A Laboratory-Developed Assay for Clade II Human Mpox Virus on the Panther Fusion Open Access System.

This paper describes the methods for developing and optimizing a laboratory-developed assay (LDA) for detecting clade II human mpox virus using the automated Panther Fusion platform and Open Access software. Various concentrations of reagents in a primer-probe mix were tested to optimize the LDA. The LDA was validated using 10 previously characterized positive and 10 negative human mpox samples, resulting in 95% accuracy and 100% precision. The LDA resulted in 100% specificity among previously tested HSV1-, HSV2-, and VZV-positive human samples. Several spiked media extensions were also validated and achieved 98% accuracy and 100% precision across all collection media types. The assay's limit of detection was calculated to be 1.475 copies/reaction, and the polymerase chain reaction efficiency resulted in 89.87% (slope, -3.5911; R2 = 0.9947). The methods described here can be applied to the rapid optimization and development of LDAs for many possible pathogens of public health importance.

Human biomonitoring without in-person interaction: public health engagements during the COVID-19 pandemic and future implications.

BACKGROUND: Public health initiatives, including human biomonitoring, have been impacted by unique challenges since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, compounding a decades-long trend of declining public participation. To combat low public participation rates, public health professionals often employ extensive engagement approaches including in-person interactions related to enrollment and sampling, success of which is an essential component of a statistically defensible study. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic challenged public health programs to diversify engagement and sampling approaches, limiting direct interactions for the health and safety of the population. This study explores biomonitoring recruitment strategies through non-contact mechanisms and evaluate the application feasibility for population-based studies. METHODS: The Iowa Biomonitoring Program at the State Hygienic Laboratory developed a human biomonitoring study that utilized a multifaceted, distance-based approach. Traditional techniques, such as mailed recruitment invitations and phone-based discussions, were coupled with internet-based surveys and self-collected, shipped urine and water samples. Participation rates were evaluated by employing different mailing methods, and the demographics of enrolled participants were examined. RESULTS: This non-human contact approach achieved a nearly 14% participation rate among a rural population, well above our target rates. Our improved mailing strategy for targeting initially unresponsive participants yielded a significantly increase in the participation rates. The respondents were predominantly individuals with educational attainment of at least high school level. Among all the eligible participants, 83% submitted self-collected samples, a rate comparable to the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey which involved in-person interviews. CONCLUSIONS: The practice of engaging a rural population during the COVID-19 pandemic by transitioning from face-to-face interactions to a combination of mailing and internet-based approaches resulted in higher-than-expected participant recruitment and sample collection rates. Given the declining trend in the response rates for population-based survey studies, our results suggest conducting human biomonitoring without direct human interaction is feasible, which provides further opportunity to improve response rates and the relevance and reach of public health initiatives.

Clinical Laboratory Biosafety Gaps: Lessons Learned from Past Outbreaks Reveal a Path to a Safer Future.

Patient care and public health require timely, reliable laboratory testing. However, clinical laboratory professionals rarely know whether patient specimens contain infectious agents, making ensuring biosafety while performing testing procedures challenging. The importance of biosafety in clinical laboratories was highlighted during the 2014 Ebola outbreak, where concerns about biosafety resulted in delayed diagnoses and contributed to patient deaths. This review is a collaboration between subject matter experts from large and small laboratories and the federal government to evaluate the capability of clinical laboratories to manage biosafety risks and safely test patient specimens. We discuss the complexity of clinical laboratories, including anatomic pathology, and describe how applying current biosafety guidance may be difficult as these guidelines, largely based on practices in research laboratories, do not always correspond to the unique clinical laboratory environments and their specialized equipment and processes. We retrospectively describe the biosafety gaps and opportunities for improvement in the areas of risk assessment and management; automated and manual laboratory disciplines; specimen collection, processing, and storage; test utilization; equipment and instrumentation safety; disinfection practices; personal protective equipment; waste management; laboratory personnel training and competency assessment; accreditation processes; and ethical guidance. Also addressed are the unique biosafety challenges successfully handled by a Texas community hospital clinical laboratory that performed testing for patients with Ebola without a formal biocontainment unit. The gaps in knowledge and practices identified in previous and ongoing outbreaks demonstrate the need for collaborative, comprehensive solutions to improve clinical laboratory biosafety and to better combat future emerging infectious disease outbreaks.

