When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness.

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.

Building representations of the social world: Children extract patterns from social choices to reason about multi-group hierarchies.

How do children learn about the structure of the social world? We tested whether children would extract patterns from an agent's social choices to make inferences about multiple groups' relative social standing. In Experiment 1, 4- to 6-year-old children (N = 36; tested in Central New York) saw an agent and three groups (Group-A, Group-B, and Group-C) and observed the agent choose between pairs of individuals from different groups. Across pairwise selections, a pattern emerged: The agent chose individuals from Group-A > Group-B > Group-C. Children tracked the agent's choices to predict that Group-A was "most-preferred" and the "leader" and that Group-C was "least-preferred" and the "helper." In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined children's reasoning about a more complex pattern involving four groups and tested a wider age range. In Experiment 2, 5- to 10-year-old children (N = 98; tested in Central New York) used the agent's pattern of pairwise choices to infer that the agent liked Group-A > Group-B > Group-C > Group-D and to make predictions about which groups were likely to be "leaders" and "helpers." In Experiment 3, we found evidence for social specificity in children's reasoning: 5- to 10-year-old children (N = 96; from 26 US States) made inferences about groups' relative social but not physical power from the agent's pattern of affiliative choices across the four groups. These findings showcase a mechanism through which children may learn about societal-level hierarchies through the patterns they observe over time in people's group-based social choices. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Children in our sample extracted patterns from an agent's positive social choices between multiple groups to reason about groups' relative social standing. Children used the pattern of an agent's positive social choices to guide their reasoning about which groups were likely to be "leaders" and "helpers" in a fictional town. The pattern that emerged in an agent's choices of friends shaped children's thinking about groups' relative social but not physical power. Children tracked social choices to reason about group-based hierarchies at the individual level (which groups an agent prefers) and societal level (which groups are privileged).

Walking in Her Shoes: Pretending to Be a Female Role Model Increases Young Girls' Persistence in Science.

Pretend play is a ubiquitous learning tool in early childhood, enabling children to explore possibilities outside of their current reality. Here, we demonstrate how pretend play can be leveraged to empower girls in scientific domains. American children ages 4 to 7 years (N = 240) played a challenging science activity in one of three conditions. Children in the exposure condition heard about a successful gender-matched scientist, children in the roleplay condition pretended to be that scientist, and children in the baseline condition did not receive information about the scientist. Girls in the roleplay condition, but not in the exposure condition, persisted longer in the science activity than girls in the baseline condition. Pretending to be the scientist equated girls' persistence to that of boys. These findings suggest that pretend play of role models motivates young girls in science and may help reduce gender gaps from their roots.

Leaving a Choice for Others: Children's Evaluations of Considerate, Socially-Mindful Actions.

People value those who act with others in mind even as they pursue their own goals. Across three studies (N = 566; 4- to 6-year-olds), we investigated children's developing understanding of such considerate, socially-mindful actions. By age 6, both U.S. and Chinese children positively evaluate a character who takes a snack for herself in a way that leaves a snack choice for others over a character who leaves no choice (Study 1), but only when the actors had alternative possible actions (Study 2) and when a clear beneficiary was present (Study 3). These results suggest an emerging ability to infer underlying social intentions from self-oriented actions, providing insights into the role of social-cognitive capacities versus culture-specific norms in children's moral evaluations.

The ontogeny of cumulative culture: Individual toddlers vary in faithful imitation and goal emulation.

The success of human culture depends on early emerging mechanisms of social learning, which include the ability to acquire opaque cultural knowledge through faithful imitation, as well as the ability to advance culture through flexible discovery of new means to goal attainment. This study explores whether this mixture of faithful imitation and goal emulation is based in part on individual differences which emerge early in ontogeny. Experimental measurements and parental reports were collected for a group of 2-year-old children (N = 48, age = 23-32 months) on their imitative behavior as well as other aspects of cognitive and social development. Results revealed individual differences in children's imitative behavior across trials and tasks which were best characterized by a model that included two behavioral routines; one corresponding to faithful imitation, and one to goal emulation. Moreover, individual differences in faithful imitation and goal emulation were correlated with individual differences in theory of mind, prosocial behavior, and temperament. These findings were discussed in terms of their implications for understanding the mechanisms of social learning, ontogeny of cumulative culture, and the benefit of analyzing individual differences for developmental experiments.

Young children consider individual authority and collective agreement when deciding who can change rules.

