Understanding individualised genetic interventions as research-treatment hybrids.

Until recently, medicine has had little to offer most of the millions of patients suffering from rare and ultrarare genetic conditions. But the development in 2019 of Milasen, the first genetic intervention developed for and administered to a single patient suffering from an ultrarare genetic disorder, has offered hope to patients and families. In addition, Milasen raised a series of conceptual and ethical questions about how individualised genetic interventions should be developed, assessed for safety and efficacy and financially supported. The answers to these questions depend in large part on whether individualised therapies are understood as human subjects research or clinical innovation, different domains of biomedicine that are regulated by different modes of oversight, funding and professional norms. In this article, with development and administration of the drug Milasen as our case study, we argue that at least some individualised genetic therapies are not, as some have argued, either research or treatment. Instead, they are research-treatment hybrids, a category that has both epistemological and pragmatic repercussions for funding, ethics oversight and regulation.

Individualized interventions for rare genetic conditions and the research-treatment spectrum: Stakeholder perspectives.

PURPOSE: Advances in the study of ultrarare genetic conditions are leading to the development of targeted interventions developed for single or very small numbers of patients. Owing to the experimental but also highly individualized nature of these interventions, they are difficult to classify cleanly as either research or clinical care. Our goal was to understand how parents, institutional review board members, and clinical geneticists familiar with individualized genetic interventions conceptualize these activities and their implications for the relationship between research and clinical care. METHODS: We conducted qualitative, semi-structured interviews with 28 parents, institutional review board members, and clinical geneticists and derived themes from those interviews through content analysis. RESULTS: Individuals described individualized interventions as blurring the lines between research and clinical care and focused on hopes for therapeutic benefit and expectations for generalizability of knowledge and benefit to future patients. CONCLUSION: Individualized interventions aimed at one or few patients reveal the limitations of a binary framing of research and clinical care. As a hybrid set of activities, individualized interventions suggest the need for flexibility and new frameworks that acknowledge these activities across the spectrum of research and clinical care.

Shaping the CRISPR Gene-Editing Debate: Questions About Enhancement and Germline Modification.

Today's debate about the use of gene-editing technologies to alter human DNA brings together two longstanding lines of inquiry in bioethics: the ethics of human enhancement, and the ethics of heritable genetic modification. This article traces that lineage by identifying key distinctions and ethics questions in these preexisting lines of inquiry that are also employed in four recent policy and ethics statements on human gene editing. These distinctions and ethics questions can be helpful heuristics for organizing discussion, learning from existing analysis, and highlighting what is at stake with new gene-editing technologies. Yet scientists, policymakers, and others new to the ethics of emerging technologies should also be aware of both the limitations of these distinctions and past challenges in adequately addressing the ethics questions they raise. In particular, the treatment-enhancement distinction and the somatic-germline distinction are not as clear-cut as they might initially appear. More importantly, they cannot be used to definitively differentiate right from wrong uses of the technologies in question.

Plutonormativity: Illuminating Inequities in Assisted Reproduction and Genetics.

Researchers and research subjects are reporting that the results of genetic testing, including testing conducted using sequencing technology, could inform reproductive decisions. Thus far unacknowledged are the out-of-pocket expenses often associated with genomics-enabled reproductive planning. These expenses will render this benefit of medical technology inaccessible to many people. No word currently exists for the mistaken assumption that the typical person has significant financial resources or the construction of policies and practices with that assumption baked in. In this essay, I propose the term "plutonormativity" to illuminate these often unacknowledged inequities. I then show how plutonormative thinking is operating in one particular context: access to reproductive planning within current discussions of the benefits of the genetic testing.

Trustworthy Research Institutions: The Challenging Case of Studying the Genetics of Intelligence.

It is simple enough to claim that academic research institutions ought to be trustworthy. Building the culture and taking the steps necessary to earn and preserve institutional trust are, however, complex processes. The experience motivating this special report--a request for the Center for Talented Youth at Johns Hopkins University to collaborate on research regarding the genetics of intelligence--illustrates how ensuring institutional trustworthiness can be in tension with a commitment to fostering research. In this essay, we explore the historical context for biomedical research institutions like Johns Hopkins that have worked to build local community trust. In so doing, we consider how the example under focus in this special report can lead to greater consideration of how research institutions balance fostering trust with their other commitments.

Neuroimaging: beginning to appreciate its complexities.

