Ethical and practical considerations related to data sharing when collecting patient-reported outcomes in care-based child health research.

PURPOSE: The collection and use of patient reported outcomes (PROs) in care-based child health research raises challenging ethical and logistical questions. This paper offers an analysis of two questions related to PROs in child health research: (1) Is it ethically obligatory, desirable or preferable to share PRO data collected for research with children, families, and health care providers? And if so, (2) What are the characteristics of a model best suited to guide the collection, monitoring, and sharing of these data? METHODS: A multidisciplinary team of researchers, providers, patient and family partners, and ethicists examined the literature and identified a need for focus on PRO sharing in pediatric care-based research. We constructed and analyzed three models for managing pediatric PRO data in care-based research, drawing on ethical principles, logistics, and opportunities to engage with children and families. RESULTS: We argue that it is preferable to share pediatric PRO data with providers, but to manage expectations and balance the risks and benefits of research, this requires a justifiable data sharing model. We argue that a successful PRO data sharing model will allow children and families to have access to and control over their own PRO data and be engaged in decision-making around how PROs collected for research may be integrated into care, but require support from providers. CONCLUSION: We propose a PRO data sharing model that can be used across diverse research settings and contributes to improved transparency, communication, and patient-centered care and research.

Ethical challenges in research on sexual dysfunction.

Despite more than a century of research on sexual dysfunction, there has been limited attention to ethical concerns. This is problematic because sex research involves complex ethical questions that generate confusion for ethics review and have not been addressed by ethical guidelines. We analyze two questions. First, does sexual content raise the risk profile of a research protocol? We argue that there is nothing inherent in sexual content that makes a study high risk and that many sexual dysfunction studies involve no more than minimal risk. Second, we ask whether research interventions that involve seeing participants undressed or having physical contact with a research subject are permissible? We argue that these interventions raise an important ethical challenge-they often involve sexual dysfunction researchers engaging in interventions that would not be conducted in their standard practice. To resolve this, we propose an expertise-based account of the permissibility of sexual dysfunction research.

Minority report: can minor parents refuse treatment for their child?

Infants are unable to make their own decisions or express their own wishes about medical procedures and treatments. They rely on surrogates to make decisions for them. Who should be the decision-maker when an infant's biological parents are also minors? In this paper, we analyse a case in which the biological mother is a child. The central questions raised by the case are whether minor parents should make medical decisions on behalf of an infant, and if so, what are the limits to this decision-making authority? In particular, can they refuse treatment that might be considered best for the infant? We examine different ethical arguments to underpin parental decision-making authority; we argue that provided that minor parents are capable of fulfilling their parental duties, they should have a right to make medical decisions for their infant. We then examine the ethical limits to minor parents' decision-making authority for their children. We argue that the restricted authority that teenagers are granted to make medical decisions for themselves looks very similar to the restricted autonomy of all parents. That is, they are permitted to make choices, but not harmful choices. Like all parents, minor parents must not abuse or neglect their children and must also promote their welfare. They have a moral right to make medical decisions for their infants within the same 'zone of parental discretion' that applies to adult parents. We conclude that adult and minor parents should have comparable decision-making authority for their infants.

SARS-CoV-2 challenge studies: ethics and risk minimisation.

COVID-19 poses an exceptional threat to global public health and well-being. Recognition of the need to develop effective vaccines at unprecedented speed has led to calls to accelerate research pathways ethically, including by conducting challenge studies (also known as controlled human infection studies (CHIs)) with SARS-CoV-2 (the virus which causes COVID-19). Such research is controversial, with concerns being raised about the social, legal, ethical and clinical implications of infecting healthy volunteers with SARS-CoV-2 for research purposes. Systematic risk evaluations are critical to inform assessments of the ethics of any proposed SARS-CoV-2 CHIs. Such evaluations will necessarily take place within a rapidly changing and at times contested epidemiological landscape, in which differing criteria for the ethical acceptability of research risks have been proposed. This paper critically reviews two such criteria and evaluates whether the use of effective treatment should be a necessary condition for the ethical acceptability of SARS-CoV-2 CHIs, and whether the choice of study sites should be influenced by COVID-19 incidence levels. The paper concludes that ethical evaluations of proposed SARS-CoV-2 CHIs should be informed by rigorous, consultative and holistic approaches to systematic risk assessment.

What risks should be permissible in controlled human infection model studies?

