Reduced emergent character of neural dynamics in patients with a disrupted connectome.

High-level brain functions are widely believed to emerge from the orchestrated activity of multiple neural systems. However, lacking a formal definition and practical quantification of emergence for experimental data, neuroscientists have been unable to empirically test this long-standing conjecture. Here we investigate this fundamental question by leveraging a recently proposed framework known as "Integrated Information Decomposition," which establishes a principled information-theoretic approach to operationalise and quantify emergence in dynamical systems - including the human brain. By analysing functional MRI data, our results show that the emergent and hierarchical character of neural dynamics is significantly diminished in chronically unresponsive patients suffering from severe brain injury. At a functional level, we demonstrate that emergence capacity is positively correlated with the extent of hierarchical organisation in brain activity. Furthermore, by combining computational approaches from network control theory and whole-brain biophysical modelling, we show that the reduced capacity for emergent and hierarchical dynamics in severely brain-injured patients can be mechanistically explained by disruptions in the patients' structural connectome. Overall, our results suggest that chronic unresponsiveness resulting from severe brain injury may be related to structural impairment of the fundamental neural infrastructures required for brain dynamics to support emergence.

Distributed harmonic patterns of structure-function dependence orchestrate human consciousness.

A central question in neuroscience is how consciousness arises from the dynamic interplay of brain structure and function. Here we decompose functional MRI signals from pathological and pharmacologically-induced perturbations of consciousness into distributed patterns of structure-function dependence across scales: the harmonic modes of the human structural connectome. We show that structure-function coupling is a generalisable indicator of consciousness that is under bi-directional neuromodulatory control. We find increased structure-function coupling across scales during loss of consciousness, whether due to anaesthesia or brain injury, capable of discriminating between behaviourally indistinguishable sub-categories of brain-injured patients, tracking the presence of covert consciousness. The opposite harmonic signature characterises the altered state induced by LSD or ketamine, reflecting psychedelic-induced decoupling of brain function from structure and correlating with physiological and subjective scores. Overall, connectome harmonic decomposition reveals how neuromodulation and the network architecture of the human connectome jointly shape consciousness and distributed functional activation across scales.

The complexity of the stream of consciousness.

Typical consciousness can be defined as an individual-specific stream of experiences. Modern consciousness research on dynamic functional connectivity uses clustering techniques to create common bases on which to compare different individuals. We propose an alternative approach by combining modern theories of consciousness and insights arising from phenomenology and dynamical systems theory. This approach enables a representation of an individual's connectivity dynamics in an intrinsically-defined, individual-specific landscape. Given the wealth of evidence relating functional connectivity to experiential states, we assume this landscape is a proxy measure of an individual's stream of consciousness. By investigating the properties of this landscape in individuals in different states of consciousness, we show that consciousness is associated with short term transitions that are less predictable, quicker, but, on average, more constant. We also show that temporally-specific connectivity states are less easily describable by network patterns that are distant in time, suggesting a richer space of possible states. We show that the cortex, cerebellum and subcortex all display consciousness-relevant dynamics and discuss the implication of our results in forming a point of contact between dynamical systems interpretations and phenomenology.

Whole-brain modelling identifies distinct but convergent paths to unconsciousness in anaesthesia and disorders of consciousness.

The human brain entertains rich spatiotemporal dynamics, which are drastically reconfigured when consciousness is lost due to anaesthesia or disorders of consciousness (DOC). Here, we sought to identify the neurobiological mechanisms that explain how transient pharmacological intervention and chronic neuroanatomical injury can lead to common reconfigurations of neural activity. We developed and systematically perturbed a neurobiologically realistic model of whole-brain haemodynamic signals. By incorporating PET data about the cortical distribution of GABA receptors, our computational model reveals a key role of spatially-specific local inhibition for reproducing the functional MRI activity observed during anaesthesia with the GABA-ergic agent propofol. Additionally, incorporating diffusion MRI data obtained from DOC patients reveals that the dynamics that characterise loss of consciousness can also emerge from randomised neuroanatomical connectivity. Our results generalise between anaesthesia and DOC datasets, demonstrating how increased inhibition and connectome perturbation represent distinct neurobiological paths towards the characteristic activity of the unconscious brain.

Network dynamics scale with levels of awareness.

