Severe weather event attribution: Why values won't go away.

We start by reviewing the complicated situation in methods of scientific attribution of climate change to extreme weather events. We emphasize the social values involved in using both so-called ″storyline″ and ordinary probabilistic or ″risk-based″ methods, noting that one important virtue claimed by the storyline approach is that it features a reduction in false negative results, which has much social and ethical merit, according to its advocates. This merit is critiqued by the probabilistic, risk-based, opponents, who claim the high ground; the usual probabilistic approach is claimed to be more objective and more ″scientific″, under the grounds that it reduces false positive error. We examine this mostly-implicit debate about error, which apparently mirrors the old Jeffrey-Rudner debate. We also argue that there is an overlooked component to the role of values in science: that of second-order inductive risk, and that it makes the relative role of values in the two methods different from what it first appears to be. In fact, neither method helps us to escape social values, and be more scientifically ″objective″ in the sense of being removed or detached from human values and interests. The probabilistic approach does not succeed in doing so, contrary to the claims of its proponents. This is important to understand, because neither method is, fundamentally, a successful strategy for climate scientists to avoid making value judgments.

The fact of uncertainty, the uncertainty of facts and the cultural resonance of doubt.

Sixty years after industry executives first decided to fight the facts of tobacco, the exploitation of doubt and uncertainty as a defensive tactic has spread to a diverse set of industries and issues with an interest in challenging scientific evidence. However, one can find examples of doubt-mongering before tobacco. One involves the early history of electricity generation in the USA. In the 1920s, the American National Electric Light Association ran a major propaganda campaign against public sector electricity generation, focused on the insistence that privately generated electricity was cheaper and that public power generation was socialistic and therefore un-American. This campaign included advertisements, editorials (generally ghost-written), the rewriting of textbooks and the development of high school and college curricula designed to cast doubt on the cost-effectiveness of public electricity generation and extol the virtues of laissez-faire capitalism. It worked in large part by finding, cultivating and paying experts to endorse the industry's claims in the mass media and the public debate, and to legitimatize the alterations to textbooks and curricula. The similarities between the electric industry strategy and the defence of tobacco, lead paint and fossil fuels suggests that these strategies work for reasons that are not specific to the particular technical claims under consideration. This paper argues that a reason for the cultural persistence of doubt is what we may label the 'fact of uncertainty'. Uncertainty is intrinsic to science, and this creates vulnerabilities that interested parties may, and commonly do, exploit, both by attempting to challenge the specific conclusions of technical experts and by implying that those conclusions threaten other social values.

Earth at risk: An urgent call to end the age of destruction and forge a just and sustainable future.

Human development has ushered in an era of converging crises: climate change, ecological destruction, disease, pollution, and socioeconomic inequality. This review synthesizes the breadth of these interwoven emergencies and underscores the urgent need for comprehensive, integrated action. Propelled by imperialism, extractive capitalism, and a surging population, we are speeding past Earth's material limits, destroying critical ecosystems, and triggering irreversible changes in biophysical systems that underpin the Holocene climatic stability which fostered human civilization. The consequences of these actions are disproportionately borne by vulnerable populations, further entrenching global inequities. Marine and terrestrial biomes face critical tipping points, while escalating challenges to food and water access foreshadow a bleak outlook for global security. Against this backdrop of Earth at risk, we call for a global response centered on urgent decarbonization, fostering reciprocity with nature, and implementing regenerative practices in natural resource management. We call for the elimination of detrimental subsidies, promotion of equitable human development, and transformative financial support for lower income nations. A critical paradigm shift must occur that replaces exploitative, wealth-oriented capitalism with an economic model that prioritizes sustainability, resilience, and justice. We advocate a global cultural shift that elevates kinship with nature and communal well-being, underpinned by the recognition of Earth's finite resources and the interconnectedness of its inhabitants. The imperative is clear: to navigate away from this precipice, we must collectively harness political will, economic resources, and societal values to steer toward a future where human progress does not come at the cost of ecological integrity and social equity.

Misinformation and the epistemic integrity of democracy.

Democracy relies on a shared body of knowledge among citizens, for example trust in elections and reliable knowledge to inform policy-relevant debate. We review the evidence for widespread disinformation campaigns that are undermining this shared knowledge. We establish a common pattern by which science and scientists are discredited and how the most recent frontier in those attacks involves researchers in misinformation itself. We list several ways in which psychology can contribute to countermeasures.

The rapid disintegration of projections: the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and the intergovernmental panel on climate change.

How and why did the scientific consensus about sea level rise due to the disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS), expressed in the third Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment, disintegrate on the road to the fourth? Using ethnographic interviews and analysis of IPCC documents, we trace the abrupt disintegration of the WAIS consensus. First, we provide a brief historical overview of scientific assessments of the WAIS. Second, we provide a detailed case study of the decision not to provide a WAIS prediction in the Fourth Assessment Report. Third, we discuss the implications of this outcome for the general issue of scientists and policymakers working in assessment organizations to make projections. IPCC authors were less certain about potential WAIS futures than in previous assessment reports in part because of new information, but also because of the outcome of cultural processes within the IPCC, including how people were selected for and worked together within their writing groups. It became too difficult for IPCC assessors to project the range of possible futures for WAIS due to shifts in scientific knowledge as well as in the institutions that facilitated the interpretations of this knowledge.

