Influencing choices with conversational primes: How a magic trick unconsciously influences card choices.

Past research demonstrates that unconscious primes can affect people's decisions. However, these free choice priming paradigms present participants with very few alternatives. Magicians' forcing techniques provide a powerful tool to investigate how natural implicit primes can unconsciously influence decisions with multiple alternatives. We used video and live performances of the mental priming force. This technique uses subtle nonverbal and verbal conversational primes to influence spectators to choose the three of diamonds. Our results show that a large number of participants chose the target card while reporting feeling free and in control of their choice. Even when they were influenced by the primes, participants typically failed to give the reason for their choice. These results show that naturally embedding primes within a person's speech and gestures effectively influenced people's decision making. This raises the possibility that this form of mind control could be used to effectively manipulate other mental processes.

Subtly encouraging more deliberate decisions: using a forcing technique and population stereotype to investigate free will.

Magicians' forcing techniques allow them to covertly influence spectators' choices. We used a type of force (Position Force) to investigate whether explicitly informing people that they are making a decision results in more deliberate decisions. The magician placed four face-down cards on the table in a horizontal row, after which the spectator was asked to select a card by pushing it forward. According to magicians and position effects literature, people should be more likely to choose a card in the third position from their left, because it can be easily reached. We manipulated whether participants were reminded that they were making a decision (explicit choice) or not (implicit choice) when asked to select one of the cards. Two experiments confirmed the efficiency of the Position Force-52% of participants chose the target card. Explicitly informing participants of the decision impairs the success of the force, leading to a more deliberate choice. A range of awareness measures illustrates that participants were unaware of their stereotypical behaviours. Participants who chose the target card significantly underestimated the number of people who would have chosen the same card, and felt as free as the participants who chose another card. Finally, we tested an embodied-cognition idea, but our data suggest that different ways of holding an object do not affect the level of self-control they have over their actions. Results are discussed in terms of theoretical implications regarding free will, Wegner's apparent mental causation, choice blindness and reachability effects.

A psychologically based taxonomy of Magicians' forcing Techniques: How magicians influence our choices, and how to use this to study psychological mechanisms.

Magicians have developed a wide range of techniques to influence and control spectators' choices of such things as card, word, or number. These techniques are what is called forcing. The present paper develops a psychologically-based taxonomy of forcing techniques with two goals in mind. Firstly, it should help uncover the different psychological mechanisms that underlie forcing techniques. Secondly, it should facilitate knowledge transfer between magicians and psychologists. The main division present two basic categories that can be used as a way of focussing separately on (1) decision-making processes and external influences on choices, and (2) links between sense of agency over action and outcome as well as the illusion of control over this outcome. This taxonomy allows us to clearly differentiate between forces in which there is or is not a free choice, and whether this choice has an impact on the following events.1.

Forcing you to experience wonder: Unconsciously biasing people's choice through strategic physical positioning.

Magicians have developed powerful tools to covertly force a spectator to choose a specific card. We investigate the physical location force, in which four cards (from left to right: 1-2-3-4) are placed face-down on the table in a line, after which participants are asked to push out one card. The force is thought to rely on a behavioural bias in that people are more likely to choose the third card from their left. Participants felt that their choice was extremely free, yet 60% selected the 3rd card. There was no significant difference in estimates and feelings of freedom between those who chose the target card (i.e. 3rd card) and those who selected a different card, and they underestimated the actual proportion of people who selected the target card. These results illustrate that participants' behaviour was heavily biased towards choosing the third card, but were oblivious to this bias.

Oculomotor atypicalities in Developmental Coordination Disorder.

