Adaptations to infer fitness interdependence promote the evolution of cooperation.

The evolution of cooperation is a major question in the biological and behavioral sciences. While most theoretical studies model cooperation in the context of an isolated interaction (e.g., a Prisoner's Dilemma), humans live in heterogeneous social environments, characterized by large variations in fitness interdependence-the extent to which one's fitness is affected by others. Theoretical and experimental work indicates that humans can infer, and respond to, variations in interdependence. In a heterogeneous ancestral environment, these psychological mechanisms to infer fitness interdependence could have provided a selective advantage, allowing individuals to maximize their fitness by deciding when and with whom to cooperate. Yet, to date, the link between cognitive inference, variation in fitness interdependence, and cooperation remains unclear. Here we introduce a theoretical framework to study the evolution of inference and cooperation in heterogeneous social environments, where individuals experience interactions with varying levels of corresponding interests. Using a combination of evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling, we model the evolution of adaptive agents, who incur a cost to infer interdependence, in populations of fixed-behavior agents who always cooperate or defect. Our results indicate that natural selection could promote the evolution of psychological mechanisms to infer fitness interdependence, provided that there is enough variation in fitness interdependence to offset the cost of inference. Under certain conditions, the fixation of adaptive agents results in higher levels of cooperation. This depends crucially on the type of inference performed and the features of the interdependence landscape.

Social norm complexity and past reputations in the evolution of cooperation.

Indirect reciprocity is the most elaborate and cognitively demanding of all known cooperation mechanisms, and is the most specifically human because it involves reputation and status. By helping someone, individuals may increase their reputation, which may change the predisposition of others to help them in future. The revision of an individual's reputation depends on the social norms that establish what characterizes a good or bad action and thus provide a basis for morality. Norms based on indirect reciprocity are often sufficiently complex that an individual's ability to follow subjective rules becomes important, even in models that disregard the past reputations of individuals, and reduce reputations to either 'good' or 'bad' and actions to binary decisions. Here we include past reputations in such a model and identify the key pattern in the associated norms that promotes cooperation. Of the norms that comply with this pattern, the one that leads to maximal cooperation (greater than 90 per cent) with minimum complexity does not discriminate on the basis of past reputation; the relative performance of this norm is particularly evident when we consider a 'complexity cost' in the decision process. This combination of high cooperation and low complexity suggests that simple moral principles can elicit cooperation even in complex environments.

Link recommendation algorithms and dynamics of polarization in online social networks.

The level of antagonism between political groups has risen in the past years. Supporters of a given party increasingly dislike members of the opposing group and avoid intergroup interactions, leading to homophilic social networks. While new connections offline are driven largely by human decisions, new connections on online social platforms are intermediated by link recommendation algorithms, e.g., "People you may know" or "Whom to follow" suggestions. The long-term impacts of link recommendation in polarization are unclear, particularly as exposure to opposing viewpoints has a dual effect: Connections with out-group members can lead to opinion convergence and prevent group polarization or further separate opinions. Here, we provide a complex adaptive-systems perspective on the effects of link recommendation algorithms. While several models justify polarization through rewiring based on opinion similarity, here we explain it through rewiring grounded in structural similarity-defined as similarity based on network properties. We observe that preferentially establishing links with structurally similar nodes (i.e., sharing many neighbors) results in network topologies that are amenable to opinion polarization. Hence, polarization occurs not because of a desire to shield oneself from disagreeable attitudes but, instead, due to the creation of inadvertent echo chambers. When networks are composed of nodes that react differently to out-group contacts, either converging or polarizing, we find that connecting structurally dissimilar nodes moderates opinions. Overall, our study sheds light on the impacts of social-network algorithms and unveils avenues to steer dynamics of radicalization and polarization in online social networks.

Opposing Responses to Scarcity Emerge from Functionally Unique Sociality Drivers.

AbstractFrom biofilms to whale pods, organisms across taxa live in groups, thereby accruing numerous diverse benefits of sociality. All social organisms, however, pay the inherent cost of increased resource competition. One expects that when resources become scarce, this cost will increase, causing group sizes to decrease. Indeed, this occurs in some species, but there are also species for which group sizes remain stable or even increase under scarcity. What accounts for these opposing responses? We present a conceptual framework, literature review, and theoretical model demonstrating that differing responses to sudden resource shifts can be explained by which sociality benefit exerts the strongest selection pressure on a particular species. We categorize resource-related benefits of sociality into six functionally distinct classes and model their effect on the survival of individuals foraging in groups under different resource conditions. We find that whether, and to what degree, the optimal group size (or correlates thereof) increases, decreases, or remains constant when resource abundance declines depends strongly on the dominant sociality mechanism. Existing data, although limited, support our model predictions. Overall, we show that across a wide diversity of taxa, differences in how group size shifts in response to resource declines can be driven by differences in the primary benefits of sociality.

