Children endorse deterrence motivations for third-party punishment but derive higher enjoyment from compensating victims.

Children's punishment behavior may be driven by both retribution and deterrence, but the potential primacy of either motive is unknown. Moreover, children's punishment enjoyment and compensation enjoyment have never been directly contrasted. Here, British, Colombian, and Italian 7- to 11-year-old children (N = 123) operated a Justice System in which they viewed different moral transgressions in Minecraft, a globally popular video game, either face-to-face with an experimenter or over the internet. Children could respond to transgressions by punishing transgressors and compensating victims. The purpose of the system was framed in terms of retribution, deterrence, or compensation between participants. Children's performance, endorsement, and enjoyment of punishment and compensation were measured, along with their endorsement of retribution versus deterrence as punishment justifications, during and/or after justice administration. Children overwhelmingly endorsed deterrence over retribution as their punishment justification irrespective of age. When asked to reproduce the presented frame in their own words, children more reliably reproduced the deterrence frame rather than the retribution frame. Punishment enjoyment decreased while compensation enjoyment increased over time. Despite enjoying compensation more, children preferentially endorsed punishment over compensation, especially with increasing age and transgression severity. Reported deterrent justifications, superior reproduction of deterrence framing, lower enjoyment of punishment than of compensation, and higher endorsement of punishment over compensation together suggest that children felt that they ought to mete out punishment as a means to deter future transgressions. Face-to-face and internet-mediated responses were not distinguishable, supporting a route to social psychology research with primary school-aged children unable to physically visit labs.

The behavioral effects of cooperative and competitive board games in preschoolers.

Traditional board games are a common social activity for many children, but little is known about the behavioral effects of this type of game. The current study aims to explore the behavioral effects of cooperative and competitive board games in four-to-six-year-old children (N = 65). Repeatedly during 6 weeks, children in groups of four played either cooperative or competitive board games in a between-subject design, and shortly after each game conducted a task in which children's cooperative, prosocial, competitive, and antisocial behavior were observed. The type of board game did not have an effect on cooperative, prosocial or antisocial behavior. Cooperative and competitive board games elicited equal amounts of cooperative and prosocial behavior, which suggest that board games, regardless of type, could have positive effects on preschoolers' social behavior. Our results suggest that children may compete more after playing competitive board games; but the measure of competitive behavior in particular was unreliable. Preschoolers enjoyed playing cooperative board games more than competitive board games, which may be one reason to prefer their use.

The social foundation of executive function.

In this study, we propose that infant social cognition may 'bootstrap' the successive development of domain-general cognition in line with the cultural intelligence hypothesis. Using a longitudinal design, 6-month-old infants (N = 118) were assessed on two basic social cognitive tasks targeting the abilities to share attention with others and understanding other peoples' actions. At 10 months, we measured the quality of the child's social learning environment, indexed by parent's abilities to provide scaffolding behaviors during a problem-solving task. Eight months later, the children were followed up with a cognitive test-battery, including tasks of inhibitory control and working memory. Our results showed that better infant social action understanding interacted with better parental scaffolding skills in predicting simple inhibitory control in toddlerhood. This suggests that infants' who are better at understanding other's actions are also better equipped to make the most of existing social learning opportunities, which in turn may benefit future non-social cognitive outcomes.

The "now moment" is believed privileged because "now" is when happening is experienced.

Hoerl & McCormack risk misleading people about the cognitive underpinnings of the belief in a privileged "now moment" because they do not explicitly acknowledge that the sense of existing in the now moment is an intrinsically temporally dynamic one. The sense of happening that is exclusive to the now moment is a better candidate for the source of belief in a privileged now.

Diminished ability to identify facial emotional expressions in children with disorganized attachment representations.

The development of children's ability to identify facial emotional expressions has long been suggested to be experience dependent, with parental caregiving as an important influencing factor. This study attempts to further this knowledge by examining disorganization of the attachment system as a potential psychological mechanism behind aberrant caregiving experiences and deviations in the ability to identify facial emotional expressions. Typically developing children (N = 105, 49.5% boys) aged 6-7 years (M = 6 years 8 months, SD = 1.8 months) completed an attachment representation task and an emotion identification task, and parents rated children's negative emotionality. The results showed a generally diminished ability in disorganized children to identify facial emotional expressions, but no response biases. Disorganized attachment was also related to higher levels of negative emotionality, but discrimination of emotional expressions did not moderate or mediate this relation. Our novel findings relate disorganized attachment to deviations in emotion identification, and therefore suggest that disorganization of the attachment system may constitute a psychological mechanism linking aberrant caregiving experiences to deviations in children's ability to identify facial emotional expressions. Our findings further suggest that deviations in emotion identification in disorganized children, in the absence of maltreatment, may manifest in a generally diminished ability to identify emotional expressions, rather than in specific response biases.