Controlled human infection model (CHIM) studies involve the intentional exposure of healthy research volunteers to infectious agents. These studies contribute to knowledge about the cause or development of disease and to the advancement of vaccine research. But they also raise ethical questions about the kinds of risks that should be permissible and whether limits should be imposed on research risks in CHIM studies. Two possible risk thresholds have been considered for CHIM studies. The first suggests constraining ethically permissible risks according to a minimal risk threshold and the second endorses a higher risk threshold that excludes irreversible or fatal infections. I argue that neither of these thresholds is persuasive and situate questions about risk thresholds in CHIM studies within a broader debate about permissible risks in research. I argue that risks in CHIM studies should be constrained according to limits on research risks that do not offer corresponding benefits in all studies rather than developing a unique risk threshold for CHIM studies. I then propose five recommendations for the ethical assessment of risk in CHIM studies.

Delaying and withholding interventions: ethics and the stepped wedge trial.

Ethics has been identified as a central reason for choosing the stepped wedge trial over other kinds of trial designs. The potential advantage of the stepped wedge design is that it provides all arms of the trial with the active intervention over the course of the study. Some groups receive it later than others, but the study intervention is not withheld from any group. This feature of the stepped wedge design seems particularly ethically advantageous in two instances: (1) when the study intervention appears especially likely to be effective and (2) when the consequences of not receiving the intervention may be dire. But despite an increase in the use of the stepped wedge design and appeals to its ethical superiority as the motivation for its selection, there has been limited attention to the stepped wedge trial in the ethics literature. In the following, I examine whether there are persuasive ethical reasons to prefer or to require a stepped wedge trial. I argue that while the stepped wedge design is ethically permissible, it is not morally superior to other kinds of trials. To this end, I examine the ethical justification for providing, withholding, and delaying interventions in research.

Does benefit justify research with children?

The inclusion of children in research gives rise to a difficult ethical question: What justifies children's research participation and exposure to research risks when they cannot provide informed consent? This question arises out of the tension between the moral requirement to obtain a subject's informed consent for research participation, on the one hand, and the limited capacity of most children to provide informed consent, on the other. Most agree that children's participation in clinical research can be justified. But the ethical justification for exposing children to research risks in the absence of consent remains unclear. One prevalent group of arguments aims to justify children's risk exposure by appealing to the concept of benefit. I call these 'benefit arguments'. Prominent versions of this argument defend the idea that broadening our understanding of the notion of benefit to include non-medical benefits (such as the benefit of a moral education) helps to justify children's research participation. I argue that existing benefit arguments are not persuasive and raise problems with the strategy of appealing to broader notions of benefit to justify children's exposure to research risk.

A Defense of The-Risks-of-Daily-Life.

Research examining the safe and effective treatment of diseases and disorders affecting children offers one of the best prospects for improving the medical treatment of children. But the inclusion of children in research raises difficult ethical questions, among them: To how much risk is it permissible to expose children in research? Various thresholds have been proposed to constrain research risks that do not offer children the prospect of direct medical benefit. These proposals include limiting research risks to (1) the risks of routine medical examinations, (2) the risks of participation in charitable activities, (3) the risks of family life, and (4) the risks-of-daily-life. I examine which, if any, of these proposals is defensible. I argue that only the risks-of-daily-life threshold is defensible and I offer a new justification for this risk threshold. I argue that the risks of daily life are justifiable because they are part of a reasonable trade-off between personal safety and our ability to pursue meaningful lives.

Position statement on ethics, equipoise and research on charged particle radiation therapy.

The use of charged-particle radiation therapy (CPRT) is an increasingly important development in the treatment of cancer. One of the most pressing controversies about the use of this technology is whether randomised controlled trials are required before this form of treatment can be considered to be the treatment of choice for a wide range of indications. Equipoise is the key ethical concept in determining which research studies are justified. However, there is a good deal of disagreement about how this concept is best understood and applied in the specific case of CPRT. This report is a position statement on these controversies that arises out of a workshop held at Wolfson College, Oxford in August 2011. The workshop brought together international leaders in the relevant fields (radiation oncology, medical physics, radiobiology, research ethics and methodology), including proponents on both sides of the debate, in order to make significant progress on the ethical issues associated with CPRT research. This position statement provides an ethical platform for future research and should enable further work to be done in developing international coordinated programmes of research.

On the minimal risk threshold in research with children.

To protect children in research, procedures that are not administered in the medical interests of a child must be restricted. The risk threshold for these procedures is generally measured according to the concept of minimal risk. Minimal risk is often defined according to the risks of "daily life." But it is not clear whose daily life should serve as the baseline; that is, it is not clear to whom minimal risk should refer. Commentators in research ethics often argue that "minimal risk" should refer to healthy children or the subjects of the research. I argue that neither of these interpretations is successful. I propose a new interpretation in which minimal risk refers to children who are not unduly burdened by their daily lives. I argue that children are not unduly burdened when they fare well, and I defend a substantive goods account of children's welfare.

Why the debate over minimal risk needs to be reconsidered.

Minimal risk is a central concept in the ethical analysis of research with children. It is defined as the risks ". . . ordinarily encountered in daily life . . . ." But the question arises: who is the referent for minimal risk? Commentators in the research ethics literature often answer this question by endorsing one of two possible interpretations: the uniform interpretation (which is also known as the absolute interpretation) or the relative interpretation of minimal risk. We argue that describing the debate over minimal risk as a disagreement between the uniform and the relative interpretation impedes progress on the identification of a justifiable referent for minimal risk. There are two main problems with this approach: (1) constructing the debate over minimal risk as a disagreement between a uniform and a relative interpretation misconstrues the main difference between competing interpretations and (2) neither the uniform nor the relative interpretation identifies one unique and consistent group of children as the referent for minimal risk. We conclude that progress on the debate over minimal risk requires that we abandon the uniform and relative interpretations and address the main moral problem at stake: whether healthy children or the subjects of the research should be the referent for minimal risk.

Should Children Be Included in Human Challenge Studies?

Human challenge studies, in which human research subjects are intentionally exposed to pathogens to contribute to scientific knowledge, raise many ethical complexities. One controversial question is whether it is ethically permissible to include children as participants. Commentary of the past decades endorses the exclusion of children, while new guidance suggests that pediatric human challenge studies can be ethically permissible. This paper argues that neither children's exclusion nor their inclusion are well justified. I examine and reject three arguments for exclusion, but suggest that these arguments establish pediatric human challenge studies as a complex ethical category of research that requires caution. I then argue for a strong presumption against children's inclusion, by drawing on an analogy to children's inclusion in phase I trials, emphasizing a requirement of necessity, and suggesting that accommodating children's vulnerability promotes an age de-escalation approach for pediatric human challenge studies research. In the final section, I suggest a procedure for ethics review.

A Framework for Assessing Scientific Merit in Ethical Review of Clinical Research.

Ethics guidelines and commentary suggest that a central function of research ethics committees is to assess the scientific merit of the protocols they review. However, some commentators object to this role, and evidence suggests that the assessment of scientific merit is a significant source of confusion and animosity between ethics committees and clinical investigators. In this essay, we argue that ethics committees should assess the scientific value and validity of research protocols and that new decision-making tools are needed to help them do so in a systematic, transparent, and reliable way. We present a novel ethical framework that can assist in this task.

Rethinking risk in pediatric research.

This article reviews four areas of pediatric research in which we have identified questionable levels of allowable risk, exceeding those foreseen by the Commission. They are the following: (1) the categorization of increasingly risky interventions as minimal risk in a variety of protocols; (2) the increasing number of applications for federal panel review of research not otherwise approvable because of higher projected risk levels; (3) research on asymptomatic at risk children; and (4) the inclusion of children and adolescents in placebo-controlled trials for participants of all ages without performing subgroup analysis. While embracing the imperative to include children in research is an encouraging step towards providing the pediatric population with effective medical care and finally eradicating the therapeutic orphan, we must ensure that this research does not become overly permissive.

Logistic, ethical, and political dimensions of stepped wedge trials: critical review and case studies.

BACKGROUND: Three arguments are usually invoked in favour of stepped wedge cluster randomised controlled trials: the logistic convenience of implementing an intervention in phases, the ethical benefit of providing the intervention to all clusters, and the potential to enhance the social acceptability of cluster randomised controlled trials. Are these alleged benefits real? We explored the logistic, ethical, and political dimensions of stepped wedge trials using case studies of six recent evaluations. METHODS: We identified completed or ongoing stepped wedge evaluations using two systematic reviews. We then purposively selected six with a focus on public health in high, middle, and low-income settings. We interviewed their authors about the logistic, ethical, and social issues faced by their teams. Two authors reviewed interview transcripts, identified emerging issues through qualitative thematic analysis, reflected upon them in the context of the literature, and invited all participants to co-author the manuscript. RESULTS: Our analysis raises three main points. First, the phased implementation of interventions can alleviate problems linked to simultaneous roll-out, but also brings new challenges. Issues to consider include the feasibility of organising intervention activities according to a randomised sequence, estimating time lags in implementation and effects, and accommodating policy changes during the trial period. Second, stepped wedge trials, like parallel cluster trials, require equipoise: without it, randomising participants to a control condition, even for a short time, remains problematic. In stepped wedge trials, equipoise is likely to lie in the degree of effect, effectiveness in a specific operational milieu, and the balance of benefit and harm, including the social value of better evaluation. Third, the strongest arguments for a stepped wedge design are logistic and political rather than ethical. The design is advantageous when simultaneous roll-out is impractical and when it increases the acceptability of using counterfactuals. CONCLUSIONS: The logistic convenience of phased implementation is context-dependent, and may be vitiated by the additional requirements of phasing. The potential for stepped wedge trials to enhance the social acceptability of cluster randomised trials is real, but their ethical legitimacy still rests on demonstrating equipoise and its configuration for each research question and setting.

