Incentivizing free riders improves collective intelligence in social dilemmas.

Collective intelligence challenges are often entangled with collective action problems. For example, voting, rating, and social innovation are collective intelligence tasks that require costly individual contributions. As a result, members of a group often free ride on the information contributed by intrinsically motivated people. Are intrinsically motivated agents the best participants in collective decisions? We embedded a collective intelligence task in a large-scale, virtual world public good game and found that participants who joined the information system but were reluctant to contribute to the public good (free riders) provided more accurate evaluations, whereas participants who rated frequently underperformed. Testing the underlying mechanism revealed that a negative rating bias in free riders is associated with higher accuracy. Importantly, incentivizing evaluations amplifies the relative influence of participants who tend to free ride without altering the (higher) quality of their evaluations, thereby improving collective intelligence. These results suggest that many of the currently available information systems, which strongly select for intrinsically motivated participants, underperform and that collective intelligence can benefit from incentivizing free riding members to engage. More generally, enhancing the diversity of contributor motivations can improve collective intelligence in settings that are entangled with collective action problems.

Composing games into complex institutions.

Game theory is used by all behavioral sciences, but its development has long centered around the economic interpretation of equilibrium outcomes in relatively simple games and toy systems. But game theory has another potential use: the high-level design of large game compositions that express complex architectures and represent real-world institutions faithfully. Compositional game theory, grounded in the mathematics underlying programming languages, and introduced here as a general computational framework, increases the parsimony of game representations with abstraction and modularity, accelerates search and design, and helps theorists across disciplines express real-world institutional complexity in well-defined ways. Relative to existing approaches in game theory, compositional game theory is especially promising for solving game systems with long-range dependencies, for comparing large numbers of structurally related games, and for nesting games into the larger logical or strategic flows typical of real world policy or institutional systems.

Institutional similarity drives cultural similarity among online communities.

Human organizations are driven by their rules and cultures. But the effects of rules and cultures on organizational development cannot be understood without untangling their effects on each other. People's values are contingent on how they have been enculturated within organizations. Conversely, their values may influence the organizations they join, particularly in online community settings, where users have thousands of organizations to choose from and exert selection pressure in favor of communities with favorable rules. Using longitudinal data on the rules systems of thousands of online communities, as well as the traffic of millions of users between them, we use techniques from network science to disentangle the relationship between cultural assimilation and institutional assimilation. We find that institutional similarities in administrative rules and informational rules drive cultural similarities. We discuss implications of these findings for research on organizational evolution, institution and culture, and the use of tracking data in organizational studies.

Quantifying the Selective, Stochastic, and Complementary Drivers of Institutional Evolution in Online Communities.

Institutions and cultures usually evolve in response to environmental incentives. However, sometimes institutional change occurs due to stochastic drivers beyond current fitness, including drift, path dependency, blind imitation, and complementary cooperation in fluctuating environments. Disentangling the selective and stochastic components of social system change enables us to identify the key features of long-term organizational development. Evolutionary approaches provide organizational science with abundant theories to demonstrate organizational evolution by tracking beneficial or harmful features. In this study, focusing on 20,000 Minecraft communities, we measure these drivers empirically using two of the most widely applied evolutionary models: the Price equation and the bet-hedging model. As a result, we find strong selection pressure on administrative and information rules, suggesting that their positive correlation with community fitness is the main reason for their frequency change. We also find that stochastic drivers decrease the average frequency of administrative rules. The result makes sense when viewed in the context of evolutionary bet-hedging. We show through the bet-hedging result that institutional diversity contributes to the growth and stability of rules related to information, communication, and economic behaviors.

A dynamic over games drives selfish agents to win-win outcomes.

Understanding human institutions, animal cultures and other social systems requires flexible formalisms that describe how their members change them from within. We introduce a framework for modelling how agents change the games they participate in. We contrast this between-game 'institutional evolution' with the more familiar within-game 'behavioural evolution'. We model institutional change by following small numbers of persistent agents as they select and play a changing series of games. Starting from an initial game, a group of agents trace trajectories through game space by navigating to increasingly preferable games until they converge on 'attractor' games. Agents use their 'institutional preferences' for game features (such as stability, fairness and efficiency) to choose between neighbouring games. We use this framework to pose a pressing question: what kinds of games does institutional evolution select for; what is in the attractors? After computing institutional change trajectories over the two-player space, we find that attractors have disproportionately fair outcomes, even though the agents who produce them are strictly self-interested and indifferent to fairness. This seems to occur because game fairness co-occurs with the self-serving features these agents do actually prefer. We thus present institutional evolution as a mechanism for encouraging the spontaneous emergence of cooperation among small groups of inherently selfish agents, without space, reputation, repetition, or other more familiar mechanisms. Game space trajectories provide a flexible, testable formalism for modelling the interdependencies of behavioural and institutional evolutionary processes, as well as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.

Emergence of integrated institutions in a large population of self-governing communities.

