ABSTRACT
As social animals, people are highly sensitive to the attention of others. Seeing someone else gaze at an object automatically draws one's own attention to that object. Monitoring the attention of others aids in reconstructing their emotions, beliefs, and intentions and may play a crucial role in social alignment. Recently, however, it has been suggested that the human brain constructs a predictive model of other people's attention that is far more involved than a moment-by-moment monitoring of gaze direction. The hypothesized model learns the statistical patterns in other people's attention and extrapolates how attention is likely to move. Here, we tested the hypothesis of a predictive model of attention. Subjects saw movies of attention displayed as a bright spot shifting around a scene. Subjects were able to correctly distinguish natural attention sequences (based on eye tracking of prior participants) from altered sequences (e.g., played backward or in a scrambled order). Even when the attention spot moved around a blank background, subjects could distinguish natural from scrambled sequences, suggesting a sensitivity to the spatial-temporal statistics of attention. Subjects also showed an ability to recognize the attention patterns of different individuals. These results suggest that people possess a sophisticated model of the normal statistics of attention and can identify deviations from the model. Monitoring attention is therefore more than simply registering where someone else's eyes are pointing. It involves predictive modeling, which may contribute to our remarkable social ability to predict the mind states and behavior of others.
Subject(s)
Brain , Cognition , Humans , Vision, Ocular , Eye , EmotionsABSTRACT
This article argues that consciousness has a logically sound, explanatory framework, different from typical accounts that suffer from hidden mysticism. The article has three main parts. The first describes background principles concerning information processing in the brain, from which one can deduce a general, rational framework for explaining consciousness. The second part describes a specific theory that embodies those background principles, the Attention Schema Theory. In the past several years, a growing body of experimental evidence-behavioral evidence, brain imaging evidence, and computational modeling-has addressed aspects of the theory. The final part discusses the evolution of consciousness. By emphasizing the specific role of consciousness in cognition and behavior, the present approach leads to a proposed account of how consciousness may have evolved over millions of years, from fish to humans. The goal of this article is to present a comprehensive, overarching framework in which we can understand scientifically what consciousness is and what key adaptive roles it plays in brain function.
Subject(s)
Cognition , Consciousness , Animals , Attention , Brain , Computer SimulationABSTRACT
In the attention schema theory (AST), the brain constructs a model of attention, the attention schema, to aid in the endogenous control of attention. Growing behavioral evidence appears to support the presence of a model of attention. However, a central question remains: does a controller of attention actually benefit by having access to an attention schema? We constructed an artificial deep Q-learning neural network agent that was trained to control a simple form of visuospatial attention, tracking a stimulus with an attention spotlight in order to solve a catch task. The agent was tested with and without access to an attention schema. In both conditions, the agent received sufficient information such that it should, theoretically, be able to learn the task. We found that with an attention schema present, the agent learned to control its attention spotlight and learned the catch task. Once the agent learned, if the attention schema was then disabled, the agent's performance was greatly reduced. If the attention schema was removed before learning began, the agent was impaired at learning. The results show how the presence of even a simple attention schema can provide a profound benefit to a controller of attention. We interpret these results as supporting the central argument of AST: the brain contains an attention schema because of its practical benefit in the endogenous control of attention.
Subject(s)
Attention , Deep Learning , Neural Networks, Computer , Spatial ProcessingABSTRACT
The attention schema theory posits a specific relationship between subjective awareness and attention, in which awareness is the control model that the brain uses to aid in the endogenous control of attention. In previous experiments, we developed a behavioral paradigm in human subjects to manipulate awareness and attention. The paradigm involved a visual cue that could be used to guide attention to a target stimulus. In task 1, subjects were aware of the cue, but not aware that it provided information about the target. The cue measurably drew exogenous attention to itself. In addition, implicitly, the subjects' endogenous attention mechanism used the cue to help shift attention to the target. In task 2, subjects were no longer aware of the cue. The cue still measurably drew exogenous attention to itself, yet without awareness of the cue, the subjects' endogenous control mechanism was no longer able to use the cue to control attention. Thus, the control of attention depended on awareness. Here, we tested the two tasks while scanning brain activity in human volunteers. We predicted that the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) would be active in relation to the process in which awareness helps control attention. This prediction was confirmed. The right TPJ was active in relation to the effect of the cue on attention in task 1; it was not measurably active in task 2. The difference was significant. In our interpretation, the right TPJ is involved in an interaction in which awareness permits the control of attention.
