An ERP measure of non-conscious memory reveals dissociable implicit processes in human recognition using an open-source automated analytic pipeline.

Non-conscious processing of human memory has traditionally been difficult to objectively measure and thus understand. A prior study on a group of hippocampal amnesia (N = 3) patients and healthy controls (N = 6) used a novel procedure for capturing neural correlates of implicit memory using event-related potentials (ERPs): old and new items were equated for varying levels of memory awareness, with ERP differences observed from 400 to 800 ms in bilateral parietal regions that were hippocampal-dependent. The current investigation sought to address the limitations of that study by increasing the sample of healthy subjects (N = 54), applying new controls for construct validity, and developing an improved, open-source tool for automated analysis of the procedure used for equating levels of memory awareness. Results faithfully reproduced prior ERP findings of parietal effects that a series of systematic control analyses validated were not contributed to nor contaminated by explicit memory. Implicit memory effects extended from 600 to 1000 ms, localized to right parietal sites. These ERP effects were found to be behaviorally relevant and specific in predicting implicit memory response times, and were topographically dissociable from other traditional ERP measures of implicit memory (miss vs. correct rejections) that instead occurred in left parietal regions. Results suggest first that equating for reported awareness of memory strength is a valid, powerful new method for revealing neural correlates of non-conscious human memory, and second, behavioral correlations suggest that these implicit effects reflect a pure form of priming, whereas misses represent fluency leading to the subjective experience of familiarity.

Neural correlates of the Dunning-Kruger effect.

The Dunning-Kruger effect (DKE) is a metacognitive phenomenon of illusory superiority in which individuals who perform poorly on a task believe they performed better than others, yet individuals who performed very well believe they under-performed compared to others. This phenomenon has yet to be directly explored in episodic memory, nor explored for physiological correlates or reaction times. We designed a novel method to elicit the DKE via a test of item recognition while electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. Throughout the task, participants were asked to estimate the percentile in which they performed compared to others. Results revealed participants in the bottom 25th percentile over-estimated their percentile, while participants in the top 75th percentile under-estimated their percentile, exhibiting the classic DKE. Reaction time measures revealed a condition-by-group interaction whereby over-estimators responded faster than under-estimators when estimating being in the top percentile and responded slower when estimating being in the bottom percentile. Between-group EEG differences were evident between over-estimators and under-estimators during Dunning-Kruger responses, which revealed FN400-like effects of familiarity supporting differences for over-estimators, whereas "old-new" memory event-related potential effects revealed a late parietal component associated with recollection-based processing for under-estimators that was not evident for over-estimators. Findings suggest over- and under-estimators use differing cognitive processes when assessing their performance, such that under-estimators may rely on recollection during memory while over-estimators may draw upon excess familiarity when over-estimating their performance. Episodic memory thus appears to play a contributory role in metacognitive judgements of illusory superiority.

Recallable but not recognizable: The influence of semantic priming in recall paradigms.

When people can successfully recall a studied word, they should be able to recognize it as having been studied. In cued-recall paradigms, however, participants sometimes correctly recall words in the presence of strong semantic cues but then fail to recognize those words as actually having been studied. Although the conditions necessary to produce this unusual effect are known, the underlying neural correlates have not been investigated. Across five experiments, involving both behavioral and electrophysiological methods (EEG), we investigated the cognitive and neural processes that underlie recognition failures. Experiments 1 and 2 showed behaviorally that assuming that recalled items can be recognized in cued-recall paradigms is a flawed assumption, because recognition failures occur in the presence of cues, regardless of whether those failures are measured. With event-related potentials (ERPs), Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that successfully recalled words that are recognized are driven by recollection at recall and then by a combination of recollection and familiarity at ensuing recognition. In contrast, recognition failures did not show that memory signature and may instead be driven by semantic priming at recall and followed at recognition stages by negative-going ERP effects consistent with implicit processes, such as repetition fluency. These results demonstrate that recall - long-characterized as predominantly reflecting recollection-based processing in episodic memory - may at times also be served by a confluence of implicit cognitive processes.