Emotion as a source of moral understanding in conservation.

Recent debates around the meaning and implications of compassionate conservation suggest that some conservationists consider emotion a false and misleading basis for moral judgment and decision making. We trace these beliefs to a long-standing, gendered sociocultural convention and argue that the disparagement of emotion as a source of moral understanding is both empirically and morally problematic. According to the current scientific and philosophical understanding, reason and emotion are better understood as partners, rather than opposites. Nonetheless, the two have historically been seen as separate, with reason elevated in association with masculinity and emotion (especially nurturing emotion) dismissed or delegitimated in association with femininity. These associations can be situated in a broader, dualistic, and hierarchical logic used to maintain power for a dominant male (White, able-bodied, upper class, heterosexual) human class. We argue that emotion should be affirmed by conservationists for the novel and essential insights it contributes to conservation ethics. We consider the specific example of compassion and characterize it as an emotional experience of interdependence and shared vulnerability. This experience highlights conservationists' responsibilities to individual beings, enhancing established and widely accepted beliefs that conservationists have a duty to protect populations, species, and ecosystems (or biodiversity). We argue compassion, thus understood, should be embraced as a core virtue of conservation.

El Sentimiento como Fuente de Entendimiento Moral en la Conservación Resumen Los debates recientes en torno al significado y las implicaciones de la conservación compasiva sugieren que algunos conservacionistas consideran al sentimiento como una base falsa y engañosa para el juicio moral y la toma de decisiones. Seguimos estas creencias hasta una convención sociocultural prolongada y relacionada con el género y argumentamos que el menosprecio por el sentimiento como fuente del entendimiento moral es problemático empírica y moralmente. De acuerdo con el conocimiento científico y filosófico actual, la razón y el sentimiento se entienden de mejor manera como pareja, en lugar de como opuestos. Sin embargo, ambos conceptos han estado históricamente separados, con la razón como concepto elevado asociado con la masculinidad y el sentimiento (especialmente el sentimiento de crianza) rechazado o deslegitimado en asociación con la feminidad. Estas asociaciones pueden situarse dentro de una lógica más general, dualista y jerárquica usada para mantener el poder de la clase humana del macho dominante (blanco, sin discapacidades, de clase alta, heterosexual). Sostenemos que el sentimiento debería ser ratificado por los conservacionistas por el conocimiento novedoso y esencial que contribuye a la ética de la conservación. Consideramos el ejemplo específico de la compasión y lo caracterizamos como una experiencia emocional de la interdependencia y la vulnerabilidad compartida. Esta experiencia resalta las responsabilidades que los conservacionistas tienen con los individuos, fortaleciendo las creencias establecidas y ampliamente aceptadas de que los conservacionistas tienen el deber de proteger a las poblaciones, especies y ecosistemas (o a la biodiversidad). Sostenemos que la compasión, entendida así, debería ser aceptada como una virtud nuclear de la conservación.

Guiding principles for rewilding.

There has been much recent interest in the concept of rewilding as a tool for nature conservation, but also confusion over the idea, which has limited its utility. We developed a unifying definition and 10 guiding principles for rewilding through a survey of 59 rewilding experts, a summary of key organizations' rewilding visions, and workshops involving over 100 participants from around the world. The guiding principles convey that rewilding exits on a continuum of scale, connectivity, and level of human influence and aims to restore ecosystem structure and functions to achieve a self-sustaining autonomous nature. These principles clarify the concept of rewilding and improve its effectiveness as a tool to achieve global conservation targets, including those of the UN Decade on Ecosystem Restoration and post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework. Finally, we suggest differences in rewilding perspectives lie largely in the extent to which it is seen as achievable and in specific interventions. An understanding of the context of rewilding projects is the key to success, and careful site-specific interpretations will help achieve the aims of rewilding.

Recientemente ha habido mucho interés por el concepto de retorno a la vida silvestre como herramienta para la conservación de la naturaleza, pero también ha habido confusión por la idea que ha limitado su utilidad. Desarrollamos una definición unificadora y diez principios básicos para el retorno a la vida silvestre por medio de encuestas a 59 expertos en retorno a la vida silvestre, un resumen de las visiones de las organizaciones más importantes para el retorno a la vida silvestre y talleres que involucraron a más de 100 participantes de todo el mundo. Los principios básicos transmiten que el retorno a la vida silvestre existe en un continuo de escala, conectividad y nivel de influencia humana y que su objetivo es restaurar la estructura y las funciones del ecosistema para lograr una naturaleza autónoma autosustentable. Estos principios aclaran el concepto del retorno a la vida silvestre e incrementan su efectividad como herramienta para lograr los objetivos mundiales de conservación, incluyendo aquellos de la Década de la ONU para la Restauración de Ecosistemas y el Marco de Trabajo de la Biodiversidad Global post 2020. Finalmente, sugerimos que las diferencias en las perspectivas del retorno a la vida silvestre yacen principalmente en el grado al que es visto como factible y en intervenciones específicas. Un entendimiento del contexto de los proyectos de retorno a la vida silvestre es importante para el éxito, y las interpretaciones específicas de sitio ayudarán a lograr las metas del retorno a la vida silvestre. Principios Básicos para el Retorno a la Vida Silvestre.

Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation.

Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space.

Reconocimiento de la Calidad de Persona en los Animales dentro de la Conservación Compasiva Resumen La conservación compasiva está basada en la posición ética que parte de que las acciones tomadas para proteger a la biodiversidad deberían estar dirigidas por la compasión por todos los seres sintientes. Los críticos de esta postura argumentan que hay tres razones nucleares por las que el daño a los animales es aceptable dentro de los programas de conservación: el principal motivo de la conservación es la protección de la biodiversidad; la conservación ya es compasiva con los animales; y la conservación debería priorizar la compasión hacia los humanos. Usamos un análisis de argumentos para aclarar los valores y la lógica subyacentes al debate en torno a la conservación compasiva. Encontramos que el rechazo a la conservación compasiva es una expresión de la excepcionalidad humana, la visión de que los humanos están en un nivel categóricamente separado y de mayor moral que todas las demás especies. Por el contrario, los conservacionistas compasivos creen que la conservación debería expandir su comunidad moral al reconocer a todos los seres sintientes como personas. La calidad de persona, en un sentido ético, implica que el individuo merece respeto y no debería ser tratado solamente como un medio para otros fines. Si hablamos desde fundamentos científicos y éticos, existen muy buenas razones para extender la calidad de persona a todos los animales sintientes, particularmente en la conservación. La exclusión moral o la subordinación de los miembros de otras especies justifica la continua manipulación y explotación de los seres vivos, la justa razón por la que necesitamos de la conservación desde el principio. La aceptación de la compasión nos puede ayudar a desmantelar la excepcionalidad humana, a reconocer la calidad de persona no humana y a navegar un espacio moral más expansivo.

Summoning compassion to address the challenges of conservation.

Conservation practice is informed by science, but it also reflects ethical beliefs about how humanity ought to value and interact with Earth's biota. As human activities continue to drive extinctions and diminish critical life-sustaining ecosystem processes, achieving conservation goals becomes increasingly urgent. However, the determination to react decisively can drive conservationists to handle complex challenges without due deliberation, particularly when wildlife individuals are sacrificed for the so-called greater good of wildlife collectives (populations, species, ecosystems). With growing recognition of the widespread sentience and sapience of many nonhuman animals, standard conservation practices that categorically prioritize collectives without due consideration for the well-being of individuals are ethically untenable. Here we highlight 3 overarching ethical orientations characterizing current and historical practices in conservation that suppress compassion: instrumentalism, collectivism, and nativism. We examine how establishing a commitment to compassion could reorient conservation in more ethically expansive directions that incorporate recognition of the intrinsic value of wildlife, the sentience of nonhuman animals, and the values of novel ecosystems, introduced species, and their members. A compassionate conservation approach allays practices that intentionally and unnecessarily harm wildlife individuals, while aligning with critical conservation goals. Although the urgency of achieving effective outcomes for solving major conservation problems may enhance the appeal of quick and harsh measures, the costs are too high. Continuing to justify moral indifference when causing the suffering of wildlife individuals, particularly those who possess sophisticated capacities for emotion, consciousness, and sociality, risks estranging conservation practice from prevailing, and appropriate, social values. As conservationists and compassionate beings, we must demonstrate concern for both the long-term persistence of collectives and the well-being of individuals by prioritizing strategies that do both.

A Postzoo Future: Why Welfare Fails Animals in Zoos.

Discussions on the welfare of nonhuman animals in zoos tend to focus on incremental improvements without addressing the underlying problem of captivity. But alterations to the conditions of zoo captivity are irrelevant for animals. Real zoo reform will involve working to completely change the landscape. We offer six necessary reforms to bring zoos into a more ethical future: (1) Shut down bad zoos, now; (2) stop exhibiting animals who cannot and never will do well in captivity; (3) stop killing healthy animals; (4) stop captive breeding; (5) stop moving animals around from one zoo to another; and (6) use the science of animal cognition and emotion on behalf on animals.

