The level of consumer information about health insurance in Nanjing, China.

The Chinese government is considering a (regulated) competitive healthcare system. Sufficient consumer information is a crucial pre-condition to benefit from such a change. We conducted a survey on the level of consumer information regarding health insurance among the insured population in Nanjing, China in 2009. The results from descriptive analysis and binary logistic regression demonstrate that the current level of consumer information about health insurance is low. The level of consumer information is positively correlated with the subscribers' motivation to obtain the information and its availability. The level of searching for health insurance information is also low; moreover, even upon searching, the chance of finding relevant information is less than 25%. We conclude that the level of consumer information is currently insufficient in China. If the Chinese government is determined to adopt market mechanisms in the healthcare sector, it should take the lead in making valid and reliable information publicly available and easily accessible.

Preconditions for efficiency and affordability in competitive healthcare markets: Are they fulfilled in Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland? Ten years later.

From the mid-1990s several countries have introduced elements of the model of regulated competition in healthcare. In 2012 we assessed the extent to which in five countries ten important preconditions for achieving efficiency and affordability in competitive healthcare markets were fulfilled. In this paper we assess to what extent the fulfilment of these preconditions has changed ten years later. In 2022, as in 2012, in none of the five countries all preconditions are completely fulfilled. In the period 2012-2022 on balance there have been some improvements in the fulfillment of the preconditions, although to a different extent in the five countries. The only preconditions that were improved in most countries were 'consumer information and transparency' and 'cross-subsidies without incentives for risk selection'. On balance the Netherlands and Switzerland made most progress in the number of better fulfilled preconditions. For Belgium these preconditions no longer seem relevant because the idea of regulated competition has been completely abandoned. In Germany, Israel and Switzerland, the preconditions 'effective competition policy' and 'contestability of the markets' are not sufficiently fulfilled in 2022, just as in 2012. In Germany and Switzerland this also holds for the precondition 'freedom to contract and integrate'. Overall, the progress towards realizing the preconditions has been limited.

Risk-adjusting the doughnut hole to improve efficiency and equity.

An important goal of consumer cost-sharing in health insurance is to increase incentives for cost containment. A relatively new cost-sharing phenomenon is the "doughnut hole": a gap in coverage starting at a predefined level of medical expenses. An important question is where to locate the starting point to achieve the strongest incentives for cost containment. We argue that the answer depends on an individual's health status. Using data from a Dutch insurer, this paper illustrates that using a risk-adjusted starting point results in both stronger incentives for cost containment and more equity than a uniform starting point.

Diagnostic, pharmacy-based, and self-reported health measures in risk equalization models.

BACKGROUND: Current research on the added value of self-reported health measures for risk equalization modeling does not include all types of self-reported health measures; and/or is compared with a limited set of medically diagnosed or pharmacy-based diseases; and/or is limited to specific populations of high-risk individuals. OBJECTIVE: The objective of our study is to determine the predictive power of all types of self-reported health measures for prospective modeling of health care expenditures in a general population of adult Dutch sickness fund enrollees, given that pharmacy and diagnostic data from administrative records are already included in the risk equalization formula. RESEARCH DESIGN: We used 4 models of 2002 total, inpatient and outpatient expenditures to evaluate the separate and combined predictive ability of 2 kinds of data: (1) Pharmacy-based (PCGs) and Diagnosis-based (DCGs) Cost Groups and (2) summarized self-reported health information. Model performance is measured at the total population level using R2 and mean absolute prediction error; also, by examining mean discrepancies between model-predicted and actual expenditures (ie, expected over- or undercompensation) for members of potentially "mispriced" subgroups. These subgroups are identified by self-reports from prior-year health surveys and utilization and expenditure data from 5 preceding years. SUBJECTS: Subjects were 18,617 respondents to a health survey, held among a stratified sample of adult members of the largest Dutch sickness fund in 2002, with an overrepresentation of people in poor health. DATA: The data were extracted from a claims database and a health survey. The claims-based data are the outcomes of total, inpatient, and outpatient annualized expenditures in 2002; age, gender, PCGs, DCGs in 2001; and health care expenditures and hospitalizations during the years 1997 to 2001. The SF-36, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development items, and long-term diseases and conditions were collected by a special purpose health survey conducted in the last quarter of 2001. RESULTS: Out-of-sample R2 equals 17.2%, 2.6%, and 32.4% for the models of total, inpatient and outpatient expenditures including PCGs, DCGs, and self-reported health measures. Self-reported health measures contribute less to predictive power than PCGs and DCGs. PCGs and DCGs also predict better than self-reported health measures for people with top 25% total expenditures or hospitalizations in each year during a 5-year period. On the other hand, self-reported health measures are better predictors than PCGs and DCGs for people without any top 25% expenditures during the 5-year period, for switchers, and for most subgroups of relatively unhealthy people defined by self-reported health measures. Among the set of self-reported health measures, the SF-36 adds most to predictive power in terms of R2, mean absolute prediction error, and for almost all studied subgroups. CONCLUSION: It is concluded that the self-reported health measures make an independent contribution to forecasting health care expenditures, even if the prediction model already includes diagnostic and pharmacy-based information currently used in Dutch risk equalization models.

Toward a 21st-century health care system: recommendations for health care reform.

The coverage, cost, and quality problems of the U.S. health care system are evident. Sustainable health care reform must go beyond financing expanded access to care to substantially changing the organization and delivery of care. The FRESH-Thinking Project (www.fresh-thinking.org) held a series of workshops during which physicians, health policy experts, health insurance executives, business leaders, hospital administrators, economists, and others who represent diverse perspectives came together. This group agreed that the following 8 recommendations are fundamental to successful reform: 1. Replace the current fee-for-service payment system with a payment system that encourages and rewards innovation in the efficient delivery of quality care. The new payment system should invest in the development of outcome measures to guide payment. 2. Establish a securely funded, independent agency to sponsor and evaluate research on the comparative effectiveness of drugs, devices, and other medical interventions. 3. Simplify and rationalize federal and state laws and regulations to facilitate organizational innovation, support care coordination, and streamline financial and administrative functions. 4. Develop a health information technology infrastructure with national standards of interoperability to promote data exchange. 5. Create a national health database with the participation of all payers, delivery systems, and others who own health care data. Agree on methods to make de-identified information from this database on clinical interventions, patient outcomes, and costs available to researchers. 6. Identify revenue sources, including a cap on the tax exclusion of employer-based health insurance, to subsidize health care coverage with the goal of insuring all Americans. 7. Create state or regional insurance exchanges to pool risk, so that Americans without access to employer-based or other group insurance could obtain a standard benefits package through these exchanges. Employers should also be allowed to participate in these exchanges for their employees' coverage. 8. Create a health coverage board with broad stakeholder representation to determine and periodically update the affordable standard benefit package available through state or regional insurance exchanges.

Purchasing health care in China: competing or non-competing third-party purchasers?

OBJECTIVES: China's government has decided to increase government funding by 1-1.5% of the Gross Domestic Products in the health care sector. However, it is still a question how to turn the new funding into efficient health care. METHODS: To help to answer this question we analyze three prototype models of organizing the health care system that may be relevant for China, namely the "Government provision model", the "regulated market with non-competing third-party purchasers", and the "regulated market with competing third-party purchasers". The pre- and post-reform English health care system and the present Dutch health care system are used as examples of the three models. During the last 20 years these countries had, just as China, major health care reforms from a national centrally planned system to a market-based system. Based on the experiences in these countries we analyze the advantages and disadvantages of these three prototype models and discuss their relevance for China. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: We conclude that the creation of prudent third-party purchasers, who have the incentive and ability to act on behalf of individual consumers, is a critical success factor, whatever model China chooses to implement.

The potential premium range of risk-rating in competitive markets for supplementary health insurance.

In this paper, we simulate several scenarios of the potential premium range for voluntary (supplementary) health insurance, covering benefits which might be excluded from mandatory health insurance (MI). Our findings show that, by adding risk-factors, the minimum premium decreases and the maximum increases. The magnitude of the premium range is especially substantial for benefits such as medical devices and drugs. When removing benefits from MI policymakers should be aware of the implications for the potential reduction of affordability of voluntary health insurance coverage in a competitive market.

