The combination of infectious bronchitis virus BR1 and Mass vaccines provides broad protection.

Two vaccination-challenge trials were performed using a commercial infectious bronchitis virus (IBV) BR1 vaccine, given alone or combined with a commercial IBV Mass vaccine against challenges with IBV M41, 793B, D388 (QX), Q1, Brasil-1 or Variant 2 challenge viruses, which includes the IB viruses that are dominant in South America. The efficacy of the vaccines against the challenge viruses was investigated by determination of the ciliary activity of the tracheal epithelium after challenge. The level of protection induced by the IBV BR1 vaccine alone against the six IBV challenge strains, of which five were of heterologous genotypes, varied from 50% to 100% with an average of 80%. The level of protection induced by the combination of the IBV BR1 and IBV Mass vaccines against the six IBV challenge strains, of which four were of heterologous genotypes, varied from 80% to 100% with an average of 92%. Vaccination with IBV BR1 alone provided a high level of protection against most tested challenge viruses, though the combination of IBV BR1 and IBV Mass was more consistent, showing less variation and compliance with the criterium mentioned in the European Pharmacopoeia 10th edition (at least 80% protection) for all tested challenge viruses. These trials show that vaccination with a combination of IBV BR1 and IBV Mass vaccines provides high levels of protection against the circulating IBV strains in South America.

A Salmonella Pullorum outbreak with neurological signs in adult layers and outbreak investigation using whole genome sequencing.

RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Cerebral granulomas are associated with nervous signs in Salmonella Pullorum outbreak.Bone marrow is also a recommended tissue for isolation of Salmonella Pullorum.Rapid plate agglutination test detects Pullorum antibodies in a vaccinated flock.Phylogenetic analysis showed clonality of isolates within the outbreak.

Occupational and environmental exposure to SARS-CoV-2 in and around infected mink farms.

OBJECTIVE: Unprecedented SARS-CoV-2 infections in farmed minks raised immediate concerns regarding transmission to humans and initiated intensive environmental investigations to assess occupational and environmental exposure. METHODS: Air sampling was performed at infected Dutch mink farms, at farm premises and at nearby residential sites. A range of other environmental samples were collected from minks' housing units, including bedding materials. SARS-CoV-2 RNA was analysed in all samples by quantitative PCR. RESULTS: Inside the farms, considerable levels of SARS-CoV-2 RNA were found in airborne dust, especially in personal inhalable dust samples (approximately 1000-10 000 copies/m3). Most of the settling dust samples tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA (82%, 75 of 92). SARS-CoV-2 RNA was not detected in outdoor air samples, except for those collected near the entrance of the most recently infected farm. Many samples of minks' housing units and surfaces contained SARS-CoV-2 RNA. CONCLUSIONS: Infected mink farms can be highly contaminated with SARS-CoV-2 RNA. This warns of occupational exposure, which was substantiated by considerable SARS-CoV-2 RNA concentrations in personal air samples. Dispersion of SARS-CoV-2 to outdoor air was found to be limited and SARS-CoV-2 RNA was not detected in air samples collected beyond farm premises, implying a negligible risk of environmental exposure to nearby communities. Our occupational and environmental risk assessment is in line with whole genome sequencing analyses showing mink-to-human transmission among farm workers, but no indications of direct zoonotic transmission events to nearby communities.

Clinical and Pathological Findings in SARS-CoV-2 Disease Outbreaks in Farmed Mink (Neovison vison).

SARS-CoV-2, the causative agent of COVID-19, caused respiratory disease outbreaks with increased mortality in 4 mink farms in the Netherlands. The most striking postmortem finding was an acute interstitial pneumonia, which was found in nearly all examined mink that died at the peak of the outbreaks. Acute alveolar damage was a consistent histopathological finding in mink that died with pneumonia. SARS-CoV-2 infections were confirmed by detection of viral RNA in throat swabs and by immunohistochemical detection of viral antigen in nasal conchae, trachea, and lung. Clinically, the outbreaks lasted for about 4 weeks but some animals were still polymerase chain reaction-positive for SARS-CoV-2 in throat swabs after clinical signs had disappeared. This is the first report of the clinical and pathological characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in mink farms.

SARS-CoV-2 infection in farmed minks, the Netherlands, April and May 2020.

Respiratory disease and increased mortality occurred in minks on two farms in the Netherlands, with interstitial pneumonia and SARS-CoV-2 RNA in organ and swab samples. On both farms, at least one worker had coronavirus disease-associated symptoms before the outbreak. Variations in mink-derived viral genomes showed between-mink transmission and no infection link between the farms. Inhalable dust contained viral RNA, indicating possible exposure of workers. One worker is assumed to have attracted the virus from mink.