When is informed consent required in cluster randomized trials in health research?

This article is part of a series of papers examining ethical issues in cluster randomized trials (CRTs) in health research. In the introductory paper in this series, we set out six areas of inquiry that must be addressed if the cluster trial is to be set on a firm ethical foundation. This paper addresses the second of the questions posed, namely, from whom, when, and how must informed consent be obtained in CRTs in health research? The ethical principle of respect for persons implies that researchers are generally obligated to obtain the informed consent of research subjects. Aspects of CRT design, including cluster randomization, cluster level interventions, and cluster size, present challenges to obtaining informed consent. Here we address five questions related to consent and CRTs: How can a study proceed if informed consent is not possible? Is consent to randomization always required? What information must be disclosed to potential subjects if their cluster has already been randomized? Is passive consent a valid substitute for informed consent? Do health professionals have a moral obligation to participate as subjects in CRTs designed to improve professional practice?We set out a framework based on the moral foundations of informed consent and international regulatory provisions to address each of these questions. First, when informed consent is not possible, a study may proceed if a research ethics committee is satisfied that conditions for a waiver of consent are satisfied. Second, informed consent to randomization may not be required if it is not possible to approach subjects at the time of randomization. Third, when potential subjects are approached after cluster randomization, they must be provided with a detailed description of the interventions in the trial arm to which their cluster has been randomized; detailed information on interventions in other trial arms need not be provided. Fourth, while passive consent may serve a variety of practical ends, it is not a substitute for valid informed consent. Fifth, while health professionals may have a moral obligation to participate as subjects in research, this does not diminish the necessity of informed consent to study participation.

Does clinical equipoise apply to cluster randomized trials in health research?

This article is part of a series of papers examining ethical issues in cluster randomized trials (CRTs) in health research. In the introductory paper in this series, Weijer and colleagues set out six areas of inquiry that must be addressed if the cluster trial is to be set on a firm ethical foundation. This paper addresses the third of the questions posed, namely, does clinical equipoise apply to CRTs in health research? The ethical principle of beneficence is the moral obligation not to harm needlessly and, when possible, to promote the welfare of research subjects. Two related ethical problems have been discussed in the CRT literature. First, are control groups that receive only usual care unduly disadvantaged? Second, when accumulating data suggests the superiority of one intervention in a trial, is there an ethical obligation to act?In individually randomized trials involving patients, similar questions are addressed by the concept of clinical equipoise, that is, the ethical requirement that, at the start of a trial, there be a state of honest, professional disagreement in the community of expert practitioners as to the preferred treatment. Since CRTs may not involve physician-researchers and patient-subjects, the applicability of clinical equipoise to CRTs is uncertain. Here we argue that clinical equipoise may be usefully grounded in a trust relationship between the state and research subjects, and, as a result, clinical equipoise is applicable to CRTs. Clinical equipoise is used to argue that control groups receiving only usual care are not disadvantaged so long as the evidence supporting the experimental and control interventions is such that experts would disagree as to which is preferred. Further, while data accumulating during the course of a CRT may favor one intervention over another, clinical equipoise supports continuing the trial until the results are likely to be broadly convincing, often coinciding with the planned completion of the trial. Finally, clinical equipoise provides research ethics committees with formal and procedural guidelines that form an important part of the assessment of the benefits and harms of CRTs in health research.

Ethical issues posed by cluster randomized trials in health research.

The cluster randomized trial (CRT) is used increasingly in knowledge translation research, quality improvement research, community based intervention studies, public health research, and research in developing countries. However, cluster trials raise difficult ethical issues that challenge researchers, research ethics committees, regulators, and sponsors as they seek to fulfill responsibly their respective roles. Our project will provide a systematic analysis of the ethics of cluster trials. Here we have outlined a series of six areas of inquiry that must be addressed if the cluster trial is to be set on a firm ethical foundation: 1. Who is a research subject? 2. From whom, how, and when must informed consent be obtained? 3. Does clinical equipoise apply to CRTs? 4. How do we determine if the benefits outweigh the risks of CRTs? 5. How ought vulnerable groups be protected in CRTs? 6. Who are gatekeepers and what are their responsibilities? Subsequent papers in this series will address each of these areas, clarifying the ethical issues at stake and, where possible, arguing for a preferred solution. Our hope is that these papers will serve as the basis for the creation of international ethical guidelines for the design and conduct of cluster randomized trials.