Coordination and expertise foster legal textualism.

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule's letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants' adherence to rules' literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule's purpose, the rule's literal meaning provides a clear focal point-an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges.

Vicarious punishment of moral violations in naturalistic drama narratives predicts cortical synchronization.

Punishment of moral norm violators is instrumental for human cooperation. Yet, social and affective neuroscience research has primarily focused on second- and third-party norm enforcement, neglecting the neural architecture underlying observed (vicarious) punishment of moral wrongdoers. We used naturalistic television drama as a sampling space for observing outcomes of morally-relevant behaviors to assess how individuals cognitively process dynamically evolving moral actions and their consequences. Drawing on Affective Disposition Theory, we derived hypotheses linking character morality with viewers' neural processing of characters' rewards and punishments. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine neural responses of 28 female participants while free-viewing 15 short story summary video clips of episodes from a popular US television soap opera. Each summary included a complete narrative structure, fully crossing main character behaviors (moral/immoral) and the consequences (reward/punishment) characters faced for their actions. Narrative engagement was examined via intersubject correlation and representational similarity analysis. Highest cortical synchronization in 9 specifically selected regions previously implicated in processing moral information was observed when characters who act immorally are punished for their actions with participants' empathy as an important moderator. The results advance our understanding of the moral brain and the role of normative considerations and character outcomes in viewers' engagement with popular narratives.

People Endorse Harsher Policies in Principle Than in Practice: Asymmetric Beliefs About Which Errors to Prevent Versus Fix.

Countless policies are crafted with the intention of punishing all who do wrong or rewarding only those who do right. However, this requires accommodating certain mistakes: some who do not deserve to be punished might be, and some who deserve to be rewarded might not be. Six preregistered experiments (N = 3,484 U.S. adults) reveal that people are more willing to accept this trade-off in principle, before errors occur, than in practice, after errors occur. The result is an asymmetry such that for punishments, people believe it is more important to prevent false negatives (e.g., criminals escaping justice) than to fix them, and more important to fix false positives (e.g., wrongful convictions) than to prevent them. For rewards, people believe it is more important to prevent false positives (e.g., welfare fraud) than to fix them and more important to fix false negatives (e.g., improperly denied benefits) than to prevent them.

Seeing Gray in a World of Black and White: Children Appreciate Reasoners Who Approach Moral Dilemmas With Humility.

Moral decisions often involve dilemmas: cases of conflict between competing obligations. In two studies (N = 204), we ask whether children appreciate that reasoning through dilemmas involves acknowledging that there is no single, simple solution. In Study 1, 5- to 8-year-old US children were randomly assigned to a Moral Dilemma condition, in which story characters face dilemmas between two prosocial actions, or a Personal Cost control, in which story characters face decisions between a matched prosocial action and a self-interested action. Children were then presented with two reasoners who made the same judgment, but one confidently endorsed one moral action, and the other hesitantly acknowledged both actions. As they aged, children became more likely to prefer the uncertain reasoner's "way of thinking" in the Moral Dilemma compared to the Personal Cost condition. They also inferred that the uncertain reasoner was nicer and more trustworthy than the confident one. In Study 2, when both reasoners acknowledged the dilemma and differed only in their level of uncertainty, 5-year-olds preferred the acknowledgment to be accompanied by a confident decision, 6- and 7-year-olds preferred it be accompanied by uncertainty, and 8-year-olds showed no preference. These results show that, before the age at which children can resolve dilemmas successfully on their own, they recognize and value others who approach dilemmas with appropriate humility.

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT: How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

The good, the rich, and the powerful: How young children compensate victims of moral transgressions depending on moral character, wealth, and social dominance.

Theories of justice suggest that it serves two main purposes: punishment and restoration. Although punishment emerges early and has been well-documented, little is known about the contexts in which young children engage in restorative practices like compensation for victims. The current study investigated whether children's engagement in compensation and punishment (which often involve a redistribution of resources) was sensitive to characteristics of the perpetrator and victim known to shape distributive justice decisions (decisions about how resources should be distributed), such as social dominance, resource inequality, and moral character. A total of 54 children aged 3 to 7 years completed a series of moral judgment experiments. Each experiment featured interactions between a perpetrator and a victim, ending with the perpetrator stealing the victim's toy. In Experiment 1 (N = 44), social dominance did not affect punishment or compensation overall, but older children compensated the dominant victim (but not the subordinate victim) less than younger children. In Experiment 2 (N = 42), children compensated the poor victim more than the rich victim, but they did not punish the rich perpetrator more than the poor perpetrator. In Experiment 3 (N = 45), children compensated the victim with a good moral character more than the victim with a bad moral character, and the victim's moral character did not influence punishment. Altogether, these findings offer new insights into how children resort to compensation for victims as a complement to, rather than an alternative to, punishment.

