Knowledge about others reduces one's own sense of anonymity.

Social ties often seem symmetric, but they need not be1-5. For example, a person might know a stranger better than the stranger knows them. We explored whether people overlook these asymmetries and what consequences that might have for people's perceptions and actions. Here we show that when people know more about others, they think others know more about them. Across nine laboratory experiments, when participants learned more about a stranger, they felt as if the stranger also knew them better, and they acted as if the stranger was more attuned to their actions. As a result, participants were more honest around known strangers. We tested this further with a field experiment in New York City, in which we provided residents with mundane information about neighbourhood police officers. We found that the intervention shifted residents' perceptions of officers' knowledge of illegal activity, and it may even have reduced crime. It appears that our sense of anonymity depends not only on what people know about us but also on what we know about them.

Disadvantaged group members are prouder of their group when using the language of the dominant group compared to their native language.

In ethnically and linguistically diverse societies, disadvantaged groups often face pressures to acquire and speak the advantaged group's language to achieve social inclusion and economic mobility. This work investigates how using the advantaged group's language affects disadvantaged group members' in-group pride and collective self-esteem, relative to using their native language. Across six experimental studies involving Palestinian citizens of Israel (total N = 1,348), we test two competing hypotheses: Disadvantaged group members may experience greater in-group pride when using a) their native language, due to its emotional significance (the nativity hypothesis), or b) the language of the advantaged group, due to activation of habituated compensatory responses to dominance relations (the identity enhancement hypothesis). We found that respondents reported significantly higher in-group pride when responding to a Hebrew survey when compared to performing the same activity in Arabic (Studies 1a and 1b), regardless of whether the researchers administering the survey were identified as Jewish or Arab (Studies 2a and 2b). Study 3 replicated this effect while employing the "bogus pipeline" technique, suggesting the pride expression was authentic, not merely driven by social desirability. Finally, Study 4 (pre-registered) examined additional measures of positive regard for the in-group, finding that participants described their group more positively in an attribute selection task, and reported greater collective self-esteem, when surveyed in Hebrew, rather than in Arabic. Taken together, these findings suggest that language use influences disadvantaged group members' perceptions and feelings concerning their group when those languages are associated with relative position in an intergroup hierarchy.

Self-esteem trajectories over three decades predict opposition to social equality in midlife.

Although life trajectories are frequently theorized to explain people's attitudes toward different social groups, few studies have been able to directly assess their importance with suitable data. Addressing this gap and focusing on the development of general and domain-specific self-esteem, we report results from a population-based sample of Norwegians (N = 2,215) followed over 28 years and five time points from adolescence to midlife. Growth curve models demonstrated that irrespective of self-esteem domain, low levels of self-esteem in adolescence as well as a depressed self-esteem development over the next three decades were related to more overall opposition to social equality as well as more opposition to gender equality and immigration in midlife. The results held when controlling for participants' baseline political orientations and other key covariates in adolescence. Our findings indicate that low self-esteem and a lack of positive self-esteem development can be detrimental to harmonious intergroup relations in ever-diversifying societies. We discuss how future psychological interventions aimed at enhancing self-esteem may promote support for a more inclusive society.

Cleaner fish recognize self in a mirror via self-face recognition like humans.

Some animals have the remarkable capacity for mirror self-recognition (MSR), yet any implications for self-awareness remain uncertain and controversial. This is largely because explicit tests of the two potential mechanisms underlying MSR are still lacking: mental image of the self and kinesthetic visual matching. Here, we test the hypothesis that MSR ability in cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, is associated with a mental image of the self, in particular the self-face, like in humans. Mirror-naive fish initially attacked photograph models of both themselves and unfamiliar strangers. In contrast, after all fish had passed the mirror mark test, fish did not attack their own (motionless) images, but still frequently attacked those of unfamiliar individuals. When fish were exposed to composite photographs, the self-face/unfamiliar body were not attacked, but photographs of unfamiliar face/self-body were attacked, demonstrating that cleaner fish with MSR capacity recognize their own facial characteristics in photographs. Additionally, when presented with self-photographs with a mark placed on the throat, unmarked mirror-experienced cleaner fish demonstrated throat-scraping behaviors. When combined, our results provide clear evidence that cleaner fish recognize themselves in photographs and that the likely mechanism for MSR is associated with a mental image of the self-face, not a kinesthetic visual-matching model. Humans are also capable of having a mental image of the self-face, which is considered an example of private self-awareness. We demonstrate that combining mirror test experiments with photographs has enormous potential to further our understanding of the evolution of cognitive processes and private self-awareness across nonhuman animals.