Aquatic animals, cognitive ethology, and ethics: questions about sentience and other troubling issues that lurk in turbid water.

In this general, strongly pro-animal, and somewhat utopian and personal essay, I argue that we owe aquatic animals respect and moral consideration just as we owe respect and moral consideration to all other animal beings, regardless of the taxonomic group to which they belong. In many ways it is more difficult to convince some people of our ethical obligations to numerous aquatic animals because we do not identify or empathize with them as we do with animals with whom we are more familiar or to whom we are more closely related, including those species (usually terrestrial) to whom we refer as charismatic megafauna. Many of my examples come from animals that are more well studied but they can be used as models for aquatic animals. I follow Darwinian notions of evolutionary continuity to argue that if we feel pain, then so too do many other animals, including those that live in aquatic environs. Recent scientific data ('science sense') show clearly that many aquatic organisms, much to some people's surprise, likely suffer at our hands and feel their own sorts of pain. Throughout I discuss how cognitive ethology (the study of animal minds) is the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals because it is essential to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines. Lastly, I argue that when we are uncertain if we are inflicting pain due to our incessant, annoying, and frequently unnecessary intrusions into the lives of other animals as we go about 'redecorating nature' (removing animals or moving them from place to place), we should err on the side of the animals and stop engaging in activities that cause pain and suffering.

Ecological analyses of nesting success in evening grosbeaks.

We studied the nesting success of Evening Grosbeaks (Coccothraustes vespertinus) inhabiting two areas of the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains of Colorado from 1983-1987. Sixty-four nests were followed during building, incubating, brooding, and fledging; 54.7% were successful (young fledged). The largest number of nests failed during incubation. Nests started later were more successful than nests begun earlier in the season. Failure was most likely due to severe weather, abandonment during building, or predation. Specific habitat characteristics of grosbeak nesting sites and where nests were placed in trees were consistently associated with nesting success. Successful nests, when compared with nests that failed, were: (1) built in more open areas characterized by dispersed vegetation and a higher minimum canopy, (2) oriented in more southerly directions, (3) built closer to the main trunk of the nest tree, and (4) built in larger trees. Current ideas about whether or not birds actually select nest-sites are briefly discussed. We conclude that some grosbeaks "optimally select" nest sites where the likelihood of producing fledglings is higher than in other areas.

Integrating Values and Ethics into Wildlife Policy and Management-Lessons from North America.

Few animals provoke as wide a range of emotions as wolves. Some see wolves as icons of a lost wilderness; others see them as intruders. As the battle continues between wolf proponents and opponents, finding solutions that resolve conflicts while supporting the integrity of nature is challenging. In this essay we argue that we need to make room for wolves and other native carnivores who are re-colonizing areas from which they were extirpated. Strategies that foster coexistence are necessary and wildlife agencies must consider all stakeholders and invest adequate resources to inform the public about how to mitigate conflicts between people/domestic animals, and predators. Values and ethics must be woven into wildlife policy and management and we must be willing to ask difficult ethical questions and learn from past mistakes.

Animal welfare and individual characteristics: a conversation against speciesism.

It seems impossible for a human being not to have some point of view concerning nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) welfare. Many people make decisions about how humans are permitted to treat animals using speciesist criteria, basing their decisions on an individual's species membership rather than on that animal's individual characteristics. Although speciesism provides a convenient way for making difficult decisions about who should be used in different types of research, we argue that such decisions should rely on an analysis of individual characteristics and should not be based merely on species membership. We do not argue that the concept of species is never useful or important. To make our points, we present a conversation among a skeptic, an agnostic, and a proponent of the view that our moral obligations to an animal must be based on an analysis of that individual's characteristics. In the course of the discussion, concepts such as personhood, consciousness, cognitive ability, harm, and pain are presented, because one's understanding of these concepts informs his or her ethical decisions about the use of animals by humans.

Reflections on animal selves.

Is self-cognizance a uniquely human attribute, or do other animals also have a sense of self? Although there is considerable interest in this question, answers remain elusive. Progress has been stymied by misunderstandings in terminology, a focus on a narrow range of species, and controversies over key concepts, experimental paradigms and interpretations of data. Here, we propose a new conceptual and terminological framework, emphasizing that degrees of self-cognizance differ among animals because of the cognitive demands that their species-specific social structures and life-history characteristics have placed upon them over evolutionary time. We suggest that the self-cognizance of an organism falls at a point on a continuum of social complexity and conscious involvement.

Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model.

Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether 'fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies-fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness.