The political polarization of COVID-19 treatments among physicians and laypeople in the United States.

In the United States, liberals and conservatives disagree about facts. To what extent does expertise attenuate these disagreements? To study this question, we compare the polarization of beliefs about COVID-19 treatments among laypeople and critical care physicians. We find that political ideology predicts both groups' beliefs about a range of COVID-19 treatments. These associations persist after controlling for a rich set of covariates, including local politics. We study two potential explanations: a) that partisans are exposed to different information and b) that they interpret the same information in different ways, finding evidence for both. Polarization is driven by preferences for partisan cable news but not by exposure to scientific research. Using a set of embedded experiments, we demonstrate that partisans perceive scientific evidence differently when it pertains to a politicized treatment (ivermectin), relative to when the treatment is not identified. These results highlight the extent to which political ideology is increasingly relevant for understanding beliefs, even among expert decision makers such as physicians.

Underestimating Counterparts' Learning Goals Impairs Conflictual Conversations.

Given the many contexts in which people have difficulty engaging with views that disagree with their own-from political discussions to workplace conflicts-it is critical to understand how conflictual conversations can be improved. Whereas previous work has focused on strategies to change individual-level mindsets (e.g., encouraging open-mindedness), the present study investigated the role of partners' beliefs about their counterparts. Across seven preregistered studies (N = 2,614 adults), people consistently underestimated how willing disagreeing counterparts were to learn about opposing views (compared with how willing participants were themselves and how willing they believed agreeing others would be). Further, this belief strongly predicted greater derogation of attitude opponents and more negative expectations for conflictual conversations. Critically, in both American partisan politics and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a short informational intervention that increased beliefs that disagreeing counterparts were willing to learn about one's views decreased derogation and increased willingness to engage in the future. We built on research recognizing the power of the situation to highlight a fruitful new focus for conflict research.

Receptiveness to Opposing Views: Conceptualization and Integrative Review.

The present article reviews a growing body of research on receptiveness to opposing views-the willingness to access, consider, and evaluate contradictory opinions in a relatively impartial manner. First, we describe the construct of receptiveness and consider how it can be measured and studied at the individual level. Next, we extend our theorizing to the interpersonal level, arguing that receptiveness in the course of any given interaction is mutually constituted by the dispositional tendencies and observable behaviors of the parties involved. We advance the argument that receptiveness should be conceptualized and studied as an interpersonal construct that emerges dynamically over the course of an interaction and is powerfully influenced by counterpart behavior. This interpersonal conceptualization of receptiveness has important implications for intervention design and raises a suite of novel research questions.

Confidence in Context: Perceived Accuracy of Quantitative Estimates Decreases With Repeated Trials.

Across seven studies (combined N = 5,484), we demonstrated that confidence in one's judgments decreases over a series of quantitative estimates. This finding was robust to various methods of confidence elicitation, the presence of incentives, and different estimation topics (Studies 1, 2, and 4). Our results also stand in contrast to participant expectations (Study 3). The phenomenon does not appear to be driven by fatigue, lack of effort, or various explanations based on incorporating uncertainty from prior judgments into subsequent ones. Our findings suggest that rather than evaluating confidence in isolation, participants evaluate confidence in reference to their stated confidence on earlier judgments. We theorize that confidence in earlier judgments increases in hindsight because of biased forgetting of disconfirming evidence. As a result, confidence in subsequent judgments appears to be comparatively lower (preregistered Studies 5-7). We discuss the implications for confidence research and consumer, organizational, and policy decision-making.

In Generous Offers I Trust: The Effect of First-Offer Value on Economically Vulnerable Behaviors.

Negotiation scholarship espouses the importance of opening a bargaining situation with an aggressive offer, given the power of first offers to shape concessionary behavior and outcomes. In our research, we identified a surprising consequence to this common prescription. Through four studies in the field and laboratory (total N = 3,742), we explored how first-offer values affect the recipient's perceptions of the offer-maker's trustworthiness and, subsequently, the recipient's behaviors. Specifically, we found that recipients of generous offers are more likely to make themselves economically vulnerable to their counterparts, exhibiting behaviors with potentially deleterious consequences, such as disclosing negative information. We observed this effect in an online marketplace (Study 1) and in an incentivized laboratory experiment (Study 3). We found that it is driven by the greater trust that generous first offers engender (Studies 2 and 3). These results persisted in the face of debiasing attempts and were surprising to lay negotiators (Studies 3 and 4).