Suspending the Embodied Self in Meditation Attenuates Beta Oscillations in the Posterior Medial Cortex.

Human experience is imbued by the sense of being an embodied agent. The investigation of such basic self-consciousness has been hampered by the difficulty of comprehensively modulating it in the laboratory while reliably capturing ensuing subjective changes. The present preregistered study fills this gap by combining advanced meditative states with principled phenomenological interviews: 46 long-term meditators (19 female, 27 male) were instructed to modulate and attenuate their embodied self-experience during magnetoencephalographic monitoring. Results showed frequency-specific (high-beta band) activity reductions in frontoparietal and posterior medial cortices (PMC). Importantly, PMC reductions were driven by a subgroup describing radical embodied self-disruptions, including suspension of agency and dissolution of a localized first-person perspective. Neural changes were correlated with lifetime meditation and interview-derived experiential changes, but not with classical self-reports. The results demonstrate the potential of integrating in-depth first-person methods into neuroscientific experiments. Furthermore, they highlight neural oscillations in the PMC as a central process supporting the embodied sense of self.

Psychedelic drugs: neurobiology and potential for treatment of psychiatric disorders.

Renewed interest in the use of psychedelics in the treatment of psychiatric disorders warrants a better understanding of the neurobiological mechanisms underlying the effects of these substances. After a hiatus of about 50 years, state-of-the art studies have recently begun to close important knowledge gaps by elucidating the mechanisms of action of psychedelics with regard to their effects on receptor subsystems, systems-level brain activity and connectivity, and cognitive and emotional processing. In addition, functional studies have shown that changes in self-experience, emotional processing and social cognition may contribute to the potential therapeutic effects of psychedelics. These discoveries provide a scientific road map for the investigation and application of psychedelic substances in psychiatry.

The influence of self-esteem on interpersonal and competence evaluations: electrophysiological evidence from an ERP study.

Using event-related potentials, this study examined how self-esteem affects neural responses to competence (interpersonal) feedback when the need for relatedness (competence) is thwarted or met. Participants with low and high self-esteem acted as advisors who selected one of two options for a putative advisee. Subsequently, they passively observed the advisee, accepted, or rejected their advice (i.e. interpersonal feedback) and received correct or incorrect outcomes (i.e. competence feedback). When interpersonal feedback was followed by competence feedback, high self-esteem participants showed a smaller P3 following incorrect than correct outcomes, irrespective of whether the advice had been accepted or rejected. However, low self-esteem participants showed this P3 effect only when the advice was rejected, and the P3 difference disappeared when the advice was accepted. When competence feedback was followed by interpersonal feedback, both low self-esteem and high self-esteem individuals showed a larger P2 for rejection than for acceptance and a larger late potential component for incorrect than correct outcomes. These findings suggest that when interpersonal feedback is followed by competence feedback, low self-esteem and high self-esteem individuals have a desire for self-positivity. When competence feedback is followed by interpersonal feedback, they may have motives for self-change. Our findings shed light on the motivational mechanisms for self-esteem and feedback.

What makes an event significant: an fMRI study on self-defining memories.

Self-defining memories are highly significant personal memories that contribute to an individual's life story and identity. Previous research has identified 4 key subcomponents of self-defining memories: content, affect, specificity, and self-reflection. However, these components were not tested under functional neuroimaging. In this study, we first explored how self-defining memories distinguish themselves from everyday memories (non-self-defining) through their associated brain activity. Next, we evaluated the different self-defining memory subcomponents through their activity in the underlying brain system. Participants recalled both self-defining and non-self-defining memories under functional MRI and evaluated the 4 subcomponents for each memory. Multivoxel pattern analysis uncovered a brain system closely related to the default mode network to discriminate between self-defining and non-self-defining memories. Representational similarity analysis revealed the neural coding of each subcomponent. Self-reflection was coded mainly in the precuneus, middle and inferior frontal gyri, and cingulate, lateral occipital, and insular cortices. To a much lesser extent, content coding was primarily in the left angular gyrus and fusiform gyrus. No region was found to represent information on affect and specificity. Our findings highlight the marked difference in brain processing between significant and non-significant memories, and underscore self-reflection as a predominant factor in the formation and maintenance of self-defining memories, inviting a reassessment of what constitutes significant memories.

Get out of my head: social evaluative brain states carry over into post-feedback rest and influence remembering how others view us.