Creating a Blueprint for the Future: Lessons Learned From Public Health Laboratories in the COVID-19 Response.

Public health laboratories have played a central role in the US response to COVID-19. Since the earliest days, myriad issues have impeded the laboratory community's ability to keep pace with the overwhelming demand for effective tests. In this article, the Association of Public Health Laboratories and a subset of its members examine the response to date and evaluate lessons learned from 4 main categories: testing surges, supplies, staffing, and regulations and policy. Within these categories, the authors offer recommendations intended both to improve the ongoing COVID-19 response and to strengthen planning for future outbreaks.

Impact of Changes in Clinical Microbiology Laboratory Location and Ownership on the Practice of Infectious Diseases.

The number of onsite clinical microbiology laboratories in hospitals is decreasing, likely related to the business model for laboratory consolidation and labor shortages, and this impacts a variety of clinical practices, including that of banking isolates for clinical or epidemiologic purposes. To determine the impact of these trends, infectious disease (ID) physicians were surveyed regarding their perceptions of offsite services. Clinical microbiology practices for retention of clinical isolates for future use were also determined. Surveys were sent to members of the Infectious Diseases Society of America's (IDSA) Emerging Infections Network (EIN). The EIN is a sentinel network of ID physicians who care for adult and/or pediatric patients in North America and who are members of IDSA. The response rate was 763 (45%) of 1,680 potential respondents. Five hundred forty (81%) respondents reported interacting with the clinical microbiology laboratory. Eighty-six percent of respondents thought an onsite laboratory very important for timely diagnostic reporting and ongoing communication with the clinical microbiologist. Thirty-five percent practiced in institutions where the core microbiology laboratory has been moved offsite, and an additional 7% (n = 38) reported that movement of core laboratory functions offsite was being considered. The respondents reported that only 24% of laboratories banked all isolates, with the majority saving isolates for less than 30 days. Based on these results, the trend toward centralized core laboratories negatively impacts the practice of ID physicians, potentially delays effective implementation of prompt and targeted care for patients with serious infections, and similarly adversely impacts infection control epidemiologic investigations.

Application, Verification, and Implementation of SARS-CoV-2 Serologic Assays with Emergency Use Authorization.

Interest continues to grow regarding the role of serologic assays for the detection of prior infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has granted emergency use authorization (EUA) status to many SARS-CoV-2 serologic assays. In this document, expert recommendations from clinical microbiologist members of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM) concerning detailed verification strategies for SARS-CoV-2 serologic assays with FDA EUA are provided, as are insights into assay limitations and reporting considerations for laboratories. Assessments concerning single-antibody and multiantibody isotype detection assays, which may provide either differentiated or nondifferentiated (i.e., total antibody) antibody class results, are addressed. Additional considerations prior to assay implementation are also discussed, including biosafety, quality control, and proficiency testing strategies. As the landscape of SARS-CoV-2 serologic testing is rapidly changing, this document provides updated guidance for laboratorians on application of these assays.

Practical Guidance for Clinical Microbiology Laboratories: Implementing a Quality Management System in the Medical Microbiology Laboratory

This document outlines a comprehensive practical approach to a laboratory quality management system (QMS) by describing how to operationalize the management and technical requirements described in the ISO 15189 international standard. It provides a crosswalk of the ISO requirements for quality and competence for medical laboratories to the 12 quality system essentials delineated by the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute. The quality principles are organized under three main categories: quality infrastructure, laboratory operations, and quality assurance and continual improvement. The roles and responsibilities to establish and sustain a QMS are outlined for microbiology laboratory staff, laboratory management personnel, and the institution's leadership. Examples and forms are included to assist in the real-world implementation of this system and to allow the adaptation of the system for each laboratory's unique environment. Errors and nonconforming events are acknowledged and embraced as an opportunity to improve the quality of the laboratory, a culture shift from blaming individuals. An effective QMS encourages "systems thinking" by providing a process to think globally of the effects of any type of change. Ultimately, a successful QMS is achieved when its principles are adopted as part of daily practice throughout the total testing process continuum.

Multicenter Evaluation of Clinical Diagnostic Methods for Detection and Isolation of Campylobacter spp. from Stool.

