Transaction Frame Determines Preferences: Valuation of Labor by Employee and Contractor.

A major concern in today's economic reality is the extent to which a sharing economy, in comparison with a traditional economy, promotes inequality. In the transformation from a traditional to a sharing economy, wage setting is replaced by contract pricing. The switch to contract trading implies that the party who carries out the labor evaluates the transaction from a buyer's rather than a seller's perspective. Drawing on psychological research on constructed and reference-dependent preferences, we predicted that the net valuation of work would decrease when the regimen involved contract trading. Three experiments (N = 1,105) eliciting work valuation under the two regimens confirmed our prediction, thus pointing to a novel factor that increases inequality.

Winning a competition predicts dishonest behavior.

Winning a competition engenders subsequent unrelated unethical behavior. Five studies reveal that after a competition has taken place winners behave more dishonestly than competition losers. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that winning a competition increases the likelihood of winners to steal money from their counterparts in a subsequent unrelated task. Studies 3a and 3b demonstrate that the effect holds only when winning means performing better than others (i.e., determined in reference to others) but not when success is determined by chance or in reference to a personal goal. Finally, study 4 demonstrates that a possible mechanism underlying the effect is an enhanced sense of entitlement among competition winners.

Category-bounded emotional enhancement: spillover effects in the valuation of public goods.

We examined whether enhancing (vs. not enhancing) the emotionality of a referent public good influences the subsequent valuation of a target public good. We predicted that it would and that the directionality of its impact would depend on a fundamental cognitive process - categorisation. If the target and referent goods belong to the same domain, we expected that the effect on the target would be in the same direction as the emotional enhancement of the referent (assimilation effect). However, if the target and referent goods belong to different domains, we expected that the effect on the target would be either negligible or in the opposite direction to that of the emotional enhancement of the referent (null or contrast effect). In Experiment 1 we examined the impact of emotionally enhancing a referent public good on feelings towards a target public good, whereas in Experiment 2 on the willingness to contribute towards a target public good. The results support the predicted interaction, which was driven by an assimilation effect for same-domain goods and a null effect for different-domain goods. In doing so, the present findings highlight the interplay between cognition and emotion in the valuation of public goods. We discuss theoretical and practical implications.

Perceived Physical Vulnerability Promotes Prosocial Behavior.

Our research examines the association between perceived physical vulnerability and prosocial behavior. Studies 1 to 4 establish a positive association between individuals' vulnerability and their prosociality. To increase generality, these studies looked at different behaviors (volunteering vs. monetary donations), various physical harms (e.g., war vs. illness), and different samples (students vs. MTurk workers). Study 4 also provides initial evidence of a partial mediating effect of closeness on the observed association. In Study 5, perceived vulnerability is experimentally manipulated, demonstrating a causal link between vulnerability and willingness to donate. Study 6 further demonstrates that closeness partially mediates the association between vulnerability and donation, while ruling out an alternative explanation of the effect-such as that vulnerable people donate in expectation of future reciprocity. Together, our research demonstrates a consistent positive association between perceived physical vulnerability and prosociality. This effect appears small when considering daily threats and stronger when vulnerability becomes more salient.

Joint presentation reduces the effect of emotion on evaluation of public actions.

In four experiments conducted on the world wide web, subjects evaluated the priority of policies presented separately or presented jointly in pairs, and/or reported their emotional responses to the problem that each policy addressed. Strength of emotional responses was more strongly related to priority when policies were presented separately than when they were presented jointly. We found evidence for one mechanism that could produce these results: joint presentation increases the evaluability of the policies, thus increasing the influence of cognitive evaluations of importance on priority judgements, and reducing the relative influence of emotional responses. We also found evidence that importance can affect emotional responses. We found no evidence for other mechanisms in which the emotions evoked by one item spread to the other item in joint presentation. The role of evaluability points to the applied value of evaluating policies in the context of alternatives.

The effect of contest participation and contest outcome on subsequent prosocial behavior.

Following previous research on various aspects of contests, we aim to explore how taking part in a contest affects subsequent behavior. We focus on whether the experience of having just competed in a contest, beyond its outcome, would have an impact on other-regarding decisions towards an individual who was not part of the preliminary contest. In addition, in light of inconclusive results in the existing literature regarding the effect of contest outcome on subsequent prosociality, we reexamine this effect. In line with our hypothesis, participation in a contest was found to reduce prosociality. Additionally, we found that winning a contest reduced prosociality only when decisions were framed as "giving" decisions and not as "dividing" decisions. This finding suggests that the effect of contest outcome may depend on specific elements of the presented situations.

Gamble for the needy! Does identifiability enhances donation?

