Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
; 116(51): 25398-25404, 2019 12 17.
Article
em En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-31772008
ABSTRACT
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a model of evolutionary dynamics with game transitions, where individuals' behaviors together with the games that they play in one time step influence the games to be played in the next time step. Within this model, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations and find a simple rule Weak selection favors cooperation over defection if the ratio of the benefit provided by an altruistic behavior, b, to the corresponding cost, c, exceeds [Formula see text], where k is the average number of neighbors of an individual and [Formula see text] captures the effects of the game transitions. Even if cooperation cannot be favored in each individual game, allowing for a transition to a relatively valuable game after mutual cooperation and to a less valuable game after defection can result in a favorable outcome for cooperation. In particular, small variations in different games being played can promote cooperation markedly. Our results suggest that simple game transitions can serve as a mechanism for supporting prosocial behaviors in highly connected populations.
Palavras-chave
Texto completo:
1
Coleções:
01-internacional
Base de dados:
MEDLINE
Assunto principal:
Comportamento Cooperativo
/
Teoria dos Jogos
/
Modelos Biológicos
Tipo de estudo:
Prognostic_studies
Idioma:
En
Revista:
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Ano de publicação:
2019
Tipo de documento:
Article
País de afiliação:
China