Stochastic Dynamics through Hierarchically Embedded Markov Chains.

Studying dynamical phenomena in finite populations often involves Markov processes of significant mathematical and/or computational complexity, which rapidly becomes prohibitive with increasing population size or an increasing number of individual configuration states. Here, we develop a framework that allows us to define a hierarchy of approximations to the stationary distribution of general systems that can be described as discrete Markov processes with time invariant transition probabilities and (possibly) a large number of states. This results in an efficient method for studying social and biological communities in the presence of stochastic effects-such as mutations in evolutionary dynamics and a random exploration of choices in social systems-including situations where the dynamics encompasses the existence of stable polymorphic configurations, thus overcoming the limitations of existing methods. The present formalism is shown to be general in scope, widely applicable, and of relevance to a variety of interdisciplinary problems.

Pre-processing and transfer entropy measures in motor neurons controlling limb movements.

Directed information transfer measures are increasingly being employed in modeling neural system behavior due to their model-free approach, applicability to nonlinear and stochastic signals, and the potential to integrate repetitions of an experiment. Intracellular physiological recordings of graded synaptic potentials provide a number of additional challenges compared to spike signals due to non-stationary behaviour generated through extrinsic processes. We therefore propose a method to overcome this difficulty by using a preprocessing step based on Singular Spectrum Analysis (SSA) to remove nonlinear trends and discontinuities. We apply the method to intracellular recordings of synaptic responses of identified motor neurons evoked by stimulation of a proprioceptor that monitors limb position in leg of the desert locust. We then apply normalized delayed transfer entropy measures to neural responses evoked by displacements of the proprioceptor, the femoral chordotonal organ, that contains sensory neurones that monitor movements about the femoral-tibial joint. We then determine the consistency of responses within an individual recording of an identified motor neuron in a single animal, between repetitions of the same experiment in an identified motor neurons in the same animal and in repetitions of the same experiment from the same identified motor neuron in different animals. We found that delayed transfer entropy measures were consistent for a given identified neuron within and between animals and that they predict neural connectivity for the fast extensor tibiae motor neuron.

Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies.

Indirect reciprocity, besides providing a convenient framework to address the evolution of moral systems, offers a simple and plausible explanation for the prevalence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. By helping someone, an individual may increase her/his reputation, which may change the pre-disposition of others to help her/him in the future. This, however, depends on what is reckoned as a good or a bad action, i.e., on the adopted social norm responsible for raising or damaging a reputation. In particular, it remains an open question which social norms are able to foster cooperation in small-scale societies, while enduring the wide plethora of stochastic affects inherent to finite populations. Here we address this problem by studying the stochastic dynamics of cooperation under distinct social norms, showing that the leading norms capable of promoting cooperation depend on the community size. However, only a single norm systematically leads to the highest cooperative standards in small communities. That simple norm dictates that only whoever cooperates with good individuals, and defects against bad ones, deserves a good reputation, a pattern that proves robust to errors, mutations and variations in the intensity of selection.

Delayed mutual information infers patterns of synaptic connectivity in a proprioceptive neural network.

Understanding the patterns of interconnections between neurons in complex networks is an enormous challenge using traditional physiological approaches. Here we combine the use of an information theoretic approach with intracellular recording to establish patterns of connections between layers of interneurons in a neural network responsible for mediating reflex movements of the hind limb of an insect. By analysing delayed mutual information of the synaptic and spiking responses of sensory neurons, spiking and nonspiking interneurons in response to movement of a joint receptor that monitors the position of the tibia relative to the femur, we are able to predict the patterns of interconnections between the layers of sensory neurons and interneurons in the network, with results matching closely those known from the literature. In addition, we use cross-correlation methods to establish the sign of those interconnections and show that they also show a high degree of similarity with those established for these networks over the last 30 years. The method proposed in this paper has great potential to elucidate functional connectivity at the neuronal level in many different neuronal networks.

Evolutionary dynamics of group fairness.

The emergence and impact of fairness is commonly studied in the context of 2-person games, notably the Ultimatum Game. Often, however, humans face problems of collective action involving more than two individuals where fairness is known to play a very important role, and whose dynamics cannot be inferred from what is known from 2-person games. Here, we propose a generalization of the Ultimatum Game for an arbitrary number of players--the Multiplayer Ultimatum Game. Proposals are made to a group of responders who must individually reject or accept the proposal. If the total number of individual acceptances stands below a given threshold, the offer will be rejected; otherwise, the offer will be accepted, and equally shared by all responders. We investigate the evolution of fairness in populations of individuals by means of evolutionary game theory, providing both analytical insights and results from numerical simulations. We show how imposing stringent consensuses significantly increases the value of the proposals, leading to fairer outcomes and more tolerant players. Furthermore, we show how stochastic effects--such as imitation errors and/or errors when assessing the fitness of others--may further enhance the overall success in reaching fair collective action.

