It's good and it's bad: Sampling processes can generate decision-framing effects.

Framing a choice in terms of gains versus losses can have a dramatic impact on peoples' decisions, sometimes completely reversing their choices. This decision-framing effect is often assumed to stem from individuals' inherent motivational biases to react more strongly to negative information. However, more recent work suggests these decision biases can also stem from biases in the information samples based on which people make their decisions. Here, we test how biases in the frequency of information people have about each decision option can produce decision-framing effects via a sampling process. Specifically, we hypothesize that a gain versus loss framing determines whether people probe their memories for positive or negative information about each decision option. This can lead to inaccuracy if there are biases in the amount of information people have about each option. That is, when people have more information about one option, it is possible that they retrieve both more positive and more negative information about it, creating a bias to select it as being both more and less likely to result in success, depending on decision framing. Three experiments show that people's decisions are more accurate with a gain (vs. loss) framing when a high (vs. low) frequency option has a higher proportion of success; but decisions are less accurate with a gain (vs. loss) framing when the high frequency option has a lower proportion of success. The current results suggest that decision-framing effects do not necessarily indicate a motivational bias. Instead, sampling processes may underlie decision-framing effects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Bridging the gap between autonomous and predetermined paradigms: The role of sampling in evaluative learning.

Whereas most evaluative learning paradigms remove participants' autonomy over the information they receive, other research traditions have demonstrated that information sampling has an important role in learning. We investigated the impact of information sampling on a central evaluative learning paradigm: evaluative conditioning. We compared a traditional evaluative conditioning paradigm with a paradigm in which participants have autonomy over the stimulus pairings they receive. Participants in the high-autonomy condition showed a strong preference for positively paired CSs. Nevertheless, the strength of evaluative conditioning effects was independent of autonomy. Moreover, high-autonomy participants, but not their low-autonomy counterparts, demonstrated a relationship between sampling frequency and evaluations, in line with the interpretation that sampled stimuli become more positive, whereas ignored stimuli become more negative over the course of the learning phase. The present research provides a cornerstone for integrating several research traditions within and beyond the evaluative learning literature, providing a foundation for new insights and more comprehensive theories of evaluative learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

When the going gets tough, the committed get going: Preexisting goal commitment determines the consequences of experiencing regulatory nonfit.

A body of empirical research shows that pursuing goals via means that do not fit (vs. do fit) one's regulatory mode creates resistance that disrupts motivation. However, other empirical research shows that resistance sometimes motivates people to work harder toward their goals, suggesting that regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) might be more motivating at times. The current research tests this possibility while also demonstrating how an integral dimension of a goal-a person's preexisting commitment to it-determines when regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) is more motivating. Three initial studies provide evidence that, among people low in preexisting commitment, regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) demotivates people: goal value and intentions to pursue the goal become lower with nonfit (vs. fit). However, among people high in preexisting commitment, regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) motivates people: goal value and intentions to pursue the goal become higher with nonfit (vs. fit). Three additional studies document an experimental causal chain providing evidence for underlying mechanisms: regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) creates an experience of resistance that people need to interpret, and preexisting commitment shifts whether people interpret resistance as a negative or positive motivational signal. Finally, two studies demonstrate how naturally occurring variance in preexisting goal commitment moderates the effect of experiencing regulatory nonfit (vs. fit) on people's subsequent goal-directed behavior. By identifying an integral dimension of goals that can reverse the motivational effects of regulatory nonfit, the present research connects with other work documenting the importance of mindsets about resistance, and suggests novel implications for motivating desired behaviors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

I can see myself enjoying that: Using imagery perspective to circumvent bias in self-perceptions of interest.

People experience life satisfaction when pursuing activities that genuinely interest them. Unfortunately, cultural stereotypes (e.g., "science is not for girls") and preexisting self-beliefs can bias people's memories, thereby hindering their ability to identify the domains that they actually experience as interesting. The current experiments tested a novel method for circumventing this problem by manipulating visual imagery perspective as people recalled their experiences. Four experiments measured (or manipulated) participants' actual experience of interest as they completed a task; the experiments also measured (or manipulated) participants' self-beliefs about their interest in the domain. The experiments then manipulated imagery perspective as participants recalled their interest in the task. Prior research suggests that imagery from an actor's first-person perspective facilitates a bottom-up processing style, whereas imagery from an external third-person facilitates a top-down processing style (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Consistent with this account, across all 4 experiments, first-person imagery (vs. third-person) caused people's recall to be less biased by the top-down influence of their self-beliefs and better aligned with their past experienced interest. The final experiment demonstrated downstream consequences of these effects on female undergraduates' intentions to pursue future activities in a domain (STEM) that negative stereotypes typically might dissuade them from pursuing. Thus, the present results suggest that first-person imagery can be a useful tool to reduce the influence of biased self-beliefs, while increasing sensitivity to past bottom-up experiences during recall. Further, these results hold practical implications for reducing psychological barriers that can keep underrepresented individuals from pursuing interests in counterstereotypical domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Does the future look bright? Processing style determines the impact of valence weighting biases and self-beliefs on expectations.

People regularly form expectations about their future, and whether those expectations are positive or negative can have important consequences. So, what determines the valence of people's expectations? Research seeking to answer this question by using an individual-differences approach has established that trait biases in optimistic/pessimistic self-beliefs and, more recently, trait biases in behavioral tendencies to weight one's past positive versus negative experiences more heavily each predict the valence of people's typical expectations. However, these two biases do not correlate, suggesting limits on a purely individual-differences approach to predicting people's expectations. We hypothesize that, because these two biases appear to operate via distinct processes (with self-beliefs operating top-down and valence weighting bias operating bottom-up), to predict a person's expectations on a given occasion, it is also critical to consider situational factors influencing processing style. To test this hypothesis, we investigated how an integral part of future thinking that influences processing style-mental imagery-determines each bias's influence. Two experiments measured valence weighting biases and optimistic/pessimistic self-beliefs, then manipulated whether participants formed expectations using their own first-person visual perspective (which facilitates bottom-up processes) or an external third-person visual perspective (which facilitates top-down processes). Expectations corresponded more with valence weighting biases from the first-person (vs. third-person) but more with self-beliefs from the third-person (vs. first-person). Two additional experiments manipulated valence weighting bias, demonstrating its causal role in shaping expectations (and behaviors) with first-person, but not third-person, imagery. These results suggest the two biases operate via distinct processes, holding implications for interventions to increase optimism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).