Advice from the health insurer as a channelling strategy: a natural experiment at a Dutch health insurance company.

BACKGROUND: In a health care system based on managed competition it is important that health insurers are able to channel their enrolees to preferred care providers. However, enrolees are often very negative about financial incentives and any limitations in their choice of care provider. Therefore, a Dutch health insurance company conducted an experiment to study the effectiveness of a new method of channelling their enrolees. This method entails giving enrolees advise on which physiotherapists to choose when they call customer service. Offering this advice as an extra service is supposed to improve service quality ratings. Objective of this study is to evaluate this channelling method on effectiveness and the impact on service quality ratings. METHODS: In this experiment, one of the health insurer's customer service call teams (pilot team) began advising enrolees on their choice of physiotherapist. Three data sources were used. Firstly, all enrolees who called customer service received an online questionnaire in order to measure their evaluation of the quality of service. Enrolees who were offered advice received a slightly different questionnaire which, in addition, asked about whether they intended to follow the advice they were offered. Multilevel regression analysis was conducted to analyse the difference in service quality ratings between the pilot team and two comparable customer service teams before and after the implementation of the channelling method. Secondly, employees logged each call, registering, if they offered advice, whether the enrolee accepted it, and if so, which care provider was advised. Thirdly, data from the insurance claims were used to see if enrolees visited the recommended physiotherapist. RESULTS: The results of the questionnaire show that enrolees responded favorably to being offered advice on the choice of physiotherapist. Furthermore, 45% of enrolees who received advice and then went on to visit a care provider, followed the advice. The service quality ratings were higher compared to control groups. However, it could not be determined whether this effect was entirely due to the intervention. CONCLUSIONS: Channelling enrolees towards preferred care providers by offering advice on their choice of care provider when they call customer service is successful. The effect on service quality seems positive, although a causal relationship could not be determined.

Measuring Healthcare Providers' Performances Within Managed Competition Using Multidimensional Quality and Cost Indicators.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: The Dutch healthcare system is in transition towards managed competition. In theory, a system of managed competition involves incentives for quality and efficiency of provided care. This is mainly because health insurers contract on behalf of their clients with healthcare providers on, potentially, quality and costs. The paper develops a strategy to comprehensively analyse available multidimensional data on quality and costs to assess and report on the relative performance of healthcare providers within managed competition. DATA AND METHODS: We had access to individual information on 2409 clients of 19 Dutch diabetes care groups on a broad range of (outcome and process related) quality and cost indicators. We carried out a cost-consequences analysis and corrected for differences in case mix to reduce incentives for risk selection by healthcare providers. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION: There is substantial heterogeneity between diabetes care groups' performances as measured using multidimensional indicators on quality and costs. Better quality diabetes care can be achieved with lower or higher costs. Routine monitoring using multidimensional data on quality and costs merged at the individual level would allow a systematic and comprehensive analysis of healthcare providers' performances within managed competition.

Unveiling the unicorn: a leader's guide to ACO preparation.

The great uncertainty surrounding healthcare reform provides little incentive for action. However, as healthcare leaders wait for final rules and clarity about accountable care organizations (ACOs), inaction is the inappropriate response. Several central themes emerge from research about beginning the ACO process. Leaders should be able to understand and articulate ACO concepts. They should champion embracing cultural change while partnering with physicians. Inventory of skills and capabilities should take place to understand any deficiencies required to implement an ACO. Finally, a plan should be formed by asking strategic questions on each platform needed to ensure performance and strategic goals are at the forefront of decisions regarding structure and function of an ACO. It takes a visionary leader to accept these challenges.

Health IT: the glue for accountable care organizations. Four big systems show how they're using EHRs, connectivity, and data warehouses to drive ACOs.

Healthcare organizations moving into the uncharted territory of accountable care organizations (ACOs) face technological and organizational challenges that could stop their fledgling attempts in their tracks. Many have embraced health IT as the key to establishing successful ACO models.

Risk or reward? Laying the IT foundation for ACOs presents daunting challenges for healthcare leaders nationwide.

Industry experts and healthcare IT leaders agree that the recently released proposed rule on the creation of accountable care organizations (ACOs) is offering a heady mix of opportunity and risk, and that laying the IT foundation for success under ACO initiatives will be massively challenging for the vast majority of patient care organizations nationwide. Those a bit further along on the journey say that interoperability, connectivity, and the leveraging of clinical lT for intensive care management and data analysis will be essential to ACO success.

Hell no, we won't ACO. Providers, once eager to sign up for new program, say proposed rule on accountable care is a deal-breaker.

Hospital executives were eager to sign up for Medicare's proposed ACO program--until they saw the proposed rule spelling out how the CMS wants to structure it. They see too many risks, with too little chance of rewards. Stephen Mansfield, left, of Methodist Health System, describes the rule as "cold water" on the industry's interest and says he fears a promising opportunity will be sidelined. "I am so disappointed," Mansfield says.

Cooperation amongst insurers on enhancing quality of care: precondition or substitute for competition?