Children with Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD) fail to acquire adequate motor skill, yet surprisingly little is known about the oculomotor system in DCD. Successful completion of motor tasks is supported by accurate visual feedback. The purpose of this study was to determine whether any oculomotor differences can distinguish between children with and without a motor impairment. Using eye tracking technology, visual fixation, smooth pursuit, and pro- and anti-saccade performance were assessed in 77 children that formed three groups: children with DCD (aged 7-10), chronologically age (CA) matched peers, and a motor-match (MM) group (aged 4-7). Pursuit gain and response preparation in the pro- and anti-saccade tasks were comparable across groups. Compared to age controls, children with DCD had deficits in maintaining engagement in the fixation and pursuit tasks, and made more anti-saccade errors. The two typically developing groups performed similarly, except on the fast speed smooth pursuit and antisaccade tasks, where the CA group outperformed the younger MM group. The findings suggest that children with DCD have problems with saccadic inhibition and maintaining attention on a visual target. Developmental patterns were evident in the typically developing groups, suggesting that the pursuit system and cognitive control develop with age. This study adds to the literature by being the first to systematically identify specific oculomotor differences between children with and without a motor impairment. Further examination of oculomotor control may help to identify underlying processes contributing to DCD. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/NinXa2KlB4M. [Correction added on 27 January 2017, after first online publication: The video abstract link was added.].

Exploiting failures in metacognition through magic: Visual awareness as a source of visual metacognition bias.

We used cognitive illusions/magic tricks to study the role of visual awareness as a source of biases in visual metacognitive judgments. We conducted a questionnaire-based study (n = 144) and an eye tracking study (n = 69) in which participants watched videos of four different magic tricks that capitalize on failures of visual awareness (inattentional blindness and change blindness). We measured participants' susceptibility to these illusions, their beliefs about other people's susceptibility, as well as the role that fixating (i.e. eye position) the critical event has on detecting the secret. Participants who detected the method of the tricks believed it was more likely that other people would detect it compared to those participants who failed to notice the method. Moreover, they believed that they moved their eyes to look at it. Eye tracking data show that, contrary to participants' beliefs, peripheral vision played a significant role in detecting the method. Overall, the findings from these studies suggest that visual awareness may bias visual metacognitive judgments.

Potential social interactions are important to social attention.

Social attention, or how spatial attention is allocated to biologically relevant stimuli, has typically been studied using simplistic paradigms that do not provide any opportunity for social interaction. To study social attention in a complex setting that affords social interaction, we measured participants' looking behavior as they were sitting in a waiting room, either in the presence of a confederate posing as another research participant, or in the presence of a videotape of the same confederate. Thus, the potential for social interaction existed only when the confederate was physically present. Although participants frequently looked at the videotaped confederate, they seldom turned toward or looked at the live confederate. Ratings of participants' social skills correlated with head turns to the live, but not videotaped, confederate. Our results demonstrate the importance of studying social attention within a social context, and suggest that the mere opportunity for social interaction can alter social attention.

Magic for the blind: are auditory tricks impossible?

Many magic tricks rely solely on vision, but there are few, if any, that rely on auditory perception alone. Here, we question why this is so and argue that research focusing on this issue could provide deeper theoretical insights into the similarities and differences between our senses.

A balanced view of impossible aesthetics: An empirical investigation of how impossibility relates to our enjoyment of magic tricks.

The performance art of magic allows us to experience the impossible, and this study used a balancing magic trick to investigate the relationship between participants' enjoyment and perceived impossibility. Participants watched a live performance of a magic trick in which the magician balanced objects in progressively more impossible configurations. At seven different time points observers rated their enjoyment, and the extent to which they believed what they saw was impossible. Regression analysis revealed that participants' enjoyment of the magical effect relates to their perceived impossibility of the magic trick, and this relationship was independent of how much they enjoyed magic in general. Moreover, a one-way within-subjects analysis of variance showed that participants enjoyed the performance More as the trick became more impossible. However, once the magical effect was anticipated, enjoyment began to plateau while perceived impossibility continued to increase. These results are discussed in the context of people's aesthetic appreciation of magic and current arts appreciation models.

Experiencing misinformation: The effect of pre-exposure warnings and debunking on psychic beliefs.

Misinformation can have a detrimental impact on our beliefs, and it is therefore necessary to understand the cognitive mechanism by which false information is integrated or can be changed. In two experiments, we worked with fake psychic demonstrations, because observers easily adopt the experience as reflecting a "true" psychic event. We manipulated the availability of alternative explanations by providing a general warning that the performer is a magician with no psychic abilities (Experiment 1) or disclosing afterwards how the fake demonstration had been staged (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, witnessing the psychic demonstration significantly increased participants' psychic beliefs, even though they had been warned. However, providing the alternative explanation about the deceptive method mitigated this effect. In Experiment 2, the realisation of deception significantly reduced participants' psychic beliefs directly after the performance and remained reduced 1 week later.

