How old is old in allegations of age discrimination? The limitations of existing law.

Under Title VII, courts may give a mixed motive instruction allowing jurors to determine that defendants are liable for discrimination if an illegal factor (here: race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) contributed to an adverse decision. Recently, the Supreme Court held that to conclude that an employer discriminated against a worker because of age, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, requires "but for" causality, necessitating jurors to find that age was the determinative factor in an employer's adverse decision regarding that worker. Using a national online sample (N = 392) and 2 study phases, 1 to measure stereotypes, and a second to present experimental manipulations, this study tested whether older worker stereotypes as measured through the lens of the Stereotype Content Model, instruction type (but for vs. mixed motive causality), and plaintiff age influenced mock juror verdicts in an age discrimination case. Decision modeling in Phase 2 with 3 levels of case orientation (i.e., proplaintiff, prodefendant, and neutral) showed that participants relied on multiple factors when making a decision, as opposed to just 1, suggesting that mock jurors favor a mixed model approach to discrimination verdict decisions. In line with previous research, instruction effects showed that mock jurors found in favor of plaintiffs under mixed motive instructions but not under "but for" instructions especially for older plaintiffs (64- and 74-year-old as opposed to 44- and 54-year-old-plaintiffs). Most importantly, in accordance with the Stereotype Content Model theory, competence and warmth stereotypes moderated the instruction effects found for specific judgments. The results of this study show the importance of the type of legal causality required for age discrimination cases. (PsycINFO Database Record

Differences in the eyes of the beholders: The roles of subjective and objective judgments in sexual harassment claims.

In 2 studies, we found support for current sexual harassment jurisprudence. Currently, the courts use a 2-prong test to determine the viability of a sexual harassment claim: that the adverse treatment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of employment based on a protected class from the perspective of the individual complainant (subjective prong) and from the perspective of a reasonable person (objective prong). In Experiment 1, trained male undergraduate research assistants administered sequential objectifying gazes and comments to undergraduate female research participants. We found that the pervasive objectification delivered by multiple men (compared with 1 man) did not elicit more negative emotion or harm the experiencers' task performance, although it did lead them to make increased judgments of sexual harassment. In Experiment 2, observers (who viewed a recording of an experiencer's interactions with the male research assistants) and predictors (who read a protocol describing the facts of the interaction) anticipated the female targets would experience negative emotions, show impaired performance, as well as find more evidence in the interaction of sexual harassment. Observers' judgments mirrored those of the experiencers' while predictors' judgments demonstrated affective forecasting errors. Predictors were more likely to anticipate more negative emotion, worse performance, and greater likelihood of sexual harassment. Overall, these studies demonstrate the impact and importance of considering perceptions of sexual harassment from multiple perspectives and viewpoints. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Influence of a Juvenile's Abuse History on Support for Sex Offender Registration.

We investigated whether and how a juvenile's history of experiencing sexual abuse affects public perceptions of juvenile sex offenders in a series of 5 studies. When asked about juvenile sex offenders in an abstract manner (Studies 1 and 2), the more participants (community members and undergraduates) believed that a history of being sexually abused as a child causes later sexually abusive behavior, the less likely they were to support sex offender registration for juveniles. Yet when participants considered specific sexual offenses, a juvenile's history of sexual abuse was not considered to be a mitigating factor. This was true when participants considered a severe sexual offense (forced rape; Study 3 and Study 4) and a case involving less severe sexual offenses (i.e., statutory rape), when a juvenile's history of sexual abuse backfired and was used as an aggravating factor, increasing support for registering the offender (Study 3 and Study 5). Theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.

Predictors of support for juvenile sex offender registration: educated individuals recognize the flaws of juvenile registration.

We investigated demographic predictors of support for juvenile sex offender registration policies, including education level, gender, political orientation, and age. Participants were 168 individuals recruited from public places in a Midwest community (45% women; M age = 42). In line with hypotheses, as education level increased, support for juvenile registration decreased, as did the belief that juvenile registration protects the community. In addition, as education level increased, belief that the juvenile understood his actions decreased, as did support for juvenile registration when it is framed as ineffective at reducing sex crime. These beliefs mediated the relationship between education level and diminished support for juvenile registration. Implications of these results for the advancement of effective juvenile sex offender policy are discussed.