Learning how others perceive us helps us tune our behavior to form adaptive relationships. But which perceptions stick with us? And when in the learning process are they codified in memory? We leveraged a popular television series-The Office-to answer these questions. Prior to their functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) session, viewers of The Office reported which characters they identified with, as well as which characters they perceived another person (i.e. counterpart) was similar to. During their fMRI scan, participants found out which characters other people thought they and the counterpart were like, and also completed rest scans. Participants remembered more feedback inconsistent with their self-views (vs. views of the counterpart). Although neural activity while encoding self-inconsistent feedback did not meaningfully predict memory, returning to the inconsistent self feedback during subsequent rest did. During rest, participants reinstated neural patterns engaged while receiving self-inconsistent feedback in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC). DMPFC reinstatement also quadratically predicted self-inconsistent memory, with too few or too many reinstatements compromising memory performance. Processing social feedback during rest may impact how we remember and integrate the feedback, especially when it contradicts our self-views.

Moral Improvement of Self, Social Relations, and Society.

There is always room for moral improvement. However, very few prior reviews have focused on the phenomenon of moral improvement of self, social relations, or society. We first consider prevailing notions of the self-concept by highlighting the niche of theory and research that identifies an improving self as a possible identity and basis of motivation to act better and to be better. Second, we discuss moral improvement in the context of social relations, especially the close interpersonal relations that should most facilitate moral improvement. Third, we examine the moral improvement of society, focusing on the factors that facilitate or inhibit caring about potential immorality despite the fact that issues such as inequality, discrimination, and the climate crisis seem to be morally distant and impersonal. Finally, we discuss future directions for theory, research, and application.

Middle Eastern and North African Americans may not be perceived, nor perceive themselves, to be White.

People of Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) descent are categorized as non-White in many Western countries but counted as White on the US Census. Yet, it is not clear that MENA people see themselves or are seen by others as White. We examine both sides of this ethnoracial boundary in two experiments. First, we examined how non-MENA White and MENA individuals perceive the racial status of MENA traits (external categorization), and then, how MENA individuals identify themselves (self-identification). We found non-MENA Whites and MENAs consider MENA-related traits-including ancestry, names, and religion-to be MENA rather than White. Furthermore, when given the option, most MENA individuals self-identify as MENA or as MENA and White, particularly second-generation individuals and those who identify as Muslim. In addition, MENAs who perceive more anti-MENA discrimination are more likely to embrace a MENA identity, which suggests that perceived racial hostility may be activating a stronger group identity. Our findings provide evidence about the suitability of adding a separate MENA label to the race/ethnicity identification question in the US Census, and suggest MENAs' official designation as White may not correspond to their lived experiences nor to others' perceptions. As long as MENA Americans remain aggregated with Whites, potential inequalities they face will remain hidden.

The Self-Concept Is Represented in the Medial Prefrontal Cortex in Terms of Self-Importance.

Knowledge about one's personality, the self-concept, shapes human experience. Social cognitive neuroscience has made strides addressing the question of where and how the self is represented in the brain. The answer, however, remains elusive. We conducted two functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments (the second preregistered) with human male and female participants employing a self-reference task with a broad range of attributes and carrying out a searchlight representational similarity analysis (RSA). The importance of attributes to self-identity was represented in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), whereas mPFC activation was unrelated both to self-descriptiveness of attributes (experiments 1 and 2) and importance of attributes to a friend's self-identity (experiment 2). Our research provides a comprehensive answer to the abovementioned question: The self-concept is conceptualized in terms of self-importance and represented in the mPFC.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The self-concept comprises beliefs about who one is as an individual (e.g., personality traits, physical characteristics, desires, likes/dislikes, and social roles). Despite researchers' efforts in the last two decades to understand where and how the self-concept is stored in the brain, the question remains elusive. Using a neuroimaging technique, we found that a brain region called medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) shows differential but systematic activation patterns depending on the importance of presented word stimuli to a participant's self-concept. Our findings suggest that one's sense of the self is supported by neural populations in the mPFC, each of which is differently sensitive to distinct levels of the personal importance of incoming information.

A Fluid Self-Concept: How the Brain Maintains Coherence and Positivity across an Interconnected Self-Concept While Incorporating Social Feedback.

