Innovative platforms for data aggregation, linkage and analysis in the context of pandemic and epidemic intelligence.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, open-access platforms that aggregate, link and analyse data were transformative for global public health surveillance. This perspective explores the work of three of these platforms: Our World In Data (OWID), Johns Hopkins University (JHU) COVID-19 Dashboard (later complemented by the Coronavirus Resource Center), and Global.Health, which were presented in the second World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence Innovation Forum. These platforms, operating mostly within academic institutions, added value to public health data that are collected by government agencies by providing additional real-time public health intelligence about the spread of the virus and the evolution of the public health emergency. Information from these platforms was used by health professionals, political decision-makers and members of the public alike. Further engagement between government and non-governmental surveillance efforts can accelerate the improvements needed in public health surveillance overall. Increasing the diversity of public health surveillance initiatives beyond the government sector comes with several benefits: technology innovation in data science, engagement of additional highly skilled professionals, greater transparency and accountability for government agencies, and new opportunities to engage with members of society.

Multistate US Outbreak of Rapidly Growing Mycobacterial Infections Associated with Medical Tourism to the Dominican Republic, 2013-2014(1).

During 2013, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene in Baltimore, MD, USA, received report of 2 Maryland residents whose surgical sites were infected with rapidly growing mycobacteria after cosmetic procedures at a clinic (clinic A) in the Dominican Republic. A multistate investigation was initiated; a probable case was defined as a surgical site infection unresponsive to therapy in a patient who had undergone cosmetic surgery in the Dominican Republic. We identified 21 case-patients in 6 states who had surgery in 1 of 5 Dominican Republic clinics; 13 (62%) had surgery at clinic A. Isolates from 12 (92%) of those patients were culture-positive for Mycobacterium abscessus complex. Of 9 clinic A case-patients with available data, all required therapeutic surgical intervention, 8 (92%) were hospitalized, and 7 (78%) required ≥3 months of antibacterial drug therapy. Healthcare providers should consider infection with rapidly growing mycobacteria in patients who have surgical site infections unresponsive to standard treatment.

Notes from the field: rapidly growing nontuberculous Mycobacterium wound infections among medical tourists undergoing cosmetic surgeries in the Dominican Republic--multiple states, March 2013-February 2014.

In August 2013, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (MDHMH) was notified of two persons with rapidly growing nontuberculous mycobacterial (RG-NTM) surgical-site infections. Both patients had undergone surgical procedures as medical tourists at the same private surgical clinic (clinic A) in the Dominican Republic the previous month. Within 7 days of returning to the United States, both sought care for symptoms that included surgical wound abscesses, clear fluid drainage, pain, and fever. Initial antibiotic therapy was ineffective. Material collected from both patients' wounds grew Mycobacterium abscessus exhibiting a high degree of antibiotic resistance characteristic of this organism.

Description of the first global outbreak of mpox: an analysis of global surveillance data.

