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1.
Health Secur ; 22(1): 58-64, 2024.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38054936

RESUMO

The Federal Select Agent Program ensures the safe and secure possession, use, and transfer of biological select agents and toxins through the select agent regulations (42 CFR §73, 7 CFR §331, and 9 CFR §121). These regulations are primarily written for interpretation by diagnostic and research laboratories, with limited text pertaining to the care of individuals infected with a select agent. The regulations applicable to patient care settings are ambiguous, resulting in challenges with regulatory compliance. The COVID-19 pandemic called attention to these shortcomings and the need to clarify and modify the select agent regulations. In this article, we discuss 3 select agent regulation phrases regarding patient care that need clarification-specifically, the window of time to transfer, patient care setting, and conclusion of patient care-and provide recommendations for improvement. These recommendations include implementing minimum security standards to safeguard patient specimens against theft, loss, or release prior to the appropriate transfer or destruction of the material and increasing the time allowed for the transfer or destruction of specimens before entities are subject to the select agent regulations. We encourage the Federal Select Agent Program to release a policy statement clarifying the select agent regulations regarding patient care discussed herein and to lengthen the designated time to destroy or transfer agents to a registered entity. Addressing these challenges will aid in compliance with the select agent regulations in patient care settings.


Assuntos
Pandemias , Toxinas Biológicas , Humanos , Estados Unidos
2.
Health Secur ; 21(1): 11-21, 2023.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-36719973

RESUMO

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, substantial disruptions in personal protective equipment (PPE) supply chains forced healthcare systems to become resourceful to ensure PPE availability for healthcare workers. Most worrisome was the global shortage of N95 respirators. In response, a collaboration between the Department of Infection Control and Healthcare Epidemiology and the Department of Biosafety at the University of Texas Medical Branch developed a PPE recycling program guaranteeing an adequate supply of respirators for frontline staff. The team successfully developed and implemented a novel workflow that included validated decontamination procedures, education, and training programs as well as transportation, labeling, and storage logistics. In total, 15,995 respirators of various types and sizes were received for recycling. Of these, 12,752 (80%) were recycled. Following the program's implementation, we surveyed 134 frontline healthcare workers who overwhelmingly graded our institution's culture of safety positively. Overall impressions of the N95 respirator recycling program were mixed, although interpretation of those results was limited by a lower survey response rate. In an era of increasing health security threats, innovative recycling programs like this one may serve as a model for other health systems to respond to future PPE supply chain disruptions.


Assuntos
COVID-19 , Humanos , Respiradores N95 , SARS-CoV-2 , Descontaminação/métodos , Pandemias , Pessoal de Saúde
3.
Appl Biosaf ; 25(3): 150-156, 2020 Sep 01.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-36035759

RESUMO

Introduction: During pandemic situations like the one caused by the emergent coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, healthcare systems face the challenge of limited personal protective equipment and impaired supply chains. This problem poses a threat to healthcare workers, first responders, and the public, which demands solutions that can span the gap between institutional shortages and resupplies. Objectives: To examine the efficacy of autoclave-based decontamination for the reuse of single-use surgical masks and N95 filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs). This method is the most readily available form of decontamination in the hospital and laboratory settings. Methods: Three models of N95 FFRs and two procedural masks were evaluated in this study. A moist heat autoclave using four different autoclave cycles: 115°C for one hour, 121.1°C for 30 minutes, 130°C for two minutes, and 130°C for four minutes was used. After the autoclave process, the FFRs were NIOSH fit tested and particle counting was performed for both coarse particles of 5 micrometers (µM) and fine particles from 0.1µM to 1.0µM. Results: We observed negligible alterations in the functionality and integrity of 3M 1805 and 3M 1870/1870+ N95 FFRs after three autoclave cycles. Surgical masks also showed minimal changes in functionality and integrity. The 3M 1860 FFR failed fit test after a single autoclave decontamination cycle. Discussion and Conclusion: The study finds that specific surgical masks and N95 FFR models can withstand autoclave decontamination for up to three cycles. Additionally, the autoclave cycles tested were those that could be readily achieved by both clinical and research institutions.

4.
Biosecur Bioterror ; 11(1): 10-9, 2013 Mar.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-23477631

RESUMO

The Guidelines for Biosafety Training Programs for Workers Assigned to BSL-3 Research Laboratories were developed by biosafety professionals who oversee training programs for the 2 national biocontainment laboratories (NBLs) and the 13 regional biocontainment laboratories (RBLs) that participate in the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) NBL/RBL Network. These guidelines provide a general training framework for biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) high-containment laboratories, identify key training concepts, and outline training methodologies designed to standardize base knowledge, understanding, and technical competence of laboratory personnel working in high-containment laboratories. Emphasis is placed on building a culture of risk assessment-based safety through competency training designed to enhance understanding and recognition of potential biological hazards as well as methods for controlling these hazards. These guidelines may be of value to other institutions and academic research laboratories that are developing biosafety training programs for BSL-3 research.


Assuntos
Contenção de Riscos Biológicos , Educação/normas , Laboratórios , Microbiologia , Exposição Ocupacional/prevenção & controle , Segurança/normas , Derramamento de Material Biológico/prevenção & controle , Educação/métodos , Guias como Assunto , Humanos , Estados Unidos
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