Neural correlates of the experience of ugliness.

Previous studies have shown that the experience of beauty is dependent upon the co-activity of field A1 of the medial frontal cortex and sensory areas. This leaves us with the question of ugliness; are the same neural mechanisms involved in this experience, including neural activity patterns, or are different mechanisms at play? This question arises because ugliness, although often regarded as the opposite of beauty, could possibly be a distinct aesthetic category. Subjects were asked to rate faces according to how ugly they found them to be while their brain activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging. There was moderate agreement in the experience of ugliness of faces among subjects. Univariate parametric analyses did not reveal any brain regions with increasing activity as the declared intensity of the experience of ugliness increased. In contrast, increasing activity appeared in the striatum and posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex with decreasing levels of ugliness. As with studies on facial beauty, representational similarity analysis revealed distinct neural activity patterns with the experience of facial ugliness in sensory areas relevant for face processing and in the medial orbitofrontal cortex. Thus, similar neural mechanisms appear to be involved in the experience of facial beauty and ugliness, the difference being the level and distribution of activity within the neural network. This suggests that ugliness and beauty are on the same aesthetic continuum.

Perceptual axioms are irreconcilable with Euclidean geometry.

There are different definitions of axioms, but the one that seems to have general approval is that axioms are statements whose truths are universally accepted but cannot be proven; they are the foundation from which further propositional truths are derived. Previous attempts, led by David Hilbert, to show that all of mathematics can be built into an axiomatic system that is complete and consistent failed when Kurt Gödel proved that there will always be statements which are known to be true but can never be proven within the same axiomatic system. But Gödel and his followers took no account of brain mechanisms that generate and mediate logic. In this largely theoretical paper, but backed by previous experiments and our new ones reported below, we show that in the case of so-called 'optical illusions', there exists a significant and irreconcilable difference between their visual perception and their description according to Euclidean geometry; when participants are asked to adjust, from an initial randomised state, the perceptual geometric axioms to conform to the Euclidean description, the two never match, although the degree of mismatch varies between individuals. These results provide evidence that perceptual axioms, or statements known to be perceptually true, cannot be described mathematically. Thus, the logic of the visual perceptual system is irreconcilable with the cognitive (mathematical) system and cannot be updated even when knowledge of the difference between the two is available. Hence, no one brain reality is more 'objective' than any other.

The neural determinants of abstract beauty.

We have enquired into the neural activity which correlates with the experience of beauty aroused by abstract paintings consisting of arbitrary assemblies of lines and colours. During the brain imaging experiments, subjects rated abstract paintings according to aesthetic appeal. There was low agreement on the aesthetic classification of these paintings among participants. Univariate analyses revealed higher activity with higher declared aesthetic appeal in both the visual areas and the medial frontal cortex. Additionally, representational similarity analysis (RSA) revealed that the experience of beauty correlated with decodable patterns of activity in visual areas. These results are broadly similar to those obtained in previous studies on facial beauty. With abstract art, it was the involvement of visual areas implicated in the processing of lines and colours while with faces it was of visual areas implicated in the processing of faces. Both categories of aesthetic experience correlated with increased activity in medial frontal cortex. We conclude that the sensory areas participate in the selection of stimuli according to aesthetic appeal and that it is the co-operative activity between the sensory areas and the medial frontal cortex that is the basis for the experience of abstract visual beauty. Further, this co-operation is enabled by "experience dependent" functional connections, in the sense that currently the existence and high specificity of these connections can only be demonstrated during certain experiences.

A clinico-anatomical dissection of the magnocellular and parvocellular pathways in a patient with the Riddoch syndrome.

KEY MESSAGE: The Riddoch syndrome is thought to be caused by damage to the primary visual cortex (V1), usually following a vascular event. This study shows that damage to the anatomical input to V1, i.e., the optic radiations, can result in selective visual deficits that mimic the Riddoch syndrome. The results also highlight the differential susceptibility of the magnocellular and parvocellular visual systems to injury. Overall, this study offers new insights that will improve our understanding of the impact of brain injury and neurosurgery on the visual pathways. The Riddoch syndrome, characterised by the ability to perceive, consciously, moving visual stimuli but not static ones, has been associated with lesions of primary visual cortex (V1). We present here the case of patient YL who, after a tumour resection surgery that spared his V1, nevertheless showed symptoms of the Riddoch syndrome. Based on our testing, we postulated that the magnocellular (M) and parvocellular (P) inputs to his V1 may be differentially affected. In a first experiment, YL was presented with static and moving checkerboards in his blind field while undergoing multimodal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), including structural, functional, and diffusion, acquired at 3 T. In a second experiment, we assessed YL's neural responses to M and P visual stimuli using psychophysics and high-resolution fMRI acquired at 7 T. YL's optic radiations were partially damaged but not severed. We found extensive activity in his visual cortex for moving, but not static, visual stimuli, while our psychophysical tests revealed that only low-spatial frequency moving checkerboards were perceived. High-resolution fMRI revealed strong responses in YL's V1 to M stimuli and very weak ones to P stimuli, indicating a functional P lesion affecting V1. In addition, YL frequently reported seeing moving stimuli and discriminating their direction of motion in the absence of visual stimulation, suggesting that he was experiencing visual hallucinations. Overall, this study highlights the possibility of a selective loss of P inputs to V1 resulting in the Riddoch syndrome and in hallucinations of visual motion.

Neural patterns of conscious visual awareness in the Riddoch syndrome.

The Riddoch syndrome is one in which patients blinded by lesions to their primary visual cortex can consciously perceive visual motion in their blind field, an ability that correlates with activity in motion area V5. Our assessment of the characteristics of this syndrome in patient ST, using multimodal MRI, showed that: 1. ST's V5 is intact, receives direct subcortical input, and decodable neural patterns emerge in it only during the conscious perception of visual motion; 2. moving stimuli activate medial visual areas but, unless associated with decodable V5 activity, they remain unperceived; 3. ST's high confidence ratings when discriminating motion at chance levels, is associated with inferior frontal gyrus activity. Finally, we report that ST's Riddoch Syndrome results in hallucinatory motion with hippocampal activity as a correlate. Our results shed new light on perceptual experiences associated with this syndrome and on the neural determinants of conscious visual experience.