To investigate how neediness and identifiability of a recipient influence the willingness of a donor to invest resources in charity-like lotteries we propose a new game, called 'need game'. Similar to the dictator game, the need game includes two players, one active player (the donor or dictator) and one passive player (the recipient). Both players require a minimum need (ND and NR), expressed in terms of points. The donor is endowed with KD points and must retain at least ND points, i.e., the need, with ND < KD, at the end of the game with n rounds. The recipient starts with KR points and must end the game with at least NR points, i.e., the need, with KR < NR < KD. The donor is asked to choose one of three different amounts from KD to place a bet on a lottery. If won, the gain is added to the endowment. If lost, the recipient receives the points. The recipient is paid only when his/her need threshold is obtained; likewise the donor gets paid only when his/her need threshold is maintained. The main focus here is on need of both players (ND = NR = 2, 200, and ND = NR = 0 serving as baseline control) and the identifiability of the recipient (no information, described by text and picture, and physical presence). We probe whether the amount invested by the donor depends on need and identifiability of the recipient. In addition, we include the framing of the game as gain or loss, different probabilities to win/lose, and different time limits as covariates. We found that each of these factors can play a role when investing in charity-like lotteries.

Altruistic behavior in cohesive social groups: The role of target identifiability.

People's tendency to be more generous toward identifiable victims than toward unidentifiable or statistical victims is known as the Identifiable Victim Effect. Recent research has called the generality of this effect into question, showing that in cross-national contexts, identifiability mostly affects willingness to help victims of one's own "in-group." Furthermore, in inter-group conflict situations, identifiability increased generosity toward a member of the adversary group, but decreased generosity toward a member of one's own group. In the present research we examine the role of group-cohesiveness as an underlying factor accounting for these divergent findings. In particular, we examined novel groups generated in the lab, using the minimal group paradigm, as well as natural groups of students in regular exercise sections. Allocation decisions in dictator games revealed that a group's cohesiveness affects generosity toward in-group and out-group recipients differently, depending on their identifiability. In particular, in cohesive groups the identification of an in-group recipient decreased, rather than increased generosity.

Binding lies.

Do we feel bound by our own misrepresentations? Does one act of cheating compel the cheater to make subsequent choices that maintain the false image even at a cost? To answer these questions we employed a two-task paradigm such that in the first task the participants could benefit from false reporting of private observations whereas in the second they could benefit from making a prediction in line with their actual, rather than their previously reported observations. Thus, for those participants who inflated their report during the first task, sticking with that report for the second task was likely to lead to a loss, whereas deviating from it would imply that they had lied. Data from three experiments (total N = 116) indicate that, having lied, participants were ready to suffer future loss rather than admit, even if implicitly, that they had lied.

To make people save energy tell them what others do but also who they are: a preliminary study.

A way to make people save energy is by informing them that "comparable others" save more. We investigated whether, one can further improve this nudge by manipulating Who the "comparable others" are. We asked participants to imagine receiving feedback stating that their energy consumption exceeded that of "comparable others" by 10%. We varied Who the "comparable others" were in a 2 × 2 design: they were a household that was located either in the same neighborhood as themselves or in a different neighborhood, and its members were either identified (by names and a photograph) or unidentified. We also included two control conditions: one where no feedback was provided, and one where only statistical feedback was provided (feedback about an average household). We found that it matters Who the "comparable others" are. The most effective feedback was when the referent household was from the same neighborhood as the individual's and its members were not identified.

Routine and the perception of time.

The authors investigated the influence of routine on people's estimation of time, testing the hypothesis that duration is remembered as being shorter when time is spent in a routine activity. In 4 experiments and 2 field studies, the authors compared time estimations in routine and nonroutine conditions. Routine was established by a sequence of markers (Study 1), variation of the task (Studies 2 and 3), or the number of repetitive blocks (Study 4). As hypothesized, the duration of the task was remembered as being shorter in routine conditions than in nonroutine ones. This trend was reversed in experienced (prospective) judgments when participants were informed beforehand of the duration-judgment task (Study 3). In Studies 5 and 6, the authors examined remembered duration judgments of vacationers and kibbutz members, which provided further support for the main hypothesis.

Determinants of stated willingness to pay for public goods: A study in the headline method.

Respondents were shown brief statements ("headlines") referring to various threats to the environment or to public health, and other public issues. An intervention to deal with each problem was also introduced by a single sentence. Some respondents were asked to indicate their willingness to pay for the interventions by voluntary contributions. Others indicated their opinion of the intervention on a conventional rating scale, rated the personal satisfaction of contributing to it, or rated the importance of the problem. Group averages of these response measures were obtained for a large set of issues. Computed over issues, the rank-order correlations between the different measures were very high, suggesting that group averages of WTP and of other opinion statements are measures of the same public attitudes. Observed preference reversals and violations of monotonicity in contributions are better explained by a concept of attitude than by the notion of economic value that underlies the contingent valuation method. Contributions and purchases do not follow the same logic. Possible implications for the contingent valuation method are discussed.