Preliminary investigation of a significant national Cryptosporidium exceedance in the United Kingdom, August 2023 and ongoing.

Routine laboratory surveillance has identified an unprecedented and ongoing exceedance of Cryptosporidium spp. across the United Kingdom, notably driven by C. hominis transmission, since 14 August 2023. Information from 477 reported cases in England and Wales, followed up with a standardised exposure questionnaire as of 25 September 2023, identified foreign travel in 250 (54%) of 463 respondents and swimming in 234 (66%) of 353 cases. A significant, common exposure has not yet been identified in first analyses.

Outbreak of STEC O157:H7 linked to a milk pasteurisation failure at a dairy farm in England, 2019.

In November 2019, an outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli O157:H7 was detected in South Yorkshire, England. Initial investigations established consumption of milk from a local dairy as a common exposure. A sample of pasteurised milk tested the next day failed the phosphatase test, indicating contamination of the pasteurised milk by unpasteurised (raw) milk. The dairy owner agreed to immediately cease production and initiate a recall. Inspection of the pasteuriser revealed a damaged seal on the flow divert valve. Ultimately, there were 21 confirmed cases linked to the outbreak, of which 11 (52%) were female, and 12/21 (57%) were either <15 or >65 years of age. Twelve (57%) patients were treated in hospital, and three cases developed haemolytic uraemic syndrome. Although the outbreak strain was not detected in the milk samples, it was detected in faecal samples from the cattle on the farm. Outbreaks of gastrointestinal disease caused by milk pasteurisation failures are rare in the UK. However, such outbreaks are a major public health concern as, unlike unpasteurised milk, pasteurised milk is marketed as 'safe to drink' and sold to a larger, and more dispersed, population. The rapid, co-ordinated multi-agency investigation initiated in response to this outbreak undoubtedly prevented further cases.

Persistence of an outbreak of gonorrhoea with high-level resistance to azithromycin in England, November 2014‒May 2018.

Between November 2014 and May 2018, 118 laboratory-confirmed cases of high-level azithromycin resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae were identified in England. Cases emerged among heterosexuals in Leeds but spread across England and into sexual networks of men who have sex with men as the outbreak progressed. The few epidemiological links identified indicate substantial under-diagnosis of cases and this, along with the upturn in cases in 2017, highlights the difficulties in controlling the outbreak.

COVID-19 cluster surveillance using exposure data collected from routine contact tracing: The genomic validation of a novel informatics-based approach to outbreak detection in England.

Contact tracing was used globally to prevent onwards transmission of COVID-19. Tracing contacts alone is unlikely to be sufficient in controlling community transmission, due to the pre-symptomatic, overdispersed and airborne nature of COVID-19 transmission. We describe and demonstrate the validity of a national enhanced contact tracing programme for COVID-19 cluster surveillance in England. Data on cases occurring between October 2020 and September 2021 were extracted from the national contact tracing system. Exposure clusters were identified algorithmically by matching ≥2 cases attending the same event, identified by matching postcode and event category within a 7-day rolling window. Genetic validity was defined as exposure clusters with ≥2 cases from different households with identical viral sequences. Exposure clusters were fuzzy matched to the national incident management system (HPZone) by postcode and setting description. Multivariable logistic regression modelling was used to determine cluster characteristics associated with genetic validity. Over a quarter of a million (269,470) exposure clusters were identified. Of the eligible clusters, 25% (3,306/13,008) were genetically valid. 81% (2684/3306) of these were not recorded on HPZone and were identified on average of one day earlier than incidents recorded on HPZone. Multivariable analysis demonstrated that exposure clusters occurring in workplaces (aOR = 5·10, 95% CI 4·23-6·17) and education (aOR = 3·72, 95% CI 3·08-4·49) settings were those most strongly associated with genetic validity. Cluster surveillance using enhanced contact tracing in England was a timely, comprehensive and systematic approach to the detection of transmission events occurring in community settings. Cluster surveillance can provide intelligence to stakeholders to support the assessment and management of clusters of COVID-19 at a local, regional, and national level. Future systems should include predictive modelling and network analysis to support risk assessment of exposure clusters to improve the effectiveness of enhanced contract tracing for outbreak detection.

