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1.
Washington, D.C; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Mar. 2012. 45 p. ilus.
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-18907
2.
Amsterdam; Greenpeace International; Feb., 2012. 52 p. ilus.
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-18909
3.
Viena; IAEA; 2011. 204 p. tab, graf.(Safety Reports Series, 66).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-18908
4.
In. Rodríguez Vangort, Frances; Garza Salinas, Mario. Memoria del seminario : La nación ante los desastres, retos y oportunidades hacia el siglo XXI. México, D.F, México. Dirección General de Protección Civil;México. Red Mexicana de Estudios Interdiciplinarios para la Protección de Desastres, oct. 1999. p.273-9.
Monografia em Espanhol | Desastres | ID: des-12802

RESUMO

Cuestionamiento de la existencia de riesgo nuclear que presenta la planta nuclear Laguna Verde (LV) en México. Se expone la alta probabilidad de una accidente y por lo tanto, en estas circunstancia pordría pensarse que hay medidas eficaces contempladas para proteger la población, en caso de darse una emergencia nuclear, primero evacuando y después impidiendo la ingestiónd e radioisótopos


Assuntos
Liberação Nociva de Radioativos , Centrais Nucleares , Zona de Risco , México , Medição de Risco , Análise de Vulnerabilidade , Probabilidade
5.
In. UN. International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). Secretariat; Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. Laboratory of Hydraulics, Hydrology and Glaciology.; Versuchsanstalt für Wasserbau, Hydrologie and Glaziologie (VAW). Disaster Resilient infrastructure. Geneve, UN. International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). Secretariat;Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. Laboratory of Hydraulics, Hydrology and Glaciology.;Versuchsanstalt für Wasserbau, Hydrologie and Glaziologie (VAW), 1999. p.77-82, ilus.
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-15200
9.
In. Majumdar, S.K., ed; Forbes, G.S., ed; Miller, E.W., ed; Schmalz, R.F., ed. Natural and technological disasters : Causes, effects and preventive measures. Phillipsburg, New Jersey, <The> Pennsylvania Academy of Science, 1992. p.455-68, tab.
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13722
12.
Vienna; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Apr. 1986. 579 p. ilus, tab.(Proceedings Series).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13729
13.
In. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear facilities. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Apr. 1986. p.3-12, ilus, tab. (Proceedings Series).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13730

RESUMO

After a short review of the Belgian nuclear sector in electricity generation (more than 50


nuclear - about 5450 MW(e)), the fuel cycle industry and research centres, the paper presents the general framework of the response plans (laws and decrees). The paper also describes internal and external emergency plans and the present status of the alert procedure, the important role of the "Co-ordinating Committee", the main protective measures, decision criteria and emergency drills. The levels of responsabilities (local, provincial, national) are also explained. (AU)


Assuntos
Centrais Nucleares , Liberação Nociva de Radioativos , Reatores Nucleares , Planejamento em Desastres , Bélgica , Prevenção e Mitigação , Organização e Administração
14.
In. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear facilities. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Apr. 1986. p.13-26, ilus, tab. (Proceedings Series).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13731

RESUMO

The Finnish concept of off-site nuclear emergency response has reamined vitually constant since 1976, when the first public authoritie's emergency plan was prepared. The first principle is that of remote siting, meaning restrictions on land use within about 5 km from the power plant. In off-sitte emergency planning two zone are applied: (1) for an area within a radius of about 20 km (zone I), a detailed off-site plan is required, including rapid alerting of the population and evacuations if necessary; (2) for the surrounding area, within a radius of about 100 km (zone II), the special requirements imposed by a potential nuclear accident have to be taken into account in the general emergency preparedness planning. The emphasis on contemplated protective measures for the public has shifted somewhat over the years. Earlier, evacuation was seen as the principal course of action and sheltering was considered mainly as precaution while awaiting a decision on evacuation. However, a commissioned study on the significance of evacuation and local sheltering pointed out that the level of sheltering afforded by large stone buildings and cellars is sufficient to reduce significantly the doses received. Consequently, the evacuation capacity could be to those areas where the buildings provide the poorest protection, i.e. summer cottages and wooden houses with no basements. Subsequently the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety undertook a survey of the types of houses and building materials in the environs of the nuclear power plants. Rough estimates of the average protection factors of small houses, small houses cellars and the ground floor of typical apartment houses were made. (AU)


