claim by focusing on the importance of what we have called "capacity for preferences." The notion of capacity for preferences underscores that the moral value of a patient's preferences is not reducible to considerations of either autonomy or best interests.

Capacity for Preferences: Respecting Patients with Compromised Decision-Making.

When a patient lacks decision-making capacity, then according to standard clinical ethics practice in the United States, the health care team should seek guidance from a surrogate decision-maker, either previously selected by the patient or appointed by the courts. If there are no surrogates willing or able to exercise substituted judgment, then the team is to choose interventions that promote a patient's best interests. We argue that, even when there is input from a surrogate, patient preferences should be an additional source of guidance for decisions about patients who lack decision-making capacity. Our proposal builds on other efforts to help patients who lack decision-making capacity provide input into decisions about their care. For example, "supported," "assisted," or "guided" decision-making models reflect a commitment to humanistic patient engagement and create a more supportive process for patients, families, and health care teams. But often, they are supportive processes for guiding a patient toward a decision that the surrogate or team believes to be in the patient's medical best interests. Another approach holds that taking seriously the preferences of such a patient can help surrogates develop a better account of what the patient's treatment choices would have been if the patient had retained decision-making capacity; the surrogate then must try to integrate features of the patient's formerly rational self with the preferences of the patient's currently compromised self. Patients who lack decision-making capacity are well served by these efforts to solicit and use their preferences to promote best interests or to craft would-be autonomous patient images for use by surrogates. However, we go further: the moral reasons for valuing the preferences of patients without decision-making capacity are not reducible to either best-interests or (surrogate) autonomy considerations but can be grounded in the values of liberty and respect for persons. This has important consequences for treatment decisions involving these vulnerable patients.