Lying to recommend unqualified friends: Diverging implications for interpersonal and epistemic trust inferences.

When people are asked to recommend individuals they care about, they often grapple with conflicts regarding the level of honesty they should maintain when being truthful could potentially hinder those individuals' chances of receiving beneficial opportunities. In the current study, we examined how adolescents evaluate people based on how they respond to such dilemmas, with a focus on how it affects judgments of interpersonal and epistemic trustworthiness. We tested a sample of high school students in the southwestern United States (N = 78; Mage = 16.45 years), who were asked about a moral dilemma in which a story character needed to decide whether to recommend an unqualified friend. We experimentally manipulated whether the friend was very close to the standard (requiring a small exaggeration) or was far from the standard (requiring a large exaggeration) between participants. Across both exaggeration conditions, we observed a dissociation in judgments of epistemic and interpersonal trustworthiness: Lie-tellers were judged to be more interpersonally trustworthy than epistemically trustworthy, whereas truth-tellers were judged to be more epistemically trustworthy than interpersonally trustworthy. These results show that adolescents are capable of using information about an individual's lie-telling versus truth-telling decisions to make highly nuanced social inferences.

Influence of Social Distance on Foreign Language Effect in Moral Judgment.

Previous research has shown that moral choice depends on language, a phenomenon known as the moral foreign language effect (mFLE). The current study examines the influence of social distance on the mFLE. In Experiment 1, 200 participants were randomly assigned to either close or distant social distance in English or Chinese. In Experiment 2, 188 participants were randomly assigned to either English or Chinese and were presented with eight moral dilemmas, each with five different levels of social distance. After reading the dilemma, participants made a choice on a binary scale (Yes/No) in both Experiments 1 and 2 or on a more sensitive 100-point scale in Experiment 2. The results showed that the mFLE was present in distant social distance but absent in close social distance. Finally, a meta-analysis of the results from both studies confirmed the effect of social distance on the mFLE. These findings demonstrate that social distance might play an important role in moderating the mFLE in moral judgment.

Repeatedly Encountered Descriptions of Wrongdoing Seem More True but Less Unethical: Evidence in a Naturalistic Setting.

When news about moral transgressions goes viral on social media, the same person may repeatedly encounter identical reports about a wrongdoing. In a longitudinal experiment (N = 607 U.S. adults from Mechanical Turk), we found that these repeated encounters can affect moral judgments. As participants went about their lives, we text-messaged them news headlines describing corporate wrongdoings (e.g., a cosmetics company harming animals). After 15 days, they rated these wrongdoings as less unethical than new wrongdoings. Extending prior laboratory research, these findings reveal that repetition can have a lasting effect on moral judgments in naturalistic settings, that affect plays a key role, and that increasing the number of repetitions generally makes moral judgments more lenient. Repetition also made fictitious descriptions of wrongdoing seem truer, connecting this moral-repetition effect with past work on the illusory-truth effect. The more times we hear about a wrongdoing, the more we may believe it-but the less we may care.

Ignorance and moral judgment: Testing the logical priority of the epistemic.

It has recently been argued that a person's moral judgments (about both their own and others' actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person's epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker's menu of options. If this is right, then a person's moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects' knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations.

Just wrong? Or just WEIRD? Investigating the prevalence of moral dumbfounding in non-Western samples.

Moral dumbfounding occurs when people maintain a moral judgment even though they cannot provide a reason for this judgment. Dumbfounded responding may include admitting to not having reasons, or the use of unsupported declarations ("It's just wrong") as justification for a judgment. Published evidence for dumbfounding has drawn exclusively on samples of WEIRD backgrounds (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic), and it remains unclear to what extent the phenomenon is generalizable to other populations. Furthermore, the theoretical implications of moral dumbfounding have been disputed in recent years. In three studies we apply a standardized moral dumbfounding task, and show evidence for moral dumbfounding in a Chinese sample (Study 1, N = 165), an Indian sample (Study 2, N = 181), and a mixed sample primarily (but not exclusively) from North Africa and the Middle East (MENA region, Study 3, N = 264). These findings are consistent with a categorization theories of moral judgment.

The logic of universalization guides moral judgment.