Supplementary physicians' fees: a sustainable system?

In Belgium and France, physicians can charge a supplementary fee on top of the tariff set by the mandatory basic health insurance scheme. In both countries, the supplementary fee system is under pressure because of financial sustainability concerns and a lack of added value for the patient. Expenditure on supplementary fees is increasing much faster than total health expenditure. So far, measures taken to curb this trend have not been successful. For certain categories of physicians, supplementary fees represent one-third of total income. For patients, however, the added value of supplementary fees is not that clear. Supplementary fees can buy comfort and access to physicians who refuse to treat patients who are not willing to pay supplementary fees. Perceived quality of care plays an important role in patients' willingness to pay supplementary fees. Today, there is no evidence that physicians who charge supplementary fees provide better quality of care than physicians who do not. However, linking supplementary fees to objectively proven quality of care and limiting access to top quality care to patients able and willing to pay supplementary fees might not be socially acceptable in many countries. Our conclusion is that supplementary physicians' fees are not sustainable.

Risk adjustment and risk selection in Europe: 6 years later.

In this paper we analyse the developments concerning risk adjustment and risk selection in Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland in the period 2000-2006. Since 2000 two major trends can be observed. On the one hand the risk adjustment systems have been improved, for example, by adding relevant health-based risk adjusters. On the other hand in all five countries there is evidence of increasing risk selection, which increasingly becomes a problem, in particular in Germany and Switzerland. Some potential explanations are given for these seemingly contradictory observations. Since the mid-1990s citizens in these countries can regularly switch sickness fund, which should stimulate the sickness funds to improve efficiency in health care production and to respond to consumers' preferences. When looking at managed care there are some weak signals of increasing managed care activities by individual sickness funds in all countries (except Belgium). However, with imperfect risk adjustment, such as in Israel and Switzerland, insurers will integrate their managed care activities with their selection activities, which may have adverse effects for society, even if all insurers are equally successful in selection. The conclusion is that good risk adjustment is an essential pre-condition for reaping the benefits of a competitive health insurance market. Without good risk adjustment the disadvantages of a competitive insurance market may outweigh its advantages.

Should new health technology be available only for patients able and willing to pay?

New health technology comes on the market at a rapid pace and - sometimes - at a huge cost. Providing access to new health technology is a serious challenge for many countries with mandatory health insurance. This article analyses access to new health technology in Belgium and the Netherlands, using eight concrete examples as a starting point for comparing the two - neighbouring - countries. Contrary to the Netherlands, out-of-pocket payments for new health technology are widely accepted and practiced in Belgium. This difference is largely the result of different regulatory environments. A major difference is the way that entitlements to care are described: closed and explicit in Belgium versus open and non-explicit in the Netherlands. The characteristics of in-kind policies versus reimbursement policies also play a role. Allowing out-of-pocket payments for new health technology has consequences for the patients. It leads to greater access to new health technology (for those who are able and willing to pay), but has a negative effect on equal access to care. Choice and transparency are enhanced by allowing out-of-pocket payments for new health technology. It could be argued that lack of coverage by mandatory health insurance should not render private access to new health technology impossible.

Supplementary insurance as a switching cost for basic health insurance: Empirical results from the Netherlands.

Nearly everyone with a supplementary insurance (SI) in the Netherlands takes out the voluntary SI and the mandatory basic insurance (BI) from the same health insurer. Previous studies show that many high-risks perceive SI as a switching cost for BI. Because consumers' current insurer provides them with a guaranteed renewability, SI is a switching cost if insurers apply selective underwriting to new applicants. Several changes in the Dutch health insurance market increased insurers' incentives to counteract adverse selection for SI. Tools to do so are not only selective underwriting, but also risk rating and product differentiation. If all insurers use the latter tools without selective underwriting, SI is not a switching cost for BI. We investigated to what extent insurers used these tools in the periods 2006-2009 and 2014-2015. Only a few insurers applied selective underwriting: in 2015, 86% of insurers used open enrolment for all their SI products, and the other 14% did use open enrolment for their most common SI products. As measured by our indicators, the proportion of insurers applying risk rating or product differentiation did not increase in the periods considered. Due to the fear of reputation loss insurers may have used 'less visible' tools to counteract adverse selection that are indirect forms of risk rating and product differentiation and do not result in switching costs. So, although many high-risks perceive SI as a switching cost, most insurers apply open enrolment for SI. By providing information to high-risks about their switching opportunities, the government could increase consumer choice and thereby insurers' incentives to invest in high-quality care for high-risks.