Personal narratives build trust across ideological divides.

Lack of trust is a key barrier to collaboration in organizations and is exacerbated in contexts when employees subscribe to different ideological beliefs. Across five preregistered experiments, we find that people judge ideological opponents as more trustworthy when opposing opinions are expressed through a self-revealing personal narrative than through either data or stories about third parties-even when the content of the messages is carefully controlled to be consistent. Trust does not suffer when explanations grounded in self-revealing personal narratives are augmented with data, suggesting that our results are not driven by quantitative aversion. Perceptions of trustworthiness are mediated by the speaker's apparent vulnerability and are greater when the self-revelation is of a more sensitive nature. Consequently, people are more willing to collaborate with ideological opponents who support their views by embedding data in a self-revealing personal narrative, rather than relying on data-only explanations. We discuss the implications of these results for future research on trust as well as for organizational practice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Conveying and detecting listening during live conversation.

Across all domains of human social life, positive perceptions of conversational listening (i.e., feeling heard) predict well-being, professional success, and interpersonal flourishing. However, a fundamental question remains: Are perceptions of listening accurate? Prior research has not empirically tested the extent to which humans can detect others' cognitive engagement (attentiveness) during live conversation. Across five studies (total N = 1,225), using a combination of correlational and experimental methods, we find that perceivers struggle to distinguish between attentive and inattentive conversational listening. Though people's listening fluctuated naturally throughout their conversations (people's minds wandered away from the conversation 24% of the time), they were able to adjust their listening in line with instructions and incentives-by either listening attentively, inattentively, or dividing their attention-and their conversation partners struggled to detect these differences. Specifically, speakers consistently overestimated their conversation partners' attentiveness-often believing their partners were listening when they were not. Our results suggest this overestimation is (at least partly) due to the largely indistinguishable behavior of inattentive and attentive listeners. It appears that people can (and do) divide their attention during conversation and successfully feign attentiveness. Overestimating others' attentiveness extended to third-party observers who were not immersed in the conversation, listeners who looked back on their own listening, and people interacting with partners who could not hear their words (but were incentivized to act like they could). Our work calls for a reexamination of a fundamental social behavior-listening-and underscores the distinction between feeling heard and being heard during live conversation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

In the eye of the beholder: eye contact increases resistance to persuasion.

Popular belief holds that eye contact increases the success of persuasive communication, and prior research suggests that speakers who direct their gaze more toward their listeners are perceived as more persuasive. In contrast, we demonstrate that more eye contact between the listener and speaker during persuasive communication predicts less attitude change in the direction advocated. In Study 1, participants freely watched videos of speakers expressing various views on controversial sociopolitical issues. Greater direct gaze at the speaker's eyes was associated with less attitude change in the direction advocated by the speaker. In Study 2, we instructed participants to look at either the eyes or the mouths of speakers presenting arguments counter to participants' own attitudes. Intentionally maintaining direct eye contact led to less persuasion than did gazing at the mouth. These findings suggest that efforts at increasing eye contact may be counterproductive across a variety of persuasion contexts.

The contingent reputational benefits of selective exposure to partisan information.