BACKGROUND: In May 2022, several countries with no history of sustained community transmission of mpox (formerly known as monkeypox) notified WHO of new mpox cases. These cases were soon followed by a large-scale outbreak, which unfolded across the world, driven by local, in-country transmission within previously unaffected countries. On July 23, 2022, WHO declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Here, we aim to describe the main epidemiological features of this outbreak, the largest reported to date. METHODS: In this analysis of global surveillance data we analysed data for all confirmed mpox cases reported by WHO Member States through the global surveillance system from Jan 1, 2022, to Jan 29, 2023. Data included daily aggregated numbers of mpox cases by country and a case reporting form (CRF) containing information on demographics, clinical presentation, epidemiological exposure factors, and laboratory testing. We used the data to (1) describe the key epidemiological and clinical features of cases; (2) analyse risk factors for hospitalisation (by multivariable mixed-effects binary logistic regression); and (3) retrospectively analyse transmission trends. Sequencing data from GISAID and GenBank were used to analyse monkeypox virus (MPXV) genetic diversity. FINDINGS: Data from 82 807 cases with submitted CRFs were included in the analysis. Cases were primarily due to clade IIb MPXV (mainly lineage B.1, followed by lineage A.2). The outbreak was driven by transmission among males (73 560 [96·4%] of 76 293 cases) who self-identify as men who have sex with men (25 938 [86·9%] of 29 854 cases). The most common reported route of transmission was sexual contact (14 941 [68·7%] of 21 749). 3927 (7·3%) of 54 117 cases were hospitalised, with increased odds for those aged younger than 5 years (adjusted odds ratio 2·12 [95% CI 1·32-3·40], p=0·0020), aged 65 years and older (1·54 [1·05-2·25], p=0·026), female cases (1·61 [1·35-1·91], p<0·0001), and for cases who are immunosuppressed either due to being HIV positive and immunosuppressed (2·00 [1·68-2·37], p<0·0001), or other immunocompromising conditions (3·47 [1·84-6·54], p=0·0001). INTERPRETATION: Continued global surveillance allowed WHO to monitor the epidemic, identify risk factors, and inform the public health response. The outbreak can be attributed to clade IIb MPXV spread by newly described modes of transmission. FUNDING: WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies. TRANSLATIONS: For the French and Spanish translations of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.

Guillain-Barre syndrome during the 2009-2010 H1N1 influenza vaccination campaign: population-based surveillance among 45 million Americans.

Because of widespread distribution of the influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine (pH1N1 vaccine) and the prior association between Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) and the 1976 H1N1 influenza vaccine, enhanced surveillance was implemented to estimate the magnitude of any increased GBS risk following administration of pH1N1 vaccine. The authors conducted active, population-based surveillance for incident cases of GBS among 45 million persons residing at 10 Emerging Infections Program sites during October 2009-May 2010; GBS was defined according to published criteria. The authors determined medical and vaccine history for GBS cases through medical record review and patient interviews. The authors used vaccine coverage data to estimate person-time exposed and unexposed to pH1N1 vaccine and calculated age- and sex-adjusted rate ratios comparing GBS incidence in these groups, as well as age- and sex-adjusted numbers of excess GBS cases. The authors received 411 reports of confirmed or probable GBS. The rate of GBS immediately following pH1N1 vaccination was 57% higher than in person-time unexposed to vaccine (adjusted rate ratio = 1.57, 95% confidence interval: 1.02, 2.21), corresponding to 0.74 excess GBS cases per million pH1N1 vaccine doses (95% confidence interval: 0.04, 1.56). This excess risk was much smaller than that observed during the 1976 vaccine campaign and was comparable to some previous seasonal influenza vaccine risk assessments.

Filovirus outbreak detection and surveillance: lessons from Bundibugyo.

The first outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) due to Bundibugyo ebolavirus occurred in Uganda from August to December 2007. During outbreak response and assessment, we identified 131 EHF cases (44 suspect, 31 probable, and 56 confirmed). Consistent with previous large filovirus outbreaks, a long temporal lag (approximately 3 months) occurred between initial EHF cases and the subsequent identification of Ebola virus and outbreak response, which allowed for prolonged person-to-person transmission of the virus. Although effective control measures for filovirus outbreaks, such as patient isolation and contact tracing, are well established, our observations from the Bundibugyo EHF outbreak demonstrate the need for improved filovirus surveillance, reporting, and diagnostics, in endemic locations in Africa.

Diagnosis of 2009 pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) and seasonal influenza using rapid influenza antigen tests, San Antonio, Texas, April-June 2009.

Clinicians frequently use influenza rapid antigen tests for diagnostic testing. We tested nasal wash samples from 1 April to 7 June 2009 from 1538 patients using the QuickVue Influenza A+B (Quidel) rapid influenza antigen test and compared the results with real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) assay (gold standard). The prevalence of 2009 pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) was 1.98%, seasonal influenza type A .87%, and seasonal influenza type B 2.07%. The sensitivity and specificity of the rapid test for pH1N1 was 20% (95% CI, 8-39) and 99% (95% CI, 98-99), for seasonal influenza type A 15% (95% CI, 2-45) and 99% (95% CI, 98-99), and for influenza type B was 31% (95% CI, 9-61) and 99% (95% CI, 98-99.7). Rapid influenza antigen tests were of limited use at a time when the prevalence of pH1N1 and seasonal influenza in the United States was low. Clinicians should instead rely on clinical impression and laboratory diagnosis by rRT-PCR.

Household transmission of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) and nonpharmaceutical interventions among households of high school students in San Antonio, Texas.

San Antonio, Texas, was one of the first metropolitan areas where 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus (pH1N1) was detected. Identification of laboratory-confirmed pH1N1 in 2 students led to a preemptive 8-day closure of their high school. We assessed transmission of pH1N1 and changes in adoption of nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) within households of students attending the affected school. Household secondary attack rates were 3.7% overall and 9.1% among those 0-4 years of age. Widespread adoption of NPIs was reported among household members. Respondents who viewed pH1N1 as very serious were more likely to adopt certain NPIs than were respondents who viewed pH1N1 as not very serious. NPIs may complement influenza vaccine prevention programs or be the only line of defense when pandemic vaccine is unavailable. The 2009 pandemic provided a unique opportunity to study NPIs, and these real-world experiences provide much-needed data to inform pandemic response policy.

Serial intervals and the temporal distribution of secondary infections within households of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1): implications for influenza control recommendations.

A critical issue during the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic was determining the appropriate duration of time individuals with influenza-like illness (ILI) should remain isolated to reduce onward transmission while limiting societal disruption. Ideally this is based on knowledge of the relative infectiousness of ill individuals at each point during the course of the infection. Data on 261 clinically apparent pH1N1 infector-infectee pairs in households, from 7 epidemiological studies conducted in the United States early in 2009, were analyzed to estimate the distribution of times from symptom onset in an infector to symptom onset in the household contacts they infect (mean, 2.9 days, not correcting for tertiary transmission). Only 5% of transmission events were estimated to take place >3 days after the onset of clinical symptoms among those ill with pH1N1 virus. These results will inform future recommendations on duration of isolation of individuals with ILI.

Virus detection and duration of illness among patients with 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus infection in Texas.

Knowledge from early outbreaks is limited regarding the virus detection and illness duration of the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infections. During the period from April to May 2009 in Texas, we collected serial nasopharyngeal (NP) and stool specimens from 35 participants, testing by real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) and culture. The participants were aged 2 months to 71 years; 25 (71%) were under 18. The median duration of measured fever was 3.0 days and of virus detection in NP specimens was 4.2 days; however, few specimens were collected between days 5-9. The duration of virus detection (4.2 days) was similar to the duration of fever (3.5 days) (RR, 1.14; 95% CI, .66-1.95; P = .8), but was shorter than the duration of cough (11.0 days) (RR, .41; 95% CI, .24-.68; P < .001). We detected viral RNA in two participants' stools. All cultures were negative. This investigation suggests that the duration of virus detection was likely similar to the seasonal influenza virus.

Population incidence of Guillain-Barré syndrome: a systematic review and meta-analysis.

Population incidence of Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) is required to assess changes in GBS epidemiology, but published estimates of GBS incidence vary greatly depending on case ascertainment, definitions, and sample size. We performed a meta-analysis of articles on GBS incidence by searching Medline (1966-2009), Embase (1988-2009), Cinahl (1981-2009) and CABI (1973-2009) as well as article bibliographies. We included studies from North America and Europe with at least 20 cases, and used population-based data, subject matter experts to confirm GBS diagnosis, and an accepted GBS case definition. With these data, we fitted a random-effects negative binomial regression model to estimate age-specific GBS incidence. Of 1,683 nonduplicate citations, 16 met the inclusion criteria, which produced 1,643 cases and 152.7 million person-years of follow-up. GBS incidence increased by 20% for every 10-year increase in age; the risk of GBS was higher for males than females. The regression equation for calculating the average GBS rate per 100,000 person-years as a function of age in years was exp[-12.0771 + 0.01813(age in years)] × 100,000. Our findings provide a robust estimate of background GBS incidence in Western countries. Our regression model may be used in comparable populations to estimate the background age-specific rate of GBS incidence for future studies.

