Does self-construal shape automatic social attention?

We examined whether activating independent or interdependent self-construal modulates attention shifting in response to group gaze cues. European Canadians (Study 1) and East Asian Canadians (Study 2) primed with independence vs. interdependence completed a multi-gaze cueing task with a central face gazing left or right, flanked by multiple background faces that either matched or mismatched the direction of the foreground gaze. Results showed that European Canadians (Study 1) mostly ignored background gaze cues and were uninfluenced by the self-construal primes. However, East Asian Canadians (Study 2), who have cultural backgrounds relevant to both independence and interdependence, showed different attention patterns by prime: those primed with interdependence were more distracted by mismatched (vs. matched) background gaze cues, whereas there was no change for those primed with independence. These findings suggest activating an interdependent self-construal modulates social attention mechanisms to attend broadly, but only for those who may find these representations meaningful.

The Embodied God: Core Intuitions About Person Physicality Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God, the Holy Spirit, and Jesus.

Why are disembodied extraordinary beings like gods and spirits prevalent in past and present theologies? Under the intuitive Cartesian dualism hypothesis, this is because it is natural to conceptualize of minds as separate from bodies; under the counterintuitiveness hypothesis, this is because beliefs in minds without bodies are unnatural-such beliefs violate core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and consequently have a social transmission advantage. We report on a critical test of these contrasting hypotheses. Prior research found that among adult Christian religious adherents, intuitions about person psychology coexist and interfere with theological conceptualizations of God (e.g., infallibility). Here, we use a sentence verification paradigm where participants are asked to evaluate as true or false statements on which core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and psychology and Christian theology about God are inconsistent (true on one and false on the other) versus consistent (both true or both false). We find, as predicted by the counterintuitiveness hypothesis but not the Cartesian dualism hypothesis, that Christian religious adherents show worse performance (lower accuracy and slower response time) on statements where Christian theological doctrines about God's physicality (e.g., incorporeality, omnipresence) conflict with intuitions about person physicality. We find these effects for other extraordinary beings in Christianity-the Holy Spirit and Jesus-but not for an ordinary being (priest). We conclude that it is unintuitive to conceptualize extraordinary beings as disembodied, and that this, rather than inherent Cartesian dualism, may explain the prevalence of beliefs in such beings.

Explaining age-related decline in theory of mind: Evidence for intact competence but compromised executive function.

Previous studies suggest theory of mind (ToM) ability declines with age. However, prior tasks not only required ToM competence but also imposed high executive function (EF) demands, so decline in ToM ability could be caused by deterioration in ToM competence, EF, or both. It was predicted that if the elderly have intact ToM competence but compromised EF, then they should perform similarly to younger adults when using ToM tasks that lower executive demands, such as spontaneous-response tasks. Results showed that on tasks with reduced demands, older adults tracked belief to the same extent as younger adults, despite their declining EF. The findings support a model in which age-related decline in ToM ability is primarily caused by compromised EF, not ToM competence, suggesting that underlying ToM mechanisms are still intact in the elderly. We discuss implications of this work for competence-performance issues in ToM processing and the underlying sources of age-related deterioration of ToM.

Automatic Mechanisms for Social Attention Are Culturally Penetrable.

Are mechanisms for social attention influenced by culture? Evidence that social attention is triggered automatically by bottom-up gaze cues and is uninfluenced by top-down verbal instructions may suggest it operates in the same way everywhere. Yet considerations from evolutionary and cultural psychology suggest that specific aspects of one's cultural background may have consequence for the way mechanisms for social attention develop and operate. In more interdependent cultures, the scope of social attention may be broader, focusing on more individuals and relations between those individuals. We administered a multi-gaze cueing task requiring participants to fixate a foreground face flanked by background faces and measured shifts in attention using eye tracking. For European Americans, gaze cueing did not depend on the direction of background gaze cues, suggesting foreground gaze alone drives automatic attention shifting; for East Asians, cueing patterns differed depending on whether the foreground cue matched or mismatched background cues, suggesting foreground and background gaze information were integrated. These results demonstrate that cultural background influences the social attention system by shifting it into a narrow or broad mode of operation and, importantly, provides evidence challenging the assumption that mechanisms underlying automatic social attention are necessarily rigid and impenetrable to culture.