The impact of mobility costs on cooperation and welfare in spatial social dilemmas.

From over-exploitation of resources to urban pollution, sustaining well-being requires solving social dilemmas of cooperation. Often such dilemmas are studied assuming that individuals occupy fixed positions in a network or lattice. In spatial settings, however, agents can move, and such movements involve costs. Here we investigate how mobility costs impact cooperation dynamics. To this end, we study cooperation dilemmas where individuals are located in a two-dimensional space and can be of two types: cooperators-or cleaners, who pay an individual cost to have a positive impact on their neighbours-and defectors-or polluters, free-riding on others' effort to sustain a clean environment. Importantly, agents can pay a cost to move to a cleaner site. Both analytically and through agent-based simulations we find that, in general, introducing mobility costs increases pollution felt in the limit of fast movement (equivalently slow strategy revision). The effect on cooperation of increasing mobility costs is non-monotonic when mobility co-occurs with strategy revision. In such scenarios, low (yet non-zero) mobility costs minimise cooperation in low density environments; whereas high costs can promote cooperation even when a minority of agents initially defect. Finally, we find that heterogeneity in mobility cost affects the final distribution of strategies, leading to differences in who supports the burden of having a clean environment.

Biased perceptions explain collective action deadlocks and suggest new mechanisms to prompt cooperation.

When individuals face collective action problems, their expectations about others' willingness to contribute affect their motivation to cooperate. Individuals, however, often misperceive the cooperation levels in a population. In the context of climate action, people underestimate the pro-climate positions of others. Designing incentives to enable cooperation and a sustainable future must thereby consider how social perception biases affect collective action. We propose a theoretical model and investigate the effect of social perception bias in non-linear public goods games. We show that different types of bias play a distinct role in cooperation dynamics. False uniqueness (underestimating own views) and false consensus (overestimating own views) both explain why communities get locked in suboptimal states. Such dynamics also impact the effectiveness of typical monetary incentives, such as fees. Our work contributes to understanding how targeting biases, e.g., by changing the information available to individuals, can comprise a fundamental mechanism to prompt collective action.

The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity.

Indirect reciprocity (IR) is a key mechanism to understand cooperation among unrelated individuals. It involves reputations and complex information processing, arising from social interactions. By helping someone, individuals may improve their reputation, which may be shared in a population and change the predisposition of others to reciprocate in the future. The reputation of individuals depends, in turn, on social norms that define a good or bad action, offering a computational and mathematical appealing way of studying the evolution of moral systems. Over the years, theoretical and empirical research has unveiled many features of cooperation under IR, exploring norms with varying degrees of complexity and information requirements. Recent results suggest that costly reputation spread, interaction observability and empathy are determinants of cooperation under IR. Importantly, such characteristics probably impact the level of complexity and information requirements for IR to sustain cooperation. In this review, we present and discuss those recent results. We provide a synthesis of theoretical models and discuss previous conclusions through the lens of evolutionary game theory and cognitive complexity. We highlight open questions and suggest future research in this domain. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.

Learning image features with fewer labels using a semi-supervised deep convolutional network.

Learning feature embeddings for pattern recognition is a relevant task for many applications. Deep learning methods such as convolutional neural networks can be employed for this assignment with different training strategies: leveraging pre-trained models as baselines; training from scratch with the target dataset; or fine-tuning from the pre-trained model. Although there are separate systems used for learning features from labelled and unlabelled data, there are few models combining all available information. Therefore, in this paper, we present a novel semi-supervised deep network training strategy that comprises a convolutional network and an autoencoder using a joint classification and reconstruction loss function. We show our network improves the learned feature embedding when including the unlabelled data in the training process. The results using the feature embedding obtained by our network achieve better classification accuracy when compared with competing methods, as well as offering good generalisation in the context of transfer learning. Furthermore, the proposed network ensemble and loss function is highly extensible and applicable in many recognition tasks.

Reward and punishment in climate change dilemmas.

Mitigating climate change effects involves strategic decisions by individuals that may choose to limit their emissions at a cost. Everyone shares the ensuing benefits and thereby individuals can free ride on the effort of others, which may lead to the tragedy of the commons. For this reason, climate action can be conveniently formulated in terms of Public Goods Dilemmas often assuming that a minimum collective effort is required to ensure any benefit, and that decision-making may be contingent on the risk associated with future losses. Here we investigate the impact of reward and punishment in this type of collective endeavors - coined as collective-risk dilemmas - by means of a dynamic, evolutionary approach. We show that rewards (positive incentives) are essential to initiate cooperation, mostly when the perception of risk is low. On the other hand, we find that sanctions (negative incentives) are instrumental to maintain cooperation. Altogether, our results are gratifying, given the a-priori limitations of effectively implementing sanctions in international agreements. Finally, we show that whenever collective action is most challenging to succeed, the best results are obtained when both rewards and sanctions are synergistically combined into a single policy.