Schistosomiasis among recreational users of Upper Nile River, Uganda, 2007.

After recreational exposure to river water in Uganda, 12 (17%) of 69 persons had evidence of schistosome infection. Eighteen percent self-medicated with praziquantel prophylaxis immediately after exposure, which was not appropriate. Travelers to schistosomiasis-endemic areas should consult a travel medicine physician.

Household transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, San Antonio, Texas, USA, April-May 2009.

To assess household transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in San Antonio, Texas, USA, during April 15-May 8, 2009, we investigated 77 households. The index case-patient was defined as the household member with the earliest onset date of symptoms of acute respiratory infection (ARI), influenza-like illness (ILI), or laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Median interval between illness onset in index and secondary case-patients was 4 days (range 1-9 days); the index case-patient was likely to be < or =18 years of age (p = 0.034). The secondary attack rate was 4% for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 9% for ILI, and 13% for ARI. The secondary attack rate was highest for children <5 years of age (8%-19%) and lowest for adults > or =50 years of age (4%-12%). Early in the outbreak, household transmission primarily occurred from children to other household members and was lower than the transmission rate for seasonal influenza.

Rigorous surveillance is necessary for high confidence in end-of-outbreak declarations for Ebola and other infectious diseases.

The World Health Organization considers an Ebola outbreak to have ended once 42 days have passed since the last possible exposure to a confirmed case. Benefits of a quick end-of-outbreak declaration, such as reductions in trade/travel restrictions, must be balanced against the chance of flare-ups from undetected residual cases. We show how epidemiological modelling can be used to estimate the surveillance level required for decision-makers to be confident that an outbreak is over. Results from a simple model characterizing an Ebola outbreak suggest that a surveillance sensitivity (i.e. case reporting percentage) of 79% is necessary for 95% confidence that an outbreak is over after 42 days without symptomatic cases. With weaker surveillance, unrecognized transmission may still occur: if the surveillance sensitivity is only 40%, then 62 days must be waited for 95% certainty. By quantifying the certainty in end-of-outbreak declarations, public health decision-makers can plan and communicate more effectively. This article is part of the theme issue 'Modelling infectious disease outbreaks in humans, animals and plants: epidemic forecasting and control'. This issue is linked with the earlier theme issue 'Modelling infectious disease outbreaks in humans, animals and plants: approaches and important themes'.

Polonium-210 poisoning in London: hypochondriasis and public health.

INTRODUCTION: In November 2006, a Russian dissident died from radioactive Polonium-210 (210Po) poisoning in London. Providing reassuring messages during a public health incident may be ineffective for individuals with high health anxiety (hypochondriasis). METHODS: Members of the public who called a 24-hour telephone helpline were offered a follow-up call by a health protection specialist for reassurance. A psychiatrist attempted to contact those callers who were unable to be reassured by the health protection specialist. RESULTS: Of 872 individuals contacted for reassurance, seven (0.6%) could not be reassured. The psychiatrist contacted four of these individuals. Three had a history of health-related anxiety and two attributed somatic symptoms to 210Po exposure. CONCLUSIONS: For individuals with hypochondriasis, reassurance during major public health incidents may be ineffective. Having a psychiatrist available was helpful in managing individuals with excessive health anxiety.

Interrupted time-series analysis of regulations to reduce paracetamol (acetaminophen) poisoning.

