Discriminatory attitudes against unvaccinated people during the pandemic.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, sizeable groups of unvaccinated people persist even in countries with high vaccine access1. As a consequence, vaccination became a controversial subject of debate and even protest2. Here we assess whether people express discriminatory attitudes in the form of negative affectivity, stereotypes and exclusionary attitudes in family and political settings across groups defined by COVID-19 vaccination status. We quantify discriminatory attitudes between vaccinated and unvaccinated citizens in 21 countries, covering a diverse set of cultures across the world. Across three conjoined experimental studies (n = 15,233), we demonstrate that vaccinated people express discriminatory attitudes towards unvaccinated individuals at a level as high as discriminatory attitudes that are commonly aimed at immigrant and minority populations3-5. By contrast, there is an absence of evidence that unvaccinated individuals display discriminatory attitudes towards vaccinated people, except for the presence of negative affectivity in Germany and the USA. We find evidence in support of discriminatory attitudes against unvaccinated individuals in all countries except for Hungary and Romania, and find that discriminatory attitudes are more strongly expressed in cultures with stronger cooperative norms. Previous research on the psychology of cooperation has shown that individuals react negatively against perceived 'free-riders'6,7, including in the domain of vaccinations8,9. Consistent with this, we find that contributors to the public good of epidemic control (that is, vaccinated individuals) react with discriminatory attitudes towards perceived free-riders (that is, unvaccinated individuals). National leaders and vaccinated members of the public appealed to moral obligations to increase COVID-19 vaccine uptake10,11, but our findings suggest that discriminatory attitudes-including support for the removal of fundamental rights-simultaneously emerged.

The Ethical Obligation to Treat Infectious Patients: A Systematic Review of Reasons.

During pandemics, healthcare providers struggle with balancing obligations to self, family, and patients. While HIV/AIDS seemed to settle this issue, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) rekindled debates regarding treatment refusal. We searched MEDLINE, Embase, CINAHL Complete, and Web of Science using terms including obligation, refusal, HIV/AIDS, COVID-19, and pandemics. After duplicate removal and dual, independent screening, we analyzed 156 articles for quality, ethical position, reasons, and concepts. Diseases in our sample included HIV/AIDS (72.2%), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (10.2%), COVID-19 (10.2%), Ebola (7.0%), and influenza (7.0%). Most articles (81.9%, n = 128) indicated an obligation to treat. COVID-19 had the highest number of papers indicating ethical acceptability of refusal (60%, P < .001), while HIV had the least (13.3%, P = .026). Several reason domains were significantly different during COVID-19, including unreasonable risks to self/family (26.7%, P < .001) and labor rights/workers' protection (40%, P < .001). A surge in ethics literature during COVID-19 has advocated for permissibility of treatment refusal. Balancing healthcare provision with workforce protection is crucial in effectively responding to a global pandemic.

The Ethics of Life as It Could Be: Do We Have Moral Obligations to Artificial Life?

The field of Artificial Life studies the nature of the living state by modeling and synthesizing living systems. Such systems, under certain conditions, may come to deserve moral consideration similar to that given to nonhuman vertebrates or even human beings. The fact that these systems are nonhuman and evolve in a potentially radically different substrate should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to their potentially having rights, if they are sufficiently sophisticated in other respects. Nor should the fact that they owe their existence to us be seen as reducing their status as targets of moral concern. On the contrary, creators of Artificial Life may have special obligations to their creations, resembling those of an owner to their pet or a parent to their child. For a field that aims to create artificial life-forms with increasing levels of sophistication, it is crucial to consider the possible ethical implications of our activities, with an eye toward assessing potential moral obligations for which we should be prepared. If Artificial Life is larger than life, then the ethics of artificial beings should be larger than human ethics.

Values-Based Medicine Is an Ethical Concept for Implementing the Ethical Principles in Daily Practice.

Values-based medicine (VsBM) is an ethical concept, and bioethical framework has been developed to ensure that medical ethics and values are implemented, pervasive, and powerful parameters influencing decisions about health, clinical practice, teaching, medical industry, career development, malpractice, and research. Neurosurgeons tend to adopt ethics according to their own values and to what they see and learn from teachers. Neurosurgeons, in general, are aware about ethical codes and the patient's rights. However, the philosophy, concept, and principles of medical ethics are rarely included in the training programs or in training courses. The impact of implementing, observing the medical ethics and the patients' value and culture on the course, and outcome of patients' management should not underestimate. The main principles of medical ethics are autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, dignity, and honesty, which should be strictly observed in every step of medical practice, research, teaching, and publication. Evidence-based medicine has been popularized in the last 40-50 years in order to raise up the standard of medical practice. Medical ethics and values have been associated with the medical practice for thousands of years since patients felt a need for treatment. There is no conflict between evidence-based medicine and values-based medicine, as a medical practice should always be performed within a frame of ethics and respect for patients' values. Observing the principles of values-based medicine became very relevant as multicultural societies are dominant in some countries and hospitals in different corners of the world.