Young children demonstrate awareness of normativity in various domains of social learning. It is unclear, however, whether children recognize that rules can be changed in certain contexts and by certain people or groups. Across three studies, we provided empirical evidence that children consider individual authority and collective agreement when reasoning about who can change rules. In Study 1, children aged 4-7years watched videos of children playing simply sorting and stacking games in groups or alone. Across conditions, the group game was initiated (a) by one child, (b) by collaborative agreement, or (c) by an adult authority figure. In the group games with a rule initiated by one child, children attributed ability to change rules only to that individual and not his or her friends, and they mentioned ownership and authority in their explanations. When the rule was initiated collaboratively, older children said that no individual could change the rule, whereas younger children said that either individual could do so. When an adult initiated the rule, children stated that only the adult could change it. In contrast, children always endorsed a child's decision to change his or her own solitary rule and never endorsed any child's ability to change moral and conventional rules in daily life. Age differences corresponded to beliefs about friendship and agreement in peer play (Study 2) and disappeared when the decision process behind and normative force of collaboratively initiated rules were clarified (Study 3). These results show important connections between normativity and considerations of authority and collaboration during early childhood.

Children protest moral and conventional violations more when they believe actions are freely chosen.

Young children spontaneously engage in normative evaluations of others' actions and actively enforce social norms. It is unclear, however, how flexible and integrated this early norm psychology is. The current study explored this question by testing whether children in their "real-life" normative evaluation of actions consider the actor's freedom of choice. Children witnessed different appropriate acts or mistakes (conventional or moral) by an agent under free or constrained circumstances. Across the two types of norms, participants protested less if a mistake occurred under constrained conditions than if it occurred under free conditions. Furthermore, they laid different weight on the actor's free choice in the two conditions. While refraining from blaming the agent for inappropriate constrained acts in the moral scenario, children still criticized a social conventional mistake under constrained conditions (although less than under free conditions), indicating that free choice is a more prominent factor in moral evaluations than in conventional evaluations. Thus, two domains of social cognition, normativity and theory of mind, are functionally integrated already early in development.

Reasoning about knowledge: Children's evaluations of generality and verifiability.

In a series of experiments, we examined 3- to 8-year-old children's (N=223) and adults' (N=32) use of two properties of testimony to estimate a speaker's knowledge: generality and verifiability. Participants were presented with a "Generic speaker" who made a series of 4 general claims about "pangolins" (a novel animal kind), and a "Specific speaker" who made a series of 4 specific claims about "this pangolin" as an individual. To investigate the role of verifiability, we systematically varied whether the claim referred to a perceptually-obvious feature visible in a picture (e.g., "has a pointy nose") or a non-evident feature that was not visible (e.g., "sleeps in a hollow tree"). Three main findings emerged: (1) young children showed a pronounced reliance on verifiability that decreased with age. Three-year-old children were especially prone to credit knowledge to speakers who made verifiable claims, whereas 7- to 8-year-olds and adults credited knowledge to generic speakers regardless of whether the claims were verifiable; (2) children's attributions of knowledge to generic speakers was not detectable until age 5, and only when those claims were also verifiable; (3) children often generalized speakers' knowledge outside of the pangolin domain, indicating a belief that a person's knowledge about pangolins likely extends to new facts. Findings indicate that young children may be inclined to doubt speakers who make claims they cannot verify themselves, as well as a developmentally increasing appreciation for speakers who make general claims.

Pedagogical cues encourage toddlers' transmission of recently demonstrated functions to unfamiliar adults.

Young children use pedagogical cues as a signal that others' actions are social or cultural conventions. Here we show that children selectively transmit (enact in a new social situation) causal functions demonstrated pedagogically, even when they have learned and can produce alternative functions as well. Two-year-olds saw two novel toys, each with two functions. One experimenter demonstrated one function using pedagogical cues (eye contact and child-directed speech) and a second experimenter demonstrated the alternative function using intentional actions towards the object, but without pedagogical cues. Children imitated both functions at equal rates initially, indicating equal causal learning from both types of demonstration. However, they were significantly more likely to enact the pedagogical function for a new adult not present during the initial demonstrations. These results indicate that pedagogical cues influence children's transmission of information, perhaps playing a role in the dissemination of cultural conventions from a young age.

Development links psychological causes to evolutionary explanations.

Our conscious abilities are learned in environments that have evolved to support them. This insight provides an alternative way of framing Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) provocative hypothesis. To understand the conflict between unconscious goals and consciousness, we can study the emergence of conscious thought and control in childhood. These developmental processes are also central to the best available current evolutionary theories.

Is it personal or is it social? The interaction of knowledge domain and statistical evidence in U.S. and Chinese preschoolers' social generalizations.