Individuals often preferentially avoid information that contradicts and seek information that aligns with their prior beliefs-a tendency referred to as "selective exposure." Traditionally, prior research has focused on intrapersonal drivers of selective exposure, including avoidance of cognitive dissonance. We take a complementary approach by investigating the conditions under which interpersonal concerns drive selective exposure. Drawing on a large literature on impression management, we test a social signaling model of selective exposure, which predicts that (a) individuals shift their information selection decisions to signal to observers and (b) observers reward such shifts. We test this model in the domain of partisan politics in the United States across five financially incentivized, preregistered experiments (N = 3,598). Our results extend prior theory by identifying three key contingencies: the type of task on which observers expect to collaborate with actors, alignment of group membership between observers and actors, and the magnitude of demonstrated selective exposure. Overall, we find that tailoring one's information selection decisions can indeed have strategic value-but only under certain theoretically predictable conditions. Our work also identifies an actor-observer misalignment: While observers are sensitive to the type of future interaction with an actor, the actors themselves do not intuit this sensitivity. In the era of social media, when information selection decisions are more public than ever and the spread of misinformation is pervasive, understanding the ways in which reputational considerations shape decision making not only illuminates why selective exposure persists, but also suggests novel mitigation strategies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The cost of collaboration: why joint decision making exacerbates rejection of outside information.

Prior investigators have asserted that certain group characteristics cause group members to disregard outside information and that this behavior leads to diminished performance. We demonstrate that the very process of making a judgment collaboratively rather than individually also contributes to such myopic underweighting of external viewpoints. Dyad members exposed to numerical judgments made by peers gave significantly less weight to those judgments than did individuals working alone. This difference in willingness to use peer input was mediated by the greater confidence that the dyad members reported in the accuracy of their own estimates. Furthermore, dyads were no better at judging the relative accuracy of their own estimates and the advisor's estimates than individuals were. Our analyses demonstrate that, relative to individuals, dyads suffered an accuracy cost. Specifically, if dyad members had given as much weight to peer input as individuals working alone did, then their revised estimates would have been significantly more accurate.

Why is exposure to opposing views aversive? Reconciling three theoretical perspectives.

To form truthful beliefs, individuals must expose themselves to varied viewpoints. And yet, people routinely avoid information that contradicts their prior beliefs-a tendency termed "selective exposure." Why? Prior research theorizes that exposure to opposing views triggers negative emotions; in turn, people avoid doing so. Here, we argue that understanding why individuals find simple exposure to opposing perspectives aversive is an important and largely unanswered psychological question. We review three streams of research that offer relevant theories: self-threat borne of cognitive dissonance; naïve realism (i.e., the illusion of personal objectivity); and reluctance to expend cognitive effort. While extant empirical research offers the strongest evidence for predictions from naïve realism, more systematic research is needed to reconcile these perspectives.

Toward a psychology of attitude conflict.

We review research on "attitude conflict" -- competitive disagreement with regard to beliefs, values, and preferences, characterized by parties' intolerance of each other's positions. We propose a simple causal model of attitude conflict, including three antecedents that drive it and two consequences that frequently emerge. Whereas prior research has focused on the consequences - negative inferences about holders of opposing views and negative affect at the prospect of interacting with them - we focus on the antecedents. Specifically, we propose that disagreements that lead to attitude conflict are often characterized by perceptions of high (1) outcome importance, (2) actor interdependence, and (3) evidentiary skew. Our analysis offers multiple paths for future research to more accurately predict and more effectively intervene in such situations.

Selective exposure partly relies on faulty affective forecasts.

People preferentially consume information that aligns with their prior beliefs, contributing to polarization and undermining democracy. Five studies (collective N = 2455) demonstrate that such "selective exposure" partly stems from faulty affective forecasts. Specifically, political partisans systematically overestimate the strength of negative affect that results from exposure to opposing views. In turn, these incorrect forecasts drive information consumption choices. Clinton voters overestimated the negative affect they would experience from watching President Trump's Inaugural Address (Study 1) and from reading statements written by Trump voters (Study 2). Democrats and Republicans overestimated the negative affect they would experience from listening to speeches by opposing-party senators (Study 3). People's tendency to underestimate the extent to which they agree with opponents' views drove the affective forecasting error. Finally, correcting biased affective forecasts reduced selective exposure by 24-34% (Studies 4 and 5).

It helps to ask: The cumulative benefits of asking follow-up questions.