Early preschool environments and gender: Effects of gender pedagogy in Sweden.

To test how early social environments affect children's consideration of gender, 3- to 6-year-old children (N=80) enrolled in gender-neutral or typical preschool programs in the central district of a large Swedish city completed measures designed to assess their gender-based social preferences, stereotypes, and automatic encoding. Compared with children in typical preschools, a greater proportion of children in the gender-neutral school were interested in playing with unfamiliar other-gender children. In addition, children attending the gender-neutral preschool scored lower on a gender stereotyping measure than children attending typical preschools. Children at the gender-neutral school, however, were not less likely to automatically encode others' gender. The findings suggest that gender-neutral pedagogy has moderate effects on how children think and feel about people of different genders but might not affect children's tendency to spontaneously notice gender.

Five-year-olds punish antisocial adults.

The human tendency to impose costs on those who have behaved antisocially towards third parties (third-party punishment) has a formative influence on societies, yet very few studies of the development of this tendency exist. In most studies where young children have punished, participants have imposed costs on puppets, leaving open the question as to whether young children punish in real third-party situations. Here, five-year-olds were given the opportunity to allocate desirable or unpleasant items to antisocial and neutral adults, who were presented as real and shown on video. Neutral individuals were almost always allocated only desirable items. Antisocial individuals were instead usually allocated unpleasant items, as long as participants were told they would give anonymously. Most participants who were instead told they would give in person did not allocate unpleasant items, although a minority did so. This indicates that the children interpreted the situation as real, and that whereas they genuinely desired to punish antisocial adults, they did not usually dare do so in person. Boys punished more frequently than girls. The willingness of preschoolers to spontaneously engage in third-party punishment, occasionally even risking the social costs of antagonizing an anti-social adult, demonstrates a deep-seated early-developing punitive sentiment in humans.

Over-imitating preschoolers believe unnecessary actions are normative and enforce their performance by a third party.

Over-imitation, which is common in children, is the imitation of elements of an action sequence that are clearly unnecessary for reaching the final goal. A variety of cognitive mechanisms have been proposed to explain this phenomenon. Here, 48 3- and 5-year-olds together with a puppet observed an adult demonstrate instrumental tasks that included an unnecessary action. Failure of the puppet to perform the unnecessary action resulted in spontaneous protest by the majority of the children, with some using normative language. Children also protested in comparison tasks in which the puppet violated convention or instrumental rationality. Protest in response to the puppet's omission of unnecessary action occurred even after the puppet's successful achievement of the goal. This observation is not compatible with the hypothesis that the primary cause of over-imitation is that children believe the unnecessary action causes the goal. There are multiple domains that children may believe determine the unnecessary action's normativity, two being social convention and instrumental rationality. Because the demonstration provides no information about which domains are relevant, children are capable of encoding apparently unnecessary action as normative without information as to which domain determines the unnecessary action's normativity. This study demonstrates an early link between two processes of fundamental importance for human culture: faithful imitation and the adherence to and enforcement of norms.

Over-imitation is better explained by norm learning than by distorted causal learning.

In over-imitation, children copy even elements of a goal-directed action sequence that appear unnecessary for achieving the goal. We demonstrate in 4-year olds that the unnecessary action is specifically associated with the goal, not generally associated with the apparatus. The unnecessary action is performed flexibly: 4-year olds usually omit it if it has already been performed by an adult. Most 5-year olds do not verbally report the unnecessary action as necessary when achieving the goal, although most of them report an equivalent but necessary action as necessary. Most 5-year olds explain the necessary action in functional terms, but are unsure as to the function of the unnecessary action. These verbal measures do not support the hypothesis that children over-imitate primarily because they encode unnecessary actions as causing the goal even in causally transparent systems. In a causally transparent system, explanations for over-imitation fitting the results are that children are ignorant of the unnecessary action's purpose, and that they learn a prescriptive norm that it should be carried out. In causally opaque systems, however, for children and for adults, any action performed before achieving the goal is likely to be inferred as causally necessary-this is not over-imitation, but ordinary causal learning.

Behavioural ecology: tool manufacture by naive juvenile crows.