Children make inferences about the social world by observing human actions. However, human actions can be ambiguous: They can be sources of information about personal, idiosyncratic characteristics of individuals or socially shared knowledge. In two cross-cultural studies (N = 420; Mage = 4.05 years, SD = 0.77, 47% female), we ask if U.S. and Chinese children's inferences about whether an action is personal or social vary by domain, statistical evidence, and culture. We did this with a generalization method: Preschoolers learn about one agent's actions and then are asked what they think a new agent will do. Low rates of generalization suggest children inferred something unique to an individual, while high rates suggest that children inferred that the action represented socially shared knowledge. In a mixed between- and within-participant design, children observed agents demonstrate sequences of statistically random (or nonrandom, between participants) actions that were verbally framed as relevant to a particular domain (agent's personal preferences, labels, object functions, or game rules). We found that children's social generalizations about actions were on a continuum: with linguistic conventions (e.g., labels) being the most social, preferences being the most personal, and nonlinguistic conventions (i.e., object functions, game rules) falling somewhere in between. Furthermore, the influence of statistical evidence and cultural variation varied for each domain. These findings highlight how children combine knowledge and evidence to infer social meaning from actions and have implications for rational constructivist accounts of cultural learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Testimony and observation of statistical evidence interact in adults' and children's category-based induction.

Hearing generic or other kind-relevant claims can influence the use of information from direct observations in category learning. In the current study, we ask how both adults and children integrate their observations with testimony when learning about the causal property of a novel category. Participants were randomly assigned to hear one of four types of testimony: generic, quantified "all", specific, or only labels. In Study 1, adults (N = 1249) then observed that some proportion of objects (10%-100%) possessed a causal property. In Study 2, children (N = 123, Mage = 5.06 years, SD = 0.61 years, range 4.01-5.99 years) observed a sample where 30% of the objects had the causal property. Generic and quantified "all" claims led both adults and children to generalize the causal property beyond what was observed. Adults and children diverged, however, in their overall trust in testimony that could be verified by observations: adults were more skeptical of inaccurate quantified claims, whereas children were more accepting. Additional memory probes suggest that children's trust in unverified claims may have been due to misremembering what they saw in favor of what they heard. The current findings demonstrate that both child and adult learners integrate information from both sources, offering insights into the mechanisms by which language frames first-hand experience.

School-age children are more skeptical of inaccurate robots than adults.

We expect children to learn new words, skills, and ideas from various technologies. When learning from humans, children prefer people who are reliable and trustworthy, yet children also forgive people's occasional mistakes. Are the dynamics of children learning from technologies, which can also be unreliable, similar to learning from humans? We tackle this question by focusing on early childhood, an age at which children are expected to master foundational academic skills. In this project, 168 4-7-year-old children (Study 1) and 168 adults (Study 2) played a word-guessing game with either a human or robot. The partner first gave a sequence of correct answers, but then followed this with a sequence of wrong answers, with a reaction following each one. Reactions varied by condition, either expressing an accident, an accident marked with an apology, or an unhelpful intention. We found that older children were less trusting than both younger children and adults and were even more skeptical after errors. Trust decreased most rapidly when errors were intentional, but only children (and especially older children) outright rejected help from intentionally unhelpful partners. As an exception to this general trend, older children maintained their trust for longer when a robot (but not a human) apologized for its mistake. Our work suggests that educational technology design cannot be one size fits all but rather must account for developmental changes in children's learning goals.

The development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior: Protocol for Wave 1 data collection with children and parents by the Developing Belief Network.

The Developing Belief Network is a consortium of researchers studying human development in diverse social-cultural settings, with a focus on the interplay between general cognitive development and culturally specific processes of socialization and cultural transmission in early and middle childhood. The current manuscript describes the study protocol for the network's first wave of data collection, which aims to explore the development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior. This work is guided by three key research questions: (1) How do children represent and reason about religious and supernatural agents? (2) How do children represent and reason about religion as an aspect of social identity? (3) How are religious and supernatural beliefs transmitted within and between generations? The protocol is designed to address these questions via a set of nine tasks for children between the ages of 4 and 10 years, a comprehensive survey completed by their parents/caregivers, and a task designed to elicit conversations between children and caregivers. This study is being conducted in 39 distinct cultural-religious groups (to date), spanning 17 countries and 13 languages. In this manuscript, we provide detailed descriptions of all elements of this study protocol, give a brief overview of the ways in which this protocol has been adapted for use in diverse religious communities, and present the final, English-language study materials for 6 of the 39 cultural-religious groups who are currently being recruited for this study: Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans, American members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, and religiously unaffiliated Americans.

Giving preschoolers choice increases sharing behavior.

Young children are remarkably prosocial, but the mechanisms driving their prosociality are not well understood. Here, we propose that the experience of choice is critically tied to the expression of young children's altruistic behavior. Three- and 4-year-olds were asked to allocate resources to an individual in need by making a costly choice (allocating a resource they could have kept for themselves), a noncostly choice (allocating a resource that would otherwise be thrown away), or no choice (following instructions to allocate the resource). We measured subsequent prosociality by allowing children to then allocate new resources to a new individual. Although the majority of children shared with the first individual, children who were given costly alternatives shared more with the new individual. Results are discussed in terms of a prosocial-construal hypothesis, which suggests that children rationally infer their prosociality through the process of making difficult, autonomous choices.