Trends in American scientists' political donations and implications for trust in science.

Scientists in the United States are more politically liberal than the general population. This fact has fed charges of political bias. To learn more about scientists' political behavior, we analyze publicly available Federal Election Commission data. We find that scientists who donate to federal candidates and parties are far more likely to support Democrats than Republicans, with less than 10 percent of donations going to Republicans in recent years. The same pattern holds true for employees of the academic sector generally, and for scientists employed in the energy sector. This was not always the case: Before 2000, political contributions were more evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. We argue that these observed changes are more readily explained by changes in Republican Party attitudes toward science than by changes in American scientists. We reason that greater public involvement by centrist and conservative scientists could help increase trust in science among Republicans.

Climate scientists set the bar of proof too high.

Standards of proof for attributing real world events/damage to global warming should be the same as in clinical or environmental lawsuits, argue Lloyd et al. The central question that we raise is effective communication. How can climate scientists best and effectively communicate their findings to crucial non-expert audiences, including public policy makers and civil society? To address this question, we look at the mismatch between what courts require and what climate scientists are setting as a bar of proof. Our first point is that scientists typically demand too much of themselves in terms of evidence, in comparison with the level of evidence required in a legal, regulatory, or public policy context. Our second point is to recommend that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recommend more prominently the use of the category "more likely than not" as a level of proof in their reports, as this corresponds to the standard of proof most frequently required in civil court rooms. This has also implications for public policy and the public communication of climate evidence. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10584-021-03061-9.

Influence and seepage: An evidence-resistant minority can affect public opinion and scientific belief formation.

Some well-established scientific findings may be rejected by vocal minorities because the evidence is in conflict with political views or economic interests. For example, the tobacco industry denied the medical consensus on the harms of smoking for decades, and the clear evidence about human-caused climate change is currently being rejected by many politicians and think tanks that oppose regulatory action. We present an agent-based model of the processes by which denial of climate change can occur, how opinions that run counter to the evidence can affect the scientific community, and how denial can alter the public discourse. The model involves an ensemble of Bayesian agents, representing the scientific community, that are presented with the emerging historical evidence of climate change and that also communicate the evidence to each other. Over time, the scientific community comes to agreement that the climate is changing. When a minority of agents is introduced that is resistant to the evidence, but that enter into the scientific discussion, the simulated scientific community still acquires firm knowledge but consensus formation is delayed. When both types of agents are communicating with the general public, the public remains ambivalent about the reality of climate change. The model captures essential aspects of the actual evolution of scientific and public opinion during the last 4 decades.

The Anthropocene is functionally and stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene.

Human activity is leaving a pervasive and persistent signature on Earth. Vigorous debate continues about whether this warrants recognition as a new geologic time unit known as the Anthropocene. We review anthropogenic markers of functional changes in the Earth system through the stratigraphic record. The appearance of manufactured materials in sediments, including aluminum, plastics, and concrete, coincides with global spikes in fallout radionuclides and particulates from fossil fuel combustion. Carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus cycles have been substantially modified over the past century. Rates of sea-level rise and the extent of human perturbation of the climate system exceed Late Holocene changes. Biotic changes include species invasions worldwide and accelerating rates of extinction. These combined signals render the Anthropocene stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene and earlier epochs.

On the definition and identifiability of the alleged "hiatus" in global warming.

Recent public debate and the scientific literature have frequently cited a "pause" or "hiatus" in global warming. Yet, multiple sources of evidence show that climate change continues unabated, raising questions about the status of the "hiatus". To examine whether the notion of a "hiatus" is justified by the available data, we first document that there are multiple definitions of the "hiatus" in the literature, with its presumed onset spanning a decade. For each of these definitions we compare the associated temperature trend against trends of equivalent length in the entire record of modern global warming. The analysis shows that the "hiatus" trends are encompassed within the overall distribution of observed trends. We next assess the magnitude and significance of all possible trends up to 25 years duration looking backwards from each year over the past 30 years. At every year during the past 30 years, the immediately preceding warming trend was always significant when 17 years (or more) were included in the calculation, alleged "hiatus" periods notwithstanding. If current definitions of the "pause" used in the literature are applied to the historical record, then the climate system "paused" for more than 1/3 of the period during which temperatures rose 0.6 K.

Scaling up our vision.

Historians have been slow to incorporate the ocean as a focus of study, in part because we have viewed it as standing mostly apart from human societies and activities. Whether that was ever truly the case is arguable, but it is certainly no longer true today. Global climate change and ocean acidification point to the now-pervasive impact of humans on the ocean environment and, conversely, the crucial importance of the ocean in the development of human affairs. Understanding the human effects on the ocean will remain mainly the preserve of natural scientists, but understanding the origins, development, and repercussions of those impacts is a job for historians and other social scientists.