To explain why an action is wrong, we sometimes say, "What if everybody did that?" In other words, even if a single person's behavior is harmless, that behavior may be wrong if it would be harmful once universalized. We formalize the process of universalization in a computational model, test its quantitative predictions in studies of human moral judgment, and distinguish it from alternative models. We show that adults spontaneously make moral judgments consistent with the logic of universalization, and report comparable patterns of judgment in children. We conclude that, alongside other well-characterized mechanisms of moral judgment, such as outcome-based and rule-based thinking, the logic of universalizing holds an important place in our moral minds.

Exploring cultural and gender differences in moral judgment: A cross-cultural study based on the CNI model.

Recently, researchers have proposed a polynomial model called the "consequences, norms, generalized inaction" (CNI) model for researching moral judgment. However, it is unclear whether the model can be used to explore cultural differences in moral judgment. In this study, we investigated the applicability of the CNI model of moral judgment to East Asian groups, and subsequently explored cultural and gender differences in moral judgment between East Asian (i.e., Japan, n = 211; China, n = 200) and Western (i.e., USA, n = 201) groups. The CNI model was proposed by Gawronski et al., and it can quantify individuals' sensitivity to moral consequence, sensitivity to moral norms, and their general preference for inaction or action in moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that the CNI model fits well for Japanese and Chinese individuals. Both East Asian women and Western women were significantly more sensitive to moral norms than men in their respective countries. In the international comparison, Westerners were more sensitive to moral norms. The Japanese groups, for both men and women, were most biased towards inaction. Regarding sensitivity towards consequences, no differences were observed in the comparison between Eastern and Western male groups, whereas poor sensitivity was observed among women. By using this new model, this study provides new insights into the differences of cultural and gender in moral judgment. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04662-6.

Moral foundations of pro-choice and pro-life women.

Opinions on abortion are more polarized than opinions on most other moral issues. Why are some people pro-choice and some pro-life? Religious and political preferences play a role here, but pro-choice and pro-life people may also differ in other aspects. In the current preregistered study (N = 479), we investigated how pro-choice women differ in their moral foundations from pro-life women. When the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) was applied (i.e., when declared moral principles were measured), pro-life women scored higher than pro-choice women in loyalty, authority, and purity. However, when women were asked about moral judgments indirectly via more real-life problems from the Moral Foundations Vignettes (MFV), pro-choice women scored higher than pro-life women in emotional and physical care and liberty but lower in loyalty. When we additionally controlled for religious practice and political views, we found no differences between groups in declaring moral foundations (MFQ). However, in the case of real-life moral judgments (MFV), we observed higher care, fairness, and liberty among pro-choice and higher authority and purity among pro-life. Our results show intriguing nuances between women pro-choice and pro-life as we found a different pattern of moral foundations in those groups depending on whether we measured their declared abstract moral principles or moral judgment about real-life situations. We also showed how religious practice and political views might play a role in such differences. We conclude that attitudes to abortion "go beyond" abstract moral principles, and the real-life context matters in moral judgments. Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04800-0.

Future orientation and moral judgment in chinese youths: the mediating role of moral disengagement and the moderating role of self-control.

Based on the self-regulation theory, this study aims to examine the relationship between youths' future orientation and judgment of their own immoral behaviors. A moderated mediation model was constructed to investigate the mediating role of moral disengagement and moderating role of self-control. Six hundred and twenty-eight Chinese youths, with an age range from 16 to 34 years (M = 23.08, SD = 2.65), were recruited to take part in an anonymous survey about future orientation, moral disengagement, self-control, and moral judgment. Results revealed that youths with high future orientation judged their own moral transgressions more harshly and that moral disengagement partially mediated the relationship between the two. Moderated mediation analysis further demonstrated that self-control moderated the relationship between future orientation and moral disengagement and the indirect effect between future orientation and youths' judgment of their own immoral behaviors. To be specific, the indirect effect was much stronger for youths with high levels of self-control. These findings not only enrich the research about how future orientation affects youths' judgment of their own immoral behaviors, but also reveal the underlying mechanisms between future orientation and moral judgment, which can provide practical guidance for implementing measures that effectively enhance youths' moral character and cultivate their ability to think positively about the future.

Online Moral Conformity: how powerful is a Group of Strangers when influencing an Individual's Moral Judgments during a video meeting?