Most aspects of our lives are governed by large, highly developed institutions that integrate several governance tasks under one authority structure. But theorists differ as to the mechanisms that drive the development of such concentrated governance systems from rudimentary beginnings. Is the emergence of integrated governance schemes a symptom of consolidation of authority by small status groups? Or does integration occur because a complex institution has more potential responses to a complex environment? Here we examine the emergence of complex governance regimes in 5,000 sovereign, resource-constrained, self-governing online communities, ranging in scale from one to thousands of users. Each community begins with no community members and no governance infrastructure. As communities grow, they are subject to selection pressures that keep better managed servers better populated. We identify predictors of community success and test the hypothesis that governance complexity can enhance community fitness. We find that what predicts success depends on size: changes in complexity predict increased success with larger population servers. Specifically, governance rules in a large successful community are more numerous and broader in scope. They also tend to rely more on rules that concentrate power in administrators, and on rules that manage bad behavior and limited server resources. Overall, this work is consistent with theories that formal integrated governance systems emerge to organize collective responses to interdependent resource management problems, especially as factors such as population size exacerbate those problems.

The rippling dynamics of valenced messages in naturalistic youth chat.

Even though human behavior is largely driven by real-time feedback from others, this social complexity is underrepresented in psychological theory, largely because it is so difficult to isolate. In this work, we performed a quasi-experimental analysis of hundreds of millions of chat room messages between young people. This allowed us to reconstruct how-and on what timeline-the valence of one message affects the valence of subsequent messages by others. For the highly emotionally valenced chat messages that we focused on, we found that these messages elicited a general increase of 0.1 to 0.4 messages per minute. This influence started 2 s after the original message and continued out to 60 s. Expanding our focus to include feedback loops-the way a speaker's chat comes back to affect him or her-we found that the stimulating effects of these same chat events started rippling back from others 8 s after the original message, to cause an increase in the speaker's chat that persisted for up to 8 min. This feedback accounted for at least 1% of the bulk of chat. Additionally, a message's valence affects its dynamics, with negative events feeding back more slowly and continuing to affect the speaker longer. By reconstructing the second-by-second dynamics of many psychosocial processes in aggregate, we captured the timescales at which they collectively ripple through a social system to drive system-level outcomes.

Synergistic Information Processing Encrypts Strategic Reasoning in Poker.

There is a tendency in decision-making research to treat uncertainty only as a problem to be overcome. But it is also a feature that can be leveraged, particularly in social interaction. Comparing the behavior of profitable and unprofitable poker players, we reveal a strategic use of information processing that keeps decision makers unpredictable. To win at poker, a player must exploit public signals from others. But using public inputs makes it easier for an observer to reconstruct that player's strategy and predict his or her behavior. How should players trade off between exploiting profitable opportunities and remaining unexploitable themselves? Using a recent multivariate approach to information theoretic data analysis and 1.75 million hands of online two-player No-Limit Texas Hold'em, we find that the important difference between winning and losing players is not in the amount of information they process, but how they process it. In particular, winning players are better at integrative information processing-creating new information from the interaction between their cards and their opponents' signals. We argue that integrative information processing does not just produce better decisions, it makes decision-making harder for others to reverse engineer, as an expert poker player's cards act like the private key in public-key cryptography. Poker players encrypt their reasoning with the way they process information. The encryption function of integrative information processing makes it possible for players to exploit others while remaining unexploitable. By recognizing the act of information processing as a strategic behavior in its own right, we offer a detailed account of how experts use endemic uncertainty to conceal their intentions in high-stakes competitive environments, and we highlight new opportunities between cognitive science, information theory, and game theory.

Cyclic game dynamics driven by iterated reasoning.

Recent theories from complexity science argue that complex dynamics are ubiquitous in social and economic systems. These claims emerge from the analysis of individually simple agents whose collective behavior is surprisingly complicated. However, economists have argued that iterated reasoning--what you think I think you think--will suppress complex dynamics by stabilizing or accelerating convergence to Nash equilibrium. We report stable and efficient periodic behavior in human groups playing the Mod Game, a multi-player game similar to Rock-Paper-Scissors. The game rewards subjects for thinking exactly one step ahead of others in their group. Groups that play this game exhibit cycles that are inconsistent with any fixed-point solution concept. These cycles are driven by a "hopping" behavior that is consistent with other accounts of iterated reasoning: agents are constrained to about two steps of iterated reasoning and learn an additional one-half step with each session. If higher-order reasoning can be complicit in complex emergent dynamics, then cyclic and chaotic patterns may be endogenous features of real-world social and economic systems.

Reciprocity on the hardwood: passing patterns among professional basketball players.

Past theory and research view reciprocal resource sharing as a fundamental building block of human societies. Most studies of reciprocity dynamics have focused on trading among individuals in laboratory settings. But if motivations to engage in these patterns of resource sharing are powerful, then we should observe forms of reciprocity even in highly structured group environments in which reciprocity does not clearly serve individual or group interests. To this end, we investigated whether patterns of reciprocity might emerge among teammates in professional basketball games. Using data from logs of National Basketball Association (NBA) games of the 2008-9 season, we estimated a series of conditional logistic regression models to test the impact of different factors on the probability that a given player would assist another player in scoring a basket. Our analysis found evidence for a direct reciprocity effect in which players who had "received" assists in the past tended to subsequently reciprocate their benefactors. Further, this tendency was time-dependent, with the probability of repayment highest soon after receiving an assist and declining as game time passed. We found no evidence for generalized reciprocity - a tendency to "pay forward" assists - and only very limited evidence for indirect reciprocity - a tendency to reward players who had sent others many assists. These findings highlight the power of reciprocity to shape human behavior, even in a setting characterized by extensive planning, division of labor, quick decision-making, and a focus on inter-group competition.