The interactive toxicity of cadmium, copper, and zinc to Ceriodaphnia dubia and rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss).

Traditionally, aquatic toxicity studies examine the toxicity of a single chemical to an organism. Organisms in nature, however, may be exposed to multiple toxicants. Given this is a more realistic exposure scenario in situ, the authors sought to understand the interactive toxicity of multiple metals to aquatic organisms. The authors performed a series of studies using equitoxic mixtures of cadmium, copper, and zinc to 2 aquatic organisms, rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) and the waterflea, Ceriodaphnia dubia. Single metal toxicity tests were conducted to determine the acute median lethal concentration (LC50) values for O. mykiss and short-term, chronic median effective concentration (EC50) values for C. dubia. All 3 metals were then combined in equitoxic concentrations for subsequent mixture studies using a toxic unit (TU) approach (i.e., 1 TU = EC50 or LC50). For C. dubia, the mixture study showed greater-than-additive effects in hard water (TU-based EC50 = 0.74 TU), but less-than-additive effects in soft water (TU-based EC50 = 1.93 TU). The mixture effects for O. mykiss showed less-than-additive effects in both hard and soft waters, with TU-based LC50 values of 2.33 total TU and 2.22 total TU, respectively. These data are useful in helping understand metal mixture toxicity in aquatic systems and indicate that although in most situations the assumption of additivity of metal mixture toxicity is valid, under certain conditions it may not be sufficiently protective.

Specialized mechanisms for theory of mind: are mental representations special because they are mental or because they are representations?

Does theory of mind depend on a capacity to reason about representations generally or on mechanisms selective for the processing of mental state representations? In four experiments, participants reasoned about beliefs (mental representations) and notes (non-mental, linguistic representations), which according to two prominent theories are closely matched representations because both are represented propositionally. Reaction times were faster and accuracies higher when participants endorsed or rejected statements about false beliefs than about false notes (Experiment 1), even when statements emphasized representational format (Experiment 2), which should have favored the activation of representation concepts. Experiments 3 and 4 ruled out a counterhypothesis that differences in task demands were responsible for the advantage in belief processing. These results demonstrate for the first time that understanding of mental and linguistic representations can be dissociated even though both may carry propositional content, supporting the theory that mechanisms governing theory of mind reasoning are narrowly specialized to process mental states, not representations more broadly. Extending this theory, we discuss whether less efficient processing of non-mental representations may be a by-product of mechanisms specialized for processing mental states.

A cue-based approach to 'theory of mind': re-examining the notion of automaticity.

The potential utility of a distinction between 'automatic (or spontaneous) and implicit' versus 'controlled and explicit' processes in theory of mind (ToM) is undercut by the fact that the terms can be employed to describe different but related distinctions within cognitive systems serving that function. These include distinctions in the underlying cognitive systems, processes, or representations involved in ToM, distinctions among methodologies or task procedures used to measure ToM, and distinctions among behavioural signatures evaluated as evidence for the engagement of ToM. We propose an approach in which rather than continued dispute over whether or not ToM 'is' or 'is not' automatic, researchers focus instead on discovering what the range of stimulus conditions and task contexts are that give rise to various signatures of the ToM system. These input-output relations will constrain theorizing about the kinds of representations employed, the types of processing operating over those representations, and the overall architecture of ToM mechanisms.

A reaction time advantage for calculating beliefs over public representations signals domain specificity for 'theory of mind'.

