Mistaking an Intention for a Behavior: The Case of Enacting Behavioral Decisions Versus Simply Intending to Enact Them.

Five experiments investigated a previously unrecognized phenomenon-remembering that one enacted a mundane behavioral decision when one only intended to do so-and its psychological mechanisms. The theoretical conceptualization advanced in this research proposes that this error stems from a misattribution when an intention and a behavior are similar. Intentions and behaviors are similar when the physical aspects of the behavior resemble the intention (e.g., both require similar keystrokes) and when the behavior and the intention share mental contents (e.g., both rely on the same criterion). Experiments 1 and 2 introduced a paradigm with similar intentions and enactments and showed misreports and subsequent performance errors even when controlling for guessing. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated greater confusion when the physical involvement and mental criteria for intention and behavior were similar. Finally, Experiment 5 indicated that monitoring enactment is highly effective at reducing this error and more effective than monitoring intention.

Strategic automation of emotion regulation.

As implementation intentions are a powerful self-regulation tool for thought and action (meta-analysis by P. M. Gollwitzer & P. Sheeran, 2006), the present studies were conducted to address their effectiveness in regulating emotional reactivity. Disgust- (Study 1) and fear- (Study 2) eliciting stimuli were viewed under 3 different self-regulation instructions: the goal intention to not get disgusted or frightened, respectively, this goal intention furnished with an implementation intention (i.e., an if-then plan), and a no-self-regulation control group. Only implementation-intention participants succeeded in reducing their disgust and fear reactions as compared to goal-intention and control participants. In Study 3, electrocortical correlates (using dense-array electroencephalography) revealed differential early visual activity in response to spider slides in ignore implementation-intention participants, as reflected in a smaller P1. Theoretical and applied implications of the present findings for emotion regulation via implementation intentions are discussed.

Implicit working memory.

Working Memory (WM) plays a crucial role in many high-level cognitive processes (e.g., reasoning, decision making, goal pursuit and cognitive control). The prevalent view holds that active components of WM are predominantly intentional and conscious. This conception is oftentimes expressed explicitly, but it is best reflected in the nature of major WM tasks: All of them are blatantly explicit. We developed two new WM paradigms that allow for an examination of the role of conscious awareness in WM. Results from five studies show that WM can operate unintentionally and outside of conscious awareness, thus suggesting that the current view should be expanded to include implicit WM.

Self-regulatory consequences of observing others making goal progress: A longitudinal field study in weight loss groups.

OBJECTIVE: What happens when people see others making progress toward a goal that they also hold? Is it motivating or could it undermine goal pursuit because people feel that they have made progress themselves (i.e., they experience vicarious goal satiation)? METHODS: We investigated these questions in a longitudinal field context - a group weight loss programme. N = 132 participants who were overweight or obese and attended weekly weight loss classes completed questionnaires over 11 weeks to investigate the consequences of observing other people making progress toward their goal of losing weight RESULTS: Observing others making good progress was associated with participants holding stronger intentions to lose weight themselves (B = 0.04, p = .012), positive goal-related affect (B = 0.27, p = .017), and feeling that they were also making progress themselves (B = 0.22, p < .001). However, observing others making good progress was also associated with losing a smaller amount of weight over the following week (B = .13, p = .005). Mediation analyses showed a significant indirect effect of observing others making good progress, via feelings about their own progress, on changes in weight, B = .02, 95% CI [.00, .04]. CONCLUSIONS: People who view others making progress tend to be less successful at losing weight themselves over the following week. The findings suggest that this is, in part, explained by the person feeling as if they have made progress themselves; thereby providing the first demonstration of vicarious goal satiation in a field context. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? Many people strive toward health goals (e.g., try to lose weight) with other people. However, research into vicarious goal satiation (VGS) suggests that seeing someone else achieve their goal may lead people to believe that they have made progress themselves and undermine goal pursuit. What does this study add? A longitudinal test of VGS in a field context, namely weight loss groups. Observing other people do well was motivating for the observer. They also believed that they had made progress themselves and were less successful at losing weight.

The cooperation link: Power and context moderate verbal mimicry.

Drawing on theories of mimicry as a schema-driven process, we tested whether the degree of verbal mimicry is dependent on the congruence between interactants' power dynamic (symmetric versus asymmetric), task type (cooperative versus competitive), and interaction context (negotiation versus social). Experiment 1 found higher verbal mimicry among dyads who successfully completed a cooperative problem-solving task compared with those who did not, but only under conditions of symmetric, not asymmetric, power. Experiment 2 had dyads complete either a cooperative or a competitive negotiation task, under conditions of symmetric versus asymmetric power. Verbal mimicry was associated with improved negotiation outcomes under conditions of cooperation and symmetry, and competition and asymmetry. Experiment 3 completes this picture by separating cooperative-competitive orientation from the interaction context. Consistent with Experiment 2, verbal mimicry was associated with task success during a negotiation context with asymmetric power, and during a social interaction context with symmetric power. Our results point to the contextual link between verbal mimicry and task outcome. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Increasing and decreasing motor and cognitive output: a model of general action and inaction goals.

General action and inaction goals can influence the amount of motor or cognitive output irrespective of the type of behavior in question, with the same stimuli producing trivial and important motor and cognitive manifestations normally viewed as parts of different systems. A series of experiments examined the effects of instilling general action and inaction goals using word primes, such as "action" and "rest." The first 5 experiments showed that the same stimuli influenced motor output, such as doodling on a piece of paper and eating, as well as cognitive output, such as recall and problem solving. The last 2 experiments supported the prediction that these diverse effects can result from the instigation of general action and inaction goals. Specifically, these last 2 studies confirmed that participants were motivated to achieve active or inactive states and that attaining them decreased the effects of the primes on behavior.

