Assessing the illegal hunting of native wildlife in China.

Illegal harvesting and trading of wildlife have become major threats to global biodiversity and public health1-3. Although China is widely recognized as an important destination for wildlife illegally obtained abroad4, little attention has been given to illegal hunting within its borders. Here we extracted 9,256 convictions for illegal hunting from a nationwide database of trial verdicts in China spanning January 2014 to March 2020. These convictions involved illegal hunting of 21% (n = 673) of China's amphibian, reptile, bird and mammal species, including 25% of imperilled species in these groups. Sample-based extrapolation indicates that many more species were taken illegally during this period. Larger body mass and range size (for all groups), and proximity to urban markets (for amphibians and birds) increase the probability of a species appearing in the convictions database. Convictions pertained overwhelmingly to illegal hunting for commercial purposes and involved all major habitats across China. A small number of convictions represented most of the animals taken, indicating the existence of large commercial poaching operations. Prefectures closer to urban markets show higher densities of convictions and more individual animals taken. Our results suggest that illegal hunting is a major, overlooked threat to biodiversity throughout China.

A tragedy of the commons case study: modeling the fishers king crab system in Southern Chile.

Illegal fishing in small-scale fisheries is a contentious issue and resists a straightforward interpretation. Particularly, there is little knowledge regarding cooperative interactions between legal and illegal fishers and the potential effects on fisheries arising from these interactions. Taking the Chilean king crab (Lithodes santolla; common name centolla) fishery as a case study, our goal is twofold: (i) to model the effect of illegal-legal fishers' interactions on the fishery and (ii) analyze how management and social behavior affect fishery's outcomes. We framed the analysis of this problem within game theory combined with network theory to represent the architecture of competitive interactions. The fishers' system was set to include registered (legal) fishers and unregistered (illegal) fishers. In the presence of unregistered fishers, legal fishers may decide to cooperate (ignoring the presence of illegal fishers) or defect, which involves becoming a "super fisher" and whitewashing the captures of illegal fishers for a gain. The utility of both players, standard fisher and super fisher depend on the strategy chosen by each of them, as well as on the presence of illegal fishers. The nodes of the network represent the legal fishers (both standard and super fishers) and the links between nodes indicate that these fishers compete for the resource, assumed to be finite and evenly distributed across space. The decision to change (or not) the adopted strategy is modeled considering that fishers are subjected to variable levels of temptation to whitewash the illegal capture and to social pressure to stop doing so. To represent the vital dynamics of the king crab, we propose a model that includes the Allee effect and a term accounting for the crab extraction. We found that the super fisher strategy leads to the decrease of the king crab population under a critical threshold as postulated in the tragedy of the commons hypothesis when there are: (i) high net extraction rates of the network composed of non-competing standard fishers, (ii) high values of the extent of the fishing season, and (iii) high density of illegal fishers. The results suggest that even in the presence of super fishers and illegal fishers, the choice of properly distributed fishing/closure cycles or setting an extraction limit per vessel can prevent the king crab population from falling below a critical threshold. This finding, although controversial, reflects the reality of this fishery that, for decades, has operated under a dynamic in which whitewashing and super fishers have become well established within the system.

Great fish war with moratorium.

We consider a discrete-time version of the fish war model, where a regulator imposes a moratorium on fishing activities whenever the stock reaches a predetermined critical low value. The moratorium will be in place until the fish stock recovers, that is, attains a desirable value. We obtain conditions on the parameter values such that a moratorium could be avoided, and its optimal duration when its imposition is deemed necessary. When the players cannot avoid a moratorium under both cooperative and noncooperative modes of play, we propose a moratorium-free strategy profile that matches under some conditions the Nash equilibrium in linear-state strategies. We illustrate our results with some numerical examples.