BACKGROUND: Paracetamol (acetaminophen) poisoning is the leading cause of acute liver failure in Great Britain and the United States. Successful interventions to reduced harm from paracetamol poisoning are needed. To achieve this, the government of the United Kingdom introduced legislation in 1998 limiting the pack size of paracetamol sold in shops. Several studies have reported recent decreases in fatal poisonings involving paracetamol. We use interrupted time-series analysis to evaluate whether the recent fall in the number of paracetamol deaths is different to trends in fatal poisoning involving aspirin, paracetamol compounds, antidepressants, or nondrug poisoning suicide. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We calculated directly age-standardised mortality rates for paracetamol poisoning in England and Wales from 1993 to 2004. We used an ordinary least-squares regression model divided into pre- and postintervention segments at 1999. The model included a term for autocorrelation within the time series. We tested for changes in the level and slope between the pre- and postintervention segments. To assess whether observed changes in the time series were unique to paracetamol, we compared against poisoning deaths involving compound paracetamol (not covered by the regulations), aspirin, antidepressants, and nonpoisoning suicide deaths. We did this comparison by calculating a ratio of each comparison series with paracetamol and applying a segmented regression model to the ratios. No change in the ratio level or slope indicated no difference compared to the control series. There were about 2,200 deaths involving paracetamol. The age-standardised mortality rate rose from 8.1 per million in 1993 to 8.8 per million in 1997, subsequently falling to about 5.3 per million in 2004. After the regulations were introduced, deaths dropped by 2.69 per million (p = 0.003). Trends in the age-standardised mortality rate for paracetamol compounds, aspirin, and antidepressants were broadly similar to paracetamol, increasing until 1997 and then declining. Nondrug poisoning suicide also declined during the study period, but was highest in 1993. The segmented regression models showed that the age-standardised mortality rate for compound paracetamol dropped less after the regulations (p = 0.012) but declined more rapidly afterward (p = 0.031). However, age-standardised rates for aspirin and antidepressants fell in a similar way to paracetamol after the regulations. Nondrug poisoning suicide declined at a similar rate to paracetamol after the regulations were introduced. CONCLUSIONS: Introduction of regulations to limit availability of paracetamol coincided with a decrease in paracetamol-poisoning mortality. However, fatal poisoning involving aspirin, antidepressants, and to a lesser degree, paracetamol compounds, also showed similar trends. This raises the question whether the decline in paracetamol deaths was due to the regulations or was part of a wider trend in decreasing drug-poisoning mortality. We found little evidence to support the hypothesis that the 1998 regulations limiting pack size resulted in a greater reduction in poisoning deaths involving paracetamol than occurred for other drugs or nondrug poisoning suicide.

Mass fatality management following the South Asian tsunami disaster: case studies in Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.

BACKGROUND: Following natural disasters, mismanagement of the dead has consequences for the psychological well-being of survivors. However, no technical guidelines currently exist for managing mass fatalities following large natural disasters. Existing methods of mass fatality management are not directly transferable as they are designed for transport accidents and acts of terrorism. Furthermore, no information is currently available about post-disaster management of the dead following previous large natural disasters. METHODS AND FINDINGS: After the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004, we conducted three descriptive case studies to systematically document how the dead were managed in Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. We considered the following parameters: body recovery and storage, identification, disposal of human remains, and health risks from dead bodies. We used participant observations as members of post-tsunami response teams, conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants, and collected information from published and unpublished documents. Refrigeration for preserving human remains was not available soon enough after the disaster, necessitating the use of other methods such as dry ice or temporary burial. No country had sufficient forensic capacity to identify thousands of victims. Rapid decomposition made visual identification almost impossible after 24-48 h. In Thailand, most forensic identification was made using dental and fingerprint data. Few victims were identified from DNA. Lack of national or local mass fatality plans further limited the quality and timeliness of response, a problem which was exacerbated by the absence of practical field guidelines or an international agency providing technical support. CONCLUSIONS: Emergency response should not add to the distress of affected communities by inappropriately disposing of the victims. The rights of survivors to see their dead treated with dignity and respect requires practical guidelines and technical support. Mass fatality management following natural disasters needs to be informed by further field research and supported by a network of regional and international forensic institutes and agencies.