Structural power and the evolution of collective fairness in social networks.

From work contracts and group buying platforms to political coalitions and international climate and economical summits, often individuals assemble in groups that must collectively reach decisions that may favor each part unequally. Here we quantify to which extent our network ties promote the evolution of collective fairness in group interactions, modeled by means of Multiplayer Ultimatum Games (MUG). We show that a single topological feature of social networks-which we call structural power-has a profound impact on the tendency of individuals to take decisions that favor each part equally. Increased fair outcomes are attained whenever structural power is high, such that the networks that tie individuals allow them to meet the same partners in different groups, thus providing the opportunity to strongly influence each other. On the other hand, the absence of such close peer-influence relationships dismisses any positive effect created by the network. Interestingly, we show that increasing the structural power of a network leads to the appearance of well-defined modules-as found in human social networks that often exhibit community structure-providing an interaction environment that maximizes collective fairness.

Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates.

Cooperation has been recognized as an evolutionary puzzle since Darwin, and remains identified as one of the biggest challenges of the XXIst century. Indirect Reciprocity (IR), a key mechanism that humans employ to cooperate with each other, establishes that individual behaviour depends on reputations, which in turn evolve depending on social norms that classify behaviours as good or bad. While it is well known that different social norms give rise to distinct cooperation levels, it remains unclear how the performance of each norm is influenced by the random exploration of new behaviours, often a key component of social dynamics where a plethora of stimuli may compel individuals to deviate from pre-defined behaviours. Here we study, for the first time, the impact of varying degrees of exploration rates - the likelihood of spontaneously adopting another strategy, akin to a mutation probability in evolutionary dynamics - in the emergence of cooperation under IR. We show that high exploration rates may either improve or harm cooperation, depending on the underlying social norm at work. Regarding some of the most popular social norms studied to date, we find that cooperation under Simple-standing and Image-score is enhanced by high exploration rates, whereas the opposite occurs for Stern-judging and Shunning.

Assessing the coding reliability of work accidents statistical data: How coders make a difference.

INTRODUCTION: This study assesses the reliability of the coding procedure for a set of variables belonging to the European Statistics of Accidents at Work (ESAW). The work focused on the Portuguese data and experience with the system. In Portugal, this task has been systematically carried out by GEP (the governmental Cabinet for Strategy and Planning), here defined as the "reference group" or "expert group." However, it is anticipated that this coding task will be performed by non-expert people, since paper-forms will be replaced by e-forms, similarly to what happened in a few EU countries. OBJECTIVE: This study aims to: (a) assess the current situation, that is, to quantify reliability of data coded by GEP (reference group), and (b) assess the impact on the reliability level when the coding is carried out by non-experts (two different groups of coders). METHODS: The study comprises the estimation of both intercoder and intracoder reliability for a set of 8 nominal variables. The assessment applies 3 reliability coefficients calculated by 3 software packages. RESULTS: The results reveal that the expert group (GEP) holds good to excellent reliability (inter- and intracoder agreements), between 68-98%, while there is a considerable "loss of reliability" (-5% to -39%) when the coding process is transferred to other people, without special training or knowledge in this task. CONCLUSIONS: This work gives quantified evidence that reliability of coding accident data is substantially affected by the coders' profile. Moreover, certain variables, regardless of the coder, systematically hold a higher level of coding reliability than others, suggesting that certain codes may need improvement. Future studies should assess coding quality across the EU countries using the ESAW protocol. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS: Directions for improving the quality of accident data and related statistics; data that is used by researchers and governmental decision-makers to derive prevention strategies.

Paradigm shifts and the interplay between state, business and civil sectors.

The recent rise of the civil sector as a main player of socio-political actions, next to public and private sectors, has largely increased the complexity underlying the interplay between different sectors of our society. From urban planning to global governance, analysis of these complex interactions requires new mathematical and computational approaches. Here, we develop a novel framework, grounded on evolutionary game theory, to envisage situations in which each of these sectors is confronted with the dilemma of deciding between maintaining a status quo scenario or shifting towards a new paradigm. We consider multisector conflicts regarding environmentally friendly policies as an example of application, but the framework developed here has a considerably broader scope. We show that the public sector is crucial in initiating the shift, and determine explicitly under which conditions the civil sector-reflecting the emergent reality of civil society organizations playing an active role in modern societies-may influence the decision-making processes accruing to other sectors, while fostering new routes towards a paradigm shift of the society as a whole. Our results are shown to be robust to a wide variety of assumptions and model parametrizations.