People make moral decisions every day. When making such decisions, they may be influenced by their companions (a so-called moral conformity effect). Increasingly, people make decisions in online environments, like video meetings. In the current preregistered experiment, we studied the moral conformity effect in an online context. We applied an Asch conformity paradigm by asking participants (N = 120) to reply to sacrificial moral dilemmas through the online video communication tool Zoom either when sitting in a "virtual" room with strangers (confederates instructed on how to answer; experimental condition) or when sitting alone (control condition). We found that people displayed a moral conformity effect on half the dilemmas included in our study as well as in the aggregate. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04765-0.

Where the Blame Lies: Unpacking Groups Into Their Constituent Subgroups Shifts Judgments of Blame in Intergroup Conflict.

Whom do individuals blame for intergroup conflict? Do people attribute responsibility for intergroup conflict to the in-group or the out-group? Theoretically integrating the literatures on intergroup relations, moral psychology, and judgment and decision-making, we propose that unpacking a group by explicitly describing it in terms of its constituent subgroups increases perceived support for the view that the unpacked group shoulders more of the blame for intergroup conflict. Five preregistered experiments (N = 3,335 adults) found support for this novel hypothesis across three distinct intergroup conflicts: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, current racial tensions between White people and Black people in the United States, and the gender gap in wages in the United States. Our findings (a) highlight the independent roles that entrenched social identities and cognitive, presentation-based processes play in shaping blame judgments, (b) demonstrate that the effect of unpacking groups generalizes across partisans and nonpartisans, and (c) illustrate how constructing packed versus unpacked sets of potential perpetrators can critically shape where the blame lies.

Omission bias in children's and adults' moral judgments of lies.

This study examined whether omission bias occurs in moral judgments of lies. Omission bias is the tendency to judge acts of commission as morally worse than equivalent acts of omission. Children aged 8 and 9 years (third graders) and 11 and 12 years (sixth graders), as well as adults, made moral judgments about lies of commission and omission to conceal transgressions. Descriptions of four scenarios varied in terms of whether the protagonists lied to benefit themselves or others and whether the transgression was deliberate or accidental. The results showed that both age groups of children, as well as adults, judged that lies of commission were morally worse than lies of omission in all four scenarios, indicating that omission bias clearly occurs in moral judgments of lies. However, there were age differences in the magnitude of omission bias. Third and sixth graders generally showed omission bias of the same magnitude for all scenarios, whereas omission bias in adults was stronger for the scenarios that benefited self rather than others and for scenarios in which deliberate transgressions, rather than accidental ones, were concealed. These results reveal differences in moral judgments of lies between middle childhood and adulthood.

Preschoolers learn new moral and conventional norms from direct experiences.

By observing others, children can learn about different types of norms, including moral norms rooted in concerns for welfare and rights, and social conventions based on directives from authority figures or social consensus. Two experiments examined how preschoolers and adults constructed and applied knowledge about novel moral and conventional norms from their direct social experiences. Participants watched a video of a novel prohibited action that caused pain to a victim (moral conditions) or a sound from a box (conventional conditions). Next, they saw a transgressor puppet, who had either watched the video alongside participants or not, engage in the prohibited action. Preschoolers and adults rapidly constructed distinct moral and conventional evaluations about the novel actions. These distinctions were evident across several response modalities that have often been studied separately, including judgments, reasoning, and actions. However, children did not reliably track the puppet's knowledge of the novel norms. These studies provide experimental support for the idea that children and adults construct distinct moral and conventional norms from social experiences, which in turn guide judgments, reasoning, and behavior.

An empirical perspective on moral expertise: Evidence from a global study of philosophers.

Considerable attention in bioethics has been devoted to moral expertise and its implications for handling applied moral problems. The existence and nature of moral expertise has been a contested topic, and particularly, whether philosophers are moral experts. In this study, we put the question of philosophers' moral expertise in a wider context, utilizing a novel and global study among 4,087 philosophers from 96 countries. We find that despite the skepticism in recent literature, the vast majority of philosophers do believe in moral expertise and in the contribution of philosophical training and experience to its acquisition. Yet, they still differ on what philosophers' moral expertise consists of. While they widely accept that philosophers possess superior analytic abilities regarding moral matters, they diverge on whether they also possess improved ability to judge moral problems. Nonetheless, most philosophers in our sample believe that philosophers possess an improved ability to both analyze and judge moral problems and that they commonly see these two capacities as going hand in hand. We also point at significant associations between personal and professional attributes and philosophers' beliefs, such as age, working in the field of moral philosophy, public involvement, and association with the analytic tradition. We discuss the implications of these findings for the debate about moral expertise.