New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) are the most prolific avian tool-users. Regional variation in the shape of their tools may be the result of cumulative cultural evolution--a phenomenon considered to be a hallmark of human culture. Here we show that hand-raised juvenile New Caledonian crows spontaneously manufacture and use tools, without any contact with adults of their species or any prior demonstration by humans. Our finding is a crucial step towards producing informed models of cultural transmission in this species, and in animals in general.

Catching of balls unexpectedly thrown or fired by cannon.

Although learned actions can be automatically elicited in response to expected stimuli for which they have been prepared, little is known about whether learned actions can be automatically initiated by unexpected stimuli. Responses of unwitting participants to balls unexpectedly thrown by an experimenter (n=10) or propelled by a hidden ball cannon (n=22) were recorded by motion capture. Experience of ball catching correlated negatively with hand movement distance, indicating most responses were defensive, but successful catches were made in response to both thrown and fired balls. Although reaction time was faster in response to fired balls, interception was more frequent in response to thrown balls, indicating that movement cues by the thrower facilitated unexpected ball catching. The latency to begin a catching action by the only successful catcher of an unexpectedly fired ball was 296 msec. Given current knowledge of reaction time tasks and latencies of neural substrates of conscious perception and deliberation, it is probable that there was insufficient time available for conscious preparation of catch attempts. Ball catching may represent an example of a learned response which can be rapidly and unconsciously initiated without contextual priming or expectation of the stimulus.

Moral duty and equalization concerns motivate children's third-party punishment.

Although children enact third-party punishment, at least in response to harm and fairness violations, much remains unknown about this behavior. We investigated the tendency to make the punishment fit the crime in terms of moral domain; developmental patterns across moral domains; the effects of audience and descriptive norm violations; and enjoyment of inflicting punishment. We tested 5- to 11-year-olds in the United Kingdom (N = 152 across two experiments, 55 girls and 97 boys, predominantly White and middle-class). Children acted as referees in a computer game featuring teams of players: As these players violated fairness or loyalty norms, children were offered the opportunity to punish them. We measured the type (fining or banning) and severity of punishment children chose and their enjoyment in doing so. Children only partially made the punishment fit the crime: They showed no systematic punishment choice preference for disloyal players, but tended to fine rather than ban players allocating resources unfairly-a result best explained by equalization concerns. Children's punishment severity was not affected by audience presence or perpetrators' descriptive norm violations, but was negatively predicted by age (unless punishment could be used as an equalization tool). Most children did not enjoy punishing, and those who believed they allocated real punishment reported no enjoyment more often than children who believed they pretended to punish. Contrary to predictions, retribution was not a plausible motive for the observed punishment behavior. Children are likely to have punished for deterrence reasons or because they felt they ought to. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

10-Month-Olds Visually Anticipate an Outcome Contingent on Their Own Action.

It is known that young infants can learn to perform an action that elicits a reinforcer, and that they can visually anticipate a predictable stimulus by looking at its location before it begins. Here, in an investigation of the display of these abilities in tandem, I report that 10-month-olds anticipate a reward stimulus that they generate through their own action: .5 sec before pushing a button to start a video reward, they increase their rate of gaze shifts to the reward location; and during periods of extinction, reward location gaze shifts correlate with bouts of button pushing. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the infants have an expectation of the outcome of their actions: several alternative hypotheses are ruled out by yoked controls. Such an expectation may, however, be procedural, have minimal content, and is not necessarily sufficient to motivate action.

Social and emotional contexts predict the development of gaze following in early infancy.

The development of gaze following begins in early infancy and its developmental foundation has been under heavy debate. Using a longitudinal design (N = 118), we demonstrate that attachment quality predicts individual differences in the onset of gaze following, at six months of age, and that maternal postpartum depression predicts later gaze following, at 10 months. In addition, we report longitudinal stability in gaze following from 6 to 10 months. A full path model (using attachment, maternal depression and gaze following at six months) accounted for 21% of variance in gaze following at 10 months. These results suggest an experience-dependent development of gaze following, driven by the infant's own motivation to interact and engage with others (the social-first perspective).

Goal directedness and decision making in infants.

The term goal directed conventionally refers to either of 2 separate process types-motor processes organizing action oriented toward physical targets and decision-making processes that select these targets by integrating desire for and knowledge of action outcomes. Even newborns are goal directed in the first sense, but the status of infants as decision makers (the focus here) is unknown. In this study, 24-month-olds learned to retrieve an object from a box by pressing a button, and then the object's value was increased. After the object's subsequent disappearance, these children were more likely to press the button to try to retrieve the object than were control 24-month-olds who had learned to retrieve the object but for whom the object's value was unchanged. Such sensitivity to outcome value when selecting actions is a hallmark of decision making. However, 14- and 19-month-olds showed no such sensitivity. Possible explanations include that they had not learned the specifics of the action outcome; they had not acquired the necessary desire; or they had acquired both but did not integrate them to make a decision.