Small world topologies are thought to provide a valuable insight into human brain organisation and consciousness. However, functional magnetic resonance imaging studies in consciousness have not yielded consistent results. Given the importance of dynamics for both consciousness and cognition, here we investigate how the diversity of small world dynamics (quantified by sample entropy; dSW-E1) scales with decreasing levels of awareness (i.e., sedation and disorders of consciousness). Paying particular attention to result reproducibility, we show that dSW-E is a consistent predictor of levels of awareness even when controlling for the underlying functional connectivity dynamics. We find that dSW-E of subcortical, and cortical areas are predictive, with the former showing higher and more robust effect sizes across analyses. We find that the network dynamics of intermodular communication in the cerebellum also have unique predictive power for levels of awareness. Consequently, we propose that the dynamic reorganisation of the functional information architecture, in particular of the subcortex, is a characteristic that emerges with awareness and has explanatory power beyond that of the complexity of dynamic functional connectivity.

Preserved fractal character of structural brain networks is associated with covert consciousness after severe brain injury.

Self-similarity is ubiquitous throughout natural phenomena, including the human brain. Recent evidence indicates that fractal dimension of functional brain networks, a measure of self-similarity, is diminished in patients diagnosed with disorders of consciousness arising from severe brain injury. Here, we set out to investigate whether loss of self-similarity is observed in the structural connectome of patients with disorders of consciousness. Using diffusion MRI tractography from N = 11 patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS), N = 10 patients diagnosed with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS), and N = 20 healthy controls, we show that fractal dimension of structural brain networks is diminished in DOC patients. Remarkably, we also show that fractal dimension of structural brain networks is preserved in patients who exhibit evidence of covert consciousness by performing mental imagery tasks during functional MRI scanning. These results demonstrate that differences in fractal dimension of structural brain networks are quantitatively associated with chronic loss of consciousness induced by severe brain injury, highlighting the close connection between structural organisation of the human brain and its ability to support cognitive function.

Dopaminergic brainstem disconnection is common to pharmacological and pathological consciousness perturbation.

Clinical research into consciousness has long focused on cortical macroscopic networks and their disruption in pathological or pharmacological consciousness perturbation. Despite demonstrating diagnostic utility in disorders of consciousness (DoC) and monitoring anesthetic depth, these cortico-centric approaches have been unable to characterize which neurochemical systems may underpin consciousness alterations. Instead, preclinical experiments have long implicated the dopaminergic ventral tegmental area (VTA) in the brainstem. Despite dopaminergic agonist efficacy in DoC patients equally pointing to dopamine, the VTA has not been studied in human perturbed consciousness. To bridge this translational gap between preclinical subcortical and clinical cortico-centric perspectives, we assessed functional connectivity changes of a histologically characterized VTA using functional MRI recordings of pharmacologically (propofol sedation) and pathologically perturbed consciousness (DoC patients). Both cohorts demonstrated VTA disconnection from the precuneus and posterior cingulate (PCu/PCC), a main default mode network node widely implicated in consciousness. Strikingly, the stronger VTA-PCu/PCC connectivity was, the more the PCu/PCC functional connectome resembled its awake configuration, suggesting a possible neuromodulatory relationship. VTA-PCu/PCC connectivity increased toward healthy control levels only in DoC patients who behaviorally improved at follow-up assessment. To test whether VTA-PCu/PCC connectivity can be affected by a dopaminergic agonist, we demonstrated in a separate set of traumatic brain injury patients without DoC that methylphenidate significantly increased this connectivity. Together, our results characterize an in vivo dopaminergic connectivity deficit common to reversible and chronic consciousness perturbation. This noninvasive assessment of the dopaminergic system bridges preclinical and clinical work, associating dopaminergic VTA function with macroscopic network alterations, thereby elucidating a critical aspect of brainstem-cortical interplay for consciousness.

Fractal dimension of cortical functional connectivity networks & severity of disorders of consciousness.

Recent evidence suggests that the quantity and quality of conscious experience may be a function of the complexity of activity in the brain and that consciousness emerges in a critical zone between low and high-entropy states. We propose fractal shapes as a measure of proximity to this critical point, as fractal dimension encodes information about complexity beyond simple entropy or randomness, and fractal structures are known to emerge in systems nearing a critical point. To validate this, we tested several measures of fractal dimension on the brain activity from healthy volunteers and patients with disorders of consciousness of varying severity. We used a Compact Box Burning algorithm to compute the fractal dimension of cortical functional connectivity networks as well as computing the fractal dimension of the associated adjacency matrices using a 2D box-counting algorithm. To test whether brain activity is fractal in time as well as space, we used the Higuchi temporal fractal dimension on BOLD time-series. We found significant decreases in the fractal dimension between healthy volunteers (n = 15), patients in a minimally conscious state (n = 10), and patients in a vegetative state (n = 8), regardless of the mechanism of injury. We also found significant decreases in adjacency matrix fractal dimension and Higuchi temporal fractal dimension, which correlated with decreasing level of consciousness. These results suggest that cortical functional connectivity networks display fractal character and that this is associated with level of consciousness in a clinically relevant population, with higher fractal dimensions (i.e. more complex) networks being associated with higher levels of consciousness. This supports the hypothesis that level of consciousness and system complexity are positively associated, and is consistent with previous EEG, MEG, and fMRI studies.