Assuntos
Centrais Nucleares , Liberação Nociva de Radioativos , Reatores Nucleares , Planejamento em Desastres , Políticas Públicas de Saúde , Finlândia , Energia Nuclear , Estratégias Nacionais
15.
In. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear facilities. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Apr. 1986. p.27-34. (Proceedings Series).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13732

RESUMO

The paper presents the general philosophy applied in Yugoslovia to the problem of an emergency caused by nuclear facility; background information on the Yugoslav nuclear energy programme; relevant data on the Yugoslav nuclear power plant; experiences in the light of the recommendations provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its safety documents and specific reports of its missions to Yugoslavia; and finaly legal, organizational, planning and in specific reports of its missions to Yugoslavia; and finally legal, organizational, planning and reviewing aspects of the Civil Protection Organization applying to radiological emergencies at nuclear power plants. (AU)


Assuntos
Centrais Nucleares , Liberação Nociva de Radioativos , Reatores Nucleares , Planejamento em Desastres , Iugoslávia , Legislação , Proteção Civil
16.
In. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear facilities. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Apr. 1986. p.35-41, tab. (Proceedings Series).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13733

RESUMO

Aims, criteria and practices of transfrontier emergency planning for nuclear installations have been studied by a ground of experts convened by the Commission of the European Communities. To this end a compilation was made of relevant information on agreements concerning transfrontier nuclear emergency planning and involving the Member States of the European Communities. There are 17 nuclear installation sites within 25 km of EC Member State borders. Eight of the ten Member States are at present involved in bilateral agreements existing, under negotiation or proposed, with neighbouring states concerning transfrontier emergency planning. The study confirms that the principal objectives of agreements should concern information exchange, co-ordination and equivalence in emergency planning and, possibly, mutual assitance. Relevant financial aspects should also be considered. As far as information exchange is concerned, the study recommends inter alia that all nuclear sites for which emergency notification can be envisaged should be designated behorehand. A formal engagement to notigy the neighbouring state in the event of an accident should be made. Other recommendations concern the type of information to be provided and the communication channels. Co-ordination and equivalence in emergency planning are seen by the stuy as being of mutual advantage to the states concerned. It is recommended that consideration be given to equivalent radiological criteria on both sides of the frontier, to a number of technical aspects related to measurement and assesment, to transfrontier movement of people and equipment, and to public information policies, to transfrontier movement of people and equipment, and to public information policies. Where agreements cover mutual assistance, the guidelines provided by the IAEA are recommended. (AU)


Assuntos
Centrais Nucleares , Liberação Nociva de Radioativos , Reatores Nucleares , Planejamento em Desastres , União Europeia , Planejamento Estratégico , Estratégias Regionais
17.
In. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear facilities. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Apr. 1986. p.57-64. (Proceedings Series).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13735

RESUMO

The Swedish system for nuclear safety adminstration for commercial and research reactors derives from national legislation first introduced by the Nuclear Accident Protection Act in 1960, which includes provisions for responsability and authority concerning off-site emergency planning and preparedness. In Sweden, the National Institute of Radiation Protection has the overhall plannning responsability and the County Boards are responsible for emergency preparedness at the local level. The most important improvements in emergency preparedness have now been implemented: (a)24-hour emergency staff is now available for responsible agencies and bodies; (b) a programme of education and training of the vairous staff categories has been introduced; (c) an organization for prompt area contamination has been created for measurements within a 50 km zone around each site; (d) a telecommunication system has been set up; (e) iodine tablets have been distibuted and information what to do in the event of an alarm has been distributed to the public within a zone of about 15 km around each site; (f) an alert system including both an outdoor alaram system and telephone alarma signals has been implemented. (AU)


Assuntos
Centrais Nucleares , Liberação Nociva de Radioativos , Medidas de Segurança , Planejamento em Desastres , Suíça , Administração de Desastres , Organização e Administração
18.
In. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear facilities. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Apr. 1986. p.65-76, ilus, tab. (Proceedings Series).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13736

RESUMO

The principal problems that face the first Philippine nuclear power plant (PNPP-1) emergency preparedness programme concern the implementation of timely and adequate protective action. The population in the 0-20 km zone may reach over 87000 by the year 2020. The paper discusses the national and local government organizations which will co-ordinate the implementation of protective action and assistance to the communities at risk during a nuclear incident. (AU)