How can the regulator show evidence of (no) risk selection in health insurance markets? Conceptual framework and empirical evidence.

If consumers have a choice of health plan, risk selection is often a serious problem (e.g., as in Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, the United States of America, and Switzerland). Risk selection may threaten the quality of care for chronically ill people, and may reduce the affordability and efficiency of healthcare. Therefore, an important question is: how can the regulator show evidence of (no) risk selection? Although this seems easy, showing such evidence is not straightforward. The novelty of this paper is two-fold. First, we provide a conceptual framework for showing evidence of risk selection in competitive health insurance markets. It is not easy to disentangle risk selection and the insurers' efficiency. We suggest two methods to measure risk selection that are not biased by the insurers' efficiency. Because these measures underestimate the true risk selection, we also provide a list of signals of selection that can be measured and that, in particular in combination, can show evidence of risk selection. It is impossible to show the absence of risk selection. Second, we empirically measure risk selection among the switchers, taking into account the insurers' efficiency. Based on 2-year administrative data on healthcare expenses and risk characteristics of nearly all individuals with basic health insurance in the Netherlands (N > 16 million) we find significant risk selection for most health insurers. This is the first publication of hard empirical evidence of risk selection in the Dutch health insurance market.

Improving access to essential health care services: the case of Israel.

In a recent article in this journal Simon-Tuval, Horev and Kaplan argue that in order to improve the protection of consumers there might be a need to impose a threshold on the medical loss ratio (MLR) for voluntary health insurance (VHI) in Israel [1]. Their argument is that VHI in Israel covers several essential services that are not covered by the mandatory benefits package due to budget constraints, while there are market failures in the VHI market that justify regulation to assure consumer protection such as high accessibility to high quality coverage. In this commentary it will be argued that in addition to market failures there are also government failures. It is doubtful whether imposing a threshold on MLR is effective because of government failures. It can be even counter-productive. Therefore, alternative regulatory measures are discussed to promote the protection of the beneficiaries. If essential services covered by VHI are unaffordable for some low-income people, government can extend the current mandatory basic health insurance so that it covers all essential services. If there is a budget restriction, the amount of government funds could be increased, or the health plans could be allowed to request an additional flat rate premium, set by them and to be paid by the consumer directly to their health plan. Also, effective out-of-pocket payments could be introduced. Subsidies could be given to low-income people to compensate for their additional expenses under the mandatory health insurance. If these changes are adopted, then the government would no longer be held responsible for access to benefits outside the mandatory health insurance. Accordingly, all VHI could be sold on the normal free insurance market, just as other types of indemnity insurance. In addition, the Israeli health insurance and healthcare markets could be made more competitive by introducing procompetitive regulation. This would increase the efficiency and affordability of healthcare.

Switching rates in health insurance markets decrease with age: empirical evidence and policy implications from the Netherlands.

All consumer groups with specific preferences must feel free to easily switch insurer in order to discipline insurers to be responsive to consumers' heterogeneous preferences. This paper provides insight into the switching behaviour of low-risks (i.e. young or healthy consumers) and high-risks (i.e. elderly or unhealthy consumers) in the Netherlands in the period 2009-2012. We analysed: (1) administrative data with objective health status information (i.e. medically diagnosed diseases and pharmaceutical use) and information on health care expenses of nearly the entire Dutch population (n=15.3 million individuals) and (2) three-year sample data (n=1152 individuals). Our findings indicate that switching rates strongly decrease with age. For example, in 2009, consumers aged 25-44 switched 10 times more than consumers aged 75 or older. Another finding is that switching rates decrease as the predicted health care expenses increase. Although healthy consumers switch twice as much as unhealthy consumers, this difference becomes much smaller after adjusting for age. We conclude that our findings can be explained by higher perceived switching costs by elderly consumers than by young consumers. Consequently, insurers have low incentives to act as quality-conscious purchasers of care for the elderly consumers. Therefore, strategies should be developed to increase the choice of insurer of elderly consumers.

