Talking with strangers is surprisingly informative.

A meaningful amount of people's knowledge comes from their conversations with others. The amount people expect to learn predicts their interest in having a conversation (pretests 1 and 2), suggesting that the presumed information value of conversations guides decisions of whom to talk with. The results of seven experiments, however, suggest that people may systematically underestimate the informational benefit of conversation, creating a barrier to talking with-and hence learning from-others in daily life. Participants who were asked to talk with another person expected to learn significantly less from the conversation than they actually reported learning afterward, regardless of whether they had conversation prompts and whether they had the goal to learn (experiments 1 and 2). Undervaluing conversation does not stem from having systematically poor opinions of how much others know (experiment 3) but is instead related to the inherent uncertainty involved in conversation itself. Consequently, people underestimate learning to a lesser extent when uncertainty is reduced, as in a nonsocial context (surfing the web, experiment 4); when talking to an acquainted conversation partner (experiment 5); and after knowing the content of the conversation (experiment 6). Underestimating learning in conversation is distinct from underestimating other positive qualities in conversation, such as enjoyment (experiment 7). Misunderstanding how much can be learned in conversation could keep people from learning from others in daily life.

How gender determines the way we speak about professionals.

Gender inequality persists in many professions, particularly in high-status fields, such as science, technology, engineering, and math. We report evidence of a form of gender bias that may contribute to this state: gender influences the way that people speak about professionals. When discussing professionals or their work, it is common to refer to them by surname alone (e.g., "Darwin developed the theory of evolution"). We present evidence that people are more likely to refer to male than female professionals in this way. This gender bias emerges in archival data across domains; students reviewing professors online and pundits discussing politicians on the radio are more likely to use surname when speaking about a man (vs. a woman). Participants' self-reported references also indicate a preference for using surname when speaking about male (vs. female) scientists, authors, and others. Finally, experimental evidence provides convergent evidence: participants writing about a fictional male scientist are more likely to refer to him by surname than participants writing about an otherwise identical female scientist. We find that, on average, people are over twice as likely to refer to male professionals by surname than female professionals. Critically, we identified consequences of this gender bias in speaking about professionals. Researchers referred to by surname are judged as more famous and eminent. They are consequently seen as higher status and more deserving of eminence-related benefits and awards. For instance, scientists referred to by surname were seen as 14% more deserving of a National Science Foundation career award.

When Knowledge Knows No Bounds: Self-Perceived Expertise Predicts Claims of Impossible Knowledge.

People overestimate their knowledge, at times claiming knowledge of concepts, events, and people that do not exist and cannot be known, a phenomenon called overclaiming. What underlies assertions of such impossible knowledge? We found that people overclaim to the extent that they perceive their personal expertise favorably. Studies 1a and 1b showed that self-perceived financial knowledge positively predicts claiming knowledge of nonexistent financial concepts, independent of actual knowledge. Study 2 demonstrated that self-perceived knowledge within specific domains (e.g., biology) is associated specifically with overclaiming within those domains. In Study 3, warning participants that some of the concepts they saw were fictitious did not reduce the relationship between self-perceived knowledge and overclaiming, which suggests that this relationship is not driven by impression management. In Study 4, boosting self-perceived expertise in geography prompted assertions of familiarity with nonexistent places, which supports a causal role for self-perceived expertise in claiming impossible knowledge.

The paradox of explaining: When feeling unknowledgeable prevents learners from engaging in effective learning strategies.

People often need to learn complex information as part of their daily lives. One of the most effective strategies for understanding information is to explain it, for instance to a hypothetical other (Pilots 1 and 2). Yet, we find that learners prefer equally effortful but less effective learning strategies, even when incentivized to perform well (Study 1). Critically, we propose and find that learners' reluctance to explain is tied to their subjective knowledge of the material; learners who feel less knowledgeable about what they learned are most reluctant to explain it, despite the strategy being as effective for them (Study 2). An intervention that increased subjective knowledge (by having learners answer a few easy questions) increased learners' choice to explain, which was mediated by learners believing that explaining would be more pleasant and effective (Study 3). Directly manipulating beliefs about how fun and effective explaining is also boosted learners' willingness to explain (Study 4). Finally, because Studies 1-4 incentivized performance financially, we replicated key results in the classroom with students, finding improved scores on a class quiz (Study 5). The paradoxical implication of these findings is that those who need effective learning strategies the most are the ones least likely to use them. Put together, we find that subjective knowledge plays a key role in learning decisions and that boosting subjective knowledge is a simple intervention that can improve learning-related choices. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Talking to strangers: Intention, competence, and opportunity.

Despite having more opportunities than ever to connect with strangers, and much to gain from doing so, people often refrain from talking with, and listening to, strangers. We propose a framework that classifies obstacles to connecting with strangers into three categories concerning intention (underestimating the benefits of conversations), competence (misunderstanding how to appear likeable and competent in conversation), and opportunity (being constrained in access to a diverse set of strangers). To promote conversations among strangers, interventions have attempted to calibrate people's expectations, improve their communication, and create more opportunities for strangers to connect. We identify the need to better understand how miscalibrated beliefs emerge and are sustained, what contextual factors impact conversation likelihood, and how conversations evolve as relationships develop.

Girlboss? Highlighting versus downplaying gender through language.

Emerging research points to the power of language to shape how we think of gender in the professional domain. However, there is tension between two opposing strategies for communicating gender: gender marking and gender neutrality. Each strategy has the potential to combat gender bias, but also to reinforce it.

Undersociality: miscalibrated social cognition can inhibit social connection.

A person's well-being depends heavily on forming and maintaining positive relationships, but people can be reluctant to connect in ways that would create or strengthen relationships. Emerging research suggests that miscalibrated social cognition may create psychological barriers to connecting with others more often. Specifically, people may underestimate how positively others will respond to their own sociality across a variety of social actions, including engaging in conversation, expressing appreciation, and performing acts of kindness. We suggest that these miscalibrated expectations are created and maintained by at least three mechanisms: differential construal, uncertain responsiveness, and asymmetric learning. Underestimating the positive consequences of social engagement could make people less social than would be optimal for both their own and others' well-being.

The role of value in the attentional boost effect.

Focusing attention on one item typically interferes with the ability to process other information. Yet, target detection can both facilitate memory for items paired with the target (the attentional boost effect) and increase the perceived value of those items (cued approach). Because long-term memory is better for valuable items than for neutral items, we asked whether the attentional boost effect is due to changes in the perceived value of items that are paired with targets. In three experiments, participants memorised a series of briefly presented images that depicted valuable (e.g., food) or neutral (e.g., children's toys) items. Whenever an item appeared, a square flashed in its centre. Participants pressed a button if the square was a target colour but not if it was a distractor colour. Consistent with previous research, target-paired items were remembered better than distractor-paired items and were rated as more valuable. Importantly, if memory for target-paired items is enhanced because they increased in perceived value, then valuable items should have been better remembered than neutral items. However, we found no evidence that value enhanced memory for the items in this task. Thus, it is unlikely that the attentional boost effect is due to changes in perceived value.