Assuntos
Centrais Nucleares , Liberação Nociva de Radioativos , Planejamento em Desastres , Filipinas , Estratégias Nacionais , Políticas Públicas de Saúde
19.
In. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear facilities. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Apr. 1986. p.77-87. (Proceedings Series).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13737

RESUMO

Nuclear power reactors require on-site and off-site emergency preparedness as well as proper siting and engineered features to protect the health and safety of the public. As a result of the accident at Three Mile Island, it became clear that the protection provided by siting and engineered safety design features must be bolstered by the ability to take protective measures during the course of an accident. As a result of Commission action a final rule containing 16 standards, effective 3 November 1980, was published. It provides that no new operating licence will be granted unless the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NCR) can make a favourable finding that the integration of on-site and off-site emergency planning provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. In the case of an operating reactor, if it is determined that there are such deficiencies that a favourable NCR finding is not warranted and if the deficiencies are not corrected within four months of that determination, the Commission will determine whether the reactor should be shut down or whether some other enforcement action is appropiate. In any case, where the Commission believes that the public health, safety, or interest so requires, the plant will be requires to shut down immediately. Emergency planning considerations must be extended to emergency planning zones, and these shall consist of an are of about 10 miles in radius for exposure to the radioactive plume that might result from an accident in a nuclear power reactor and area of about 50 miles in radius for food that implement their emergency plan, a 'management oversight and risk tree' (MORT) approach was developed and used by NRC appraisal teams at all operating facilities and those close to licensing. Since April 1981, over 250 emergency preparedness exercises have been observed and annual inspections conducted at US commercial nucler power generating facilities. As a results of this experience, licensees have generally progressed from a basic ability to implement their plan to a systematic demonstration of their emergency preparedness capabilities. Almost five years have elapsed since the inception of the upgraded emergency preparedness regulatory programme, and the NCR is evaluating the resources committed to the programme to determine if modifications are appropiate. Our goal is to ensure continued adequate readiness capability to protect the public health and safety in the event of an accident. (AU)


Assuntos
Centrais Nucleares , Planejamento em Desastres , Administração de Desastres , Estados Unidos , Planejamento Estratégico , Políticas Públicas de Saúde
20.
In. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear facilities. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Apr. 1986. p.89-105, ilus, tab. (Proceedings Series).
Monografia em Inglês | Desastres | ID: des-13738

RESUMO

An emergency plan was prepared for minimizing the consequences of any unforeseen radiation accident in Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre (CNAEM) in Istanbul, Turkey. CNAEM is situated near Kücükcekmece Lake, which is about 30 km to the west of Istanbul. It includes two pool-type research reactors of 1 MW(th) and 5 MW(th). The population in the nearest inhabited areas varies from 1000 to 50000. Accidents are classified, according to their severity, into three categories al CNAEM: (a)local emergency, (b)on-site emergency, (c)off-site emergency. During local emergency situations evacuation is not necessary. An on-site emergency situation requires the evacuation of personnel from the plant. Personnel hearing the emergency alarm should move directly to the preselected place as soon as possible. An off-site emergency is any accident that leads to widespread contamination outside the boundary. In this situation the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority and governmental authorities are notified immediately. The emergency organization group consists of: (a)Plant Superintendent, (b)Emergency Director, (c)Reactor Supervisor, (d)Senior Health Physicist, (e)Reactor Shift Operator, (f)Health Physicists. The administration building will be used as the Emergency Control Centre. The emergency teams working under the direction of the Emergency Director consist of: (a)Health Physics, (b)Fire and Rescue, (c) First Aid and Decontamination, (d)Transportation, (e)Security and Patrol. The emergency situation is evaluated in three phases al CNAEM. The first phase is the first few hours after the beginning of the accident. The second phase is between 8-10 hours or more following the first phase. The third phase is the recovery phase. The integrated doses over periods of two hours and two days are calculated according to the situation of the core, i.e. total or patial melting, and weather conditions. The results of the calculated parameters can be adapted to possible accident as reference. (AU)


Assuntos
Liberação Nociva de Radioativos , Centrais Nucleares , Planejamento em Desastres , 34600 , Reatores Nucleares , Medidas de Segurança
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