Subject(s)
Attention/physiology , Awareness/physiology , Parietal Lobe/physiology , Temporal Lobe/physiology , Adolescent , Adult , Behavior , Brain Mapping , Female , Humans , Magnetic Resonance Imaging , Male , Middle Aged , Nerve Net/physiology , Task Performance and Analysis , Young AdultABSTRACT
Recent evidence suggests a link between visual motion processing and social cognition. When person A watches person B, the brain of A apparently generates a fictitious, subthreshold motion signal streaming from B to the object of B's attention. These previous studies, being correlative, were unable to establish any functional role for the false motion signals. Here, we directly tested whether subthreshold motion processing plays a role in judging the attention of others. We asked, if we contaminate people's visual input with a subthreshold motion signal streaming from an agent to an object, can we manipulate people's judgments about that agent's attention? Participants viewed a display including faces, objects, and a subthreshold motion hidden in the background. Participants' judgments of the attentional state of the faces was significantly altered by the hidden motion signal. Faces from which subthreshold motion was streaming toward an object were judged as paying more attention to the object. Control experiments showed the effect was specific to the agent-to-object motion direction and to judging attention, not action or spatial orientation. These results suggest that when the brain models other minds, it uses a subthreshold motion signal, streaming from an individual to an object, to help represent attentional state. This type of social-cognitive model, tapping perceptual mechanisms that evolved to process physical events in the real world, may help to explain the extraordinary cultural persistence of beliefs in mind processes having physical manifestation. These findings, therefore, may have larger implications for human psychology and cultural belief.
Subject(s)
Facial Recognition/physiology , Motion Perception/physiology , Social Cognition , Theory of Mind , Adolescent , Adult , Attention/physiology , Facial Expression , Female , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Photic Stimulation/methods , Young AdultABSTRACT
Keeping track of other people's gaze is an essential task in social cognition and key for successfully reading other people's intentions and beliefs (theory of mind). Recent behavioral evidence suggests that we construct an implicit model of other people's gaze, which may incorporate physically incoherent attributes such as a construct of force-carrying beams that emanate from the eyes. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and multivoxel pattern analysis to test the prediction that the brain encodes gaze as implied motion streaming from an agent toward a gazed-upon object. We found that a classifier, trained to discriminate the direction of visual motion, significantly decoded the gaze direction in static images depicting a sighted face, but not a blindfolded one, from brain activity patterns in the human motion-sensitive middle temporal complex (MT+) and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). Our results demonstrate a link between the visual motion system and social brain mechanisms, in which the TPJ, a key node in theory of mind, works in concert with MT+ to encode gaze as implied motion. This model may be a fundamental aspect of social cognition that allows us to efficiently connect agents with the objects of their attention. It is as if the brain draws a quick visual sketch with moving arrows to help keep track of who is attending to what. This implicit, fluid-flow model of other people's gaze may help explain culturally universal myths about the mind as an energy-like, flowing essence.
Subject(s)
Attention/physiology , Fixation, Ocular/physiology , Parietal Lobe/physiology , Temporal Lobe/physiology , Visual Perception/physiology , Adolescent , Adult , Female , Healthy Volunteers , Humans , Magnetic Resonance Imaging , Male , Middle Aged , Parietal Lobe/diagnostic imaging , Photic Stimulation , Social Behavior , Temporal Lobe/diagnostic imaging , Theory of Mind , Young AdultABSTRACT
As a part of social cognition, people automatically construct rich models of other people's vision. Here we show that when people judge the mechanical forces acting on an object, their judgments are biased by another person gazing at the object. The bias is consistent with an implicit perception that gaze adds a gentle force, pushing on the object. The bias was present even though the participants were not explicitly aware of it and claimed that they did not believe in an extramission view of vision (a common folk view of vision in which the eyes emit an invisible energy). A similar result was not obtained on control trials when participants saw a blindfolded face turned toward the object, or a face with open eyes turned away from the object. The findings suggest that people automatically and implicitly generate a model of other people's vision that uses the simplifying construct of beams coming out of the eyes. This implicit model of active gaze may be a hidden, yet fundamental, part of the rich process of social cognition, contributing to how we perceive visual agency. It may also help explain the extraordinary cultural persistence of the extramission myth of vision.