Manifestation of SARS-CoV-2 Infections in Mink Related to Host-, Virus- and Farm-Associated Factors, The Netherlands 2020.

SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on 69 Dutch mink farms in 2020 were studied to identify risk factors for virus introduction and transmission and to improve surveillance and containment measures. Clinical signs, laboratory test results, and epidemiological aspects were investigated, such as the date and reason of suspicion, housing, farm size and distances, human contact structure, biosecurity measures, and presence of wildlife, pets, pests, and manure management. On seven farms, extensive random sampling was performed, and age, coat color, sex, and clinical signs were recorded. Mild to severe respiratory signs and general diseases such as apathy, reduced feed intake, and increased mortality were detected on 62/69 farms. Throat swabs were more likely to result in virus detection than rectal swabs. Clinical signs differed between virus clusters and were more severe for dark-colored mink, males, and animals infected later during the year. Geographical clustering was found for one virus cluster. Shared personnel could explain some cases, but other transmission routes explaining farm-to-farm spread were not elucidated. An early warning surveillance system, strict biosecurity measures, and a (temporary) ban on mink farming and vaccinating animals and humans can contribute to reducing the risks of the virus spreading and acquisition of potential mutations relevant to human and animal health.

SARS-CoV-2 infection in cats and dogs in infected mink farms.

Animals like mink, cats and dogs are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. In the Netherlands, 69 out of 127 mink farms were infected with SARS-CoV-2 between April and November 2020 and all mink on infected farms were culled after SARS-CoV-2 infection to prevent further spread of the virus. On some farms, (feral) cats and dogs were present. This study provides insight into the prevalence of SARS-CoV-2-positive cats and dogs in 10 infected mink farms and their possible role in transmission of the virus. Throat and rectal swabs of 101 cats (12 domestic and 89 feral cats) and 13 dogs of 10 farms were tested for SARS-CoV-2 using PCR. Serological assays were performed on serum samples from 62 adult cats and all 13 dogs. Whole Genome Sequencing was performed on one cat sample. Cat-to-mink transmission parameters were estimated using data from all 10 farms. This study shows evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in 12 feral cats and 2 dogs. Eleven cats (18%) and two dogs (15%) tested serologically positive. Three feral cats (3%) and one dog (8%) tested PCR-positive. The sequence generated from the cat throat swab clustered with mink sequences from the same farm. The calculated rate of mink-to-cat transmission showed that cats on average had a chance of 12% (95%CI 10%-18%) of becoming infected by mink, assuming no cat-to-cat transmission. As only feral cats were infected it is most likely that infections in cats were initiated by mink, not by humans. Whether both dogs were infected by mink or humans remains inconclusive. This study presents one of the first reports of interspecies transmission of SARS-CoV-2 that does not involve humans, namely mink-to-cat transmission, which should also be considered as a potential risk for spread of SARS-CoV-2.

Adaptation, spread and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in farmed minks and associated humans in the Netherlands.

In the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (April 2020), SARS-CoV-2 was detected in farmed minks and genomic sequencing was performed on mink farms and farm personnel. Here, we describe the outbreak and use sequence data with Bayesian phylodynamic methods to explore SARS-CoV-2 transmission in minks and humans on farms. High number of farm infections (68/126) in minks and farm workers (>50% of farms) were detected, with limited community spread. Three of five initial introductions of SARS-CoV-2 led to subsequent spread between mink farms until November 2020. Viruses belonging to the largest cluster acquired an amino acid substitution in the receptor binding domain of the Spike protein (position 486), evolved faster and spread longer and more widely. Movement of people and distance between farms were statistically significant predictors of virus dispersal between farms. Our study provides novel insights into SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms and highlights the importance of combining genetic information with epidemiological information when investigating outbreaks at the animal-human interface.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 on mink farms between humans and mink and back to humans.

Animal experiments have shown that nonhuman primates, cats, ferrets, hamsters, rabbits, and bats can be infected by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). In addition, SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected in felids, mink, and dogs in the field. Here, we describe an in-depth investigation using whole-genome sequencing of outbreaks on 16 mink farms and the humans living or working on these farms. We conclude that the virus was initially introduced by humans and has since evolved, most likely reflecting widespread circulation among mink in the beginning of the infection period, several weeks before detection. Despite enhanced biosecurity, early warning surveillance, and immediate culling of animals in affected farms, transmission occurred between mink farms in three large transmission clusters with unknown modes of transmission. Of the tested mink farm residents, employees, and/or individuals with whom they had been in contact, 68% had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Individuals for which whole genomes were available were shown to have been infected with strains with an animal sequence signature, providing evidence of animal-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within mink farms.