For over a century, scientists have sought to see through the protective shield of the human skull and into the living brain. Today, an array of technologies allows researchers and clinicians to create astonishingly detailed images of our brain's structure as well as colorful depictions of the electrical and physiological changes that occur within it when we see, hear, think and feel. These technologies-and the images they generate-are an increasingly important tool in medicine and science. Given the role that neuroimaging technologies now play in biomedical research, both neuroscientists and nonexperts should aim to be as clear as possible about how neuroimages are made and what they can-and cannot-tell us. Add to this that neuroimages have begun to be used in courtrooms at both the determination of guilt and sentencing stages, that they are being employed by marketers to refine advertisements and develop new products, that they are being sold to consumers for the diagnosis of mental disorders and for the detection of lies, and that they are being employed in arguments about the nature (or absence) of powerful concepts like free will and personhood, and the need for citizens to have a basic understanding of how this technology works and what it can and cannot tell us becomes even more pressing.

Seeing responsibility: can neuroimaging teach us anything about moral and legal responsibility?

As imaging technologies help us understand the structure and function of the brain, providing insight into human capabilities as basic as vision and as complex as memory, and human conditions as impairing as depression and as fraught as psychopathy, some have asked whether they can also help us understand human agency. Specifically, could neuroimaging lead us to reassess the socially significant practice of assigning and taking responsibility? While responsibility itself is not a psychological process open to investigation through neuroimaging, decision-making is. Over the past decade, different researchers and scholars have sought to use neuroimaging (or the results of neuroimaging studies) to investigate what is going on in the brain when we make decisions. The results of this research raise the question whether neuroscience-especially now that it includes neuroimaging-can and should alter our understandings of responsibility and our related practice of holding people responsible. It is this question that we investigate here.

The author replies.

A response to Anne Haehl's commentary, "Fertility Treatment: Medically Necessary?"

Clarifying the Ethics and Oversight of Chimeric Research.

This article is the lead piece in a special report that presents the results of a bioethical investigation into chimeric research, which involves the insertion of human cells into nonhuman animals and nonhuman animal embryos, including into their brains. Rapid scientific developments in this field may advance knowledge and could lead to new therapies for humans. They also reveal the conceptual, ethical, and procedural limitations of existing ethics guidance for human-nonhuman chimeric research. Led by bioethics researchers working closely with an interdisciplinary work group, the investigation focused on generating conceptual clarity and identifying improvements to governance approaches, with the goal of helping scholars, funders, scientists, institutional leaders, and oversight bodies (embryonic stem cell research oversight [ESCRO] committees and institutional animal care and use committees [IACUCs]) deliver principled and trustworthy oversight of this area of science. The article, which focuses on human-nonhuman animal chimeric research that is stem cell based, identifies key ethical issues in and offers ten recommendations regarding the ethics and oversight of this research. Turning from bioethics' previous focus on human-centered questions about the ethics of "humanization" and this research's potential impact on concepts like human dignity, this article emphasizes the importance of nonhuman animal welfare concerns in chimeric research and argues for less-siloed governance and oversight and more-comprehensive public communication.

Budgets versus Bans: How U.S. Law Restricts Germline Gene Editing.

In late 2019, He Jiankui, the Chinese scientist who created the world's first gene-edited babies, and two embryologists were sentenced to prison and fined. Thirteen months earlier, when the world first learned about the experiment, He and his colleagues drew swift and nearly uniform international condemnation for prematurely moving to human trials, for the risks they took with the children's health, and for He's secrecy. The organizing committee for the second genome editing summit said the experiment failed to conform with international norms." In the United States, the legal picture is complex. No doubt the specific experiment He performed would have run afoul of long-standing research regulations due to its problems with informed consent and ethical review. But other laws also affect this kind of work, in particular, a budget rider that for the past four years has been included in federal appropriations legislation.

The ethics of genome editing in non-human animals: a systematic review of reasons reported in the academic literature.

In recent years, new genome editing technologies have emerged that can edit the genome of non-human animals with progressively increasing efficiency. Despite ongoing academic debate about the ethical implications of these technologies, no comprehensive overview of this debate exists. To address this gap in the literature, we conducted a systematic review of the reasons reported in the academic literature for and against the development and use of genome editing technologies in animals. Most included articles were written by academics from the biomedical or animal sciences. The reported reasons related to seven themes: human health, efficiency, risks and uncertainty, animal welfare, animal dignity, environmental considerations and public acceptability. Our findings illuminate several key considerations about the academic debate, including a low disciplinary diversity in the contributing academics, a scarcity of systematic comparisons of potential consequences of using these technologies, an underrepresentation of animal interests, and a disjunction between the public and academic debate on this topic. As such, this article can be considered a call for a broad range of academics to get increasingly involved in the discussion about genome editing, to incorporate animal interests and systematic comparisons, and to further discuss the aims and methods of public involvement. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The ecology and evolution of prokaryotic CRISPR-Cas adaptive immune systems'.