Too perfect to be good? An investigation of magicians' Too Perfect Theory.

The "Too Perfect Theory" states that if a trick is too perfect, it might paradoxically become less impressive, or give away its secret method. This theory suggests that an increased impossibility results in a less magical effect. The Too Perfect Theory is often applied to magic effects, but it conflicts with recent scientific investigations showing that participants' level of enjoyment of a magic performance is positively related to their perceived impossibility of the trick. The current article investigated whether an imperfect magic performance is more impressive than a perfect one. Across two experiments, we studied whether participants enjoy a performance more if the effect is not perfect. We also examined the different types of explanations people give to these two types of performances. The results showed that participants enjoyed a perfect performance more than an imperfect one. However, consistently with the Too Perfect Theory, participants watching the perfect performance also discovered the correct method behind the magic trick more frequently and believed the performance was staged more often. Moreover, participants' method explanation significantly impacted their reports about the performance.

Misdirected by the gap: the relationship between inattentional blindness and attentional misdirection.

In several of our articles we have drawn analogies between inattentional blindness paradigms and misdirection. Memmert (2010) however, has criticized this analogy and urged for caution in assuming too much of a close relationship between these two phenomena. Here we consider the points raised by Memmert and highlight some misunderstandings and omissions in his interpretation of our work, which substantially undermine his argument. Debating the similarities and differences between aspects of misdirection and inattentional blindness is valuable and has the potential to highlight the utility of these two phenomena. However, it is important not to be misdirected by subtle differences between particular instances of each phenomenon, at the expense of failing to detect the opportunities that these phenomena present for extending our understanding of attention and awareness.

Mind Control Tricks: Magicians' Forcing and Free Will.

A new research program has recently emerged that investigates magicians' mind control tricks, also called forces. This research highlights the psychological processes that underpin decision-making, illustrates the ease by which our decisions can be covertly influenced, and helps answer questions about our sense of free will and agency over choices.

Differential Effects of Experience and Information Cues on Metacognitive Judgments About Others' Change Detection Abilities.

This study explored the interaction between visual metacognitive judgments about others and cues related to the workings of System 1 and System 2. We examined how intrinsic cues (i.e., saliency of a visual change) and experience cues (i.e., detection/blindness) affect people's predictions about others' change detection abilities. In Experiment 1, 60 participants were instructed to notice a subtle and a salient visual change in a magic trick that exploits change blindness, after which they estimated the probability that others would detect the change. In Experiment 2, 80 participants watched either the subtle or the salient version of the trick and they were asked to provide predictions for the experienced change. In Experiment 1, participants predicted that others would detect the salient change more easily than the subtle change, which was consistent with the actual detection reported in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, participants' personal experience (i.e., whether they detected the change) biased their predictions. Moreover, there was a significant difference between their predictions and offline predictions from Experiment 1. Interestingly, change blindness led to lower predictions. These findings point to joint contributions of experience and information cues on metacognitive judgments about other people's change detection abilities.

Talking to the Dead in the Classroom: How a Supposedly Psychic Event Impacts Beliefs and Feelings.

Paranormal beliefs (PBs) are common in adults. There are numerous psychological correlates of PBs and associated theories, yet, we do not know whether such correlates reinforce or result from PBs. To understand causality, we developed an experimental design in which participants experience supposedly paranormal events. Thus, we can test an event's impact on PBs and PB-associated correlates. Here, 419 naïve students saw a performer making contact with a confederate's deceased kin. We tested participants' opinions and feelings about this performance, and whether these predicted how participants explain the performance. We assessed participants' PBs and repetition avoidance (PB related cognitive correlate) before and after the performance. Afterwards, participants rated explanations of the event and described their opinions and feelings (open-ended question). Overall, 65% of participants reported having witnessed a genuine paranormal event. The open-ended question revealed distinct opinion and affect groups, with reactions commonly characterized by doubt and mixed feelings. Importantly, paranormal explanations were more likely when participants reported their feelings than when not reported. Beyond these results, we replicated that 1) higher pre-existing PBs were associated with more psychic explanations (confirmation bias), and 2) PBs and repetition avoidance did not change from before to after the performance. Yet, PBs reminiscent of the actual performance (spiritualism) increased. Results showed that young adults easily endorse PBs and paranormal explanations for events, and that their affective reactions matter. Future studies should use participants' subjective experiences to target PBs in causal designs (e.g., adding control conditions).