Childhood Interests: what they are and why it matters.

This paper examines the concept and moral significance of "childhood interests." This concept is important in medical decision-making for children and more broadly in the field of pediatric ethics. The authors argue that childhood interests are identifiable components of childhood well-being that carry moral weight. Parents have a special role in protecting and promoting these interests and special obligations to do so. These parental obligations are grounded by the independent interests of the child, as well as the good of society more generally. Because parents have these child-rearing obligations, they must also have the authority and wide discretion necessary to fulfill them. However, while parental discretion is wide, it is not unlimited, for it must be used to safeguard and advance childhood interests.

The End of Personhood.

The concept of personhood has been central to bioethics debates about abortion, the treatment of patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious states, as well as patients with advanced dementia. More recently, the concept has been employed to think about new questions related to human-brain organoids, artificial intelligence, uploaded minds, human-animal chimeras, and human embryos, to name a few. A common move has been to ask what these entities have in common with persons (in the normative sense), and then draw conclusions about what we do (or do not) owe them. This paper argues that at best the concept of "personhood" is unhelpful to much of bioethics today and at worst it is harmful and pernicious. I suggest that we (bioethicists) stop using the concept of personhood and instead ask normative questions more directly (e.g., how ought we to treat this being and why?) and use other philosophical concepts (e.g., interests, sentience, recognition respect) to help us answer them. It is time for bioethics to end talk about personhood.

Abolishing morality in biomedical ethics.

In biomedical ethics, there is widespread acceptance of moral realism, the view that moral claims express a proposition and that at least some of these propositions are true. Biomedical ethics is also in the business of attributing moral obligations, such as "S should do X." The problem, as we argue, is that against the background of moral realism, most of these attributions are erroneous or inaccurate. The typical obligation attribution issued by a biomedical ethicist fails to truly capture the person's actual obligations. We offer a novel argument for rife error in obligation attribution. The argument starts with the idea of an epistemic burden. Epistemic burdens are all of those epistemic obstacles one must surmount in order to achieve some aim. Epistemic burdens shape decision-making such that given two otherwise equal options, a person will choose the option that has the lesser of epistemic burdens. Epistemic burdens determine one's potential obligations and, conversely, their non-obligations. The problem for biomedical ethics is that ethicists have little to no access to others' epistemic burdens. Given this lack of access and the fact that epistemic burdens determine potential obligations, biomedical ethicists often can only attribute accurate obligations out of luck. This suggests that the practice of attributing obligations in biomedical ethics is rife with error. To resolve this widespread error, we argue that this practice should be abolished from the discourse of biomedical ethics.

A critical take on procreative justice.

Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the principle should be adopted. Also, we show that there are some more principled worries regarding Marway's idea of a strong pro tanto duty not to complete injustices through one's procreative choices. Nonetheless, we believe Marway's arguments point in the right general direction regarding duties and structural injustice. Thus, in the final part, we suggest a positive proposal on how it would be possible to respond to the cases we raise. More specifically, we explore the suggestion that agents have a pro tanto duty to participate in eliminating structural injustice. Importantly, this duty can be satisfied, not only in procreation choices but in multiple ways.

Attending to the Moral Meaning of Pain.

In addition to a physical and emotional experience, pain is also a morally infused experience with deep, often subconscious, meaning for many sufferers. Whether justified or not, for many people, pain may represent loss, judgement, unworthiness, abandonment, punishment, and even existential suffering and thoughts of death. The moral meaning of pain is what influences the associated experiences of stigma, loneliness, and guilt that contribute to suffering. It is why nurses and other healthcare practitioners have long adhered to a moral obligation to treat those with pain, implying a duty to attempt to make right the wrong of undeserved suffering. Yet the moral meaning of pain is rarely discussed and is often overlooked when establishing a relationship with and a treatment plan for a person with pain. It is the unattended moral meaning of pain that may contribute to unnecessary suffering, futile treatment, and even moral dilemmas in establishing care. In this paper, I explore the definition of morality itself, the moral meaning of pain, and its implications for care. I discuss how moral pluralism in contemporary society contributes to various moral perceptions that influence a person's pain experience and how their pain is treated. Finally, I make the case that using a narrative approach to intentionally look for moral meaning in an individual's pain story may reveal opportunities for more effective pain management options.