Action Dominance: The Performance Effects of Multiple Action Demands and the Benefits of an Inaction Focus.

Four experiments uncovered an action dominance error by which people's natural focus on actions hinders appropriate responses to social and nonsocial stimuli. This surprising error comprises higher rates of both omission (misses) and commission (false alarms) when, in responding to action and inaction demands, people have higher numbers of action targets. The action dominance error was verified over four experiments using an analog that required responses to words and to target individuals. Experiments 1 and 2 tested our hypotheses and distinguished the action error effect from the effects of practicing action or inaction responses. Experiment 3 linked the error to the greater cognitive load imposed by the higher proportion of action over inaction targets. Furthermore, Experiment 4 demonstrated that (a) there is a default tendency to pay more attention to action (vs. inaction) targets and (b) shifting focus to inaction targets reduces the action dominance error.

People watching: The perception of the relative body proportions of the self and others.

We have an abundance of perceptual information from multiple modalities specifying our body proportions. Consequently, it seems reasonable for researchers to assume that we have an accurate perception of our body proportions. In contrast to this intuition, recent research has shown large, striking distortions in people's perceptions of the relative proportions of their own bodies. Specifically, individuals show large distortions when estimating the length of their body parts with a corporal metric, such as the hand, but not with a non-corporal object of the same length (Linkenauger et al., 2015). However, it remains unclear whether these distortions are specific to the perception of the relative proportions of one's own body or whether they generalize to the perception of the relative proportions of all human bodies. To assess this, individuals judged the relative lengths of either their own body parts or the body parts of another individual. We found that people have distorted perceptions of relative body proportions even when viewing the bodies of others. These distortions were greater when estimating the relative body parts of someone of the same gender. These results suggest our implicit full body representation is distorted and influences our perceptions of other people's bodies, especially if the other person's body is similar to our own.

Associating versus proposing or associating what we propose: comment on Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006).

This commentary highlights the strengths of the associative-propositional evaluation model. It then describes problems in proposing a qualitative separation between propositional and associative processes. Propositional processes are instead described as associative. Propositions are ordered associations, whereas many other associations do not depend on the order of the involved elements. Implications of this alternative definition for the phenomenology of thought and for social psychology are discussed.

The perceptual homunculus: the perception of the relative proportions of the human body.

Given that observing one's body is ubiquitous in experience, it is natural to assume that people accurately perceive the relative sizes of their body parts. This assumption is mistaken. In a series of studies, we show that there are dramatic systematic distortions in the perception of bodily proportions, as assessed by visual estimation tasks, where participants were asked to compare the lengths of two body parts. These distortions are not evident when participants estimate the extent of a body part relative to a noncorporeal object or when asked to estimate noncorporal objects that are the same length as their body parts. Our results reveal a radical asymmetry in the perception of corporeal and noncorporeal relative size estimates. Our findings also suggest that people visually perceive the relative size of their body parts as a function of each part's relative tactile sensitivity and physical size.

Being Active and Impulsive: The Role of Goals for Action and Inaction in Self-Control.

Although self-control often requires behavioral inaction (i.e., not eating a piece of cake), the process of inhibiting impulsive behavior is commonly characterized as cognitively active (i.e., actively exerting self-control). Two experiments examined whether motivation for action or inaction facilitates self-control behavior in the presence of tempting stimuli. Experiment 1 used a delay discounting task to assess the ability to delay gratification with respect to money. Experiment 2 used a Go/No-Go task to assess the ability to inhibit a dominant but incorrect motor response to the words "condom" and "sex". The results demonstrate that goals for inaction promote self-control, whereas goals for action promote impulsive behavior. These findings are discussed in light of recent evidence suggesting that goals for action and inaction modulate physiological resources that promote behavioral execution.

Naïve Definitions of Action and Inaction: The Continuum, Spread, and Valence of Behaviors.

The cohesiveness of a society depends, in part, on how its individual members manage their daily activities with respect to the goals of that society. Hence, there should be a degree of social agreement on what constitutes action and what constitutes inaction. The present research investigated the structure of action and inaction definitions, the evaluation of action versus inaction, and individual differences in these evaluations. Action-inaction ratings of behaviors and states showed more social agreement at the ends of the inaction-action continuum than at the middle, suggesting a socially shared construal of this definition. Action-inaction ratings were also shown to correlate with the valence of the rated behaviors, such that the more active the behavior the more positive its valence. Lastly, individual differences in locomotion, need for closure, and Christian religious beliefs correlated positively with a preference for action.

Vicarious goal satiation.

A signature feature of self-regulation is that once a goal is satiated, it becomes deactivated, thereby allowing people to engage in new pursuits. The present experiments provide evidence for vicarious goal satiation, a novel phenomenon in which individuals experience "post-completion goal satiation" as a result of unwittingly taking on another person's goal pursuit and witnessing its completion. In Experiments 1 and 2, the observation of a goal being completed (vs. not completed) led to less striving by the observer on the same task. Given that an actor's strength of commitment affects goal contagion, we hypothesized that such commitment would be an important boundary condition for vicarious goal satiation. The results of Experiment 2 showed that observing stronger (vs. weaker) goal commitment lowered accessibility of goal-related words, but only when the goal being observed was completed. Implications of vicarious goal satiation for goal pursuit in everyday environments are discussed.