Evidence, Experience, Expertise, and the US Coronavirus Disease 2019 Public Health Response.

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), state, tribal, and local health departments assess available and promising interventions and individual and population health outcomes when crafting public health recommendations. This supplement provides a snapshot of some of the science, experience, and expertise supporting the COVID-19 response.

Death Certificate-Based ICD-10 Diagnosis Codes for COVID-19 Mortality Surveillance - United States, January-December 2020.

Approximately 375,000 deaths during 2020 were attributed to COVID-19 on death certificates reported to CDC (1). Concerns have been raised that some deaths are being improperly attributed to COVID-19 (2). Analysis of International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) diagnoses on official death certificates might provide an expedient and efficient method to demonstrate whether reported COVID-19 deaths are being overestimated. CDC assessed documentation of diagnoses co-occurring with an ICD-10 code for COVID-19 (U07.1) on U.S. death certificates from 2020 that had been reported to CDC as of February 22, 2021. Among 378,048 death certificates listing U07.1, a total of 357,133 (94.5%) had at least one other ICD-10 code; 20,915 (5.5%) had only U07.1. Overall, 97.3% of 357,133 death certificates with at least one other diagnosis (91.9% of all 378,048 death certificates) were noted to have a co-occurring diagnosis that was a plausible chain-of-event condition (e.g., pneumonia or respiratory failure), a significant contributing condition (e.g., hypertension or diabetes), or both. Overall, 70%-80% of death certificates had both a chain-of-event condition and a significant contributing condition or a chain-of-event condition only; this was noted for adults aged 18-84 years, both males and females, persons of all races and ethnicities, those who died in inpatient and outpatient or emergency department settings, and those whose manner of death was listed as natural. These findings support the accuracy of COVID-19 mortality surveillance in the United States using official death certificates. High-quality documentation of co-occurring diagnoses on the death certificate is essential for a comprehensive and authoritative public record. Continued messaging and training (3) for professionals who complete death certificates remains important as the pandemic progresses. Accurate mortality surveillance is critical for understanding the impact of variants of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, and of COVID-19 vaccination and for guiding public health action.

COVID-19 Case Investigation and Contact Tracing Efforts from Health Departments - United States, June 25-July 24, 2020.

Case investigation and contact tracing are core public health tools used to interrupt transmission of pathogens, including SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19); timeliness is critical to effectiveness (1,2). In May 2020, CDC funded* 64 state, local, and territorial health departments† to support COVID-19 response activities. As part of the monitoring process, case investigation and contact tracing metrics for June 25-July 24, 2020, were submitted to CDC by 62 health departments. Descriptive analyses of case investigation and contact tracing load, timeliness, and yield (i.e., the number of contacts elicited divided by the number of patients prioritized for interview) were performed. A median of 57% of patients were interviewed within 24 hours of report of the case to a health department (interquartile range [IQR] = 27%-82%); a median of 1.15 contacts were identified per patient prioritized for interview§ (IQR = 0.62-1.76), and a median of 55% of contacts were notified within 24 hours of identification by a patient (IQR = 32%-79%). With higher caseloads, the percentage of patients interviewed within 24 hours of case report was lower (Spearman coefficient = -0.68), and the number of contacts identified per patient prioritized for interview also decreased (Spearman coefficient = -0.60). The capacity to conduct timely contact tracing varied among health departments, largely driven by investigators' caseloads. Incomplete identification of contacts affects the ability to reduce transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Enhanced staffing capacity and ability and improved community engagement could lead to more timely interviews and identification of more contacts.

Summary of Guidance for Public Health Strategies to Address High Levels of Community Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and Related Deaths, December 2020.