Consciousness-specific dynamic interactions of brain integration and functional diversity.

Prominent theories of consciousness emphasise different aspects of neurobiology, such as the integration and diversity of information processing within the brain. Here, we combine graph theory and dynamic functional connectivity to compare resting-state functional MRI data from awake volunteers, propofol-anaesthetised volunteers, and patients with disorders of consciousness, in order to identify consciousness-specific patterns of brain function. We demonstrate that cortical networks are especially affected by loss of consciousness during temporal states of high integration, exhibiting reduced functional diversity and compromised informational capacity, whereas thalamo-cortical functional disconnections emerge during states of higher segregation. Spatially, posterior regions of the brain's default mode network exhibit reductions in both functional diversity and integration with the rest of the brain during unconsciousness. These results show that human consciousness relies on spatio-temporal interactions between brain integration and functional diversity, whose breakdown may represent a generalisable biomarker of loss of consciousness, with potential relevance for clinical practice.

A hierarchy of event-related potential markers of auditory processing in disorders of consciousness.

Functional neuroimaging of covert perceptual and cognitive processes can inform the diagnoses and prognoses of patients with disorders of consciousness, such as the vegetative and minimally conscious states (VS;MCS). Here we report an event-related potential (ERP) paradigm for detecting a hierarchy of auditory processes in a group of healthy individuals and patients with disorders of consciousness. Simple cortical responses to sounds were observed in all 16 patients; 7/16 (44%) patients exhibited markers of the differential processing of speech and noise; and 1 patient produced evidence of the semantic processing of speech (i.e. the N400 effect). In several patients, the level of auditory processing that was evident from ERPs was higher than the abilities that were evident from behavioural assessment, indicating a greater sensitivity of ERPs in some cases. However, there were no differences in auditory processing between VS and MCS patient groups, indicating a lack of diagnostic specificity for this paradigm. Reliably detecting semantic processing by means of the N400 effect in passively listening single-subjects is a challenge. Multiple assessment methods are needed in order to fully characterise the abilities of patients with disorders of consciousness.

Concurrent brain responses to separate auditory and visual targets.

In the attentional blink, a target event (T1) strongly interferes with perception of a second target (T2) presented within a few hundred milliseconds. Concurrently, the brain's electromagnetic response to the second target is suppressed, especially a late negative-positive EEG complex including the traditional P3 wave. An influential theory proposes that conscious perception requires access to a distributed, frontoparietal global workspace, explaining the attentional blink by strong mutual inhibition between concurrent workspace representations. Often, however, the attentional blink is reduced or eliminated for targets in different sensory modalities, suggesting a limit to such global inhibition. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we confirm that visual and auditory targets produce similar, distributed patterns of frontoparietal activity. In an attentional blink EEG/MEG design, however, an auditory T1 and visual T2 are identified without mutual interference, with largely preserved electromagnetic responses to T2. The results suggest parallel brain responses to target events in different sensory modalities.

Thalamo-frontal connectivity mediates top-down cognitive functions in disorders of consciousness.

OBJECTIVE: We employed functional MRI (fMRI) to assess whether (1) patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) retain the ability to willfully engage in top-down processing and (2) what neurophysiologic factors distinguish patients who can demonstrate this ability from patients who cannot. METHODS: Sixteen volunteers, 8 patients in vegetative state (VS), 16 minimally conscious patients (MCS), and 4 exit from MCS (eMCS) patients were enrolled in a prospective cross-sectional fMRI study. Participants performed a target detection task in which they counted the number of times a (changing) target word was presented amidst a set of distractors. RESULTS: Three of 8 patients diagnosed as being in a VS exhibited significant activations in response to the task, thereby demonstrating a state of consciousness. Differential activations across tasks were also observed in 6 MCS patients and 1 eMCS patient. A psycho-physiologic interaction analysis revealed that the main factor distinguishing patients who responded to the task from those who did not was a greater connectivity between the anterior section of thalamus and prefrontal cortex. CONCLUSIONS: In our sample of patients, the dissociation between overt behavior observable in clinical assessments and residual cognitive faculties is prevalent among DOC patients (37%). A substantial number of patients, including some diagnosed with VS, can demonstrate willful engagement in top-down cognition. While neuroimaging data are not the same as observable behavior, this suggests that the mental status of some VS patients exceeds what can be appreciated clinically. Furthermore, thalamo-frontal circuits might be crucial to sustaining top-down functions.