Improved estimates of Belgian private health expenditure can give important lessons to other OECD countries.

OECD Health Data are a well-known source for detailed information about health expenditure. These data enable us to analyze health policy issues over time and in comparison with other countries. However, current official Belgian estimates of private expenditure (as published in the OECD Health Data) have proven not to be reliable. We distinguish four potential major sources of problems with estimating private health spending: interpretation of definitions, formulation of assumptions, missing or incomplete data and incorrect data. Using alternative sources of billing information, we have reached more accurate estimates of private and out-of-pocket expenditure. For Belgium we found differences of more than 100% between our estimates and the official Belgian estimates of private health expenditure (as published in the OECD Health Data). For instance, according to OECD Health Data private expenditure on hospitals in Belgium amounts to €3.1 billion, while according to our alternative calculations these expenses represent only €1.1 billion. Total private expenditure differs only 1%, but this is a mere coincidence. This exercise may be of interest to other OECD countries looking to improve their estimates of private expenditure on health.

Switching benefits and costs in competitive health insurance markets: A conceptual framework and empirical evidence from the Netherlands.

Competitive health insurance markets will only enhance cost-containment, efficiency, quality, and consumer responsiveness if all consumers feel free to easily switch insurer. Consumers will switch insurer if their perceived switching benefits outweigh their perceived switching costs. We developed a conceptual framework with potential switching benefits and costs in competitive health insurance markets. Moreover, we used a questionnaire among Dutch consumers (1091 respondents) to empirically examine the relevance of the different switching benefits and costs in consumers' decision to (not) switch insurer. Price, insurers' service quality, insurers' contracted provider network, the benefits of supplementary insurance, and welcome gifts are potential switching benefits. Transaction costs, learning costs, 'benefit loss' costs, uncertainty costs, the costs of (not) switching provider, and sunk costs are potential switching costs. In 2013 most Dutch consumers switched insurer because of (1) price and (2) benefits of supplementary insurance. Nearly half of the non-switchers - and particularly unhealthy consumers - mentioned one of the switching costs as their main reason for not switching. Because unhealthy consumers feel not free to easily switch insurer, insurers have reduced incentives to invest in high-quality care for them. Therefore, policymakers should develop strategies to increase consumer choice.

Risk Selection Threatens Quality Of Care For Certain Patients: Lessons From Europe's Health Insurance Exchanges.

Experience in European health insurance exchanges indicates that even with the best risk-adjustment formulas, insurers have substantial incentives to engage in risk selection. The potentially most worrisome form of risk selection is skimping on the quality of care for underpriced high-cost patients--that is, patients for whom insurers are compensated at a rate lower than the predicted health care expenses of these patients. In this article we draw lessons for the United States from twenty years of experience with health insurance exchanges in Europe, where risk selection is a serious problem. Mistakes by European legislators and inadequate evaluation criteria for risk selection incentives are discussed, as well as strategies to reduce risk selection and the complex trade-off among selection (through quality skimping), efficiency, and affordability. Recommended improvements to the risk-adjustment process in the United States include considering the adoption of risk adjusters used in Europe, investing in the collection of data, using a permanent form of risk sharing, and replacing the current premium "band" restrictions with more flexible restrictions. Policy makers need to understand the complexities of regulating competitive health insurance markets and to prevent risk selection that threatens the provision of good-quality care for underpriced high-cost patients.

Health-adjusted premium subsidies in the Netherlands.

The Dutch government has decided to proceed with managed competition in health care. In this paper we report on progress made with health-based risk adjustment, a key issue in managed competition. In 2004 both Diagnostic Cost Groups (DCGs) computed from hospital diagnoses only and Pharmacy-based Cost Groups (PCGs) computed from out-patient prescription drugs are used to set the premium subsidies for competing risk-bearing sickness funds. These health-based risk adjusters appear to be effective and complementary. Risk selection is not a major problem in the Netherlands. Despite the progress made, we are still faced with a full research agenda for risk adjustment in the coming years.