Subject(s)
Attention , Eye , Visual Perception , Adolescent , Adult , Aged , Eye Movements , Female , Fixation, Ocular , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Models, Psychological , Surveys and Questionnaires , Theory of Mind , Vision, Ocular , Young AdultABSTRACT
A logical explanation of consciousness has been known for decades. The brain must construct a specific set of information about conscious feeling (theory-of-mind information), causing people to believe, think, and claim to have consciousness. Theories that propose an actual, intangible feeling are non-explanatory. They add a magical red herring while leaving unexplained the objective phenomena: the believing, thinking, and claiming.
Subject(s)
Brain , Consciousness , HumansABSTRACT
Many people show a left-right bias in visual processing. We measured spatial bias in neurotypical participants using a variant of the line bisection task. In the same participants, we measured performance in a social cognition task. This theory-of-mind task measured whether each participant had a processing-speed bias toward the right of, or left of, a cartoon agent about which the participant was thinking. Crucially, the cartoon was rotated such that what was left and right with respect to the cartoon was up and down with respect to the participant. Thus, a person's own left-right bias could not align directly onto left and right with respect to the cartoon head. Performance on the two tasks was significantly correlated. People who had a natural bias toward processing their own left side of space were quicker to process how the cartoon might think about objects to the left side of its face, and likewise for a rightward bias. One possible interpretation of these results is that the act of processing one's own personal space shares some of the same underlying mechanisms as the social cognitive act of reconstructing someone else's processing of their space.
Subject(s)
Space Perception , Adolescent , Adult , Attention , Bias , Cognition , Female , Humans , Middle Aged , Young AdultABSTRACT
This article describes some aspects of the underlying logic of the attention schema theory (AST) of subjective consciousness. It is a theory that distinguishes between what the brain actually, physically has, what is represented by information models constructed in the brain, what higher cognition thinks based on access to those models and what speech machinery claims based on the information within higher cognition. It is a theory of how we claim to have an essentially magical, subjective mind, based on the impoverishment and reduction of information along that pathway. While the article can stand on its own as a brief account of some critical aspects of AST, it specifically addresses questions and concerns raised by a set of commentaries on a target article.
Subject(s)
Awareness , Consciousness , Attention , Brain , Cognition , HumansABSTRACT
Here we examine how people's understanding of consciousness may have been shaped by an implicit theory of mind. This social cognition approach may help to make sense of an apparent divide between the physically incoherent consciousness we think we have and the complex, rich, but mechanistic consciousness we may actually have. We suggest this approach helps reconcile some of the current cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness. We argue that a single, coherent explanation of consciousness is available and has been for some time, encompassing the views of many researchers, but is not yet recognized. It is obscured partly by terminological differences, and partly because researchers view isolated pieces of it as rival theories. It may be time to recognize that a deeper, coherent pool of ideas, a kind of standard model, is available to explain multiple layers of consciousness and how they relate to specific networks within the brain.
Subject(s)
Attention , Brain/physiology , Consciousness , Illusions , Models, Psychological , Humans , Theory of MindABSTRACT
It is now well established that visual attention, as measured with standard spatial attention tasks, and visual awareness, as measured by report, can be dissociated. It is possible to attend to a stimulus with no reported awareness of the stimulus. We used a behavioral paradigm in which people were aware of a stimulus in one condition and unaware of it in another condition, but the stimulus drew a similar amount of spatial attention in both conditions. The paradigm allowed us to test for brain regions active in association with awareness independent of level of attention. Participants performed the task in an MRI scanner. We looked for brain regions that were more active in the aware than the unaware trials. The largest cluster of activity was obtained in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) bilaterally. Local independent component analysis (ICA) revealed that this activity contained three distinct, but overlapping, components: a bilateral, anterior component; a left dorsal component; and a right dorsal component. These components had brain-wide functional connectivity that partially overlapped the ventral attention network and the frontoparietal control network. In contrast, no significant activity in association with awareness was found in the banks of the intraparietal sulcus, a region connected to the dorsal attention network and traditionally associated with attention control. These results show the importance of separating awareness and attention when testing for cortical substrates. They are also consistent with a recent proposal that awareness is associated with ventral attention areas, especially in the TPJ.