The use of culture-independent diagnostic tests (CIDTs), such as stool antigen tests, as standalone tests for the detection of Campylobacter in stool is increasing. We conducted a prospective, multicenter study to evaluate the performance of stool antigen CIDTs compared to culture and PCR for Campylobacter detection. Between July and October 2010, we tested 2,767 stool specimens from patients with gastrointestinal illness with the following methods: four types of Campylobacter selective media, four commercial stool antigen assays, and a commercial PCR assay. Illnesses from which specimens were positive by one or more culture media or at least one CIDT and PCR were designated "cases." A total of 95 specimens (3.4%) met the case definition. The stool antigen CIDTs ranged from 79.6% to 87.6% in sensitivity, 95.9 to 99.5% in specificity, and 41.3 to 84.3% in positive predictive value. Culture alone detected 80/89 (89.9% sensitivity) Campylobacter jejuni/Campylobacter coli-positive cases. Of the 209 noncases that were positive by at least one CIDT, only one (0.48%) was positive by all four stool antigen tests, and 73% were positive by just one stool antigen test. The questionable relevance of unconfirmed positive stool antigen CIDT results was supported by the finding that noncases were less likely than cases to have gastrointestinal symptoms. Thus, while the tests were convenient to use, the sensitivity, specificity, and positive predictive value of Campylobacter stool antigen tests were highly variable. Given the relatively low incidence of Campylobacter disease and the generally poor diagnostic test characteristics, this study calls into question the use of commercially available stool antigen CIDTs as standalone tests for direct detection of Campylobacter in stool.

Evaluation of a Sample-to-Result POCKIT Central SARS-CoV-2 PCR System.

The emergence of COVID-19 has caused unprecedented impacts on global public health and many other aspects. Meanwhile, many types of methods have been developed to detect the causative agent, SARS-CoV-2; this has greatly advanced the technologies in the diagnostic field. Here, we describe the development and validation of a sample-in-result-out POCKIT Central SARS-CoV-2 PCR system for detecting SARS-CoV-2 in comparison with a commercial reference real-time RT-PCR assay (TaqPath COVID-19 Combo Kit). Both assays were specific and did not cross-react with non-SARS-CoV-2 agents. Both assays were able to detect various SARS-CoV-2 strains including some variants. Based on testing serial dilutions of SARS-CoV-2 USA-WA1/2020 isolate, the limit of detection was 0.8 TCID50/mL (1.87 × 103 genomic copies/mL) for POCKIT Central SARS-CoV-2 PCR and 0.16 TCID50/mL (3.75 × 102 genomic copies/mL) for the reference PCR. Subsequently, 183 clinical samples were tested by both assays and the diagnostic sensitivity, specificity, and agreement of the POCKIT Central SARS-CoV-2 PCR were 91.7%, 100%, and 94.0%, respectively, when compared to the reference PCR. The compact sample-to-result POCKIT Central SARS-CoV-2 PCR system is a simplified and efficient point-of-care tool for SARS-CoV-2 detection. In addition, this platform can be readily adapted to detect other human and animal viruses.

Probability of negative mycobacterium tuberculosis complex cultures based on time to detection of positive cultures: a multicenter evaluation of commercial-broth-based culture systems.

We conducted a multicenter study to determine whether Mycobacterium tuberculosis complex (MTBC) cultures in automated broth-based systems could reliably be considered negative sooner than 6 weeks. Laboratory sites used Bactec MGIT or BacT/Alert and tracked results of time to detection of all mycobacteria (TTD-all, n = 1547) and of MTBC (TTD-MTBC, n = 466) over 6-month periods from primarily (93%) respiratory specimens. Cumulative percentages by day detected and median TTD of initial and follow-up specimens were analyzed. The median TTD-MTBC for MGIT (n = 6 sites) was 14 days. For laboratories using standard processing procedures, 100% of MTBC were detected from initial and follow-up specimens in 28 and 35 days, respectively, and no yield of MTBC on solid or MGIT liquid media was observed after 5 weeks. The median TTD-MTBC for BacT/Alert (n = 3 sites) was 18 days, with 95% and 100% detected within 37 and 42 days, respectively. Analysis of TTD of positive MTBC cultures in broth can predict the probability of culture negativity at defined time points. Receipt of interim negative reports earlier than 6 weeks could assist clinicians in considering alternative diagnoses and could alter the timing and prioritization of public health interventions. Laboratories should analyze their own TTD data to inform protocol decisions. Laboratories using MGIT could issue reports of no growth of MTBC on initial specimens as early as 4 weeks and for patients undergoing treatment as early as 5 weeks postinoculation.