Evaluating the impact on health outcomes of an event that resulted in a delay in contact tracing of COVID-19 cases in England, September 2020: an observational study.

OBJECTIVE: In September 2020, 15 861 SARS-CoV-2 case records failed to upload from the Second Generation Surveillance System (SGSS) to the Contact Tracing Advisory Service (CTAS) tool, delaying the contact tracing of these cases. This study used CTAS data to determine the impact of this delay on population health outcomes: transmission events, hospitalisations and mortality. Previously, a modelling study suggested a substantial impact. DESIGN: Observational study. SETTING: England. POPULATION: Individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 and their reported contacts. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Secondary attack rates (SARs), hospitalisations and deaths among primary and secondary contacts were calculated, compared with all other concurrent, unaffected cases. Affected SGSS records were matched to CTAS records. Successive contacts and cases were identified and matched to hospital episode and mortality outcomes. RESULTS: Initiation of contact tracing was delayed by 3 days on average in the primary cases in the delay group (6 days) compared with the control group (3 days). This was associated with lower completion of contact tracing: 80% (95% CI: 79% to 81%) in delay group and 83% (95% CI: 83% to 84%) in control group. There was some evidence to suggest increased transmission to non-household contacts among those affected by the delay. The SAR for non-household contacts was higher among secondary contacts in the delay group than the control group (delay group: 7.9%, 95% CI: 6.5% to 9.2%; control group: 5.9%, 95% CI: 5.3% to 6.6%). There did not appear to be a significant difference between the delay and control groups in the odds of hospitalisation (crude OR: 1.1 (95% CI: 0.9 to 1.2)) or death (crude OR: 0.7 (95% CI: 0.1 to 4.0)) among secondary contacts. CONCLUSIONS: Our analysis suggests that the delay in contact tracing had a limited impact on population health outcomes; however, contact tracing was not completed for all individuals, so some transmission events might not be captured.

Sustained transmission of high-level azithromycin-resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae in England: an observational study.

BACKGROUND: Between Nov 3, 2014, and Feb 24, 2017, 70 cases of high-level azithromycin-resistant (HL-AziR; minimum inhibitory concentration [MIC] ≥256 mg/L) Neisseria gonorrhoeae were reported from across England. Whole-genome sequencing was done to investigate this outbreak to determine whether the ongoing outbreak represented clonal spread of an HL-AziR N gonorrhoeae strain identified in Leeds. We also wanted to elucidate the molecular mechanisms of azithromycin resistance in N gonorrhoeae in the UK. METHODS: In this observational study, whole-genome sequencing was done on the HL-AziR N gonorrhoeae isolates from England. As comparators, 110 isolates from the UK and Ireland with a range of azithromycin MICs were also sequenced, including eight isolates from Scotland with azithromycin MICs ranging from 0·12 mg/L to 1·00 mg/L that were N gonorrhoeae multi-antigen sequence type 9768 (ST9768), which was the sequence type initially responsible for the outbreak. The presence of mutations or genes associated with azithromycin resistance was also investigated. FINDINGS: 37 of the 60 HL-AziR isolates from England belonged to ST9768, and were genetically similar (mean 4·3 single-nucleotide polymorphisms). A 2059A→G mutation was detected in three or all four alleles of the 23S rRNA gene. Five susceptible ST9768 isolates had one mutated 23S rRNA allele and one low-level resistant ST9768 isolate had two mutated alleles. INTERPRETATION: Sustained transmission of a successful HL-AziR clone was seen across England. Mutation 2059A→G was found in isolates with lower azithromycin MICs. Azithromycin exposure might have provided the selection pressure for one or two mutated copies of the 23S rRNA gene to recombine with wild-type copies, leading to three or four mutated copies and the HL-AziR phenotype. HL-AziR could emerge in isolates with low azithromycin MICs and eliminate the effectiveness of azithromycin as part of dual therapy for the treatment of gonorrhoea. FUNDING: Public Health England.