Disruptive Technologies and Open Science: How Open Should Open Science Be? A 'Third Bioethics' Ethical Framework.

This paper investigates the ethical implications of applying open science (OS) practices on disruptive technologies, such as generative AIs. Disruptive technologies, characterized by their scalability and paradigm-shifting nature, have the potential to generate significant global impact, and carry a risk of dual use. The tension arises between the moral duty of OS to promote societal benefit by democratizing knowledge and the risks associated with open dissemination of disruptive technologies. Van Rennselaer Potter's 'third bioethics' serves as the founding horizon for an ethical framework to govern these tensions. Through theoretical analysis and concrete examples, this paper explores how OS can contribute to a better future or pose threats. Finally, we provide an ethical framework for the intersection between OS and disruptive technologies that tries to go beyond the simple 'as open as possible' tenet, considering openness as an instrumental value for the pursuit of other ethical values rather than as a principle with prima facie moral significance.

Promoting Data Sharing: The Moral Obligations of Public Funding Agencies.

Sharing research data has great potential to benefit science and society. However, data sharing is still not common practice. Since public research funding agencies have a particular impact on research and researchers, the question arises: Are public funding agencies morally obligated to promote data sharing? We argue from a research ethics perspective that public funding agencies have several pro tanto obligations requiring them to promote data sharing. However, there are also pro tanto obligations that speak against promoting data sharing in general as well as with regard to particular instruments of such promotion. We examine and weigh these obligations and conclude that all things considered funders ought to promote the sharing of data. Even the instrument of mandatory data sharing policies can be justified under certain conditions.

The Ethics of Electronic Tracking Devices in Dementia Care: An Interview Study with Developers.

Wandering is a symptom of dementia that can have devastating consequences on the lives of persons living with dementia and their families and caregivers. Increasingly, caregivers are turning towards electronic tracking devices to help manage wandering. Ethical questions have been raised regarding these location-based technologies and although qualitative research has been conducted to gain better insight into various stakeholders' views on the topic, developers of these technologies have been largely excluded. No qualitative research has focused on developers' perceptions of ethics related to electronic tracking devices. To address this, we performed a qualitative semi-structured interview study based on grounded theory. We interviewed 15 developers of electronic tracking devices to better understand how they perceive ethical issues surrounding the design, development, and use of these devices within dementia care. Our results reveal that developers are strongly motivated by moral considerations and believe that including stakeholders throughout the development process is critical for success. Developers felt a strong sense of moral obligation towards topics within their control and a weaker sense of moral obligation towards topics outside their control. This leads to a perceived moral boundary between development and use, where some moral responsibility is shifted to end-users.

Defending and Defining Environmental Responsibilities for the Health Research Sector.

Six planetary boundaries have already been exceeded, including climate change, loss of biodiversity, chemical pollution, and land-system change. The health research sector contributes to the environmental crisis we are facing, though to a lesser extent than healthcare or agriculture sectors. It could take steps to reduce its environmental impact but generally has not done so, even as the planetary emergency worsens. So far, the normative case for why the health research sector should rectify that failure has not been made. This paper argues strong philosophical grounds, derived from theories of health and social justice, exist to support the claim that the sector has a duty to avoid or minimise causing or contributing to ecological harms that threaten human health or worsen health inequity. The paper next develops ideas about the duty's content, explaining why it should entail more than reducing carbon emissions, and considers what limits might be placed on the duty.

Advocacy and Bioethics: Aspiration, Obligation, and Negotiation.

AbstractA long-standing tenet of healthcare clinical ethics consultation has involved the neutrality of the ethicist. However, recent pressing societal issues have challenged this viewpoint. Perhaps now more than ever before, ethicists are being called upon to take up roles in public health, policy, and other community-oriented endeavors. In this article, I first review the concept of professional advocacy and contrast this conceptualization with the role of patient advocate, utilizing the profession of nursing as an exemplar. Then, I explore the status of advocacy in clinical ethics and how this conversation intersects with the existing professional obligations of the bioethicist, arguing that the goals of ethics consultation and ethical obligations of the clinical ethicist are compatible with the role of professional advocate. Finally, I explore potential barriers to professional advocacy and offer suggestions for a path forward.

Exit Duty Generator.