In a task where participants' overt task was to track the location of an object across a sequence of events, reaction times to unpredictable probes requiring an inference about a social agent's beliefs about the location of that object were obtained. Reaction times to false belief situations were faster than responses about the (false) contents of a map showing the location of the object (Experiment 1) and about the (false) direction of an arrow signaling the location of the object (Experiment 2). These results are consistent with developmental, neuro-imaging and neuropsychological evidence that there exist domain specific mechanisms within human cognition for encoding and reasoning about mental states. Specialization of these mechanisms may arise from either core cognitive architecture or via the accumulation of expertise in the social domain.

Encoding of others' beliefs without overt instruction.

Under what conditions do people automatically encode and track the mental states of others? A recent investigation showed that when subjects are instructed to track the location of an object but are not instructed to track a belief about that location in a non-verbal false-belief task, they respond more slowly to questions about an agent's belief, suggesting that belief information was not encoded or tracked automatically [Apperly, I. A., Riggs, K. J., Simpson, A., Samson, D., & Chiavarino, C. (2006). Is belief reasoning automatic? Psychological Science, 17, 841-844]. In the current experiments, we show that if belief probes occur closer in time to the events that signal the content of the agent's false belief, responses to those probes are faster than responses to probes about reality, and as fast as responses to probes about belief when instructed to track them, suggesting (i) beliefs may get encoded automatically in response to certain cues and (ii) that belief information rapidly decays unless it is maintained via 'top-down' instructions.

Orbitofrontal volume deficit in schizophrenia and thought disorder.

Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC) structural abnormality in schizophrenia has not been well characterized, probably due to marked anatomical variability and lack of consistent definitions. We previously reported OFC sulcogyral pattern alteration and its associations with social disturbance in schizophrenia, but OFC volume associations with psychopathology and cognition have not been investigated. We compared chronically treated schizophrenia patients with healthy control (HC) subjects, using a novel, reliable parcellation of OFC subregions and their association with cognition, especially the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), and with schizophrenic psychopathology including thought disorder. Twenty-four patients with schizophrenia and 25 age-matched HC subjects underwent MRI. OFC Regions of Interest (ROI) were manually delineated according to anatomical boundaries: Gyrus Rectus (GR); Middle Orbital Gyrus (MiOG); and Lateral Orbital Gyrus (LOG). The OFC sulcogyral pattern was also classified. Additionally, MiOG probability maps were created and compared between groups in a voxel-wise manner. Both groups underwent cognitive evaluations using the IGT, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, and Trail Making Test (TMT). An 11% bilaterally smaller MiOG volume was observed in schizophrenia, compared with HC (F(1,47) = 17.4, P = 0.0001). GR and LOG did not differ, although GR showed a rightward asymmetry in both groups (F(1,47) = 19.2, P < 0.0001). The smaller MiOG volume was independent of the OFC sulcogyral pattern, which differed in schizophrenia and HC (chi2 = 12.49, P = 0.002). A comparison of MiOG probability maps suggested that the anterior heteromodal region was more affected in the schizophrenia group than the posterior paralimbic region. In the schizophrenia group, a smaller left MiOG was strongly associated with worse 'positive formal thought disorder' (r = -0.638, P = 0.001), and a smaller right MiOG with a longer duration of the illness (r = -0.618, P = 0.002). While schizophrenics showed poorer performance than HC in the IGT, performance was not correlated with OFC volume. However, within the HC group, the larger the right hemisphere MiOG volume, the better the performance in the IGT (r = 0.541, P = 0.005), and the larger the left hemisphere volume, the faster the switching attention performance for the TMT, Trails B (r = -0.608, P = 0.003). The present study, applying a new anatomical parcellation method, demonstrated a subregion-specific OFC grey matter volume deficit in patients with schizophrenia, which was independent of OFC sulcogyral pattern. This volume deficit was associated with a longer duration of illness and greater formal thought disorder. In HC the finding of a quantitative association between OFC volume and IGT performance constitutes, to our knowledge, the first report of this association.