Discrimination of Small Forms in a Deviant-Detection Paradigm by 10-month-old Infants.

Using eye tracking, we investigated if 10-month-old infants could discriminate between members of a set of small forms based on geometric properties in a deviant-detection paradigm, as suggested by the idea of a core cognitive system for Euclidian geometry. We also investigated the precision of infants' ability to discriminate as well as how the discrimination process unfolds over time. Our results show that infants can discriminate between small forms based on geometrical properties, but only when the difference is sufficiently large. Furthermore, our results also show that it takes infants, on average, <3.5 s to detect a deviant form. Our findings extend previous research in three ways: by showing that infants can make similar discriminative judgments as children and adults with respect to geometric properties; by providing a first crude estimate on the limit of the discriminative abilities in infants, and finally; by providing a first demonstration of how the discrimination process unfolds over time.

Saccadic reaction times in infants and adults: Spatiotemporal factors, gender, and interlaboratory variation.

Saccade latency is widely used across infant psychology to investigate infants' understanding of events. Interpreting particular latency values requires knowledge of standard saccadic RTs, but there is no consensus as to typical values. This study provides standard estimates of infants' (n = 194, ages 9 to 15 months) saccadic RTs under a range of different spatiotemporal conditions. To investigate the reliability of such standard estimates, data is collected at 4 laboratories in 3 countries. Results indicate that reactions to the appearance of a new object are much faster than reactions to the deflection of a currently fixated moving object; upward saccades are slower than downward or horizontal saccades; reactions to more peripheral stimuli are much slower; and this slowdown is greater for boys than girls. There was little decrease in saccadic RTs between 9 and 15 months, indicating that the period of slow development which is protracted into adolescence begins in late infancy. Except for appearance and deflection differences, infant effects were weak or absent in adults (n = 40). Latency estimates and spatiotemporal effects on latency were generally consistent across laboratories, but a number of lab differences in factors such as individual variation were found. Some but not all differences were attributed to minor procedural differences, highlighting the importance of replication. Confidence intervals (95%) for infants' median reaction latencies for appearance stimuli were 242 to 250 ms and for deflection stimuli 350 to 367 ms. (PsycINFO Database Record

Four-year-olds' strategic allocation of resources: attempts to elicit reciprocation correlate negatively with spontaneous helping.

Behaviour benefitting others (prosocial behaviour) can be motivated by self-interested strategic concerns as well as by genuine concern for others. Even in very young children such behaviour can be motivated by concern for others, but whether it can be strategically motivated by self-interest is currently less clear. Here, children had to distribute resources in a game in which a rich but not a poor recipient could reciprocate. From four years of age participants strategically favoured the rich recipient, but only when recipients had stated an intention to reciprocate. Six- and eight-year-olds distributed more equally. Children allocating strategically to the rich recipient were less likely to help when an adult needed assistance but was not in a position to immediately reciprocate, demonstrating consistent cross-task individual differences in the extent to which social behaviour is self- versus other-oriented even in early childhood. By four years of age children are capable of strategically allocating resources to others as a tool to advance their own self-interest.

The neuropsychology of infants' pro-social preferences.

The current study is the first to investigate neural correlates of infants' detection of pro- and antisocial agents. Differences in ERP component P400 over posterior temporal areas were found during 6-month-olds' observation of helping and hindering agents (Experiment 1), but not during observation of identically moving agents that did not help or hinder (Experiment 2). The results demonstrate that the P400 component indexes activation of infants' memories of previously perceived interactions between social agents. This leads to suggest that similar processes might be involved in infants' processing of pro- and antisocial agents and other social perception processes (encoding gaze direction, goal directed grasping and pointing).

Lateralization of tool use in New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides).

We studied laterality of tool use in 10 captive New Caledonian (NC) crows (Corvus moneduloides). All subjects showed near-exclusive individual laterality, but there was no overall bias in either direction (five were left-lateralized and five were right-lateralized). This is consistent with results in non-human primates, which show strong individual lateralization for tool use (but not for other activities), and also with observations of four wild NC crows by Rutledge & Hunt. Jointly, these results contrast with observations that the crows have a population-level bias for manufacturing tools from the left edges of Pandanus sp. leaves, and suggest that the manufacture and use of tools in this species may have different neural underpinnings.