In health care systems based upon managed competition, insurers are expected to negotiate with providers about price and quality of care. The Dutch experience, however, shows that quality plays a limited role in insurer-provider negotiations. It has been suggested that this is partly due to a lack of cooperation among insurers. This raises the question whether cooperation amongst insurers is a precondition or a substitute for quality-based competition. To answer this question, we mapped insurers' cooperating activities to enhance quality of care using a six-stage continuum. The first three stages (defining, designing and measuring quality indicators) may enhance competition, whereas the next three stages (setting benchmarks, steering patients and selective contracting) may reduce it. We investigated which types of insurer cooperation currently take place in the Netherlands. Additionally, we organized focus groups among insurers, providers and other stakeholders to examine their perceptions on insurer cooperation. We find that all stakeholders see advantages of cooperation amongst insurers in the first stages of the continuum and sometimes cooperate in this domain. Cooperation in the next stages is almost absent and more controversial because without adequate quality information, it is difficult to assess whether the benefits outweigh the cost associated with reduced competition.

The Dutch consumer quality index: an example of stakeholder involvement in indicator development.

BACKGROUND: Like in several other Western countries, in the Dutch health care system regulated competition has been introduced. In order to make this work, comparable information is required about the performance of health care providers in terms of effectiveness, safety and patient experiences. Without further coordination, external actors will all try to force health care providers to be transparent. For health care providers this might result in a situation in which they have to deliver data for several sets of indicators, defined by different actors. Therefore, in the Netherlands an effort is made to define national sets of performance indicators and related measuring instruments. In this article, the following questions are addressed, using patient experiences as an example:- When and how are stakeholders involved in the development of indicators and instruments that measure the patients' experiences with health care providers?- Does this involvement lead to indicators and instruments that match stakeholders' information needs? DISCUSSION: The Dutch experiences show that it is possible to implement national indicator sets and to reach consensus about what needs to be measured. Preliminary evaluations show that for health care providers and health insurers the benefits of standardization outweigh the possible loss of tailor-made information. However, it has also become clear that particular attention should be given to the participation of patient/consumer organisations. SUMMARY: Stakeholder involvement is complex and time-consuming. However, it is the only way to balance the information needs of all the parties that ask for and benefit from transparency, without frustrating the health care system.

Managed competition in the Netherlands: Do insurers have incentives to steer on quality?

In health care systems based on managed competition, insurers are expected to negotiate with providers about price, quantity, and quality of care. The Dutch experience shows that this expectation may be justified with regard to price and quantity, but for quality the results are less conclusive. To examine the incentives insurers face for enhancing quality of care, we conducted in-depth interviews with CEOs and organised separate focus groups with purchasers and marketers of five Dutch health insurers. Jointly these insurers account for more than 90 percent of the market. We distinguished three categories of both positive and negative incentives to steer on quality: social, competitive and financial incentives. The overall picture emerging is that insurers are caught in a struggle between positive and negative incentives, with CEOs being more positive about the incentives to steer on quality than purchasers and marketers. At present, the social mission perceived by insurers seems to be their most important driver to invest in quality enhancement. However, whether or not the role of the social mission is sustainable in a competitive market remains unclear. Improving publicly available information on quality therefore seems to be crucially important for reinforcing the positive as well as counteracting the negative incentives insurers face with respect to enhancing quality of care.

Use of board certification and recertification of pediatricians in health plan credentialing policies.

CONTEXT: Health plans conduct credentialing processes to select and retain qualified physicians who will provide high-quality care to their subscribers. One of the tools available to health plans to help ensure physician competence is assessment of board certification status. OBJECTIVE: To determine the credentialing policies of health plans regarding the use of board certification and recertification for general pediatricians and pediatric subspecialists. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Telephone survey conducted February through July 2005 of credentialing personnel from a US national sample of 244 health plans stratified by enrollment size, Medicaid proportion, and for-profit or not-for-profit status. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Proportion of health plans that require general or subspecialty board certification at initial contract or at any time during association with the plan and recertification to maintain credentialing or to bill as a specialist or subspecialist; percentage of physicians credentialed in each health plan and credentialing goals for each plan regarding the proportion of physicians to be board certified. RESULTS: Response rate was 193 of 244 (79%). Overall, 174 (90%) of the plans do not require general pediatricians to be board certified at the time of initial credentialing, and only 41% ever require a general pediatrician to become board certified. Similarly, only 80 (40%) ever require subspecialists to become board certified in their subspecialty. Although 80 of 192 (41%) report requiring recertification of general pediatricians, almost half do not have a time frame in which recertification must occur. Seventy-seven percent of plans allow physicians to bill as subspecialists with expired certificates. CONCLUSIONS: These findings, although specific to pediatrics, likely apply to other primary care disciplines and raise questions regarding the ability of plans to ensure initial or continued competence of their credentialed physicians. Growing public concern regarding patient safety, as well as demonstrated patient preferences for certified physicians, will likely result in greater emphasis on quality assessments in physician credentialing.