Recent Iowa trends in sudden unexpected infant deaths: the importance of public health collaboration with medical examiners' offices.

During the winter in 2008, Iowa experienced an increase in sudden unexplained infant deaths (SUIDs). SUIDs and infectious causes of infant deaths generally average 3 monthly (SD = 1.0) in Iowa. However, in January 2008, 9 infant deaths were reported to the Iowa Department of Public Health and the Iowa Office of the State Medical Examiner. Between January and March of 2008, joint investigation of 22 SUIDs was conducted. The investigations required the involvement of multiple medical examiners from various jurisdictions, testing for pathogens at the University Hygienic Laboratory, epidemiologic support from the Iowa Department of Public Health, and consultation with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The preliminary hypotheses for the increase in the infant mortality included viral respiratory disease and/or possible novel respiratory viral infections being the cause. Collaboration between public health and the medical examiner offices resulted in timely assessment of the cases. While no single causative agent was responsible for the increase seen in the number of infant deaths, respiratory pathogens played a role in the deaths of 15 of 22 children.

Regional Consortia: A Framework for Public Health Laboratory Collaboration and Service Sharing.

Public health laboratories (PHLs) provide specialized testing services for programs focused on the prevention and control of communicable diseases, early detection of congenital disorders, testing for antimicrobial resistance, and identification of environmental contaminants, among other responsibilities. Although national public health programs and partners provide some funding support, training, and technical resources to PHLs, no dedicated funding is provided from federal programs to fully support comprehensive PHL services across the United States or the underlying infrastructure needed for PHLs to provide and ensure their core functions and capabilities. Public health laboratories have begun to rely on a "community of practice" approach to addressing various service needs by creating and formalizing regional consortia, which are organized groups of geographically clustered PHLs that share expertise, capacities, and capabilities to enhance PHL services. The number of states participating in these networks increased from 13 to 48 from 2015 to 2020, including participation by multiple local PHLs and a territorial PHL. These consortia have enabled strengthening of partnerships and collaboration among PHLs to address regional priorities and challenges. We explore the background and evolution of regional consortia, outline some of their practices and activities, review lessons learned from these successful collaborations, and discuss the positive effect they have on the national public health system.

Limited Variation between SARS-CoV-2-Infected Individuals in Domain Specificity and Relative Potency of the Antibody Response against the Spike Glycoprotein.

The spike protein of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is arranged as a trimer on the virus surface, composed of three S1 and three S2 subunits. Infected and vaccinated individuals generate antibodies against spike, which can neutralize the virus. Most antibodies target the receptor-binding domain (RBD) and N-terminal domain (NTD) of S1; however, antibodies against other regions of spike have also been isolated. The interhost variability in domain specificity and relative neutralization efficacy of the antibodies is still poorly characterized. To this end, we tested serum and plasma samples collected from 85 coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) convalescent subjects. Samples were analyzed using seven immunoassays that employ different domains, subunits, and oligomeric forms of spike to capture the antibodies. Samples were also tested for their neutralization of pseudovirus containing SARS-CoV-2 spike and of replication-competent SARS-CoV-2. While the total amount of anti-spike antibodies produced varied among convalescent subjects, we observed an unexpectedly fixed ratio of RBD- to NTD-targeting antibodies. The relative potency of the response (defined as the measured neutralization efficacy relative to the total level of spike-targeting antibodies) also exhibited limited variation between subjects and was not associated with the overall amount of antispike antibodies produced. These studies suggest that host-to-host variation in the polyclonal response elicited against SARS-CoV-2 spike in early pandemic subjects is primarily limited to the quantity of antibodies generated rather than their domain specificity or relative neutralization potency. IMPORTANCE Infection by SARS-CoV-2 elicits antibodies against various domains of the spike protein, including the RBD and NTD of subunit S1 and against subunit S2. The antibody responses of different infected individuals exhibit different efficacies to inactivate (neutralize) the virus. Here, we show that the observed variation in the neutralizing activity of the antibody responses in COVID-19 convalescent subjects is caused by differences in the amounts of antibodies rather than their recognition properties or the potency of their antiviral activity. These findings suggest that COVID-19 vaccine strategies that focus on enhancing the overall level of the antibodies will likely elicit a more uniformly efficacious protective response.