This article presents a revised version of negative utilitarianism. Previous versions have relied on a hedonistic theory of value and stated that suffering should be minimized. The traditional rebuttal is that the doctrine in this form morally requires us to end all sentient life. To avoid this, a need-based theory of value is introduced. The frustration of the needs not to suffer and not to have one's autonomy dwarfed should, prima facie, be decreased. When decreasing the need frustration of some would increase the need frustration of others, the case is deferred and a fuller ethical analysis is conducted. The author's perceptions on murder, extinction, the right to die, antinatalism, veganism, and abortion are used to reach a reflective equilibrium. The new theory is then applied to consumerism, material growth, and power relations. The main finding is that the burden of proof should be on those who promote the status quo.

Welfare, Abortion, and Organ Donation: A Reply to the Restrictivist.

We argued in a recent issue of this journal that if abortion is restricted,1 then there are parallel obligations for parents to donate body parts to their children. The strength of this obligation to donate is proportional to the strength of the abortion restrictions. If abortion is never permissible, then a parent must always donate any organ if they are a match. If abortion is sometimes permissible and sometimes not, then organ donation is sometimes obligatory and sometimes not. Our argument was based on the following ideas: (a) that a fetus has full moral status, (b) that parents have special obligations to their offspring, fetus or not, and (c) that this special obligation is to protect them. The result is the conclusion that abortion restrictivists cannot also consistently deny that organ donation should be compulsory.

Potentiality switches and epistemic uncertainty: the Argument from Potential in times of human embryo-like structures.

Recent advancements in developmental biology enable the creation of embryo-like structures from human stem cells, which we refer to as human embryo-like structures (hELS). These structures provide promising tools to complement-and perhaps ultimately replace-the use of human embryos in clinical and fundamental research. But what if these hELS-when further improved-also have a claim to moral status? What would that imply for their research use? In this paper, we explore these questions in relation to the traditional answer as to why human embryos should be given greater protection than other (non-)human cells: the so-called Argument from Potential (AfP). According to the AfP, human embryos deserve special moral status because they have the unique potential to develop into persons. While some take the development of hELS to challenge the very foundations of the AfP, the ongoing debate suggests that its dismissal would be premature. Since the AfP is a spectrum of views with different moral implications, it does not need to imply that research with human embryos or hELS that (may) have 'active' potential should be completely off-limits. However, the problem with determining active potential in hELS is that this depends on development passing through 'potentiality switches' about the precise coordinates of which we are still in the dark. As long as this epistemic uncertainty persists, extending embryo research regulations to research with specific types of hELS would amount to a form of regulative precaution that as such would require further justification.

How do roles impact suicidal agents' obligations?

In this paper, I assess the role responsibility argument that claims suicidal agents have obligations to specific people not to kill themselves due to their roles. Since the plausibility of the role responsibility argument is clearest in the parent-child relationship, I assess parental obligations. I defend a view that says that normative roles, such as those of a parent, are contractual and voluntary. I then suggest that the normative parameters for some roles preclude permissible suicide because the role-related contract includes a promise to provide continuing care and emotional support. I propose that as we have established criteria for morally acceptable reasons for cancelling, voiding, or amending a contract, we can apply these to the role responsibility argument to establish grounds for releasing a parent from his role-related and contractual obligations. Failure to fulfil one's contractual roles may not be blameworthy, depending upon the circumstances. I propose the factors determining culpability in failure to fulfil one's role-related obligations are: intention, voluntariness, diminished responsibility, mental capacity, and foreseeability.

A critical view on using "life not worth living" in the bioethics of assisted reproduction.

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies.

[Live-ins: A mapping of relevant actors and moral norms at the public health level]. / Live-Ins: Eine Kartierung relevanter Akteur_innen und moralischer Normen auf der Public-Health-Ebene.

Live-ins: A mapping of relevant actors and moral norms at the public health level Abstract: Background: Live-ins are embedded in a network of multiple actors that shape their current working and living situation. The causes and effects of live-in arrangements go far beyond the actual care relationship and include structures and stakeholders that are interconnected at the Public Health level. Besides a legal responsibility, these actors also have a moral responsibility, which the article focuses on. Aim: The article provides an overview of relevant actors and moral norms in the context of live-ins at the public health level. Methods: The method followed the "Context and Actor Analysis". Actors at the public health level that are relevant for the live-ins' situation were identified, and the responsibilities and tasks presented in their websites as well as their respective target groups were collected. The ethical dimension was extracted from these self-descriptions. Results: The 23 actors address the live-ins directly or indirectly in their various social roles. The self-given tasks and the moral norms deduced from them, for which the actors are particularly responsible, illustrate the importance of justice and respect. Conclusions: The work provides the basis for an urgently needed empirical-ethical analysis on the current state of responsibility-taking. Not only the variety of the live-ins' roles, but also the multitude of actors involved and shared norms illustrate the necessity of close cooperation to be able to fulfil their responsibility.