In a recent article published in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP; Huang, Yeomans, Brooks, Minson, & Gino, 2017), we reported the results of 2 experiments involving "getting acquainted" conversations among strangers and an observational field study of heterosexual speed daters. In all 3 studies, we found that asking more questions in conversation, especially follow-up questions (that indicate responsiveness to a partner), increases interpersonal liking of the question asker. Kluger and Malloy (2019) offer a critique of the analyses in Study 3 of our article. Though their response is a positive signal of engaged interest in our research, they made 3 core mistakes in their analyses that render their critique invalid. First, they tested the wrong variables, leading to conclusions that were erroneous. Second, even if they had analyzed the correct variables, some of their analytical choices were not valid for our speed-dating dataset, casting doubt on their conclusions. Third, they misrepresented our original findings, ignoring results in all 3 of our studies that disprove some of their central criticisms. In summary, the conclusions that Kluger and Malloy (2019) drew about Huang et al. (2017)'s findings are incorrect. The original results are reliable and robust: Asking more questions, especially follow-up questions, increases interpersonal liking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

It doesn't hurt to ask: Question-asking increases liking.

Conversation is a fundamental human experience that is necessary to pursue intrapersonal and interpersonal goals across myriad contexts, relationships, and modes of communication. In the current research, we isolate the role of an understudied conversational behavior: question-asking. Across 3 studies of live dyadic conversations, we identify a robust and consistent relationship between question-asking and liking: people who ask more questions, particularly follow-up questions, are better liked by their conversation partners. When people are instructed to ask more questions, they are perceived as higher in responsiveness, an interpersonal construct that captures listening, understanding, validation, and care. We measure responsiveness with an attitudinal measure from previous research as well as a novel behavioral measure: the number of follow-up questions one asks. In both cases, responsiveness explains the effect of question-asking on liking. In addition to analyzing live get-to-know-you conversations online, we also studied face-to-face speed-dating conversations. We trained a natural language processing algorithm as a "follow-up question detector" that we applied to our speed-dating data (and can be applied to any text data to more deeply understand question-asking dynamics). The follow-up question rate established by the algorithm showed that speed daters who ask more follow-up questions during their dates are more likely to elicit agreement for second dates from their partners, a behavioral indicator of liking. We also find that, despite the persistent and beneficial effects of asking questions, people do not anticipate that question-asking increases interpersonal liking. (PsycINFO Database Record

Holding the Hunger Games Hostage at the Gym: An Evaluation of Temptation Bundling.

We introduce and evaluate the effectiveness of temptation bundling-a method for simultaneously tackling two types of self-control problems by harnessing consumption complementarities. We describe a field experiment measuring the impact of bundling instantly gratifying but guilt-inducing "want" experiences (enjoying page-turner audiobooks) with valuable "should" behaviors providing delayed rewards (exercising). We explore whether such bundles increase should behaviors and whether people would pay to create these restrictive bundles. Participants were randomly assigned to a full treatment condition with gym-only access to tempting audio novels, an intermediate treatment involving encouragement to restrict audiobook enjoyment to the gym, or a control condition. Initially, full and intermediate treatment participants visited the gym 51% and 29% more frequently, respectively, than control participants, but treatment effects declined over time (particularly following Thanksgiving). After the study, 61% of participants opted to pay to have gym-only access to iPods containing tempting audiobooks, suggesting demand for this commitment device.

Two to tango: effects of collaboration and disagreement on dyadic judgment.

Four studies examined dyadic collaboration on quantitative estimation tasks. In accord with the tenets of "naïve realism," dyad members failed to give due weight to a partner's estimates, especially those greatly divergent from their own. The requirement to reach joint estimates through discussion increased accuracy more than reaching agreement through a mere exchange of numerical "bids." However, even the latter procedure increased accuracy, relative to that of individual estimates (Study 1). Accuracy feedback neither increased weight given to partner's subsequent estimates nor produced improved accuracy (Study 2). Long-term dance partners, who shared a positive estimation bias, failed to improve accuracy when estimating their performance scores (Study 3). Having dyad members ask questions about the bases of partner's estimates produced greater yielding and accuracy increases than having them explain their own estimates (Study 4). The latter two studies provided additional direct and indirect evidence for the role of naïve realism.