Update on Biosafety and Emerging Infections for the Clinical Microbiology Laboratory.

Biosafety risks are prevalent in all areas of the clinical laboratories. Clinical laboratorians have become accustomed to accepting these risks. When an emerging pathogen appears, the concerns become elevated. Since the appearance of Ebola virus in the United States in 2014, biosafety practices have made progress. A recent Association of Public Health Laboratories survey shows that clinical laboratories are unprepared for current and emerging biosafety challenges. This article focuses on the biosafety program that clinical laboratory leaders should build to meet the needs of clinical laboratories; biosafety challenges of automated laboratory systems, facilities, personnel, and practices; and the relationship with occupational health.

Optimizing influenza sentinel surveillance at the state level.

Influenza-like illness data are collected via an Influenza Sentinel Provider Surveillance Network at the state level. Because participation is voluntary, locations of the sentinel providers may not reflect optimal geographic placement. The purpose of this study was to determine the "best" locations for sentinel providers in Iowa by using a maximal coverage model (MCM) and to compare the population coverage obtained with that of the current sentinel network. The authors used an MCM to maximize the Iowa population located within 20 miles (32.2 km) of 1-143 candidate sites and calculated the coverage provided by each additional site. The first MCM location covered 15% of the population; adding a second increased coverage to 25%. Additional locations provided more coverage but with diminishing marginal returns. In contrast, the existing 22 Iowa sentinel locations covered 56% of the population, the same coverage achieved with just 10 MCM sites. Using 22 MCM sites covered more than 75% of the population, an improvement over the current site placement, adding nearly 600,000 Iowa residents. Given scarce public health resources, MCMs can help surveillance efforts by prioritizing recruitment of sentinel locations.

The duration of mumps virus shedding after the onset of symptoms.

To determine how long people shed virus after the onset of mumps, we used logistic regression modeling to analyze data from the 2006 outbreak of mumps in Iowa. Our model establishes that the probability of mumps virus shedding decreases rapidly after the onset of symptoms. However, we estimate that 8%-15% of patients will still be shedding the virus 5 days after the onset of symptoms and, thus, may still be contagious during this period.

Acute infections, cost and time to reporting of HIV test results in three U.S. State Public Health Laboratories.

OBJECTIVE: In three U.S. State Public Health Laboratories (PHLs) using a fourth-generation immunoassay (IA), an HIV-1/HIV-2 differentiation antibody IA and a nucleic acid test (NAT), we characterized the yield and time to reporting of acute infections, and cost per positive specimen. METHODS: Routine HIV testing data were collected from July 1, 2012-June 30, 2013 for Massachusetts and Maryland PHLs, and from November 27, 2012-June 30, 2013 for Michigan PHL. Massachusetts and Michigan used fourth-generation and differentiation IAs with NAT conducted by a referral laboratory. In Maryland, fourth-generation IA repeatedly reactive specimens were followed by a Western blot (WB), and those with negative or indeterminate results were tested with a differentiation IA and HIV-1 NAT, and if positive by NAT, confirmed by a different HIV-1 NAT. Specimens from WB-positive persons at risk for HIV-2 were tested with a differentiation IA and, if positive, with an HIV-2 WB and/or differential HIV-1/HIV-2 proviral DNA polymerase chain reaction. RESULTS: Among 7914 specimens from Massachusetts PHL, 6069 from Michigan PHL, and 36,266 from Maryland PHL, 0.10%, 0.02% and 0.05% acute infections were identified, respectively. Massachusetts and Maryland PHLs each had 1 HIV-2 positive specimen. The median time from specimen receipt to laboratory reporting of results for acute infections at Massachusetts, Michigan and Maryland PHLs was 8, 11, and 7 days respectively. The laboratory cost per HIV positive specimen was $336 (Massachusetts), $263 (Michigan) and $210 (Maryland). CONCLUSIONS: Acute and established infections were found by PHLs using fourth-generation IA in conjunction with antibody tests and NAT. Time to reporting of acute HIV test results to clients was suboptimal, and needs to be streamlined to expedite treatment and interrupt transmission.