Spectral signatures of reorganised brain networks in disorders of consciousness.

Theoretical advances in the science of consciousness have proposed that it is concomitant with balanced cortical integration and differentiation, enabled by efficient networks of information transfer across multiple scales. Here, we apply graph theory to compare key signatures of such networks in high-density electroencephalographic data from 32 patients with chronic disorders of consciousness, against normative data from healthy controls. Based on connectivity within canonical frequency bands, we found that patient networks had reduced local and global efficiency, and fewer hubs in the alpha band. We devised a novel topographical metric, termed modular span, which showed that the alpha network modules in patients were also spatially circumscribed, lacking the structured long-distance interactions commonly observed in the healthy controls. Importantly however, these differences between graph-theoretic metrics were partially reversed in delta and theta band networks, which were also significantly more similar to each other in patients than controls. Going further, we found that metrics of alpha network efficiency also correlated with the degree of behavioural awareness. Intriguingly, some patients in behaviourally unresponsive vegetative states who demonstrated evidence of covert awareness with functional neuroimaging stood out from this trend: they had alpha networks that were remarkably well preserved and similar to those observed in the controls. Taken together, our findings inform current understanding of disorders of consciousness by highlighting the distinctive brain networks that characterise them. In the significant minority of vegetative patients who follow commands in neuroimaging tests, they point to putative network mechanisms that could support cognitive function and consciousness despite profound behavioural impairment.

Dissociable endogenous and exogenous attention in disorders of consciousness.

Recent research suggests that despite the seeming inability of patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states to generate consistent behaviour, some might possess covert awareness detectable with functional neuroimaging. These findings motivate further research into the cognitive mechanisms that might support the existence of consciousness in these states of profound neurological dysfunction. One of the key questions in this regard relates to the nature and capabilities of attention in patients, known to be related to but distinct from consciousness. Previous assays of the electroencephalographic P300 marker of attention have demonstrated its presence and potential clinical value. Here we analysed data from 21 patients and 8 healthy volunteers collected during an experimental task designed to engender exogenous or endogenous attention, indexed by the P3a and P3b components, respectively, in response to a pair of word stimuli presented amongst distractors. Remarkably, we found that the early, bottom-up P3a and the late, top-down P3b could in fact be dissociated in a patient who fitted the behavioural criteria for the vegetative state. In juxtaposition with healthy volunteers, the patient's responses suggested the presence of a relatively high level of attentional abilities despite the absence of any behavioural indications thereof. Furthermore, we found independent evidence of covert command following in the patient, as measured by functional neuroimaging during tennis imagery. Three other minimally conscious patients evidenced non-discriminatory bottom-up orienting, but no top-down engagement of selective attentional control. Our findings present a persuasive case for dissociable attentional processing in behaviourally unresponsive patients, adding to our understanding of the possible levels and applications of consequent conscious awareness.

Perceptual load affects exogenous spatial orienting while working memory load does not.

We examined whether or not increasing visual perceptual load or visual working memory (WM) load would affect the exogenous orienting of visuo-spatial attention, in order to assess whether or not exogenous orienting is genuinely automatic. In Experiment 1, we manipulated visual perceptual load by means of a central morphing shape that in some trials morphed into a particular target shape (a rectangle) that participants had to detect. In Experiment 2, the possibility that the presentation of any changing stimulus at fixation would eliminate exogenous orienting was ruled out, by presenting two alternating letters at fixation. In Experiment 3, we manipulated visual WM load by means of arrays consisting of three (low-load) or five (high-load) randomly located coloured squares. The participants had to remember these items in order to judge whether a cued square had been presented in the same or different colour at the end of each trial. In all the experiments, exogenous visuo-spatial attentional orienting was measured by means of an orthogonal spatial cuing task, in which the participants had to discriminate the elevation (up vs. down) of a visual target previously cued by a spatially nonpredictive visual cue. The results showed that increasing the perceptual load of the task eliminated the exogenous orienting of visuo-spatial attention. By contrast, increasing the WM load had no effect on spatial orienting. These results are discussed in terms of the light that they shed on claims regarding the automaticity of visuo-spatial exogenous orienting.