Clarifying the Ethics and Oversight of Chimeric Research.

This article is the lead piece in a special report that presents the results of a bioethical investigation into chimeric research, which involves the insertion of human cells into nonhuman animals and nonhuman animal embryos, including into their brains. Rapid scientific developments in this field may advance knowledge and could lead to new therapies for humans. They also reveal the conceptual, ethical, and procedural limitations of existing ethics guidance for human-nonhuman chimeric research. Led by bioethics researchers working closely with an interdisciplinary work group, the investigation focused on generating conceptual clarity and identifying improvements to governance approaches, with the goal of helping scholars, funders, scientists, institutional leaders, and oversight bodies (embryonic stem cell research oversight [ESCRO] committees and institutional animal care and use committees [IACUCs]) deliver principled and trustworthy oversight of this area of science. The article, which focuses on human-nonhuman animal chimeric research that is stem cell based, identifies key ethical issues in and offers ten recommendations regarding the ethics and oversight of this research. Turning from bioethics' previous focus on human-centered questions about the ethics of "humanization" and this research's potential impact on concepts like human dignity, this article emphasizes the importance of nonhuman animal welfare concerns in chimeric research and argues for less-siloed governance and oversight and more-comprehensive public communication.

Disaster and Contingency Planning for Scientific Shared Resource Cores.

Progress in biomedical research is largely driven by improvements, innovations, and breakthroughs in technology, accelerating the research process, and an increasingly complex collaboration of both clinical and basic science. This increasing sophistication has driven the need for centralized shared resource cores ("cores") to serve the scientific community. From a biomedical research enterprise perspective, centralized resource cores are essential to increased scientific, operational, and cost effectiveness; however, the concentration of instrumentation and resources in the cores may render them highly vulnerable to damage from severe weather and other disasters. As such, protection of these assets and the ability to recover from a disaster is increasingly critical to the mission and success of the institution. Therefore, cores should develop and implement both disaster and business continuity plans and be an integral part of the institution's overall plans. Here we provide an overview of key elements required for core disaster and business continuity plans, guidance, and tools for developing these plans, and real-life lessons learned at a large research institution in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy.

Dewetting of unreacted epoxy/amine mixtures on silica.

We employ a direct method, time-of-flight secondary ion mass spectroscopy (ToF-SIMS), to determine experimentally the chemical compositions of the wetted and dewetted regions of an uncured epoxy thin film. Determining the composition of the dewetted region indicated the presence of a very thin sublayer of resin in what was thought to be a region devoid of resin. The capability of ToF-SIMS to probe small 65 x 65 microm(2) areas of the surface has permitted us to directly compare the SIMS spectra of the wetted and dewetted regions to the survey spectra of the reactants. This may indicate the strength of resin/silica interactions, which determine interface formation and properties.

A comprehensive laboratory animal facility pandemic response plan.

The potential of a severe influenza pandemic necessitates the development of an organized, rational plan for continued laboratory animal facility operation without compromise of the welfare of animals. A comprehensive laboratory animal program pandemic response plan was integrated into a university-wide plan. Preparation involved input from all levels of organizational hierarchy including the IACUC. Many contingencies and operational scenarios were considered based on the severity and duration of the influenza pandemic. Trigger points for systematic action steps were based on the World Health Organization's phase alert criteria. One extreme scenario requires hibernation of research operations and maintenance of reduced numbers of laboratory animal colonies for a period of up to 6 mo. This plan includes active recruitment and cross-training of volunteers for essential personnel positions, protective measures for employee and family health, logistical arrangements for delivery and storage of food and bedding, the removal of waste, and the potential for euthanasia. Strategies such as encouraging and subsidizing cryopreservation of unique strains were undertaken to protect valuable research assets and intellectual property. Elements of this plan were put into practice after escalation of the pandemic alerts due to influenza A (H1N1) in April 2009.