How magic changes our expectations about autism.

In the vanishing-ball illusion, the magician's social cues misdirect the audience's expectations and attention so that the audience "sees" a ball vanish in the air. Because individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are less sensitive to social cues and have superior perception for nonsocial details compared with typically developing individuals, we predicted that they would be less susceptible to the illusion. Surprisingly, the opposite result was found, as individuals with ASD were more susceptible to the illusion than a comparison group. Eye-tracking data indicated that subtle temporal delays in allocating attention might explain their heightened susceptibility. Additionally, although individuals with ASD showed typical patterns of looking to the magician's face and eyes, they were slower to launch their first saccade to the face and had difficulty in fixating the fast-moving observable ball. Considered together, the results indicate that individuals with ASD have difficulties in rapidly allocating attention toward both people and moving objects.

Eye movements affirm: automatic overt gaze and arrow cueing for typical adults and adults with autism spectrum disorder.

People with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show reduced interest towards social aspects of the environment and a lesser tendency to follow other people's gaze in the real world. However, most studies have shown that people with ASD do respond to eye-gaze cues in experimental paradigms, though it is possible that this behaviour is based on an atypical strategy. We tested this possibility in adults with ASD using a cueing task combined with eye-movement recording. Both eye gaze and arrow pointing distractors resulted in overt cueing effects, both in terms of increased saccadic reaction times, and in proportions of saccades executed to the cued direction instead of to the target, for both participant groups. Our results confirm previous reports that eye gaze cues as well as arrow cues result in automatic orienting of overt attention. Moreover, since there were no group differences between arrow and eye gaze cues, we conclude that overt attentional orienting in ASD, at least in response to centrally presented schematic directional distractors, is typical.

The apparent action causation: Using a magician forcing technique to investigate our illusory sense of agency over the outcome of our choices.

We often fall victim of an illusory sense of control and agency over our thoughts and actions. Magicians are masters at exploiting these illusions, and forcing techniques provide a powerful way to study apparent action causation-the illusion that our action caused the outcome we get. In this article, we used the Criss-Cross force to study whether people can tell the difference between an action which had an impact on the outcome they get and one which has no impact. In the Criss-Cross force, participants are asked to cut to a card, and while they are genuinely free to cut the cards at any position, the cut does not affect the card they are given (i.e., they always get the top card). We investigate the psychological processes that underpin the success of this force. Experiment 1 (N = 60) showed that participants cannot tell the difference between a forced and a controlled outcome. Experiment 2 (N = 90) showed that contrary to common magicians' knowledge, misdirection does not play a role in the success of the force. Finally, Experiment 3 (N = 60) suggests that rather than misdirection, an attribute substitution error explains why people fail to understand that their action does not have an impact on the outcome they get. Debriefing also shows the importance of participants' expectations in the perception of the trick, as well as the role of prediction of the outcome in participants' sense of agency over the events.

The magician's choice: Providing illusory choice and sense of agency with the equivoque forcing technique.

Forcing techniques allow magicians to subtly influence spectators' choices and the outcome of their actions, and they provide powerful tools to study decision-making and the illusory sense of agency and freedom over choices we make. We investigated the equivoque force, a technique that exploits semantic ambiguities and people's failure to notice inconsistencies, to ensure that a spectator ends up with a predetermined outcome. Similar to choice blindness paradigms, the equivoque forces participants to end up with an item they did not choose in the first place. However, here, the subterfuge is accomplished in full view. In 3 experiments, we showed that the equivoque is highly effective in providing participants an illusory sense of agency over the outcome of their actions, even after 2 repetitions of the trick (Experiment 2) and using items for which preexisting preferences can be present (Experiment 3). Across all experiments, participants were oblivious to inconsistencies in the procedure used to guide their decisions, and they were genuinely surprised by the experimenter's matching prediction. Contrary to our prediction, the equivoque force did not significantly change participants' preference for the chosen item. We discuss the results with regard to other illusions of agency (e.g., forcing, choice blindness), failures in noticing semantic inconsistencies (e.g., Moses illusion), and issues surrounding choice-induced-preference literature. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).