People experience instances of social feedback as interdependent with potential implications for their entire self-concept. How do people maintain positivity and coherence across the self-concept while updating self-views from feedback? We present a network model describing how the brain represents the semantic dependency relations among traits and uses this information to avoid an overall loss of positivity and coherence. Both male and female human participants received social feedback during a self-evaluation task while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. We modeled self-belief updating by incorporating a reinforcement learning model within the network structure. Participants learned more rapidly from positive than negative feedback and were less likely to change self-views for traits with more dependencies in the network. Further, participants back propagated feedback across network relations while retrieving prior feedback on the basis of network similarity to inform ongoing self-views. Activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) reflected the constrained updating process such that positive feedback led to higher activation and negative feedback to less activation for traits with more dependencies. Additionally, vmPFC was associated with the novelty of a trait relative to previously self-evaluated traits in the network, and angular gyrus was associated with greater certainty for self-beliefs given the relevance of prior feedback. We propose that neural computations that selectively enhance or attenuate social feedback and retrieve past relevant experiences to guide ongoing self-evaluations may support an overall positive and coherent self-concept.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT We humans experience social feedback throughout our lives, but we do not dispassionately incorporate feedback into our self-concept. The implications of feedback for our entire self-concept plays a role in how we either change or retain our prior self-beliefs. In a neuroimaging study, we find that people are less likely to change their beliefs from feedback when the feedback has broader implications for the self-concept. This resistance to change is reflected in processing in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a region that is central to self-referential and social cognition. These results are broadly applicable given the role that maintaining a positive and coherent self-concept plays in promoting mental health and development throughout the lifespan.

Developmental Roots of Human Self-consciousness.

Human consciousness is considered in the perspective of early development. Infants and young children remind us that at its core, the problem of consciousness is primarily a problem of identity, in particular a problem of self-identity with others in mind. It is about how we feel and construe ourselves as an entity among other entities. It is about becoming co-conscious: Aware of oneself through the evaluative eyes of others. This development unfolds in the first 18 months of life, following major steps that are described, and arguably considered as a human trademark.

Roles of the Default Mode Network in Different Aspects of Self-representation When Remembering Social Autobiographical Memories.

Autobiographical memory (AM) is episodic memory for personally experienced events, in which self-representation is more important than that in laboratory-based memory. Theoretically, self-representation in a social context is categorized as the interpersonal self (IS) referred to in a social interaction with a person or the social-valued self (SS) based on the reputation of the self in the surrounding society. Although functional neuroimaging studies have demonstrated the involvement of the default mode network (DMN) in self-representation, little is known about how the DMN subsystems contribute differentially to IS-related and SS-related AMs. To elucidate this issue, we used fMRI to scan healthy young adults during the recollection of AMs. We performed multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) and assessed functional connectivity in the DMN subsystems: the midline core, medial temporal lobe (MTL), and dorsomedial pFC (dmPFC) subsystems. The study yielded two main sets of findings. First, MVPA revealed that all DMN subsystems showed significant classification accuracy between IS-related and nonsocial-self-related AMs, and IS-related functional connectivity of the midline core regions with the retrosplenial cortex of the MTL subsystem and the dmPFC of the dmPFC subsystem was significant. Second, MVPA significantly distinguished between SS-related and nonsocial-self-related AMs in the midline core and dmPFC subsystems but not in the MTL subsystem, and SS-related functional connectivity with the midline core regions was significant in the temporal pole and TPJ of the dmPFC subsystem. Thus, dissociable neural mechanisms in the DMN could contribute to different aspects of self-representation in social AMs.

How sexual objectification marks the brain: fMRI evidence of self-objectification and its harmful emotional consequences.

Female Sexual Objectification refers to perceiving and treating women based on their body appearance. This phenomenon may serve as a precursor for dysfunctional behaviors, particularly among females prone to self-objectification and experiencing shame emotions. Understanding this challenging trajectory by disclosing its neural consequences may be crucial for comprehending extreme psychopathological outcomes. However, investigations in this sense are still scarce. The present study explores the neural correlates of female participants' experiences of being objectified and their relationship with self-objectification, emotional responses and individual dispositions in self-esteem, emotion regulation abilities and self-conscious emotion proneness. To this aim, 25 female participants underwent an fMRI experimental session while they were exposed to interpersonal encounters with objectifying or non-objectifying men. Participants' experienced emotions and levels of attention shifted toward their bodies (self-objectification) was reported after each interaction. The results revealed increased brain activity in objectifying contexts, impacting cortical (frontal, occipital and temporal cortex) and subcortical regions (thalamus, and hippocampus) involved in visual, emotion, and social processing. Remarkably, the inferior temporal gyrus emerged as a crucial neural hub associated in opposite ways with self-esteem and the self-conscious emotion of shame, highlighting its role in self-referential processing during social dynamics. This study points out the importance of adopting a neuroscientific perspective for a deeper understanding of sexual objectification, and to shed light on its possible neural consequences.