Subject(s)
Attention/physiology , Awareness/physiology , Nerve Net/physiology , Visual Perception/physiology , Adolescent , Adult , Brain Mapping , Female , Functional Laterality , Humans , Magnetic Resonance Imaging , Male , Middle Aged , Parietal Lobe/diagnostic imaging , Parietal Lobe/physiology , Photic Stimulation , Reaction Time , Temporal Lobe/diagnostic imaging , Temporal Lobe/physiologyABSTRACT
The neural basis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is not yet understood. ASD is marked by social deficits and is strongly associated with cerebellar abnormalities. We studied the organization and cerebellar connectivity of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), an area that plays a crucial role in social cognition. We applied localized independent component analysis to resting-state fMRI data from autistic and neurotypical adolescents to yield an unbiased parcellation of the bilateral TPJ into 11 independent components (ICs). A comparison between neurotypical and autistic adolescents showed that the organization of the TPJ was not significantly altered in ASD. Second, we used the time courses of the TPJ ICs as spatially unbiased "seeds" for a functional connectivity analysis applied to voxels within the cerebellum. We found that the cerebellum contained a fine-grained, lateralized map of the TPJ. The connectivity of the TPJ subdivisions with cerebellar zones showed one striking difference in ASD. The right dorsal TPJ showed markedly less connectivity with the left Crus II. Disturbed cerebellar input to this key region for cognition and multimodal integration may contribute to social deficits in ASD. The findings might also suggest that the right TPJ and/or left Crus II are potential targets for noninvasive brain stimulation therapies.
Subject(s)
Autism Spectrum Disorder/pathology , Cerebellum/pathology , Neural Pathways/pathology , Parietal Lobe/pathology , Temporal Lobe/pathology , Adolescent , Brain Mapping , Female , Humans , Image Interpretation, Computer-Assisted , Magnetic Resonance Imaging , MaleABSTRACT
This study tested the possible relationship between reported visual awareness ("I see a visual stimulus in front of me") and the social attribution of awareness to someone else ("That person is aware of an object next to him"). Subjects were tested in two steps. First, in an fMRI experiment, subjects were asked to attribute states of awareness to a cartoon face. Activity associated with this task was found bilaterally within the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) among other areas. Second, the TPJ was transiently disrupted using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). When the TMS was targeted to the same cortical sites that had become active during the social attribution task, the subjects showed symptoms of visual neglect in that their detection of visual stimuli was significantly affected. In control trials, when TMS was targeted to nearby cortical sites that had not become active during the social attribution task, no significant effect on visual detection was found. These results suggest that there may be at least some partial overlap in brain mechanisms that participate in the social attribution of sensory awareness to other people and in attributing sensory awareness to oneself.
Subject(s)
Awareness/physiology , Social Behavior , Adolescent , Adult , Brain Mapping , Female , Humans , Magnetic Resonance Imaging , Male , Middle Aged , Task Performance and Analysis , Time Factors , Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation , Visual Perception/physiology , Young AdultABSTRACT
The human temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is a topic of intense research. Imaging studies have identified TPJ activation in association with many higher-order functions such as theory-of-mind, episodic memory, and attention, causing debate about the distribution of different processes. One major challenge is the lack of consensus about the anatomical location and extent of the TPJ. Here, we address this problem using data-driven analysis to test the hypothesis that the bilateral TPJ can be parcellated into subregions. We applied independent component analysis (ICA) to task-free fMRI data within a local region around the bilateral TPJ, iterating the ICA at multiple model orders and in several datasets. The localized analysis allowed finer separation of processes and the use of multiple dimensionalities provided qualitative information about lateralization. We identified four subdivisions that were bilaterally symmetrical and one that was right biased. To test whether the independent components (ICs) reflected true subdivisions, we performed functional connectivity analysis using the IC coordinates as seeds. This confirmed that the subdivisions belonged to distinct networks. The right-biased IC was connected with a network often associated with attentional processing. One bilateral subdivision was connected to sensorimotor regions and another was connected to auditory regions. One subdivision that presented as distinct left- and right-biased ICs was connected to frontoparietal regions. Another subdivision that also had left- and right-biased ICs was connected to social or default mode networks. Our results show that the TPJ in both hemispheres hosts multiple neural processes with connectivity patterns consistent with well developed specialization and lateralization.