Fetal liver T2* values: defining a standardized scale.

PURPOSE: To define the normal T2* values of liver in the third trimester of pregnancy in normal fetuses. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Multi-echo gradient echo T2* sequence was applied to the fetal abdomen in the axial plane in women undergoing a fetal MRI (1.5 Tesla [T], MRI system). A region of interest, best visualizing in the liver parenchyma was used for measurements. Studies were independently read by two experienced readers to assess intra- and interobserver variability. RESULTS: The study cohort included 46 pregnant women undergoing fetal MRI for any indication other than liver pathology evaluation. Three scans were excluded due to fetal motion. Average maternal and gestational age were 33 ± 4 years and 31.9 ± 3 weeks, respectively. Average T2* values were found to be 19.7 ± 7.4 ms. The intra- and interobserver agreement were very good: 0.93 and 0.8-0.084, respectively. CONCLUSION: T2* MRI allows noninvasive evaluation liver iron content in the third trimester fetus. Measured values at this stage of pregnancy are significantly lower compared with values cited in the literature for adults. This is of major importance in the correct diagnosis of fetal iron overload states. We propose this as the standard reference when evaluating fetal iron overload pathology.

Rational learners and parochial norms.

Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However, another possibility is rational learning: given the available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) - were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2) we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial norms.

The minds of machines: Children's beliefs about the experiences, thoughts, and morals of familiar interactive technologies.

Children are developing alongside interactive technologies that can move, talk, and act like agents, but it is unclear if children's beliefs about the agency of these household technologies are similar to their beliefs about advanced, humanoid robots used in lab research. This study investigated 4-11-year-old children's (N = 127, Mage = 7.50, SDage = 2.27, 53% females, 75% White; from the Northeastern United States) beliefs about the mental, physical, emotional, and moral features of two familiar technologies (Amazon Alexa and Roomba) in comparison to their beliefs about a humanoid robot (Nao). Children's beliefs about the agency of these technologies were organized into three distinct clusters-having experiences, having minds, and deserving moral treatment. Children endorsed some agent-like features for each technology type, but the extent to which they did so declined with age. Furthermore, children's judgment of the technologies' freedom to "act otherwise" in moral scenarios changed with age, suggesting a development shift in children's understanding of technologies' limitations. Importantly, there were systematic differences between Alexa, Roomba, and Nao, that correspond to the unique characteristics of each. Together these findings suggest that children's intuitive theories of agency are informed by an increasingly technological world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Evidence for tissue iron overload in long-term hemodialysis patients and the impact of withdrawing parenteral iron.

BACKGROUND/AIMS: Erythropoiesis in long-term hemodialyzed (LTH) patients is supported by erythropoietin (rHuEpo) and intravenous (IV) iron. This treatment may end up in iron overload (IO) in major organs. We studied such patients for the parameters of IO in the serum and in major organs. METHODS: Patients were treated with rHuEpo (6-8 x 10(3) units × 1-3/wk) and IV 100 mg ferric saccharate. RESULTS: Of 115 patients, 21 had serum ferritin (SF) > 1000 ng/mL. This group was further analyzed. Their SF and transferrin saturation (TSAT) were 2688 ± 1489 ng/mL and 54.2 ± 32.7%, respectively (vs. 125-360 ng/mL and 20-50% in normal controls). Serum hepcidin was 60.1 ± 29.5 nm (vs. 10.61 ± 6.44 nm in controls) (P < 0.001). Nineteen patients had increased malonyldialdehyde, a product of lipid peroxidation, indicating oxidative stress. T2* MRI disclosed in 19 of 21 patients moderate to severe IO in the liver and spleen, in three of eight patients in the pancreas, but in no patient in the heart. After stopping IV iron for a mean of 12 months, while continuing rHuEpo, the mean SF decreased in 11 patients to 1682 ng/mL and the mean TSAT decreased to 28%, whereas hemoglobin did not change indicating that tissue iron was utilized. CONCLUSION: High SF correlates with IO in the liver and spleen, but not in the heart.

Imagination and social cognition in childhood.

Imagination is a cognitive process used to generate new ideas from old, not just in the service of creativity and fantasy, but also in our ordinary thoughts about alternatives to current reality. In this article, I argue for the central function of imagination in the development of social cognition in infancy and childhood. In Section 1, I review a work showing that even in the first year of life, social cognition can be viewed through a nascent ability to imagine the physical possibilities and physical limits on action. In Section 2, I discuss how imagination of what should happen is appropriately constrained by what can happen, and how this influences children's moral evaluations. In the final section, I suggest developmental changes in imagination-especially the ability to imagine improbable events-may have implications for social inference, leading children to learn that inner motives can conflict. These examples point to a flexible and domain-general process that operates on knowledge to make social meaning. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Development and Aging Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief.