Strategic identity signaling in heterogeneous networks.

SignificanceMuch of online conversation today consists of signaling one's political identity. Although many signals are obvious to everyone, others are covert, recognizable to one's ingroup while obscured from the outgroup. This type of covert identity signaling is critical for collaborations in a diverse society, but measuring covert signals has been difficult, slowing down theoretical development. We develop a method to detect covert and overt signals in tweets posted before the 2020 US presidential election and use a behavioral experiment to test predictions of a mathematical theory of covert signaling. Our results show that covert political signaling is more common when the perceived audience is politically diverse and open doors to a better understanding of communication in politically polarized societies.

The miss of the framework.

The authors rightly critique existing social sciences approaches. However, they are too quick to dismiss the criticism that their proposed paradigm is atheoretical. Social and cognitive theories are indeed incommensurate, often due to the lack of a unifying framework. Without proper integration with theoretical frameworks, their proposal may merely produce a resource-intensive veneer of thoroughness without substantive improvements to understanding.

Innovation-facilitating networks create inequality.

Theories of innovation often balance contrasting views that either smart people create smart things or smartly constructed institutions create smart things. While population models have shown factors including population size, connectivity and agent behaviour as crucial for innovation, few have taken the individual-central approach seriously by examining the role individuals play within their groups. To explore how network structures influence not only population-level innovation but also performance among individuals, we studied an agent-based model of the Potions Task, a paradigm developed to test how structure affects a group's ability to solve a difficult exploration task. We explore how size, connectivity and rates of information sharing in a network influence innovation and how these have an impact on the emergence of inequality in terms of agent contributions. We find, in line with prior work, that population size has a positive effect on innovation, but also find that large and small populations perform similarly per capita; that many small groups outperform fewer large groups; that random changes to structure have few effects on innovation in the task; and that the highest performing agents tend to occupy more central positions in the network. Moreover, we show that every network factor which improves innovation leads to a proportional increase in inequality of performance in the network, creating 'genius effects' among otherwise 'dumb' agents in both idealized and real-world networks.

Mechanistic modeling for the masses.

The generalizability crisis is compounded, or even partially caused, by a lack of specificity in psychological theories. Expanding the use of mechanistic models among psychologists is therefore important, but faces numerous hurdles. A cultural evolutionary approach can help guide and evaluate interventions to improve modeling efforts in psychology, such as developing standards and implementing them at the institutional level.

Hidden clusters beyond ethnic boundaries.

Hidden cluster problems can manifest when broad ethnic categories are used as proxies for cultural traits, especially when traits are assumed to encode cultural distances between groups. We suggest a granular understanding of cultural trait distributions within and between ethnic categories is fundamental to the interpretation of heritability estimates as well as general behavioral outcomes.

Organizational Development as Generative Entrenchment.

A critical task for organizations is how to best structure themselves to efficiently allocate information and resources to individuals tasked with solving sub-components of the organization's central problems. Despite this criticality, the processes by which organizational structures form remain largely opaque within organizational theory, with most approaches focused on how structure is influenced by individual managerial heuristics, normative cultural perceptions, and trial-and-error. Here, we propose that a broad understanding of organizational formation can be aided by appealing to generative entrenchment, a theory from developmental biology that helps explain why phylogenetically diverse animals appear similar as embryos. Drawing inferences from generative entrenchment and applying it to organizational differentiation, we argue that the reason many organizations appear structurally similar is due to core informational restraints on individual actors beginning at the top and descending to the bottom of these informational hierarchies, which reinforces these structures via feedback between separate levels. We further argue that such processes can lead to the emergence of a variety of group-level traits, an important but undertheorized class of phenomena in cultural evolution.

Why don't cockatoos have war songs?

We suggest that the accounts offered by the target articles could be strengthened by acknowledging the role of group selection and cultural niche construction in shaping the evolutionary trajectory of human music. We argue that group level traits and highly variable cultural niches can explain the diversity of human song, but the target articles' accounts are insufficient to explain such diversity.

Integrating models of cognition and culture will require a bit more math.

We support the goal to integrate models of culture and cognition. However, we are not convinced that the free energy principle and Thinking Through Other Minds will be useful in achieving it. There are long traditions of modeling both cultural evolution and cognition. Demonstrating that FEP or TTOM can integrate these models will require a bit more math.

Mills made of grist, and other interesting ideas in need of clarification.

Heyes' book is an important contribution that rightly integrates cognitive development and cultural evolution. However, understanding the cultural evolution of cognitive gadgets requires a deeper appreciation of complexity, feedback, and self-organization than her book exhibits.

Not even wrong: Imprecision perpetuates the illusion of understanding at the cost of actual understanding.

The target article is plagued by imprecision, making it largely impossible to evaluate the authors' theory in a scientific manner.

Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the evidence.

Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufficient variation at the level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group selection? If the answer to one of these questions is "no," then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is "yes" and argue that we must take the cultural group selection hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation.

Cultural group selection follows Darwin's classic syllogism for the operation of selection.

The main objective of our target article was to sketch the empirical case for the importance of selection at the level of groups on cultural variation. Such variation is massive in humans, but modest or absent in other species. Group selection processes acting on this variation is a framework for developing explanations of the unusual level of cooperation between non-relatives found in our species. Our case for cultural group selection (CGS) followed Darwin's classic syllogism regarding natural selection: If variation exists at the level of groups, if this variation is heritable, and if it plays a role in the success or failure of competing groups, then selection will operate at the level of groups. We outlined the relevant domains where such evidence can be sought and characterized the main conclusions of work in those domains. Most commentators agree that CGS plays some role in human evolution, although some were considerably more skeptical. Some contributed additional empirical cases. Some raised issues of the scope of CGS explanations versus competing ones.

Evolution of fairness in the dictator game by multilevel selection.

The most perplexing experimental results on fairness come from the dictator game where one of two players, the dictator, decides how to divide a resource with an anonymous player. The dictator, acting self-interestedly, should offer nothing to the anonymous second player, but in experimental studies, dictators offer much more than nothing. We developed a multilevel selection model to explain why people offer more than nothing in the dictator game. We show that fairness can evolve when population structure emerges from the aggregation and limited dispersal of offspring. We begin with an analytical model that shows how fair behavior can benefit groups by minimizing within-group variance in resources and thereby increasing group fitness. To investigate the generality of this result, we developed an agent-based model with agents that have no information about other agents. We allowed agents to aggregate into groups and evolve different levels of fairness by playing the dictator game for resources to reproduce. This allowed multilevel selection to emerge from the spatiotemporal properties of individual agents. We found that the population structure that emerged under low population densities was most conducive to the evolution of fairness, which is consistent with group selection as a major evolutionary force. We also found that fairness only evolves if resources are not too scarce relative to the lifespan of agents. We conclude that the evolution of fairness could evolve under multilevel selection. Thus, our model provides a novel explanation for the results of dictator game experiments, in which participants often fairly split a resource rather than keeping it all for themselves.

Teaching as an exaptation.

We appreciate and endorse Kline's ethological taxonomy and its application. However, the definition of teaching she presents is problematic, as it replaces mentalistic intent with intention on the part of natural selection. We discuss problems with the strict adaptationist view and suggest instead that the five forms of teaching presented in the taxonomy may constitute exaptations rather than adaptations.

Group-level traits emerge.

Most commentators supported the thesis of the target article, though there were also those who were less fully persuaded. I will begin with a response to the most critical commentaries. First, I will justify an evolutionary perspective that includes group organization and nongenetic inheritance. Next, I will discuss the concept of emergence. Following that, I will transition to an exploration of ideas and concerns brought up by some of the more supportive commentators. This will include a discussion of different types of groups; the psychology of group-level traits; the uses and limitations of an institutional perspective; the link between transmission, adaptation, and selection; current and future methodologies; and the variety of fields that may benefit from a group-level traits perspective.

The cultural evolution of emergent group-level traits.

Many of the most important properties of human groups - including properties that may give one group an evolutionary advantage over another - are properly defined only at the level of group organization. Yet at present, most work on the evolution of culture has focused solely on the transmission of individual-level traits. I propose a conceptual extension of the theory of cultural evolution, particularly related to the evolutionary competition between cultural groups. The key concept in this extension is the emergent group-level trait. This type of trait is characterized by the structured organization of differentiated individuals and constitutes a unit of selection that is qualitatively different from selection on groups as defined by traditional multilevel selection (MLS) theory. As a corollary, I argue that the traditional focus on cooperation as the defining feature of human societies has missed an essential feature of cooperative groups. Traditional models of cooperation assume that interacting with one cooperator is equivalent to interacting with any other. However, human groups involve differential roles, meaning that receiving aid from one individual is often preferred to receiving aid from another. In this target article, I discuss the emergence and evolution of group-level traits and the implications for the theory of cultural evolution, including ramifications for the evolution of human cooperation, technology, and cultural institutions, and for the equivalency of multilevel selection and inclusive fitness approaches.

Let the social sciences evolve.

We agree that evolutionary perspectives may help us organize many divergent realms of the science of human behavior. Nevertheless, an imperative to unite all social science under an evolutionary framework risks turning off researchers who have their own theoretical perspectives that can be informed by evolutionary theory without being exclusively defined by it. We propose a few considerations for scholars interested in joining the evolutionary and social sciences.

Maintaining Transient Diversity Is a General Principle for Improving Collective Problem Solving.

Humans regularly solve complex problems in cooperative teams. A wide range of mechanisms have been identified that improve the quality of solutions achieved by those teams on reaching consensus. We argue that many of these mechanisms work via increasing the transient diversity of solutions while the group attempts to reach a consensus. These mechanisms can operate at the level of individual psychology (e.g., behavioral inertia), interpersonal communication (e.g., transmission noise), or group structure (e.g., sparse social networks). Transient diversity can be increased by widening the search space of possible solutions or by slowing the diffusion of information and delaying consensus. All of these mechanisms increase the quality of the solution at the cost of increased time to reach it. We review specific mechanisms that facilitate transient diversity and synthesize evidence from both empirical studies and diverse formal models-including multiarmed bandits, NK landscapes, cumulative-innovation models, and evolutionary-transmission models. Apparent exceptions to this principle occur primarily when problems are sufficiently simple that they can be solved by mere trial and error or when the incentives of team members are insufficiently aligned. This work has implications for our understanding of collective intelligence, problem solving, innovation, and cumulative cultural evolution.

Animal play and evolution: Seven timely research issues about enigmatic phenomena.

The nature of play in animals has been long debated, but progress is being made in characterizing play and its variants, documenting its distribution across vertebrate and invertebrate taxa, describing its mechanisms and development, and proposing testable theories about its origins, evolution, and adaptive functions. To achieve a deeper understanding of the functions and evolution of play, integrative and conceptual advances are needed in neuroscience, computer modeling, phylogenetics, experimental techniques, behavior development, and inter- and intra-specific variation. The special issue contains papers documenting many of these advances. Here, we describe seven timely areas where further research is needed to understand this still enigmatic class of phenomena more fully. Growing empirical and theoretical evidence reveals that play has been crucial in the evolution of behavior and psychology but has been underestimated, if not ignored, in both empirical and theoretical areas of evolutionary biology and neuroscience. Play research has important ramifications for understanding the evolution of cognition, emotion, and culture, and research on animals can be both informative and transformative.