In the 10 months since the first confirmed case of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was reported in the United States on January 20, 2020 (1), approximately 13.8 million cases and 272,525 deaths have been reported in the United States. On October 30, the number of new cases reported in the United States in a single day exceeded 100,000 for the first time, and by December 2 had reached a daily high of 196,227.* With colder weather, more time spent indoors, the ongoing U.S. holiday season, and silent spread of disease, with approximately 50% of transmission from asymptomatic persons (2), the United States has entered a phase of high-level transmission where a multipronged approach to implementing all evidence-based public health strategies at both the individual and community levels is essential. This summary guidance highlights critical evidence-based CDC recommendations and sustainable strategies to reduce COVID-19 transmission. These strategies include 1) universal face mask use, 2) maintaining physical distance from other persons and limiting in-person contacts, 3) avoiding nonessential indoor spaces and crowded outdoor spaces, 4) increasing testing to rapidly identify and isolate infected persons, 5) promptly identifying, quarantining, and testing close contacts of persons with known COVID-19, 6) safeguarding persons most at risk for severe illness or death from infection with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, 7) protecting essential workers with provision of adequate personal protective equipment and safe work practices, 8) postponing travel, 9) increasing room air ventilation and enhancing hand hygiene and environmental disinfection, and 10) achieving widespread availability and high community coverage with effective COVID-19 vaccines. In combination, these strategies can reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission, long-term sequelae or disability, and death, and mitigate the pandemic's economic impact. Consistent implementation of these strategies improves health equity, preserves health care capacity, maintains the function of essential businesses, and supports the availability of in-person instruction for kindergarten through grade 12 schools and preschool. Individual persons, households, and communities should take these actions now to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission from its current high level. These actions will provide a bridge to a future with wide availability and high community coverage of effective vaccines, when safe return to more everyday activities in a range of settings will be possible.

COVID-19 Contact Tracing in Two Counties - North Carolina, June-July 2020.

Contact tracing is a strategy implemented to minimize the spread of communicable diseases (1,2). Prompt contact tracing, testing, and self-quarantine can reduce the transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (3,4). Community engagement is important to encourage participation in and cooperation with SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing (5). Substantial investments have been made to scale up contact tracing for COVID-19 in the United States. During June 1-July 12, 2020, the incidence of COVID-19 cases in North Carolina increased 183%, from seven to 19 per 100,000 persons per day* (6). To assess local COVID-19 contact tracing implementation, data from two counties in North Carolina were analyzed during a period of high incidence. Health department staff members investigated 5,514 (77%) persons with COVID-19 in Mecklenburg County and 584 (99%) in Randolph Counties. No contacts were reported for 48% of cases in Mecklenburg and for 35% in Randolph. Among contacts provided, 25% in Mecklenburg and 48% in Randolph could not be reached by telephone and were classified as nonresponsive after at least one attempt on 3 consecutive days of failed attempts. The median interval from specimen collection from the index patient to notification of identified contacts was 6 days in both counties. Despite aggressive efforts by health department staff members to perform case investigations and contact tracing, many persons with COVID-19 did not report contacts, and many contacts were not reached. These findings indicate that improved timeliness of contact tracing, community engagement, and increased use of community-wide mitigation are needed to interrupt SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

Trends in Number and Distribution of COVID-19 Hotspot Counties - United States, March 8-July 15, 2020.

The geographic areas in the United States most affected by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have changed over time. On May 7, 2020, CDC, with other federal agencies, began identifying counties with increasing COVID-19 incidence (hotspots) to better understand transmission dynamics and offer targeted support to health departments in affected communities. Data for January 22-July 15, 2020, were analyzed retrospectively (January 22-May 6) and prospectively (May 7-July 15) to detect hotspot counties. No counties met hotspot criteria during January 22-March 7, 2020. During March 8-July 15, 2020, 818 counties met hotspot criteria for ≥1 day; these counties included 80% of the U.S. population. The daily number of counties meeting hotspot criteria peaked in early April, decreased and stabilized during mid-April-early June, then increased again during late June-early July. The percentage of counties in the South and West Census regions* meeting hotspot criteria increased from 10% and 13%, respectively, during March-April to 28% and 22%, respectively, during June-July. Identification of community transmission as a contributing factor increased over time, whereas identification of outbreaks in long-term care facilities, food processing facilities, correctional facilities, or other workplaces as contributing factors decreased. Identification of hotspot counties and understanding how they change over time can help prioritize and target implementation of U.S. public health response activities.

CDC Deployments to State, Tribal, Local, and Territorial Health Departments for COVID-19 Emergency Public Health Response - United States, January 21-July 25, 2020.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral respiratory illness caused by SARS-CoV-2. During January 21-July 25, 2020, in response to official requests for assistance with COVID-19 emergency public health response activities, CDC deployed 208 teams to assist 55 state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments. CDC deployment data were analyzed to summarize activities by deployed CDC teams in assisting state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments to identify and implement measures to contain SARS-CoV-2 transmission (1). Deployed teams assisted with the investigation of transmission in high-risk congregate settings, such as long-term care facilities (53 deployments; 26% of total), food processing facilities (24; 12%), correctional facilities (12; 6%), and settings that provide services to persons experiencing homelessness (10; 5%). Among the 208 deployed teams, 178 (85%) provided assistance to state health departments, 12 (6%) to tribal health departments, 10 (5%) to local health departments, and eight (4%) to territorial health departments. CDC collaborations with health departments have strengthened local capacity and provided outbreak response support. Collaborations focused attention on health equity issues among disproportionately affected populations (e.g., racial and ethnic minority populations, essential frontline workers, and persons experiencing homelessness) and through a place-based focus (e.g., persons living in rural or frontier areas). These collaborations also facilitated enhanced characterization of COVID-19 epidemiology, directly contributing to CDC data-informed guidance, including guidance for serial testing as a containment strategy in high-risk congregate settings, targeted interventions and prevention efforts among workers at food processing facilities, and social distancing.

Anthrax Epizootic in Wildlife, Bwabwata National Park, Namibia, 2017.

In late September 2017, Bwabwata National Park in Namibia experienced a sudden die-off of hippopotamuses and Cape buffalo. A multiorganizational response was initiated, involving several ministries within Namibia and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Rapid interventions resulted in zero human or livestock cases associated with this epizootic.

Initial Public Health Laboratory Response After Hurricane Maria - Puerto Rico, 2017.

Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017, causing major damage to infrastructure and severely limiting access to potable water, electric power, transportation, and communications. Public services that were affected included operations of the Puerto Rico Department of Health (PRDOH), which provides critical laboratory testing and surveillance for diseases and other health hazards. PRDOH requested assistance from CDC for the restoration of laboratory infrastructure, surveillance capacity, and diagnostic testing for selected priority diseases, including influenza, rabies, leptospirosis, salmonellosis, and tuberculosis. PRDOH, CDC, and the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) collaborated to conduct rapid needs assessments and, with assistance from the CDC Foundation, implement a temporary transport system for shipping samples from Puerto Rico to the continental United States for surveillance and diagnostic and confirmatory testing. This report describes the initial laboratory emergency response and engagement efforts among federal, state, and nongovernmental partners to reestablish public health laboratory services severely affected by Hurricane Maria. The implementation of a sample transport system allowed Puerto Rico to reinitiate priority infectious disease surveillance and laboratory testing for patient and public health interventions, while awaiting the rebuilding and reinstatement of PRDOH laboratory services.

Zoonotic Disease Programs for Enhancing Global Health Security.

Most infectious diseases that recently emerged in humans originated in animals. Besides close contact between animals and humans, other factors probably contribute to the cross-species transmission of infectious diseases. It is critical to establish effective mechanisms for coordination and collaboration between the animal, human, and environmental health sectors before new threats emerge by bringing the different sectors together to tackle endemic zoonotic diseases of greatest concern. Such multisectoral partnerships should begin by identifying priority zoonotic diseases for national engagement with equal input from the different sectors. Improvements in surveillance and data sharing for prioritized zoonotic diseases and enhancements of laboratory testing and joint outbreak response capacities in the human and animal health sectors will create and strengthen the mechanisms necessary to effectively detect and respond to emerging health threats, and thereby enhance global health security.

Enhancing Surveillance and Diagnostics in Anthrax-Endemic Countries.

Naturally occurring anthrax disproportionately affects the health and economic welfare of poor, rural communities in anthrax-endemic countries. However, many of these countries have limited anthrax prevention and control programs. Effective prevention of anthrax outbreaks among humans is accomplished through routine livestock vaccination programs and prompt response to animal outbreaks. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention uses a 2-phase framework when providing technical assistance to partners in anthrax-endemic countries. The first phase assesses and identifies areas for improvement in existing human and animal surveillance, laboratory diagnostics, and outbreak response. The second phase provides steps to implement improvements to these areas. We describe examples of implementing this framework in anthrax-endemic countries. These activities are at varying stages of completion; however, the public health impact of these initiatives has been encouraging. The anthrax framework can be extended to other zoonotic diseases to build on these efforts, improve human and animal health, and enhance global health security.

Update: Interim Guidance for the Diagnosis, Evaluation, and Management of Infants with Possible Congenital Zika Virus Infection - United States, October 2017.

CDC has updated its interim guidance for U.S. health care providers caring for infants with possible congenital Zika virus infection (1) in response to recently published updated guidance for health care providers caring for pregnant women with possible Zika virus exposure (2), unknown sensitivity and specificity of currently available diagnostic tests for congenital Zika virus infection, and recognition of additional clinical findings associated with congenital Zika virus infection. All infants born to mothers with possible Zika virus exposure* during pregnancy should receive a standard evaluation at birth and at each subsequent well-child visit including a comprehensive physical examination, age-appropriate vision screening and developmental monitoring and screening using validated tools (3-5), and newborn hearing screen at birth, preferably using auditory brainstem response (ABR) methodology (6). Specific guidance for laboratory testing and clinical evaluation are provided for three clinical scenarios in the setting of possible maternal Zika virus exposure: 1) infants with clinical findings consistent with congenital Zika syndrome regardless of maternal testing results, 2) infants without clinical findings consistent with congenital Zika syndrome who were born to mothers with laboratory evidence of possible Zika virus infection,† and 3) infants without clinical findings consistent with congenital Zika syndrome who were born to mothers without laboratory evidence of possible Zika virus infection. Infants in the first two scenarios should receive further testing and evaluation for Zika virus, whereas for the third group, further testing and clinical evaluation for Zika virus are not recommended. Health care providers should remain alert for abnormal findings (e.g., postnatal-onset microcephaly and eye abnormalities without microcephaly) in infants with possible congenital Zika virus exposure without apparent abnormalities at birth.

Update: Interim Guidance for Health Care Providers Caring for Pregnant Women with Possible Zika Virus Exposure - United States (Including U.S. Territories), July 2017.

CDC has updated the interim guidance for U.S. health care providers caring for pregnant women with possible Zika virus exposure in response to 1) declining prevalence of Zika virus disease in the World Health Organization's Region of the Americas (Americas) and 2) emerging evidence indicating prolonged detection of Zika virus immunoglobulin M (IgM) antibodies. Zika virus cases were first reported in the Americas during 2015-2016; however, the incidence of Zika virus disease has since declined. As the prevalence of Zika virus disease declines, the likelihood of false-positive test results increases. In addition, emerging epidemiologic and laboratory data indicate that, as is the case with other flaviviruses, Zika virus IgM antibodies can persist beyond 12 weeks after infection. Therefore, IgM test results cannot always reliably distinguish between an infection that occurred during the current pregnancy and one that occurred before the current pregnancy, particularly for women with possible Zika virus exposure before the current pregnancy. These limitations should be considered when counseling pregnant women about the risks and benefits of testing for Zika virus infection during pregnancy. This updated guidance emphasizes a shared decision-making model for testing and screening pregnant women, one in which patients and providers work together to make decisions about testing and care plans based on patient preferences and values, clinical judgment, and a balanced assessment of risks and expected outcomes.

Contact investigation of melioidosis cases reveals regional endemicity in Puerto Rico.

BACKGROUND: Melioidosis results from infection with Burkholderia pseudomallei and is associated with case-fatality rates up to 40%. Early diagnosis and treatment with appropriate antimicrobials can improve survival rates. Fatal and nonfatal melioidosis cases were identified in Puerto Rico in 2010 and 2012, respectively, which prompted contact investigations to identify risk factors for infection and evaluate endemicity. METHODS: Questionnaires were administered and serum specimens were collected from coworkers, neighborhood contacts within 250 m of both patients' residences, and injection drug user (IDU) contacts of the 2012 patient. Serum specimens were tested for evidence of prior exposure to B. pseudomallei by indirect hemagglutination assay. Neighborhood seropositivity results guided soil sampling to isolate B. pseudomallei. RESULTS: Serum specimens were collected from contacts of the 2010 (n = 51) and 2012 (n = 60) patients, respectively. No coworkers had detectable anti-B. pseudomallei antibody, whereas seropositive results among neighborhood contacts was 5% (n = 2) for the 2010 patient and 23% (n = 12) for the 2012 patient, as well as 2 of 3 IDU contacts for the 2012 case. Factors significantly associated with seropositivity were having skin wounds, sores, or ulcers (odds ratio [OR], 4.6; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.2-17.8) and IDU (OR, 18.0; 95% CI, 1.6-194.0). Burkholderia pseudomallei was isolated from soil collected in the neighborhood of the 2012 patient. CONCLUSIONS: Taken together, isolation of B. pseudomallei from a soil sample and high seropositivity among patient contacts suggest at least regional endemicity of melioidosis in Puerto Rico. Increased awareness of melioidosis is needed to enable early case identification and early initiation of appropriate antimicrobial therapy.

Melioidosis diagnostic workshop, 2013.

Melioidosis is a severe disease that can be difficult to diagnose because of its diverse clinical manifestations and a lack of adequate diagnostic capabilities for suspected cases. There is broad interest in improving detection and diagnosis of this disease not only in melioidosis-endemic regions but also outside these regions because melioidosis may be underreported and poses a potential bioterrorism challenge for public health authorities. Therefore, a workshop of academic, government, and private sector personnel from around the world was convened to discuss the current state of melioidosis diagnostics, diagnostic needs, and future directions.

Rapid intervention to reduce Ebola transmission in a remote village - Gbarpolu County, Liberia, 2014.

As late as September 14, 2014, Liberia's Gbarpolu County had reported zero cases of Ebola virus disease (Ebola). On October 25, the Bong County Health Team, a local health department in the Liberian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW), received confirmation of Ebola in a man who had recently left Geleyansiesu, a remote village of approximately 800 residents, after his wife and daughter had died of illnesses consistent with Ebola. MOHSW requested assistance from CDC, the World Health Organization, and other international partners to investigate and confirm the outbreak in Geleyansiesu and begin interventions to interrupt transmission. A total of 22 cases were identified, of which 18 (82%) were laboratory confirmed by real-time polymerase chain reaction. There were 16 deaths (case-fatality rate = 73%). Without road access to or direct telecommunications with the village, interventions had to be tailored to the local context. Public health interventions included 1) education of the community about Ebola, transmission of the virus, signs and symptoms, the importance of isolating ill patients from family members, and the potential benefits of early diagnosis and treatment; 2) establishment of mechanisms to alert health authorities of possibly infected persons leaving the village to facilitate safe transport to the closest Ebola treatment unit (ETU); 3) case investigation, contact tracing, and monitoring of contacts; 4) training in hygienic burial of dead bodies; 5) active case finding and diagnosis; and 6) isolation and limited no-touch treatment in the village of patients unwilling or unable to seek care at an ETU. The findings of this investigation could inform interventions aimed at controlling focal outbreaks in difficult-to-reach communities, which has been identified as an important component of the effort to eliminate Ebola from Liberia.

Rapid response to Ebola outbreaks in remote areas - Liberia, July-November 2014.

West Africa is experiencing its first epidemic of Ebola virus disease (Ebola). As of February 9, Liberia has reported 8,864 Ebola cases, of which 3,147 were laboratory-confirmed. Beginning in August 2014, the Liberia Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW), supported by CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), and others, began systematically investigating and responding to Ebola outbreaks in remote areas. Because many of these areas lacked mobile telephone service, easy road access, and basic infrastructure, flexible and targeted interventions often were required. Development of a national strategy for the Rapid Isolation and Treatment of Ebola (RITE) began in early October. The strategy focuses on enhancing capacity of county health teams (CHT) to investigate outbreaks in remote areas and lead tailored responses through effective and efficient coordination of technical and operational assistance from the MOHSW central level and international partners. To measure improvements in response indicators and outcomes over time, data from investigations of 12 of 15 outbreaks in remote areas with illness onset dates of index cases during July 16-November 20, 2014, were analyzed. The times to initial outbreak alerts and durations of the outbreaks declined over that period while the proportions of patients who were isolated and treated increased. At the same time, the case-fatality rate in each outbreak declined. Implementation of strategies, such as RITE, to rapidly respond to rural outbreaks of Ebola through coordinated and tailored responses can successfully reduce transmission and improve outcomes.