When the interoceptive and conceptual clash: The case of oppositional phenomenal self-modelling in Tourette syndrome.

Tourette syndrome (TS) has been associated with a rich set of symptoms that are said to be uncomfortable, unwilled, and effortful to manage. Furthermore, tics, the canonical characteristic of TS, are multifaceted, and their onset and maintenance is complex. A formal account that integrates these features of TS symptomatology within a plausible theoretical framework is currently absent from the field. In this paper, we assess the explanatory power of hierarchical generative modelling in accounting for TS symptomatology from the perspective of active inference. We propose a fourfold analysis of sensory, motor, and cognitive phenomena associated with TS. In Section 1, we characterise tics as a form of action aimed at sensory attenuation. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of epistemic ticcing and describe such behaviour as the search for evidence that there is an agent (i.e., self) at the heart of the generative hierarchy. In Section 3, we characterise both epistemic (sensation-free) and nonepistemic (sensational) tics as habitual behaviour. Finally, in Section 4, we propose that ticcing behaviour involves an inevitable conflict between distinguishable aspects of selfhood; namely, between the minimal phenomenal sense of self-which is putatively underwritten by interoceptive inference-and the explicit preferences that constitute the individual's conceptual sense of self. In sum, we aim to provide an empirically informed analysis of TS symptomatology under active inference, revealing a continuity between covert and overt features of the condition.

Electrophysiological correlates of self-related processing in adults with autism.

The term "self-bias" refers to the human propensity to prioritize self- over other-related stimuli and is believed to influence various stages of the processing stream. By means of event-related potentials (ERPs), it was recently shown that the self-bias in a shape-label matching task modulates early as well as later phases of information processing in neurotypicals. Recent claims suggest autism-related deficits to specifically impact later stages of self-related processing; however, it is unclear whether these claims hold based on current findings. Using the shape-label matching task while recording ERPs in individuals with autism can clarify which stage of self-related processing is specifically affected in this condition. Therefore, this study sought to investigate the temporal course of self-related processing in adults with and without autism. Thirty-two adults with autism and 27 neurotypicals completed a shape-label matching task while ERPs were concomitantly recorded. At the behavioral level, results furnished evidence for a comparable self-bias across groups, with no differences in task performance between adults with and without autism. At the ERP level, the two groups showed a similar self-bias at early stages of self-related information processing (the N1 component). Conversely, the autism group manifested a lessened differentiation between self- and other-related stimuli at later stages (the parietal P3 component). In line with recent claims of later phases of self-related processing being altered in autism, we found an equivalent self-bias between groups at an early, sensory stage of processing, yet a strongly diminished self-bias at a later, cognitive stage in adults with autism.

"I have to get up and exercise because that's how I'm going to get over this": a qualitative exploration of exercise identity and behavior in early cancer survivorship.

PURPOSE: Exercise is beneficial for people living with and beyond cancer (LWBC); however, many people LWBC fail to meet the exercise guidelines. Having an identity related to exercise, a component of one's self-concept, correlates with exercising more frequently in general adult populations. Understanding how exercise identity influences exercise behaviors in people LWBC is warranted due to the many barriers people LWBC face in relation to physical activity. The purpose of this study was to explore the perceived impact of an exercise identity of the exercise behaviors and motivations among people LWBC. METHODS: Thirteen participants of mixed diagnoses (Mage = 60.8 ± 10.8 years) in the early survivorship period (i.e., within five years of primary treatment completion or diagnosis) participated in semi-structured interviews to identify influences of exercise identity on exercise behavior. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using thematic analysis. RESULTS: Findings demonstrated that people LWBC with a strong exercise identity engage in high and varied exercise behaviors. Despite barriers such as changes in motivations and ability to engage in exercise, participants maintained exercise throughout cancer by constant adaptation of their outlook and behaviors related to exercise. These results demonstrate a maintenance of physical activity in relation to a strong exercise identity. IMPLICATIONS FOR CANCER SURVIVORS: Results of this study have implications for the design and implementation of exercise behavior change programs for people LWBC as it provides insights into predictors of sustained exercise behavior during and following cancer treatment.