Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever in Europe: current situation calls for preparedness.

During the last decade Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) emerged and/or re-emerged in several Balkan countries, Turkey, southwestern regions of the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine, with considerable high fatality rates. Reasons for re-emergence of CCHF include climate and anthropogenic factors such as changes in land use, agricultural practices or hunting activities, movement of livestock that may influence host-tick-virus dynamics. In order to be able to design prevention and control measures targeted at the disease, mapping of endemic areas and risk assessment for CCHF in Europe should be completed. Furthermore, areas at risk for further CCHF expansion should be identified and human, vector and animal surveillance be strengthened.

Massive outbreak of viral gastroenteritis associated with consumption of municipal drinking water in a European capital city.

On 24 August 2008, an outbreak alert regarding cases of acute gastroenteritis in Podgorica triggered investigations to guide control measures. From 23 August to 7 September, 1699 cases were reported in Podgorica (population 136 000) and we estimated the total size of the outbreak to be 10 000-15 000 corresponding to an attack rate of approximately 10%. We conducted an age- and neighbourhood-matched case-control study, microbiologically analysed faecal and municipal water samples and assessed the water distribution system. All cases (83/83) and 90% (80/90) [corrected] of controls drank unboiled chlorinated municipal water [matched odds ratio (mOR) 11.2, 95% confidence interval (CI), 1.6-infinity]. Consumption of bottled water was inversely associated with illness (mOR 0.3, 95% CI 0.1-0.8). Analyses of faecal samples identified six norovirus genotypes (21/38 samples) and occasionally other viruses. Multiple defects in the water distribution system were noted. These results suggest that the outbreak was caused by faecally contaminated municipal water. It is unusual to have such a large outbreak in a European city especially when the municipal water supply is chlorinated. Therefore, it is important to establish effective multiple-barrier water-treatment systems whenever possible, but even with an established chlorinated supply, sustained vigilance is central to public health.

Two clusters of human infection with influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Republic of Azerbaijan, February-March 2006.

Following the appearance of influenza A/H5 virus infection in several wild and domestic bird species in the Republic of Azerbaijan in February 2006, two clusters of potential human avian influenza due to A/H5N1 (HAI) cases were detected and reported by the Ministry of Health (MoH) to the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe during the first two weeks of March 2006. On 15 March 2006, WHO led an international team, including infection control, clinical management, epidemiology, laboratory, and communications experts, to support the MoH in investigation and response activities. As a result of active surveillance, 22 individuals, including six deaths, were evaluated for HAI and associated risk infections in six districts. The investigations revealed eight cases with influenza A/H5N1 virus infection confirmed by a WHO Collaborating Centre for Influenza and one probable case for which samples were not available. The cases were in two unrelated clusters in Salyan (seven laboratory confirmed cases, including four deaths) and Tarter districts (one confirmed case and one probable case, both fatal). Close contact with and de-feathering of infected wild swans was considered to be the most plausible source of exposure to influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Salyan cluster, although difficulties in eliciting information were encountered during the investigation, because of the illegality of some of the activities that might have led to the exposures (hunting and trading in wild birds and their products). These cases constitute the first outbreak worldwide where wild birds were the most likely source of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection in humans. The rapid mobilisation of resources to contain the spread of influenza A/H5 in the two districts was achieved through collaboration between the MoH, WHO and its international partners. Control activities were supported by the establishment of a field laboratory with real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) capacity to detect influenza A/H5 virus. Daily door-to-door surveillance undertaken in the two affected districts made it unlikely that human cases of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection remained undetected.

Two clusters of human infection with influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Republic of Azerbaijan, February-March 2006.

Following the appearance of influenza A/H5 virus infection in several wild and domestic bird species in the Republic of Azerbaijan in February 2006, two clusters of potential human avian influenza due to A/H5N1 (HAI) cases were detected and reported by the Ministry of Health (MoH) to the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe during the first two weeks of March 2006. On 15 March 2006, WHO led an international team, including infection control, clinical management, epidemiology, laboratory, and communications experts, to support the MoH in investigation and response activities. As a result of active surveillance, 22 individuals, including six deaths, were evaluated for HAI and associated risk infections in six districts. The investigations revealed eight cases with influenza A/H5N1 virus infection confirmed by a WHO Collaborating Centre for Influenza and one probable case for which samples were not available. The cases were in two unrelated clusters in Salyan (seven laboratory confirmed cases, including four deaths) and Tarter districts (one confirmed case and one probable case, both fatal). Close contact with and de-feathering of infected wild swans was considered to be the most plausible source of exposure to influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Salyan cluster, although difficulties in eliciting information were encountered during the investigation, because of the illegality of some of the activities that might have led to the exposures (hunting and trading in wild birds and their products). These cases constitute the first outbreak worldwide where wild birds were the most likely source of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection in humans. The rapid mobilisation of resources to contain the spread of influenza A/H5 in the two districts was achieved through collaboration between the MoH, WHO and its international partners. Control activities were supported by the establishment of a field laboratory with real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) capacity to detect influenza A/H5 virus. Daily door-to-door surveillance undertaken in the two affected districts made it unlikely that human cases of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection remained undetected.

[Multiple Ebola virus haemorrhagic fever outbreaks in Gabon, from October 2001 to April 2002]. / Plusieurs epidémies de fièvre hémorragique due au virus Ebola au Gabon, d'octobre 2001 a avril 2002.