Subject(s)
Parietal Lobe/anatomy & histology , Parietal Lobe/physiology , Temporal Lobe/anatomy & histology , Temporal Lobe/physiology , Adolescent , Adult , Female , Functional Laterality/physiology , Humans , Image Processing, Computer-Assisted , Magnetic Resonance Imaging , Male , Middle Aged , Neural Pathways/anatomy & histology , Neural Pathways/physiology , Young AdultABSTRACT
Previous studies show that it is possible to attend to a stimulus without awareness of it. Whether attention and awareness are independent or have a specific relationship, however, remains debated. Here, we tested three aspects of visual attention with and without awareness of the visual stimulus. Metacontrast masking rendered participants either subjectively aware or not aware of the stimulus. Attention drawn to the stimulus was measured by using the stimulus as a cue in a spatial attention task. We found that attention was drawn to the stimulus regardless of whether or not people were aware of it. However, attention changed significantly in the absence of awareness in at least three ways. First, attention to a task-relevant stimulus was less stable over time. Second, inhibition of return, the automatic suppression of attention to a task-irrelevant stimulus, was reduced. Third, attention was more driven by the luminance contrast of the stimulus. These findings add to the growing information on the behavior of attention with and without awareness. The findings are also consistent with our recently proposed account of the relationship between attention and awareness. In the attention schema theory, awareness is the internal model of attention. Just as the brain contains a body schema that models the body and helps control the body, so it contains an attention schema that helps control attention. In that theory, in the absence of awareness, the control of attention should suffer in basic ways predictable from dynamical systems theory. The present results confirm some of those predictions.
Subject(s)
Attention , Awareness , Executive Function , Visual Perception , Adolescent , Adult , Analysis of Variance , Female , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Photic Stimulation , Psychological Tests , Psychophysics , Young AdultABSTRACT
The "attention schema" theory provides one possible account of the biological basis of consciousness, tracing the evolution of awareness through steps from the advent of selective signal enhancement about half a billion years ago to the top-down control of attention, to an internal model of attention (which allows a brain, for the first time, to attribute to itself that it has a mind that is aware of something), to the ability to attribute awareness to other beings, and from there to the human attribution of a rich spirit world surrounding us. Humans have been known to attribute awareness to plants, rocks, rivers, empty space, and the universe as a whole. Deities, ghosts, souls--the spirit world swirling around us is arguably the exuberant attribution of awareness.
Subject(s)
Awareness , Biological Evolution , Animals , Attention , Brain/physiology , Consciousness/physiology , Humans , Models, Neurological , Social PerceptionABSTRACT
The question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) can be considered conscious and therefore should be evaluated through a moral lens has surfaced in recent years. In this paper, we argue that whether AI is conscious is less of a concern than the fact that AI can be considered conscious by users during human-AI interaction, because this ascription of consciousness can lead to carry-over effects on human-human interaction. When AI is viewed as conscious like a human, then how people treat AI appears to carry over into how they treat other people due to activating schemas that are congruent to those activated during interactions with humans. In light of this potential, we might consider regulating how we treat AI, or how we build AI to evoke certain kinds of treatment from users, but not because AI is inherently sentient. This argument focuses on humanlike, social actor AI such as chatbots, digital voice assistants, and social robots. In the first part of the paper, we provide evidence for carry-over effects between perceptions of AI consciousness and behavior toward humans through literature on human-computer interaction, human-AI interaction, and the psychology of artificial agents. In the second part of the paper, we detail how the mechanism of schema activation can allow us to test consciousness perception as a driver of carry-over effects between human-AI interaction and human-human interaction. In essence, perceiving AI as conscious like a human, thereby activating congruent mind schemas during interaction, is a driver for behaviors and perceptions of AI that can carry over into how we treat humans. Therefore, the fact that people can ascribe humanlike consciousness to AI is worth considering, and moral protection for AI is also worth considering, regardless of AI's inherent conscious or moral status.