Outbreaks of Ebola virus haemorrhagic fever have been reported from 1994 to 1996 in the province of Ogooué Ivindo, a forest zone situated in the Northeast of Gabon. Each time, the great primates had been identified as the initial source of human infection. End of November 2001 a new alert came from this province, rapidly confirmed as a EVHV outbreak. The response was given by the Ministry of Health with the help of an international team under the aegis of WHO. An active monitoring system was implemented in the three districts hit by the epidemic (Zadié, Ivindo and Mpassa) to organize the detection of cases and their follow-up. A case definition has been set up, the suspected cases were isolated at hospital, at home or in lazarets and serological tests were performed. These tests consisted of the detection of antigen or specific IgG and the RT-PCR. A classification of cases was made according to the results of biological tests, clinical and epidemiological data. The contact subjects were kept watch over for 21 days. 65 cases were recorded among which 53 deaths. The first human case, a hunter died on the 28th of October 2001. The epidemic spreads over through family transmission and nosocomial contamination. Four distinct primary foci have been identified together with an isolated case situated in the South East of Gabon, 580 km away from the epicenter. Deaths happened within a delay of 6 days. The last death has been recorded on the 22nd of March 2002 and the end of the outbreak was declared on the 6th of May 2002. The epidemic spreads over the Gabon just next. Unexplained deaths of animals had been mentionned in the nearby forests as soon as August 2001: great primates and cephalophus. Samples taken from their carcasses confirmed a concomitant animal epidemic.

Euthanasia: from the perspective of HIV infected persons in Europe.

BACKGROUND: In the debate about legalization of euthanasia very little attention has so far been given to the opinion of the patient. OBJECTIVE: To assess the opinion of persons with HIV infection in Europe. METHODS: A cross-sectional survey of persons with HIV infection attending HIV/AIDS treatment centres or HIV support organizations in 11 European Union Member States was performed. A total of 2751 anonymous patient self-administered questionnaires were distributed between August 1996 and September 1997. The questionnaire contained 108 questions concerning a variety of topics about HIV care, including five questions on euthanasia. RESULTS: One thousand three hundred and seventy-one people with HIV infection completed the questionnaire, of whom 1341 (98%) responded to the questions concerning euthanasia. Seventy-eight percent of respondents agreed with the legalization of euthanasia in case of severe physical suffering, 47% if there was severe psychological suffering and 24% simply at the patient's request. For physical suffering and at a clear patient's request, accepted practices were: alleviation of pain with double effect (81%), medical euthanasia (62%) and physician assisted suicide (45%). Fifty percent would consider euthanasia for themselves if all treatment options were exhausted. Social indicators such as educational level and employment seemed to play a more significant role in determining attitudes towards legalization, and personal interest in, euthanasia than indicators related to disease status. CONCLUSION: In this study a majority of HIV infected persons in Europe favoured the legalization of euthanasia.

Receiving a positive HIV test result: the experience of patients in Europe.

OBJECTIVE: To describe HIV-infected people's experience of the HIV test procedure in Europe. METHODS: Between August 1996 and September 1997, anonymous self-administered questionnaires were distributed to HIV-infected people in 11 European countries. RESULTS: A total of 1366 people completed the questionnaire (50% response rate). Of these, 194 (16%) had more than five negative HIV tests before being diagnosed as HIV positive, 179 (14%) were tested without consent and 192 (15%) were informed about the HIV positive test result by mail or by telephone. Of the 963 people who received a positive test result during a consultation, 247 (26%) reported that this visit lasted less than 10 min, 336 (35%) between 10 and 20 min, and 289 (30%) more than 20 min. Over half the total respondents (591, 54%) felt they did not receive adequate support when they were informed about being HIV positive, with 249 (19%) experiencing feelings of rejection. People who were diagnosed as HIV positive after 1994 reported more frequently receiving adequate support, information and understanding when the positive test result was revealed compared with those diagnosed before 1990. CONCLUSION: A large number of our study participants did not endorse the way HIV tests were conducted and positive test results revealed. Although there was an improvement over time in the way HIV tests were conducted, they often did not conform to international guidelines.

Primary care involvement in human immune deficiency virus infection-a pan-European view. The Eurosupport Study Group.

OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to compare the primary care experiences of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-positive individuals across Europe. METHODS: An anonymous self-administered questionnaire study was carried out between August 1996 and August 1997. A total of 15 HIV/AIDS treatment centres and 14 HIV support organizations in 11 European countries participated in the distribution of questionnaires. Overall, 1366 completed questionnaires were included in the analysis from a total of 2751 distributed (50% response rate). The majority of respondents were homosexual men (53.6%), and 54.2% had AIDS or symptomatic HIV disease. The main outcome measures were use of GP services in the preceding 6 months, GP involvement in HIV care provision, satisfaction with current service provision and reasons for non-involvement of the primary care services. RESULTS: Most patients (64.8%) had visited their GP at least once in the preceding 6 months, but 53.9% of respondents reported that their GP was not involved in their HIV care. Of these patients, 53.4% would like their GP to be involved. Patients from central European countries were more likely to have seen their GP than their counterparts from northern and southern countries (P < 0.005), and were less worried that the GP would not have enough knowledge about HIV (P = 0.002) or would not be sympathetic (P = 0.052). CONCLUSIONS: There are clear differences in GP utilization by HIV-positive individuals across Europe, reflecting in part local service provision but primarily patients' attitudes and beliefs. Strategies to promote the involvement of primary health care services need to address patients' core beliefs, if these are to be changed.